

**PROGRESS REPORT
OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON THE
CAUSES AND PREVENTION
OF VIOLENCE
TO
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON**

JANUARY 9, 1969

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Introduction

Mr. President, your charge to this Commission was, in your words, "simple and direct." It was also demanding. You said:

I ask you to undertake a penetrating search for the causes and prevention of violence—a search into our national life, our past as well as our present, our traditions as well as our institutions, our culture, our customs and our laws.

We submit this progress report not as the mature product of our deliberations, with findings and recommendations, but rather as a first look at the multifaceted problem of violence in our nation.

This report will tell you how we have conducted, and are continuing to conduct, our search into the causes and prevention of violence. The organized research effort that we have mounted under your auspices is one which has never before been made in the area of violence by a single entity on a comparable scale.

Our labor is far from finished, and we offer no final judgments or conclusions at this time: the contents of this report are entirely tentative in nature and subject to later revision in light of fuller consideration. But we can at least share with you some of the knowledge we have gained about violence, and we can reaffirm our commitment to carry on our work in a manner consistent with your trust.

Violence In America Today

The people of America are deeply concerned about violence. They have seen a President struck down by an assassin's bullet, and then seen the assassin himself slain while in police custody. They have seen other assassinations of national figures, and none more devastating than the killings earlier this year, first of a major leader of the civil rights movement, and then of the brother of the dead President.

Americans have seen smoke and flames rising over the skylines of their cities as civil disorder has spread across their land—holocausts of rioting, looting, firebombing, and death—a pattern of disorder and destruction repeated in city after city.

Americans have seen students disrupt classes, seize buildings and destroy property at institutions of learning. They have seen young people confronting police at the Pentagon and at draft induction centers across the country. They have seen them heckling, vilifying and even physically abusing public officials. They have heard them shouting obscenities and the strident rhetoric of revolution.

Americans have also come to know the fear of violent crime. They know that robberies and assaults have increased sharply in the last few years. They know that only a small fraction of all such crimes is solved.

For many Americans this is the sum and substance of violence.

But many Americans see additional kinds of violence. They see the violence of overseas war. At home, they see the violence of terrorist murders of civil rights workers, of four little black girls bombed to death in a Sunday school class, the violence of police dogs, fire hoses and cattle prods; others see "violence" in discrimination and deprivation, disease, hunger, and rats. They see the violence of capital punishment, of slaughter on the highways, of movies, of radio and television programs, of some professional sports.

In the minds of some Americans all these different sorts of violence overlap. To some, the scourge of rats excuses robberies and riots. To others, the Vietnam War justifies attacks on Selective Service facilities. Others say looting justifies shooting those who seek to escape arrest.

We as a Commission must take into account all these kinds of violence. There are, of course, moral, social, and legal distinctions which can and must be drawn among the different kinds of violence. We cannot intelligently make these vital distinctions by studying only what we would personally regard as "illegitimate" violence. We have thus had to find a vantage point from which we can see all the forms of violence and their causes in a perspective broader than that of our individual day-to-day concerns.

Violence In Perspective

Man, said Aristotle, is a social animal. Man's ability to create social order has enabled him to embrace for human purposes the challenges and opportunities of the environment. The condition of social order came in time to be known as the state, and the rules of its maintenance, the law.

But interwoven in human history with the strand of social order and cooperative behavior is the strand of violence. From *Genesis* and the *Iliad* to this morning's newspaper, the story of civilization has also included the story of man's violence toward other men.

Historically men have not acted on the principle that all violence is to be avoided. Our nation is no exception. Like all others, our society has recognized some uses of violence as necessary and legitimate and some as unacceptable and illegitimate.

All societies must draw moral and legal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate violence. One traditional and vital function of social order, of the state and its laws, has been to determine in particular cases when violence is legitimate (as in self-defense, discipline of children, maintenance of public order or war against an enemy) and when it is illegitimate (as in violent crime, civil disorder, rebellion or treason).

History records a persistence of challenge to any given social order's determinations of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of violence—sometimes by other social orders, sometimes by individuals within the social order. To most of our forefathers and to virtually all of us today, for example, the American revolution was an act of courage, patriotism, and honor. To most of the English at that time, however, it was treason and revolution. Even the phenomenon of assassination is subject to this relativity of values: our judgment of the wartime plot to murder Hitler is utterly different from our reaction to the murder of the Head of State in our own open and democratic society.

There is, therefore, no universal agreement on a definition of the term "violence" which makes it mean something that is always to be condemned. For purposes of commencing our study, we have defined "violence" simply as the threat or use of force that results, or is intended to result, in the injury or forcible restraint or intimidation of persons, or the destruction or forcible seizure of property.

There is no implicit value judgment in this definition. The maintenance of law and order falls within it, for a policeman may find it necessary in the course of duty to threaten or use force, even to injure or kill an individual. Wars are included within this definition, as is some punishment of children. It also includes police brutality, the violence of the Nazis, and the physical abuse of a child.

This definition has important implications for our understanding of the causes and prevention of the illegitimate violence that our society condemns. For example, it helps us to recognize that illegitimate violence, like most deviant behavior, is on a continuum with and dynamically similar to legitimate violence. The parent who spans a child may be engaging in legitimate violence, but for the parent to break the child's arm would be illegitimate violence.

A neutral definition of violence also helps us to recognize that some minimum level of illegitimate violence is to be expected in a free and rapidly changing industrial society. Maintaining a system of law enforcement capable of eliminating all illegitimate individual and group violence might so increase the level of legitimate violence that the harm to other values would be intolerable. A totalitarian police state, however efficient its use of violence might be in preserving order, would destroy the freedom of all.

The elimination of all violence in a free society is impossible. But the better control of illegitimate violence in our democratic society is an urgent imperative, and one within our means to accomplish.

These observations return us to a basic point about violence. Violence is but one facet of man living with his fellow men. Throughout history men have sought to control violence, to institutionalize it and to regulate the forms it takes, to make some forms of violence serve their collective needs and desires and to place other forms of violence beyond the pale. Violence becomes sharply separated into the basic categories of "legitimate" and "illegitimate" primarily in the context of a particular human society or cultural tradition.

Man's effort to control violence has been one part, a major part, of his learning to live in society. The phenomenon of violence cannot be understood or evaluated except in the context of that larger effort.

The wisdom of your mandate to us, Mr. President, is confirmed: this Commission's study of violence in contemporary America must, if it is to reach meaningful conclusions, include the study of American society itself, past and present, and the traditions and institutions which accept or condemn the various forms that violence takes in our society.

The National Commission

In planning our work we have thus acted on the premise that to reach an understanding of the social context of contemporary domestic violence, we must conduct a broad-ranging inquiry into many seemingly unrelated subjects. Aware of the dangers of an over-ambitious

approach, we have nonetheless concluded that this broad inquiry is the only way to achieve an appropriate perspective on violence in America and a national consensus about the means of its control. That is our task, and our effort must be commensurate with it.

We wish we could promise solutions to all of the problems of illegitimate violence. We cannot. There is no simple answer to the problem of illegitimate violence: no single explanation of its causes, and no single prescription for its control.

The phenomena of illegitimate violence—from robbery to murder, from civil disorder to larger conflicts, from child abuse to suicide—are enormously complicated.

An awesome complexity is concealed in such simple questions as who is violent, when, why, under what conditions, and with what consequences. Recognizing this complexity, however, may well be the first step toward understanding—and toward convincing the American people that they must be uncommonly thoughtful, open-minded, and persevering if the challenge of illegitimate violence in our society is to be met.

Accordingly, we have divided our research work into seven basic areas of detailed inquiry. We have created a staff Task Force to conduct the research effort and produce a staff report in each area. Our Task Forces are:

- (1) **Task Force on Historical and Comparative Perspectives.** An overview of the causes, processes and consequences of violence in American history and in other societies.
- (2) **Task Force on Group Violence.** An analysis of the nature and causes of the violence accompanying contemporary student unrest, opposition to overseas war, and racial militancy, together with a consideration of the responses of social and political institutions to these phenomena.
- (3) **Task Force on Individual Acts of Violence.** A study of the patterns of violent crime and other individual acts of violence and of the role of biological, psychological, and socio-cultural factors.
- (4) **Task Force on Assassination.** A world-wide study of violence directed toward politically prominent persons.
- (5) **Task Force on Firearms.** An investigation of the role of firearms in accidents, suicides and crime, and an evaluation of alternative systems of firearms control.
- (6) **Task Force on the Media.** An investigation of the effects of media portrayals of violence upon the public and of the role of the mass media in the process of violent and non-violent social change.
- (7) **Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement.** An assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of our system of justice, and of the steps that can be taken to increase respect for the rule of law.

The dimensions of the research are suggested by the fact that the personnel of the Task Forces and the central staff numbers approximately 70, and that more than 140 research projects and special analyses have been undertaken for the Task Forces by outside experts and scholars.

In addition to these seven basic Task Forces, an eighth Task Force, consisting of a number of Study Teams, has been investigating recent violent events on which no other adequate factual record has yet been made. The reports of these Teams become part of the research base of the relevant Task Forces and ultimately of the Commission itself.

While the work of the Task Forces has been proceeding, the Commission has met almost weekly, has studied scores of reports and articles, and has held a series of hearings and conferences in which we received the views of more than 150 public officials, scholars, experts, religious leaders and private citizens. The testimony and discussions have been valuable; from them we have gained a deeper understanding of attitudes and motivations than we would otherwise have had.

Themes of Challenge

Attached to this progress report is a staff memorandum describing the work of our Task Forces in carrying out the research assignments we have set forth. The final reports of our Task Forces are now becoming available for study by the Commission along with other materials. We will present our final conclusions and recommendations in the spring of the year. Meanwhile, however, from preliminary reports, testimony, and consultation, we have identified certain themes of challenge for the leaders and the people of America. Among these are the following:

First: As we have noted, not all violence in our society is illegitimate. Indeed, a major function of society is the organization and legitimation of violence in the interest of maintaining society itself. Unfortunately, however, the existence of legitimate violence—from a shooting in lawful self-defense through international violence in the form of warfare—sometimes provides rationalization for those who would achieve ends or express grievances through illegitimate violence.

Second: Violence by some individuals may result in part from a deranged mind or abnormal biological make-up. Experts agree, however, that most persons who commit violence—criminal or noncriminal—are basically no different from others, and their behavior is the result of the complex interaction of their biology and life experience. Scholars observe that man has no instinct or trait born within that directs aggression in a specific way. He does have, from birth, the potential for violence. He also has the capacity for creative, constructive activity and for the rejection of violence. Insofar as life experience teaches individuals violence, the incidence of violence is subject to modification, control, and prevention through conscious changes in man's environment.

Third: Historically, when groups or individuals have been unable to attain the quality of life to which they believe they are entitled, the resulting discontent and anger have often culminated in violence. Violent protest today—from middle-class students to the inhabitants of the black ghettos and the white ghettos—has occurred in part because the protesters believe that they cannot make their demands felt effectively through normal, approved channels and that "the system," for whatever reasons, has become unresponsive to them.

Fourth: Progress in meeting the demands of those seeking social change does not always reduce the level of violence. It may cause those who feel threatened by change to engage in counter-violence against those seeking to shift the balance. And the pace of change may be slower and more uneven than the challenging group is willing to tolerate. We see these social

forces at work in our country today. After several decades of rapid social change, we have better housing, education, medical care and career opportunities for most groups in our society than at any time in the past. Nonetheless, these advances have been uneven, and what we have so far achieved falls short of the needs or expectations of many. Impatience is felt on all sides, and our social order is subjected to escalated demands both from those who desire greater stability and from those who desire greater social change.

Fifth: The key to much of the violence in our society seems to lie with the young. Our youth account for an ever-increasing percentage of crime, greater than their increasing percentage of the population. The thrust of much of the group protest and collective violence—on the campus, in the ghettos, in the streets—is provided by our young people. It may be here, with tomorrow's generation, that much of the emphasis of our studies and the national response should lie.

Sixth: The existence of a large number of firearms in private hands and a deep-seated tradition of private firearms ownership are complicating factors in the task of social control of violence.

Seventh: Additional complications arise from the high visibility of both violence and social inequalities, resulting from the widespread impact of mass communications media. The powerful impact of the media may aggravate the problems of controlling violence; on the other hand, the media may be one of our most useful social agents for explaining all elements of our society to one another and achieving a consensus as to the need for social change that may help to reduce levels of violence.

Eighth: Social control of violence through law depends in large measure on the perceived legitimacy of the law and the society it supports. Persons tend to obey the law when the groups with which they identify disapprove those who violate it. Group attitudes about lawful behavior depend, in turn, on the group's views of the justice provided by the legal order and of the society which created it. The justice and decency of the social order thus are not simply desirable embellishments. On the contrary, a widespread conviction of the essential justice and decency of the social order is an indispensable condition of civil peace in a free society.

Ninth: Our system of criminal justice suffers from an under-investment of resources at every level—police, courts and corrections. Partly because of this accumulated deficit, the criminal justice system is neither as strong nor as fair as it should be—and consequently it has failed to control illegitimate violence as well as it should.

Tenth: The social control of violence does not depend merely on the conduct of those who attack or defend the social order. It depends also on the attitudes, cooperation, and commitments of the community—of our political, religious, educational, and other social institutions and of citizens in every walk of life. Violence in our society affects us all. Its more effective control requires the active engagement and commitment of every citizen.

Steps Toward Control

Facing these challenges, we as a nation have been taking important additional steps to improve the ability of our social order to control violence. Previous commissions and study groups which you appointed, Mr. President, have provided much of the knowledge the nation needs to move ahead. Fundamental contributions have already been made by the President's

Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Moreover, acting in response to your initiatives, the Congress has begun to lay the legislative foundation for effective action on a number of fronts critical to the complex problem of violence.

Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides the groundwork for substantial research and financial assistance in aid of local law enforcement. The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act will stimulate and support expansion of youth opportunity and youth rehabilitation programs. The Gun Control Act of 1968 makes a necessary contribution to effective firearms control. The Model Cities Act, the Housing Act of 1968, the Civil Rights enactments of recent years and the employment program of the National Alliance of Businessmen have accelerated the process of social change believed necessary to remove some of the causes of violence in our midst.

All these measures are important steps along the road to a more peaceful, prosperous and equitable society. They confirm the judgment of the Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice that the Nation can, if it will, take steps to control crime and other forms of violence. Much more, of course, remains to be done. We hope the work of our Commission will make an equally significant contribution toward the completion of this unfinished task.

Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower
Chairman
Judge A. Leon Higginbotham
Vice Chairman
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Ambassador Patricia Harris
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The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence today released the Progress Report which it submitted to President Johnson January 9, 1969.

Dr. Milton S. Eisenhower, Chairman of the Commission, stated: "This Report describes the progress that the Commission and its research staff have made in assessing the problem of violence in America. During the next few months we shall study the research data and findings and develop our conclusions. This Report, therefore, contains no recommendations, but it does include a brief analysis of the dimensions and complexity of the problems we are examining."

Attached to the Commission's Progress Report is a staff memorandum signed by Lloyd N. Cutler, Executive Director of the Commission, which describes in detail the scope of the studies being conducted by the Commission's seven research Task Forces, and the current status of their work.

The Commission was established by President Johnson on June 10, 1968 "to undertake a penetrating search for the causes and prevention of violence -- a search into our national life, our past as well as our present, our traditions as well as our institutions, our culture, our customs and our laws."

The Commission is required to complete its Final Report before June 10, 1969.

MEMORANDUM

for

THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION

This memorandum describes the scope of the studies being conducted by the Commission's seven research Task Forces, and the current status of their work.

The full reports of the Task Forces will be available for consideration by the Commission during January and February. The attached memorandum is intended only to describe the problems which the Task Forces are examining and their methods of attack. It contains no conclusions or recommendations, and sets forth only the minimum factual data necessary for a thoughtful discussion of the subject.

Lloyd N. Cutler
Executive Director

January 9, 1969

Attachment:
Chapters I-VII

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I. HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

In periods of great social stress, when the demands of opposing groups seem beyond peaceful reconciliation, there is a tendency to conclude that the times have never been so bad. History suggests that many past generations have expressed this same sentiment about the America of their day, and that our nation has experienced many upheavals of the most violent sort.

There are useful lessons in our history. By studying antecedents and counterparts, we can learn a good deal about the causes of violence, and how to cope with violence and with the conditions that bring it about.

The Task Force on Historical and Comparative Perspectives is seeking to provide a general framework in which we can interpret contemporary violence. This Task Force is under the joint direction of Hugh Davis Graham, Associate Professor of History at Johns Hopkins University, and Ted Gurr, Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton University. It has commissioned a number of significant studies. Some of these identify specific aspects of American history and character that have contributed to our present conditions. Others assess the American experience with violence and compare it with that of other nations. A number analyze general patterns of the historical causes, processes, and consequences of resort to violence.

The studies of the Task Force suggest that two general themes have provided motivation and justification for group violence in American history: (1) progressive demands for change by groups that have felt themselves excluded from a fair share of the social, economic and political privileges of the majority; and (2) defensive responses by groups whose members felt their ways and conditions of life threatened by these demands. Progressive and defensive sentiments for and against change have not always led to violence. Violence seems to have been a consequence of the intensity with which those sentiments were felt, the availability of nonviolent means of achieving change, and the extent of the threat perceived by those resisting change.

"Progressive" demands have led to violence in several instances, particularly involving workers and ethnic groups.

Labor violence was chronic in the United States for over half a century, from the 1870's to the 1930's, and has been sporadic in more recent decades. It appears to have reached its peak early in the 20th Century. In some instances—as in the railroad strike of 1877 and the Colorado mining strikes of 1913-14—it exceeded in pervasiveness and intensity the recent violence within the city ghetto. Violence was initiated on some occasions by workers, on others by employers or by the forces of public order. Violence occurred most frequently during periods when strikes, picketing and other forms of protest or economic pressure were regarded as illegal; it diminished as the legality of such activities became defined and accepted, and as governmental rules of conciliation and adjustment were devised and brought into use.

Ethnic and religious violence has also occurred frequently in the United States, involving the Irish, Italians, Orientals, and—far most consequentially—Negroes. Only in the last decade, however, has it become common for such ethnic groups to initiate violent conflict. Historically the violence resulted when groups farther up the socioeconomic ladder resisted the peaceful upward progress of particular ethnic and religious groups toward higher positions in the social order. Those who felt threatened by the prospect of the new immigrant or the Negro getting "too big" and "too close" resorted to defensive violence.

Defensive sentiments are almost inextricably interwoven in most group violence in American history. The demands of workers, immigrants, and Negroes were usually expressed in violence only when other groups violently resisted satisfaction of their demands. Our studies suggest that at least three outstanding examples of substantially defensive violence can be identified—those of farmers, vigilantes, and employers.

Agrarian protests and uprisings have characterized both frontier and settled regions since before the Revolution. They have been a blend of both progressive and defensive sentiments, including demands for land reform, defense against more powerful economic interests, and relief from onerous political restrictions. Some major examples include Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts, 1786-1787, Fries' Rebellion in eastern Pennsylvania, 1799, some of the activities of the Grangers, Greenbackers, and Farmers' Alliance after the Civil War; and the "Green Corn Rebellion" of Oklahoma farmers during World War I.

Vigilantism has been a recurrent defensive response of middle- and working-class Americans to threats to their security. The most widely-known manifestations have been the frontier tradition of citizen enforcement of the law and Ku Klux Klan efforts to maintain class lines and their moral code by taking their version of the law into their own hands. Less well known were the "Regulators" of pre-Revolutionary South Carolina, the Bald Knobbers of the Missouri Ozarks in the late 1880's, and the nation-wide activities of the White Cap movement of the 1880's and 1890's, a spontaneous movement for the moral regulation of the poor whites and ne'er-do-wells of rural America. There are many other manifestations of vigilantism as well; no region and few historical eras have been entirely free of it.

As noted earlier, much labor violence in American history occurred as a result of violent resistance by employers to worker organization and demands. Apart from the assistance they received from troops and police upholding the laws of the times against strikes, boycotts and picketing, employers repeatedly resorted to private coercive and sometimes terroristic activities against union organizers and to violent strike-breaking tactics. Whether company resistance and violence provoked or merely responded to violence by workers, it led in many situations to an escalating spiral of violent conflict to the point of mutual exhaustion.

Comparative studies of levels and characteristics of civil strife in the United States and other countries have been developed in recent years, and have been analyzed by the Task Force. They suggest that in the past five years the United States has experienced strife of greater intensity and greater duration than all but a few other Western democracies. For the purpose of this cross-national comparison, the term "civil strife" includes all collective protests, legal or illegal under the applicable national law, violent or non-violent in their consequences. Three general levels of civil strife are distinguished. The lowest level is "turmoil"—relatively spontaneous, partially organized or unorganized strife with substantial popular participation and limited objectives. The middle level is "conspiracy"—intensively organized strife with limited participation but with terroristic or revolutionary objectives. The highest level is "internal war"—intensively organized strife with widespread participation, almost always accompanied by extensive and intensive violence and directed at the overthrow of political regimes. The studies suggest the following:

1. In roughly comparable 5-year periods during the 1960's,* about 11 of every thousand Americans took part in civil strife, almost all of it at the turmoil level, compared with an average of seven per thousand in 17 other Western democracies. Six of these 17 had higher rates of participation than the United States, including Belgium, France, and Italy. About 9,500 injuries including some deaths resulted from American strife. This is a rate of 48 per million population, compared with an average of 12 per million in other Western nations. In total magnitude of civil strife, measured by these factors, plus the total duration of strife, the United States ranks first among the 17 Western democracies.

2. Civil strife in the United States has been much less disruptive than in many non-Western countries, however. Most American civil strife has consisted of lawful protest with relatively non-violent consequences. For example, the nation has experienced no internal wars since the Civil War

*The periods are June 1963 through May 1968 for the United States, and 1961-1965 for the other Western democracies.

and almost none of the chronic revolutionary conspiracy and terrorism that plague dozens of other nations. Although about 220 Americans died in violent civil strife in the past five years, the rate of 1.1 per million population is infinitesimal compared with the world-wide average of 238 deaths per million. These differences reflect the comparative evidence that from a world-wide perspective Americans, with few exceptions, have not organized for collective violence. Most demonstrators and rioters are protesting, not rebelling. If there were many serious revolutionaries in the United States, levels of collective violence would be much higher than they are. However, the tumult of the United States contrasts unfavorably with the relative domestic tranquility of developed democratic nations like Sweden, Great Britain, and Australia, or with the comparable current tranquility of nations as diverse as Yugoslavia, Turkey, Jamaica, or Malaysia. In total magnitude of strife, the United States ranks 24th among the 114 larger nations and colonies of the world. In magnitude of turmoil alone it ranks sixth.

3. Civil strife in the United States is about the same *in kind* as strife in other Western nations. The anti-government demonstration and riot, violent clashes of political or ethnic groups, and student protests are pervasive forms of conflict in modern democracies. Some such public protest has occurred in every Western nation in the past decade. People in non-Western countries also resort to these limited forms of public protest, but they are much more likely than citizens of Western nations to organize serious conspiratorial and revolutionary movements.

4. Strife in the United States and other European countries is quite likely to mobilize members of both the working class and the middle classes but rarely members of the political establishment such as military officers, civil servants, and disaffected political leaders. Strife also is likely to occur within or on the periphery of the normal and open political processes in Western nations, rather than being organized by clandestine revolutionary movements or cells of plotters within the political and military hierarchy.

The Task Force has also been examining the history of how discontented groups have sought to improve their lot. Three kinds of group response to intense discontents can be examined.

One is the resort to violence itself. In some instances violence occurs as a direct and unstructured outpouring of rage against sensed injustice that is satisfying in and of itself for its participants. In other cases violence is manifest in carefully organized forms and has specific tactical objectives. Both anger and hope of gain appear to be present in almost all outbreaks of civil strife and in most of their participants.

A related question being studied by the Task Force is the extent to which violence has been a successful means of achieving change and the effects of success on subsequent violence. A study of American labor violence suggests that violence was almost always ineffective for those seeking the change. The more violent the conflict, the more disastrous the consequences were for the workers who took part. It is true that the ultimate effects of the struggle were beneficial for workers as a group. But whether the violent aspects of the conflict accelerated or delayed the ultimate beneficial resolution is an open question. It may well have been a general consensus that violence and counter violence were unproductive that led to more conciliatory action by both union leaders and employers, and to the establishment of peaceful means of conflict resolution.

In the case of the labor movement, the long-range consequence of conciliatory responses by the social order was thus a decrease, not an increase in violent conflict. Violence was chronic so long as recognition was denied; during this period state or federal troops were employed at least 160 times in labor disputes. Violence diminished sharply after a peaceful system of conflict resolution became a part of our law.

For remedial social change to be an effective moderator of violence, history also suggests that the changes made must command a wide measure of support throughout the community, as was true when labor finally succeeded in establishing its rights. Official efforts to impose change resisted by a dominant majority, as in the South during the Reconstruction period, have acted as a spur to counter-violence. Effective change

has depended not only on decreeing the reforms advocated by a discontented minority, but also on persuading the community at large that these changes are just and necessary.

On the other hand, historical and comparative evidence indicates that primary emphasis on repressive measures, instead of remedial action, has frequently led to a decaying cycle in which resistance takes the form of increasingly organized and targeted armed attacks, countered by escalating repression, sometimes resulting in coup d'état or revolution. The French and Russian Revolutions are notable examples of such an outcome.

A second kind of group response to intense stresses and discontents is what anthropologists call "defensive adaptation." It is essentially an inward-turning, nonviolent response characterized by centralization of authority in the group, attempts to set the group apart by emphasizing symbols of group identity and minimizing contact with other groups, and maintenance of the group's cultural integrity. It is an especially common reaction among ethnic and religious groups whose members perceive their social environments to be permanently hostile, deprecatory, and powerful. Such adaptations are apparent among some American Indians, ethnolinguistic enclaves in Europe, Jewish "shtetl" communities, and also among groups like the Black Muslims. Defensive adaptation provides some essentially social and psychological satisfactions; it seldom can provide members with substantial economic benefits or political means by which it can promote their causes vis-a-vis hostile external groups. This kind of defensive withdrawal may also lead to violence when outside groups press too closely on the defensive group, but it is typically a response that minimizes violent conflict.

A third general kind of response is the development by the discontented group of political means for the satisfaction of members' felt needs. This more constructive response has characterized most discontented groups throughout Western history.

In England, social protest was institutionalized through the trade unions, cooperative societies, and other self-help activities. In continental Europe, the discontent of the urban workers and *petit bourgeoisie* led to the organization of fraternal societies, unions, and political parties, which provided some intrinsic satisfactions for their members and which could channel demands effectively to employers and into the political system. In the United States the chronic local rebellions of the late 18th and the first half of the 19th century were superseded by organized, conventional political manifestations of local, regional, ethnic and economic interests. Labor violence similarly declined once trade unions were organized and recognized.

The organization of such functional and community groups for self-help has sometimes increased violent conflict, especially when the Government or adverse elements of the community have opposed such efforts. But when these new organizations have received public and private cooperation and obtained sufficient resources to carry out their activities, violence has been substantially reduced.

The contemporary efforts of black Americans to develop effective community organizations, and their demands for greater control of community affairs, may be in this self-help tradition. So also may be the attempts of white urban citizens to create new neighborhood organizations, and the demands of student protestors for greater participation in university affairs.

The foregoing discussion suggests some of the subjects being examined by our Task Force on Historical and Comparative Perspectives. A more complete idea of the scope of our work in this area can be gained from the research summary below.

Research Summary

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Robin Brooks Department of History San Jose State College San Jose, California	An Historical Interpretation of Violent Domestic Responses to American Military Involvement
Richard Maxwell Brown Department of History William and Mary College Williamsburg, Virginia	(1) Historical Patterns of Violence in America and (2) The American Vigilante Tradition
George M. Carstairs Department of Psychiatry Royal Edinburgh Hospital Edinburgh, Scotland	Overcrowding and Human Aggression
James P. Comer Yale Child Study Center New Haven, Connecticut	The Psychological Dynamics of Black and White Violence
James Davies Department of Political Science University of Oregon Eugene, Oregon	The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction: Its Appearance before Some Great Revolutions and Some Contained Rebellions
Ivo K. Feierabend Rosalind L. Feierabend Betty A. Nesvold Department of Political Science University of Oregon Eugene, Oregon	Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns
Joseph B. Frantz Department of History University of Texas Austin, Texas	The Frontier Tradition: An Invitation to Violence
Fred P. Graham Reporter, New York Times Washington, D.C.	A Contemporary History of American Crime
Edward Gude Department of Political Science Dartmouth College Hanover, New Hampshire	Batista and Betancourt: Alternative Responses to Violence
Ted Gurr Center of International Studies Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey	Civil Strife in the Contemporary World: A Comparative Survey of its Extent and Causes
Louis Hartz Department of Government Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts	A Comparative Study of Immigrant Cultures

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Sheldon Hackney Department of History Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey	Individual Violence and the Southern Tradition
Michael C. Hudson Political Data Program Yale University New Haven, Connecticut	Violence and Political Stability in the United States: A Comparative Analysis
Morris Janowitz Department of Sociology University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois	Social Control of Urban Turmoil
Roger Lane Department of History Haverford College Haverford, Pennsylvania	Urbanization and Criminal Violence in the Nineteenth Century: Massachusetts as a Test Case
Kenneth Lynn Department of English Literature Federal City College Washington, D.C.	Violence in American Literature and Folk Lore
August Meier and Elliott Rudwick Department of History Kent State University Kent, Ohio	Black Violence in the Twentieth Century: A Study in Rhetoric and Retaliation
Ben Roberts Department of Industrial Relations London School of Economics and Political Science London, England	The Origins and Resolution of English Working-Class Protest
Bernard Siegel Department of Anthropology Stanford University Stanford, California	Defensive Cultural Adaptation
Philip Taft and Philip Ross Department of Industrial Relations University of Buffalo Buffalo, New York	American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character, and Outcome
Raymond Tanter Department of Political Science University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan	Some Contemporary Patterns of External Conflict and Domestic Disorder
Charles Tilly Department of Sociology Center for the Advance Study of Behavioral Sciences Stanford, California	Collective Violence in European Perspective

II. GROUP VIOLENCE

Consider the dimensions and the forms of the protest and response that have swept our society during the past five years:

- 370 civil rights demonstrations have occurred, involving more than a million participants; 80 counter-demonstrations have been held in opposition to civil rights demonstrators and school integration; confrontation between demonstrators and police and between opposing groups has often led to violence.
- Some 200 private acts of violence toward Negroes and civil rights workers have caused more than 20 deaths and more than 100 injuries. (These figures are derived only from those incidents reported in the *New York Times* Index; many others may also have occurred.)
- Nearly every major city in the United States has experienced riots and civil disorder, arising, as the Commission on Civil Disorders found, from widespread Negro discontent and frustration over the conditions of life in the black ghetto; 239 violent urban outbursts, involving 200,000 participants, have resulted in nearly 8,000 injuries and 191 deaths, as well as hundreds of millions of dollars in property damage and economic losses.
- Hundreds of student demonstrations have occurred on campuses across the land; some of the conflicts arising between demonstrators and authorities have resulted in seizure of university facilities, police intervention, riot, property damage, and even death, and several institutions have been brought to a temporary halt.
- Anti-war and anti-draft protests have involved some 700,000 participants in cities and on campuses throughout the country; some of these protests either were violently conducted or resulted in a violent official response; some were marked by violence on both sides.

This Commission was not formed to study dissent or protest as such. Its concern is violence. Most manifestations of dissent, demonstration and protest in our society have not been and are not today violent or productive of violent responses. But protest and other expressions of discontent result in violence with sufficient frequency so that it becomes necessary to understand the purposes and tactics of group protest and the social response to protest in order to understand the causes and prevention of collective violence. Accordingly, the Task Force on Group Violence, under the direction of Jerome Skolnick, Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago, is examining the major forms of group protest and the responses of the social order. It is considering the circumstances and the tactical decisions of the contending forces that make the interaction of protest and response conducive to violence.

Group protest and collective violence are familiar themes in American history. As the preceding chapter shows, illuminating historical and comparative parallels may be found. But there appear to be some dynamic new elements in the most frequently violent protest movements of today. Identifying and understanding these new elements is a difficult task, because the process of research and investigation necessarily lags behind the rapidly unfolding current events that we are attempting to study. The Task Force is systematically reviewing all the research that has been done, and it is obtaining the views of a wide variety of persons participating in or responding to current protest activities. The Commission has also created a series of investigative study teams to conduct detailed field studies of important instances of current disorder for

which no other adequate factual record is available. These study teams have been at work compiling detailed factual accounts of the events which occurred in Chicago, Cleveland, and Miami during the summer of 1968, and a study of recent campus disruptions is now getting underway.

On the basis of these investigations and other major studies such as the Report of the Commission on Civil Disorders and the Cox Commission Report on the Columbia University disturbances last spring, the Task Force is analyzing the activities of protesting groups and the responses of the social order, to determine how and why some protest becomes violent, and how to prevent violence from occurring.

Our study of group protest as a source of collective violence concentrates on four main areas: anti-war and anti-draft protest; campus unrest; protest by the black community and other ethnic groups; and official response to protest.

Protest against foreign war is not new in the United States, but the current opposition to the Vietnam War appears to be among the highest in scale and intensity. The Task Force is trying to understand what factors are contributing to this opposition and what forces make it different from protests against previous wars. It hopes to ascertain more precisely the nature of the protest itself, the specific segments of the population which have actively opposed the war, the varying reasons for their opposition and the forms that opposition has taken. In particular, the Task Force is studying the question of why anti-war protest, which began peacefully with "teach-ins" and similarly traditional forms of dissent, has in some more recent instances involved violent confrontations between the protesters and the police.

Some obvious features of the anti-war protest movement command attention. One is that the impetus of the anti-war movement seems to come basically from young, middle-class, white liberals and radicals. Although white student activists were deeply involved at an earlier time in the Negro protest movement and although the anti-war protesters often imitate many of the tactics of that group, anti-war protest appears to be more often an activity of white protesters.

Another salient feature of anti-war protest is its apparent "fractionation." The anti-war movement as a whole is not organizationally or ideologically united, but instead appears to be consciously fractured into many small groups. Each of these groups tends to be responsible to no higher authority than its own immediate and often transitory membership.

A third important feature of the anti-war movement is that the violent aspects of anti-war protest often involve confrontation over symbolic acts such as the destruction of flags or the use of language and gestures which the larger community considers obscene. Much of its activity seems mainly designed to dramatize the difference in life style between the "establishment" and the young people who are the core of the movement. Whether or not these tactics are intended to provoke a violent response, there is evidence to suggest that public distaste for the personal conduct of demonstrators, widely shared by the police, has sometimes led the police to respond more violently than necessary to restore order.

There are a number of other factors which may also have had an impact on the course of anti-war protest. The sharp dissent to the Vietnam War in the academic community, together with opposition from conservative and apolitical sources as well, may have had a stimulating effect. The proliferation of media coverage has been another stimulus; no previous war has ever been reported to the American people in such depth and such vivid detail as the conflict in Vietnam. Moreover, the length and indecisive status of the war may also have been important factors in the extension of the anti-war movement and in the intensity of protest.

The Berkeley student rebellion of 1964 (the "Free Speech Movement") aroused the concern of the academic community and puzzled the nation. Today, the large campus that has not experienced some form of active student protest is exceptional. In many cases the protests have been both violent and forcefully disruptive of university activity.

Much current campus protest is closely related to the anti-war movement. Surveys of students indicate that opposition to the Vietnam War probably has been the most common reason for recent campus demonstrations. There are, however, other important sources of campus discontent we are studying. In the early years of this decade, American students channeled most of their activism toward "off-campus" social issues such as the civil rights movement. Student concern was expressed over the nuclear arms race and civil defense, and the first national student demonstration in several decades, the Washington Peace March, occurred in February of 1962. As in the case of student civil rights activities, this early anti-war demonstration was in support of official policy—the Test Ban Treaty—rather than anti-government in character.

These and other similar experiences seasoned students politically and honed a cutting edge to their idealism. Many returned to the campuses with their activism intact and with a distrust of "reactionary" elements in what they called "the establishment." They brought with them the nonviolent direct action tactics of the civil rights movement, and they became increasingly attracted to social criticism and the prospects of a new movement in American politics. It was at this time that the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was formed. SDS has since come to overshadow other "New Left" student organizations in size and influence.

The Berkeley rebellion in the fall of 1964 marked the beginning of a new phase in American student protest. This event represented the first major attack by the student movement on a university administration for its on-campus policies, and the first concerted use by students of direct action techniques to disrupt the processes of a university. Although there were some precedents for this kind of activity, student activists before the Berkeley rebellion had focused their protest on events off the campus and had sought to embrace the campus as a home base. The Berkeley struggle apparently was not simply a protest against what was thought to be particular violations of student rights, but seems rather to have been an expression of a deeper conflict between the interests of students as a class and the other interests of the "multiversity" itself. On-campus issues were no longer regarded as trivial, and the campus itself became the front line of confrontation with the "system."

Of more recent origin is the black student movement. Black Student Unions and Afro-American Associations now exist on most of the campuses that have a significant number of black students. Task Force studies indicate that until a few years ago, the extremely small minority of black students tended to be individualistic and on most campuses politically inactive. The Black Power Movement, however, coupled with substantial increases in the number of black students, has offered some black students a vehicle for giving collective expression of their particular grievances and at the same time to identify them with the larger black community. Black student spokesmen are at least as militant as white radicals, especially in terms of tactics advocated, but at least in interracial colleges, black student organizations seem to have been more oriented toward negotiating specific race-related reforms and concessions than white radicals. At the same time, the militant stance of some black students may be a major factor in increasing the militance of white students, whose commitments to racial justice and equality have been greeted with skepticism by blacks. At Columbia, for example, the white student seizure of some campus buildings may have resulted in part from overtly expressed doubts by black students that the whites were really prepared to do what both groups felt was necessary to challenge the university and resist the police.

It is important to observe that the majority of students have not been radicals or organizers of protest movements. Radical student groups, most notably the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), have usually been most successful in rallying non-radical students to their cause by finding a popular issue that provokes university administrations into unyielding defiance or over-reaction. Conversely, sympathetic and conciliatory responses by flexible university administrations—including changes in unpopular university rules and policies—have so far tended to isolate the nucleus of student radicals. As President Brewster of Yale University observed in testimony before the Commission, "Once you leave out the small pathological or malevolent fringe, I am convinced that the urge to violence rises in proportion to the frustration of peaceful change."

The Task Force is examining the characteristics of the activist students: who they are, where they come from, what they profess to believe, what motivates them. It is also studying their organizations, and

the activities and influence of these organizations in campus protests. It is attempting to see the student movement in the broader social context of the larger community. Finally, it is assessing the nature of the response to campus protest by university administrators and faculties in specific instances, and its bearing on the escalation of campus protest into violence.

Within the category of community protest, the Task Force is examining two distinct phenomena. The first is the Negro protest movement, which was only recently spoken of as the "civil rights movement" but which is increasingly referred to in terms of "black militancy" or "black power." The second phenomenon is that of the "white backlash," the private response of white communities and groups which feel threatened by Negro efforts to alter the status quo. Both the Task Force on Group Violence and the Task Force on Assassination are examining this white response to Negro demands, its manifestations in extremist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, its racist rhetoric, and its occasional resort to vigilante-like techniques of self-help.

The monumental report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission) is still only ten months old. Our own examination of Negro protest and its relationship to violence is profoundly affected by the work of that Commission. Not only does the Commission identify in detail the main ingredients of "the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since World War II," it also traces the history of Negro protest up to the time of the Report's publication in March of last year. The Report tells how the non-violent civil rights movement of the 1950's led to federal court decisions and legislation eliminating the most flagrant instances of legal segregation in the South. It notes that in the early 1960's civil rights groups began to employ similar nonviolent direct-action tactics in Northern cities in an enthusiastic effort to remove all the burdens of racial discrimination throughout the nation. In August of 1963, a quarter of a million people, 20 percent of them white, participated in a dramatic and nonviolent March on Washington, which provided a major impetus for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The March seemed to symbolize both the achievements of the past years of struggle and new hopes and challenges for the future.

But on July 16, 1964, only two weeks after Congress had passed the Civil Rights bill, an off-duty policeman in Manhattan shot a 15-year-old Negro who was attacking him with a knife, and in Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant this episode triggered the most serious rioting in two decades. There were other riots that summer in Rochester and Philadelphia, but it was still possible to think that these disorders were just a single summer's deviation from the essentially nonviolent efforts of Negroes to achieve an equal place in American society. In August of 1965, however, the Watts riot, in which 34 died, hundreds were injured and approximately \$35 million in property damage was inflicted, shocked all who had been confident that race relations were improving in our cities, and evoked a new mood in Negro ghettos across the country. Many more riots followed in other cities, some of the same magnitude as Watts: in the Newark riot of July, 1967, 23 died and in the Detroit riot in the same month, 43 persons were killed.

Meanwhile, the rhetoric of black power was first heard in mid-1966, and from it a new mood of "black consciousness" has developed. Increasingly, black spokesmen are demanding control on a local level of public services such as schools, police and welfare which affect their daily lives, and some black radicals are describing their communities as "occupied countries" and as "colonial outposts." Among these black radicals the emphasis extends beyond the self-help and racial unity that most black leaders espouse to notions of retaliatory violence and, in some instances, even urban guerilla warfare.

Since the publication of the Report of the Commission on Civil Disorders, the country has seen the second worst month of rioting in recent years in the aftermath of the slaying of Dr. Martin Luther King. This was the first time—and the only time to date—that disorders in different cities have been touched off by a single national event. In the Glenville district of Cleveland last July an even more ominous event occurred—an armed "shoot-out" between a group of militant Negroes and white police—thus raising the spectre of interracial, person-oriented rioting of the kind that wracked East St. Louis in 1917, Chicago in 1919 and Detroit in 1943. Also newly prominent were small black extremist groups such as RAM, apparently seeking

violent confrontations and reportedly employing terrorism against other black leaders. Against these disturbing developments, however, is the fact that the number of major urban disorders in the summer of 1968 is reported to have declined to 25 from 46 the previous year, while the number of minor disturbances remained approximately the same (92 as compared to 95).

The Task Force is examining these developments that have occurred since the Kerner Report. It is studying the phenomenon of radical black militancy as it affects urban institutions and, increasingly, the nation's schools and universities. It is interested in the activities of urban gangs and radical militant organizations. It is examining the detailed factual account of the Cleveland incident compiled by our Investigative Task Force, to ascertain whether it is the harbinger of a new kind of urban disorder. And as indicated in the next section of this chapter, we are examining the tactics of police and other city officials that may cause or deter violent outbreaks, and the tactics that are followed after an outbreak begins.

In the area of social response to group protest, the Task Force is studying a range of issues falling into two broad categories. Political systems can respond to violent protest in two basic ways: (1) systems of social control can be strengthened to deter the violence, and (2) efforts can be made to alleviate the conditions giving rise to the protest. The Task Force is seeking to determine which of these two approaches, or which mixture of the two, is more likely to succeed in particular circumstances and in maintaining a stable society in the long run.

Although the Task Force on Group Violence will be considering a variety of social responses to protest, it is concentrating especially on the response of one particular institution—the police and the related authorities who are charged with the complex duty of maintaining public order while permitting and protecting lawful protest.

At the level of police tactics, a wide range of responses has been employed by public authorities faced with mass protest activities. When given sufficient advance warning, they have deployed massive police forces, augmented by military reserves, and such a show of unused force has in some cases helped to prevent violence. Some public authorities have cooperated with the efforts of protesting groups to exercise their legal rights of assembly and petition, granting permits for meetings and parades in public places and resorting to force only when necessary to prevent illegal obstructions of public movement. In other cases, authorities have strictly confined the exercise of the rights of petition and assembly, and have resorted to early and vigorous use of physical force for the purpose of discouraging and dispersing the crowd before it has built up its momentum toward violence.

Choosing among these strategies is difficult. No single answer will suffice for all cases. The choice depends upon identifying correctly the motives and strategies of the protesting group, upon the strength and discipline of the protestors, and upon how the public is likely to judge the vigor of the official response. The Task Force is seeking to determine what lessons can be learned from the different responses of civil, military, and university authorities to substantially similar acts of protest and the different levels of violence that resulted.

Tactics cannot, however, be considered apart from the question of who is to execute them. The Task Force is also examining law enforcement agencies themselves and how their organization bears on the successful discharge of their responsibilities. It is studying the social and economic status of policemen, the content and level of their training, the way they function in different situations, their attitudes toward those who engage in collective protest, and the way in which they are viewed by protesting groups. Fears have recently been expressed as to a growing politicization of police, and the effect of such a development upon police responsiveness to superiors and community officials and upon their ability to fulfill their function as objective instruments of social control. The Task Force is therefore looking carefully into the attitudes, actions, and responsibilities and training of police, and is reviewing and evaluating a number of proposals to increase the effectiveness of local police forces and to encourage community understanding and respect for police. As one aspect of this study, the Task Force is examining the allegations and evidence as to the use of

excessive force by some police in dealing with particular disturbances, the extent to which segments of the protesting group have physically and verbally abused the police and deliberately sought to provoke such an over-reaction, and the types of police response that are appropriate in the face of such tactics.

Research Summary

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Isaac Balbus Department of Political Science University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois	Judicial Response to Protest
Herman Blake Department of Sociology University of California Santa Cruz, California	Black Protest
Robert Blauner Department of Sociology University of California Berkeley, California	Black Protest
Charles Carey Department of Sociology University of California Berkeley, California	Black Protest
David Chalmers Department of History University of Florida Gainesville, Florida	History of Vigilantism in the United States
Price Cobbs Department of Psychiatry University of California Medical College San Francisco, California	Black Protest
Edward Cray ACLU, Southern California Los Angeles, California	Abusive Police Conduct
Thomas Crawford Department of Psychology University of California Berkeley, California	Racial Attitudes in the United States

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Frederic Crews Department of English University of California Berkeley, California	Anti-War Movement
Harold Cruse University of California Medical College San Francisco, California	Black Protest
Elliott Currie Department of Criminology University of California Berkeley, California	Black Protest
Amitai Etzioni Bureau of Social Science Research Inc. Washington, D.C.	Demonstration Democracy
Richard Flacks Department of Sociology University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois	Campus Protest
Joseph Gusfield Chairman, Department of Sociology University of California San Diego, California	Campus Protest
Max Heirich Department of Sociology University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan	Campus Protest
Irving Louis Horowitz Department of Sociology Washington University St. Louis, Missouri	Anti-War Movements: The Struggle Is The Message
Marie-Helen LeDivelec Department of Anthropology University of Paris Paris, France	Comparison with French Student Protest Movement
Martin Leibowitz Department of Sociology Washington University St. Louis, Missouri	Counter-Insurgency Theory

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Samuel McCormack Department of Criminology University of California Berkeley, California	Police Interviews re Responses to Demonstration and Protest
Sheldon Messinger Center for the Study of Law and Society University of California Berkeley, California	Judicial Response to Protest
Gordon Misner Department of Criminology University of California Berkeley, California	Police Response to Demonstration and Protest
Thomas Pettigrew Department of Psychology Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts	Racial Attitudes in the United States
Anthony Platt Department of Criminology University of California Berkeley, California	Judicial Response to Protest
Michael Ross Department of Sociology University of California Santa Barbara, California	Racial Attitudes in the United States
Richard Rubenstein Adlai Stevenson Institute Chicago, Illinois	History of Violence in the United States
Peter Scott Department of English University of California Berkeley, California	Anti-War Movement
Charles Sellers Department of History University of California Berkeley, California	Anti-War Movement
Rodney Stark Survey Research Center University of California Berkeley, California	Police Response to Demonstration and Protest

III. INDIVIDUAL ACTS OF VIOLENCE

To most Americans, the term "individual acts of violence" means crime. Particularly, it means a crime involving personal harm or the threat of harm, perpetrated by a stranger who is either warped in his upbringing or emotionally disturbed.

Violent individual conduct is not restricted to violent crime. We know that under given circumstances, every person has a potential for violence, a point at which he may engage in violent behavior in response to a complex combination of internal psychological and biological forces and external social, cultural and environmental influences. There is a wide range of such behavior, ranging from the unintentional and impulsive to the intentional and malicious.

This potential for violence erupts not only in individual violent crimes, but also in wars, riots, other group disturbances, and in a host of other human activities, public and private. Violent individual crime must be viewed in this broader context, along with such semi-criminal activities as suicide, child abuse and some types of "accidents."

The Task Force on Individual Acts of Violence, under the direction of Donald J. Mulvihill, Esq. and Melvin M. Tumin, Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, has sought to collect information about the factors in individuals and their environment which prompt all these forms of violent behavior. Because of its high visibility and importance, major attention is being devoted to violent crime.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, in its 1967 Crime Report, suggests that violent crime is at an all-time high. It states that rates for crimes of violence per 100,000 of the population are up 57 percent over the levels of 1960.

These statistics should be viewed with caution. Criminologists raise questions about the validity and consistency of crime rate statistics because they do not reflect important qualifications about reporting and recording problems. Criminologists tell us that reporting agencies are dipping deeper each year into the well of unreported crimes which recent victimization studies indicate may be anywhere from three to ten times larger than official reported police statistics suggest. If these studies are correct, the increase in reported rates may not reflect an increase in the total number of reported plus unreported occurrences. The sharp increases in reported rates of armed robbery, forcible rape and aggravated assault over the past few years do suggest, however, a considerable increase in the actual number of such crimes, especially robberies.

To the extent there has been a recent sharp rise in the actual number of violent crimes, two factors may explain it. First, the proportion of young people in the total population has increased, and because this age group has always accounted for a large share of most violent crimes, the increase in the proportion of young people tends to explain part of the increase in reported violent crime. On this basis, increases from 1950 to 1965 in the percentage of the population aged 10 to 24 would account for fully 47 percent of the increase in rape arrests over this period. Second, crime rates have usually been higher in our cities, and our society is becoming increasingly urbanized. Shifts in population from rural to urban areas may account for substantial proportions of recent increases in rates of reported violent crimes; in the case of robbery, such shifts could explain 25 percent of the increase between 1950 and 1965.

Regardless of actual crime trends and their causes, it is clear that a great deal of crime now exists in our society. In 1967, according to the FBI, more than 12,000 Americans were victims of criminal homicide.

Police reported 253,000 aggravated assaults, 27,100 forcible rapes, and 202,050 robberies. This volume of violent crimes compares unfavorably, both absolutely and on a per capita basis, with other industrial nations. A dramatic contrast may be made between Manhattan Island, with a population of 1.7 million, which has more homicides per year than all of England and Wales with a population of 49 million. And New York's homicide rates are by no means the highest among American cities.

Yet, it is possible to read these same figures in another way, with a different baseline for a perspective—namely, the number of Americans who do not commit violent crimes. We might note that despite the recent trends 99 percent of the population do not engage in crimes of violence.

The intricacies of crime statistics have little meaning for the average citizen. He measures crime in other ways. He appears less impressed with numbers and rates and trends than with the fact that there seem to be increasingly large sections of his city where he cannot walk safely even in daylight, much less at night, and that it is now dangerous in many communities for bus drivers to carry cash or for taxis to pick up fares in certain parts of town after dark. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice made the important point: "The most damaging of the effects of violent crime is fear, and that fear must not be belittled. . . . This kind of fear has impelled hundreds of thousands of Americans to move their homes or change their habits." It has also prompted many citizens to arm themselves for self-protection.

Because of the extensive and valuable work already done by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, we have been focusing our attention on specific areas of inquiry that the earlier Commission did not exhaust. We are concerned with the human dynamics behind the statistical portrait of violent crime. We hope to learn more about who commits crimes and who its victims are. We are trying to assess the social costs and consequences of crime and to examine the potential returns on investment in alternative methods of controlling violent crime. From the studies of our Task Force on Individual Acts of Violence and from the work of earlier commissions, we are beginning to form partial answers to these critical questions.

Studies over the past decade show that the heavy concentration of crime is among the poor, the ethnic minorities who dwell in the city ghettos; that the areas of lowest per capita income and highest unemployment, of lowest level of average educational attainment, of poorest housing, and of highest infant mortality rate are also areas of high crime. A recent survey in Chicago indicates that the annual risk of physical assault for the black ghetto dweller is 1 in 77; for the white middle class citizen, the odds are 1 in 2,000; and for the upper middle class suburbanite, the odds are 1 in 10,000. Some 15 percent of the people in Los Angeles live in the 45 square mile area that was included in the curfew during the Watts riots, but in the year preceding the riots 60 percent of all arrests in the city occurred in that area.

As the Crime Commission found, existing criminal statistics do not tell us as much as we need to know about victim-offender relationships. Accordingly, the Task Force on Individual Violence is collecting statistics on victimization patterns for the major crimes of violence for the year 1967 from 17 of our largest cities throughout the United States. Our 17-city survey is designed to obtain many significant details about crimes of violence, to ascertain under what conditions violence occurs, to measure the extent of the presence of alcohol and drugs, to determine where and when these acts usually occur, and to determine what the role of the victim is in each of these crimes. No such nation-wide survey has previously been undertaken. The data from the survey should enable us to understand better the causes and consequences of violent crimes and better equip us to deal with the prevention of such violent crime.

Why are some people more likely to commit violent crimes than others? There appears to be no single cause of individual violence; rather, a variety of factors seem to trigger violent behavior, each operating differently with different people. Genetic makeup may be involved, as are intelligence, emotional state, attitudes, and values. The social and economic deprivations which press so heavily on some segments of our society also play a significant role in stimulating violent crime. The Task Force is examining various theories of aggressive behavior and criminality, in an effort to identify the particular aspects of aggressive behavior and violence that are likely to be accounted for by each of these factors. For example, genetics may account

for differentials in nervous stabilities; individual psychology may explain differences in the organization of genetically-given potentials into personality or temperament systems which then give individuals predispositions to behave in various ways; and sociological variables may affect the different ways in which norms are responded to, observed or violated. Better understanding of how these variables interact may provide the reasons for the overwhelming involvement in violent crime of men over women, slums over suburbs, youth over age and urban over rural life.

The young have always played a dominant role in the nation's crime, and the young now account for a much larger proportion of the total population than 20 years ago. But our young today account for a greater proportion of crime than the increase in their numbers alone can explain. Arrests of juveniles for violent crimes have doubled since 1960, while their share of the population has increased only 22 percent. Minors account for nearly all of the increase in arrests for serious crimes in this decade. Some 73 percent of the persons arrested for robbery are under age 25, and 54 percent are under 21. Persons under 25 account for 64 percent of all arrests for rape and 37 percent of all arrests for murder. As the Crime Commission found, the peak years among arrests for crimes of violence are from 18 to 20, followed closely by the 21 to 24 age group.

Because juvenile arrest rates for crimes of violence are rising so rapidly, the Task Force is investigating with particular care the many elements associated with juvenile delinquency, such as the familial and social environment, the failures of schools, and the lack of adequate job training. It is considering the problem of children growing up in neighborhoods where violence is a common means of solving problems among the adult models that the young emulate. The Task Force is also exploring peer group influences, particularly youth gangs, which may lead to violent or antisocial behavior in the young.

Recent research suggests the possibility of identifying the youths most prone to violent or antisocial behavior, especially those prone to commit the more serious crimes. An ongoing study of boys born in 1945 who grew up in Philadelphia has developed such a technique, which may make it feasible to establish priority targets in programs for crime prevention and rehabilitation of offenders. Of nearly ten thousand boys in the study, 3,475 became juvenile delinquents, together committing a total of 10,214 delinquent acts, from petty offenses to homicide. Half of these boys were only one-time offenders. More significantly, 627 were chronic offenders (five or more delinquent acts) who together accounted for 5,305 crimes, or 52 percent of all offenses committed by the entire cohort. Moreover, their offenses tended to be the more serious ones, including the majority of the homicides. Although a small minority (18 percent of the juvenile delinquents, 6 percent of the total group), these 627 youths accounted for the major cost to society from juvenile crimes. Clearly these chronic offenders merit special attention and study, especially as a means for judging when and how society might best take preventive and therapeutic action.

The Task Force is assessing the factors that motivate and stimulate the young to act, either peacefully or violently, and the manner in which factors that motivate peaceful behavior might be encouraged. One focus of study is the family—not only on the goals that parents consciously impart to their children, but also on how parents' actions influence child motivation and behavior.

The Task Force is also examining the relationship of organized crime to individual crimes of violence in our society, and is studying the actions of the American public that tend to finance organized crime. The extent of corruption and collusion between law enforcement agencies and organized crime will be examined in relation to patterns of violence traceable to organized crime. The Task Force is also examining evidence that implicates drugs, particularly heroin, as precipitants in certain types of violent crime.

The Task Force is giving careful attention to relationships among alcohol use, violent crimes, suicide, and automobile accidents. Although the relationship between alcohol use and assaultive behavior is well documented, we are exploring whether, for certain groups, the abuse of drugs or alcohol and involvement in accidents is part of a violent life pattern.

Another subject under investigation is the relationship of space, design and architecture to crimes of violence. Do the ways in which the location of people in social space, and in environments such as housing and cities, generate certain types of social relationships that are more criminogenic than others? The Task Force convened a conference of top urban designers, regional scientists, planners, sociologists, psychiatrists, and police officials to discuss this question.

The Task Force is giving special consideration to the corrections system and the rehabilitation of convicted offenders and adjudicated delinquents. The theme of the inadequacy of penal institutions as agents for rehabilitation has been reiterated by many of the witnesses appearing before the Commission. We have been told of over-crowding in county jails and some larger state penitentiaries, and the appalling lack of even the most basic resources for diagnosis, treatment and training of incarcerated convicts.

Beyond the lack of manpower and financial resources in the corrections system, there is a need for re-thinking the basic concept underlying much of modern corrections, namely, that good behavior within the institution has a high predictive correlation with good behavior after release. Scholars and administrators now question whether any system which keeps the offender in an isolated atmosphere, so different from the normal environment into which he will be released, can possibly improve his ability to cope with the day-to-day problems which he originally tried to solve by criminal behavior. In an FBI survey of a large number of arrestees in 1966 and 1967, approximately 75 percent of those arrested for violent crimes were "repeaters" who had been convicted previously.

The Task Forces studies indicate a great need for expanded financial support of the whole system of corrections. But even more important, they indicate a need for careful, controlled research to determine which approaches are most successful in rehabilitating young offenders. If we are to make reliable conclusions regarding what is successful we must develop the kind of rigor in the area of correctional research and experimentation that we have in other areas of research.

It will always be difficult to rehabilitate the young person who has already been in trouble and been labeled a delinquent. The Commission has given a great deal of attention to the question of prevention of juvenile delinquency and violence before it happens. In a conference on Youth Development which brought together leaders of various social service organizations, churches, and government agencies, nearly all the participants emphasized the need to involve young people in the planning and administrative roles of programs designed to serve their needs. They also stressed that programs designed to reach all youth in an area should avoid labeling some as delinquent or pre-delinquent.

The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968 is the first significant federal measure to provide support for state and local delinquency-prevention programs. It authorizes federal grants to public and non-profit private agencies for community-based preventive services for youths in danger of becoming delinquent, including parolees and probationers. The Act does not include language specifically calling for youth-involvement in planning and administration of such programs, but it does provide some hope that greater attention and support will be given the problem of reaching alienated youth and involving them in responsible roles in the community before they have struck out violently against a society which they perceive as unjust and unconcerned with their problems.

Not directly a question of crime prevention or control, but part of society's total response to crime is the question of victim compensation. The Task Force's research includes a detailed study of existing plans, including those in New Zealand, Great Britain, the Canadian Provinces, California, New York, Massachusetts, Hawaii and Maryland as well as legislation that is presently pending in the state legislatures of eleven states. With the cooperation of the University of Southern California, our Task Force on Individual Acts of Violence convened the first international victim compensation conference which brought together representatives of most of the foreign and domestic compensation plans.

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, there are forms of individual violence that are at worst semi-criminal. The Task Force is also exploring some of these forms, such as suicide, child abuse and some types of "accidents." Suicide, however performed, is a retreat from society; its rates vary by age, sex, and regional

patterns, and inversely with homicide rates for the same category. Better data are being reported on cases of battered children; it suggests that the frequency of this kind of violence may be increasing. Of the automobile accidents that account for 50,000 deaths each year in the United States, there is evidence that a substantial number result from the psychological and physiological effects of alcohol upon drivers, as well as from other factors in our culture and in the psychology of driving that promote an urge to violence. Similar factors may be present in other types of accidents.

Research Summary

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Paul Bohannon Department of Anthropology Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois	Observations of Cross-Species & Cross-Cultural Comparisons of Aggression & Violence
Bernard Chodorkoff Seymour Baxter Detroit Psychiatric Institute Detroit, Michigan	Psychiatric & Psychoanalytic Theories of Violence & its Origin
Jose M. R. Delgado Yale University School of Medicine New Haven, Connecticut	Cerebral Basis for Violence and Peaceful Coexistence
Ithiel deSola Poole Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts	Trends of Public Opinion About Violence, 1937-1968
Lawrence Dizmang National Institute of Mental Health Chevy Chase, Maryland	Suicide
LaMar Empey Department of Sociology University of Southern California Los Angeles, California	Contemporary Program for Convicted Juvenile Offenders: Prob- lems of Theory Practice & Research
Frank R. Ervin John R. Lion Harvard Medical School Boston, Massachusetts	Clinical Evaluation of Violent Patients

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Clinton Fink Center for Conflict Resolution University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan	Violent & Nonviolent Modes of Conflict & Conflict Resolution
Mark Furstenberg 3970 Legation St., N.W. Washington, D.C.	Violence in Organized Crime
Gilbert Geis Department of Sociology California State College Los Angeles, California	Victim Compensation
David G. Gil Florence Heller Graduate School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare Brandeis University Waltham, Massachusetts	Physical Abuse of Children: One Manifestation of Violence in American Society
Eli Ginzberg Conservation of Human Resources Columbia University New York, New York	Perspectives and Policies on Employment Problems of Youth and Juvenile Delinquency
William Goode Columbia University New York, New York	Violence Among Intimates
Mark Haller Department of History Temple University Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	Theories of Criminal Violence & Their Impact on the Criminal Justice System
James Johnson Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey	Social & Economic Costs of Violence
Seymour Levine Robert L. Conner Stanford University Medical Center Stanford, California	Endocrine Aspects of Violence
Perry London Psychological Research and Service Center University of Southern California Los Angeles, California	Behavior Control

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Samuel Klausner Department of Sociology University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	The Invocation & Constraint of Religious Zealotry
Malcolm Klein Youth Studies Center University of Southern California Los Angeles, California	Violence in American Juvenile Gangs: Causes, Prevalence & Control
Edwin I. Megargee Department of Psychology Florida State University Tallahassee, Florida	(1) The Psychology of Violence: A Critical Review of Theories of Violence; (2) The Assessment of Violence with Psychological Tests
Gerald McClearn Institute for the Study of Behavioral Genetics University of Colorado Boulder, Colorado	Biological Basis of Social Behavior with Special Reference to Violent Behavior
Turner McLardy Department of Mental Health Boston State Hospital Boston, Massachusetts	Research Recommendations Bearing Upon Neurological Approaches to the Causes & Prevention of Violence
National Association of Mental Health New York, New York	Violence & Mental Health
National Institute of Mental Health Chevy Chase, Maryland	Individual Acts of Violence
Office of Education Washington, D.C.	Review of Education Legislation, Survey of Requirements Necessary to Improve Educational Environment
Leon Radzinowicz Institute of Criminology University of Cambridge Cambridge, England	Economic Conditions and Crime
Lawrence Razavi Harvard Medical School Boston, Massachusetts	Chromosomal Disorder & Social Maladjustment
Clarence C. Schrag Department of Sociology University of Washington Seattle, Washington	Critical Analysis of Sociological Theories

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Hans Toch School of Criminal Justice University of New York at Albany Albany, New York	Anatomy of a Violent Offender
Melvin Tumin Department of Sociology Princeton University Princeton, New Jersey	Socialization into Violence
William J. Turner Medical Division of the Dreyfus Charitable Foundation Huntington, New York	Diphenylhydantoin in the Prevention of Violence
James Vorenberg Harvard Law School Cambridge, Massachusetts	Implementation Instructions
Julian A. Waller Department of Community Medicine University of Vermont Burlington, Vermont	Accidents & Violent Behavior: Are They Related
David Ward Department of Sociology University of Minnesota Minneapolis, Minnesota	Crimes of Violence by Women

IV. ASSASSINATION

Assassination strikes at the heart of the democratic system. It enables one man to nullify the will of the people in a single act.

There are other specific reasons to be concerned about assassination. The swiftness and complexity of events in this nuclear age make hazardous even the slightest lapse in political leadership. Moreover, the experience of other nations suggests that once assassination becomes part of a nation's political culture its eradication may be extremely difficult.

The tragic murders of several national leaders in recent years have made Americans painfully aware of the vulnerability of prominent figures and have raised fears that the United States may face a growing threat of political assassination. With the help of expert consultants and through original research projects, the Task Force on Assassination is attempting to understand the many complex elements of political violence and assassination. The Task Force, under the direction of James F. Kirkham, Esq., Sheldon G. Levy, Visiting Associate Professor of Psychology at the Lemberg Center of Brandeis University, and William J. Crotty, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University, is focusing on four fundamental areas.

First, the Task Force is seeking to learn more about the nature and incidence of assassination throughout the world.

Second, it is studying the characteristics of both the assassin and his victim in an effort to learn more about who commits assassination and why, and whether there is a relationship between assassination and the office held by the victim.

Third, it is examining the social and political context in which assassinations occur or are likely to occur. This includes a study of the nature and level of political strife in the world generally and of individuals and groups whose philosophy, conduct, and rhetoric suggest that they would use or approve the use of assassination as a means to achieve their objectives.

Fourth, the Task Force is looking into the impact of assassination on the population at large and on the political system itself, and it is searching for ways to prevent or control assassination and political violence in the United States.

The main objective in the first area of research is to identify trends:

- What are the various types of assassination?
- Has the rate of assassination attempts on a worldwide basis been changing?
- Do the rates of assassination attempts differ by country and by the area of the world, and are the rates of assassination in countries related?
- Is the frequency of assassination attempts related to the rank or position held by the victim?

Although there appear to be various types of assassination, most seem to fall into two broad categories: (1) those committed by groups or individuals, perhaps in conspiracy, as a political tactic to accomplish a specific political goal (such as the World War II attempt on the life of Adolf Hitler); and (2) those assassinations

which are unconnected with any rational political objective and which are committed by deranged individuals to satisfy their psychotic drives (such as the attack on President Andrew Jackson by a man who believed himself to be Richard III of England). Distinctions of this type are relevant in a consideration of the motives of assassins and strategies to prevent or thwart them.

To understand the nature and to assess the incidence of assassination, the Task Force has undertaken historical and comparative studies of nations throughout the world. It is analyzing data on political strife in 84 countries from 1948 to the present, and on assassination attempts worldwide from 1918 to the present. In addition, it is seeking an historical overview through detailed studies of assassination in Germany and France, Eastern Europe and Russia, the Near East, China, Japan, Australia, and Latin America. Finally, it is seeking to determine changes in the level of political violence in the United States during the past 150 years, the types of political violence that have occurred, the nature of the individuals and groups involved, and the causes and consequences of past political violence.

The Task Force is also analyzing the 81 assassination attempts on the lives of public officeholders in the United States during the past 50 years in an effort to classify them, to discover trends, and to understand better the reasons for and results of assassination in the United States. For example, the Task Force is considering the implications of the fact that the greatest concentration of assassinations in the United States occurred in the South during the Reconstruction Period following the Civil War, when many people felt that the established governments in the South were illegitimate. It is also studying the unusual frequency of assassinations and plots in the New Mexico Territory from 1860 to about 1900.

The second major area of research deals with the assassins and victims. It concentrates on attempts on the lives of the United States Presidents. The assassinations during the Reconstruction Period appear to have been political in nature, whereas attempts to assassinate Presidents seem to have been the irrational acts of mentally and emotionally disturbed persons, with the exception of the attack on President Harry S. Truman by two Puerto Rican nationals in 1950. Presidential assassins also appear to have much in common, as has been pointed out in a recent study of the Committee on Violence of the Stanford Medical School's Psychiatry Department. Of the nine persons who made the eight assassination attempts, all were Caucasian males, smaller than average in stature, and obsessed with some cause or grievance that appeared to be almost delusional. Except for John Wilkes Booth, all were virtually unknown; five were born abroad but were United States citizens at the time of the attacks; and four had tried marriage only to fail within a short period. The socio-economic status of seven deteriorated during the year prior to the assassination attempt. All used firearms, and all but one used handguns, in their attacks.

Thus evidence suggests that Presidential assassins may fit a psychological pattern, and the Task Force is attempting to identify and describe that pattern in some detail. It is also considering the protection problems suggested by the probable increase in the number of such potential assassins as the nation's population has increased. It has been studying the efforts of the Secret Service to collect and store information on potential assassins, and is compiling data on the following questions:

- What has been the total number of threats of any form directed at key political figures within the United States during recent years?
- Does the number of threats differ according to the type of office that person holds?
- What are the characteristics of those who in some way direct a threat at a political officeholder in the United States?
- Do these characteristics differ depending upon the level or type of office held by the officeholder?
- In what form is the threat expressed, and how much potential danger does it represent?

Studies of the victims of assassination suggest that the danger is greater to elected rather than appointed officials, and that the risk rises with the level of the office. The office of the Presidency illustrates this point dramatically. The Task Force is examining possible reasons why assassins, particularly deranged

individuals, focus on the Presidency. The answer may lie partly in the fact that the President is one of two nationally elected officials, and that the Executive Branch is the only branch of government headed by a single person. Both in power and symbolic importance, the Presidency is a unique office, and the President is a unique figure whose role may have critical psychological implications for the assassin. American children learn history through the study of Presidents, and the Presidency is the first political symbol to have meaning for them. The mass communications media may be a factor in the assassin's choice of a victim, for they play an important role in projecting an image both of the importance of the office and the character and conduct of the man holding it. Also, since the United States has assumed an increasing responsibility in international affairs, the President has become a symbol of this country's world power: this may enlarge the pool of potential assassins to include both Americans and foreign nationals concerned with the President's conduct of foreign affairs.

The Task Force is studying these and other factors in an attempt to understand why threats and assassination attempts are so frequently directed at Presidents of the United States.

The degree to which the social and political environment influence the incidence of assassination is not clear. The Task Force is seeking to learn from cross-national studies whether political strife and violence in a nation increase the likelihood of either political or irrational assassination. It has noted that there are groups and organizations in the United States which seem to approve the use of violence and assassination as a political tool. The Task Force has interviewed the leaders of some of these organizations and has been studying the behavior, the rhetoric, and the stated goals of such groups.

The Task Force is also seeking to identify particular groups in the United States that may have a potential for resorting to political violence. Several groups in our society are impatient for, or threatened by, rapid social change. They tend to see the Government as indifferent to their needs and even as punitive towards them. The members of such groups are generally of lower socio-economic status than the rest of society. The Task Force is studying such groups—both black and white—and is paying particular attention to those who might be said to be part of a "white ghetto." The National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty has concluded that substantial numbers of white rural Americans are living in a state of poverty and cultural deprivation comparable to that experienced by many black Americans; a similar conclusion might be warranted for some white urban residents. It is from these "white ghettos" that many extremist and racist organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan recruit their members.

The Task Force is also attempting to assess the impact of assassination on the American people and their political institutions. It has conducted a portion of the National Violence Commission Survey in order to determine the reactions of citizens to the assassinations of President Kennedy, Senator Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, Medgar Evers, and George Lincoln Rockwell. In addition, it expects to learn from the Survey how Americans feel about protest and political violence—to what degree and under what circumstances different groups in our society feel that illegal protest and violence are justified.

Finally, the Task Force is exploring ways to reduce the danger to prominent public figures, and is working closely with the Secret Service toward that end. As several of our Presidents have observed, it is difficult to prevent a determined assassin from killing a President, particularly when a mentally disturbed social isolate acts alone to avenge some real or imagined wrong. But it may be that Presidential assassins are not nearly so determined to carry out their attacks as has been commonly supposed. Zangara would not leave the warm climate of Florida to carry out his plan to assassinate President Hoover; Shrank chose not to attempt assassination in Chicago in order to protect the city's reputation; and Guiteau postponed his attempt to kill President Garfield because the President's wife was present. Efforts to increase the difficulty of attacking a President may therefore yield significant results even though they will not deter the strongly determined assassin.

The Task Force has also collaborated with the Stanford Research Institute in a research project that used gaming theory to project and assess strategies of assassination and defense. It is also considering

ways in which the mass media, particularly commercial and public television, could be used to reduce the exposure and thus the danger to high level officials. In addition, it is studying various technological means which might reduce the danger of assassination.

In sum, the research of the Task Force on Assassination involves a comprehensive consideration of the problem of assassination and violence directed toward prominent persons. It includes the rhetoric of violence on the part of extremist groups in the United States, assassination in this country and abroad, threats toward political figures, historical levels and types of political violence worldwide, and the attitudes of the American people toward political violence and assassination. These studies may help to illuminate the fundamental reasons why individuals and groups choose violence against prominent persons as the means of solving their political or personal problems, and point the way to more effective methods of control.

Research Summary

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Jerome Bakst Anti-Defamation League New York, New York	Political Extremism and Violence in the United States
Joseph Bensman Department of Sociology City College of New York New York, New York	Social and Institutional Factors Determining the Level of Assassination
Harold Deutsch Department of History University of Minnesota Minneapolis, Minnesota	Assassination and Political Violence in 20th Century France and Germany
Ivo K. Feierabend Department of Political Science San Diego State College San Diego, California	Political Violence and Assassination: A Cross-National Assessment
Lawrence Z. Freedman, M.D. Department of Psychiatry University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois	Assassins of Presidents of the United States: Their Motives and Personality Traits
Clinton E. Grimes Department of Political Science University of Idaho Moscow, Idaho	Personalism, Partisanship, and Assassination
Feliks Gross Department of Sociology Brooklyn College New York, New York	Politics of Violence: Terror and Political Assassination in Eastern Europe and Russia

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Murray C. Havens Department of Government University of Texas Austin, Texas	Assassination in Australia
Lynne Iglitzin University of Washington Seattle, Washington	Violence and American Democracy
Carl Leiden Department of Government University of Texas Austin, Texas	Assassination in the Middle East
Seymour M. Lipset Department of Government and Social Relations Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts	Values and Political Structure: An Interpretation of the Sources of Extremism and Violence in American Society
Harold L. Nieburg Department of Political Science University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, Wisconsin	The Political Uses of Assassination
Richard E. Rubenstein The Adlai Stevenson Institute Chicago, Illinois	Assassination and Breakdown of American Politics
Karl M. Schmitt Department of Government University of Texas Austin, Texas	Assassination in Latin America
Rita J. Simon Department of Sociology University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois	Political Violence Directed at Public Office Holders: A Brief Analysis of the American Scene
James R. Soukup Department of Government University of Texas Austin, Texas	Assassination in Japan
Daniel Tretiak Advanced Studies Group Westinghouse Electric Corporation Waltham, Massachusetts	Political Assassinations in China, 1600-1968
Seymour D. Vestermark, Jr. Human Sciences Research, Inc. McLean, Va.	Responses to Two Assassinations: John F. Kennedy, 1963, and Martin Luther King, 1968

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Peter B. Young Summit, N. J.	Whose Law, Whose Order?
Eduard A. Ziegenhagen Department of Political Science Wayne State University Detroit, Michigan	Systemic Constraints and Political Assassination
<u>Contracted and Special Staff Research</u>	<u>Topic</u>
The Anti-Defamation League study	The ADL is collecting from its files information dealing with the rhetoric of violence from extremist groups in the United States
The Leiden data	A team headed by Carl Leiden at the University of Texas has provided the Commission with data on approximately 1100 assassination attempts
National Violence	Analysis is being made of public reactions of a representative sample of 1200 adults to political assassinations and their attitudes regarding use of legal and illegal protest. (This survey was designed by the Commission research staff with James McEvoy, III of the University of California and was conducted under contract by Louis Harris and Associates, Inc.)
Political Violence in America	Analysis of a sample of approximately 6000 newspaper issues over the past 150 years to obtain information about the extent and nature of political violence in the United States.
The Secret Service data	The Secret Service has agreed to make available to our Task Force certain information about letters and other forms of threats to prominent political figures within the United States
Stanford Research Institute (Henry Alberts)	A study of how game theory and probability models are employed in the prediction and prevention of Assassination

V. FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE

Guns are part of the American fabric. They accompanied the settler across the continent, helping to protect him and to feed his family. They warded off the foreign invader, and they settled, at high cost, the great Civil War of a century ago. They have provided a popular motif for American literature and entertainment. Today, despite the fact that the United States is primarily and increasingly an urbanized society, there is still a widespread American ownership of guns.

There are legitimate, honorable uses of firearms and there are illegitimate uses. The illegitimate uses, however, have become a mounting problem for America. They demand deep study and rational remedial action.

Many causes of death are numerically more important than the gun. But during the first 66 years of this century, some 270,000 Americans were victims of gun homicide, another 360,000 committed suicide with guns, and well over 100,000 died in accidents involving firearms. All four United States Presidents who were assassinated were shot, and the four attempts that failed were also by gun. Guns are used in a high percentage of all violent crimes.

This toll, rising in recent years, has generated widespread popular concern and has increased public sentiment for more legislative control of firearms. Unfortunately, the arguments made to support or oppose specific kinds of gun control have often demonstrated how little reliable data we have on the subject. Some of the controversy about schemes to control firearms can perhaps be dispelled by further research. Building upon testimony before Congressional committees and recent studies of how guns are used and of the psychology of their users, the Task Force on Firearms has extended its research into five basic areas.

The Task Force is under the direction of George D. Newton, Jr., Esq., and Franklin E. Zimring, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago.

Patterns of Firearms Ownership: An essential first step is to obtain accurate baseline statistics about firearms ownership. The Task Force has been gathering data on the handguns, rifles, and shotguns manufactured or imported since 1900, how they are distributed and sold, and who owns them. Of importance are the patterns of ownership: by region, gun type, population density, income, and occupation. The Task Force is also studying patterns of gun use: by hunters, target shooters, collectors, and persons possessing guns for self-defense.

Task Force studies show that long guns tend to be concentrated in the rural areas and suburbs of middle-size and small cities, while handguns are concentrated in large cities and their suburbs. Firearms of all kinds, but especially handguns, are being sold today at unprecedented rates. Surveys show that about half of all firearms are purchased used, mostly through a person-to-person transaction between friends or strangers.

Firearms and Crime: The greatest public concern about firearms is their use in crime. With information supplied by the FBI and police departments in twenty cities, the Task Force has been studying the role of handguns, rifles, and shotguns in homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary since 1965, and the pattern of such crimes by region, race, sex, and density of population.

Its studies indicate that firearms increase the deadliness of serious attacks by at least 200 percent, and that, correspondingly, a decrease in the number of firearms used in serious attacks would decrease the homicide rate.

According to FBI reports confirmed by Task Force studies, the weapon most often used in reported criminal assaults is the handgun. Although handguns represent about 25 percent of all existing firearms in the United States, during 1967 they were used in 48 percent of all criminal homicides and in over 63 percent of all armed robberies involving firearms. Analysis of handguns confiscated by police in three cities discloses that approximately 50 percent are foreign made. Some were made in the 1800's. One-fifth of the domestic handguns which could be identified by their manufacturer are more than 50 years old. Nearly 20 percent are military weapons. Of handguns confiscated by the police in Los Angeles, more than half of those used in homicide, aggravated assault, and robbery had been recorded at some time under California law. But in only one-third of these cases was the suspect in the crime the last known owner or a member of his family.

Out of concern that they may be victims of crime, many Americans justify gun possession in self-defense. Surveys indicate that 37 percent of American households have firearms primarily for this reason. The Task Force is comparing sections of the country with high firearms ownership with sections where ownership is low, to test whether there is a relationship between firearms ownership, the number of robberies and burglaries and the number of deaths that result to victims as well as culprits. It is also seeking to determine whether firearms in the home save lives or cost lives and whether the rate of possession in the home is related significantly to the amount of crime in a community.

The Task Force is also concerned with the motivations that underlie the use of firearms and the situations under which a person decides to use a firearm. To gain insights about the psychological processes involved in the use of guns in violent crimes, it has undertaken a series of detailed psychiatric interviews of convicted criminals in California penal institutions.

Firearms, Accidents and Suicides: More and more Americans are buying firearms for the purpose of self-defense, despite the other potential consequences of owning a gun. In 1966, for example, there were approximately 2,500 accidental firearms deaths and 10,000 suicides by gun. The Task Force is analyzing both phenomena by age, sex, race, and other variables and is making comparisons with previous years. In addition, it is studying the relationship between all firearms death rates (accidental and otherwise) and the rate of possession of firearms in different communities.

Though many of the accidental deaths occur from hunting accidents, about 60 percent of the deaths occur in the home. The Task Force is studying the kinds of activities that lead to these deaths and measures that can be employed to prevent them.

Firearms are used in 46 percent of the 20,000 suicides each year in the United States. When a firearm is used in an effort to commit suicide, the chances that the act will be completed are inordinately higher than from any other method of committing suicide. Men much more commonly than women use guns in suicide, and adolescents seem especially prone to employ firearms for this purpose. Why these suicides are committed, and how they can be prevented, are subjects of Task Force study.

Firearms and Collective Violence: The increase in civil disorder in recent years lends a special significance to this area of our study. The Task Force is examining trends in sales of guns and ammunition in the United States and is analyzing market research data to determine who is buying weapons and for what reasons.

After more than a decade of relative stability, the annual sales of new firearms have more than doubled since 1963. Total production and imports of firearms was 2.7 million in 1963; if the rate for the first six months continues, the total will be more than 6 million in 1968.

Sales of handguns—most of which do not lend themselves to sporting use—increased 400 percent between 1963 and 1968. There are indications that this increase is largely due to continuing civil disorders and widespread fear of crime.

No hard data are available indicating how this increase in national firearms purchases is divided between urban and rural areas. There is some evidence to suggest that a large part of the increase is occurring in our major urban centers. In 1967, a major research organization studied the role of firearms in civil disorders in Detroit, Michigan, and Newark, New Jersey, two areas that experienced major civil disorders in 1967. In each case, a dramatic increase in pistol and revolver purchase was observed to occur after the disorders. Because the Detroit area has a larger population than Newark, the Task Force on Firearms elected to study the urban arms race and its consequences in the Detroit metropolitan area. Although caution must be exercised in generalizing for the entire country on the basis of our Detroit study, the Task Force hopes to provide a better understanding of the elements involved in increased firearms sales in urban areas, and the measurable effects of such increases on rates of gun accidents, gun suicides, and gun-related crimes.

Systems of Gun Control: The question of gun control legislation has strong emotional overtones, as debates on the subject in recent years have amply demonstrated. The Task Force seeks a thorough, factual basis for the decisions the American public must make concerning firearms control.

The Task Force is analyzing all the major and varying approaches to control: registration; prohibiting possession to felons, alcoholics, etc.; restrictive licensing, such as New York's Sullivan Law; other state, local, and federal laws now in effect; the use of scientific detection devices where firearms are prohibited; the establishment and regulation of private arsenals or gun club arsenals.

No recommendations for gun control legislation will be made until the data on the availability of firearms, and the relationship of firearms to crime, as well as the impact of recent Congressional actions to strengthen federal controls, have been thoroughly studied and evaluated.

Contract and Special Staff Research Summary

Historical Review	A study of the findings and recommendations of prior government commissions which studied firearms, crime, and violence.
Types of Firearms	Analysis of manufacturing data to describe firearms by type and usage.
Firearms Distribution and Ownership	Analysis of data furnished by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, the firearms industry, National Violence Commission survey, 1966 National Family Opinion Poll conducted for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Criminal Justice, and marketing surveys conducted by firearms manufacturing companies in 1964 and 1966.
Firearms and Crime	Analysis of data supplied by the FBI, state and local police departments, University of Chicago Center for the Study of Criminal Justice, and Guy Tardiff ("Firearms and Crime") of the University of Montreal Department of Criminology.
Violence and the Role of Guns	Interviews with convicted armed robbers by Donald E. Newman, Director, Psychiatric Services, Peninsula Hospital and Medical Center, Burlingame, Calif.
Firearms, Accidents and Suicides	Analysis of data supplied by police departments, National Health Information Center, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and Los Angeles Suicide Prevention Center.
Collective Violence, Extremist Groups, and the Urban Arms Race	Analysis of information from police departments, Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service, FBI, and testimony presented to this Commission.
State and Local Firearms Laws	Summary of firearms laws in the United States, compiled by the staff from information supplied by the Library of Congress, the National Rifle Association, and states' attorneys general.
Foreign Firearms Laws	Summary of foreign firearms laws, compiled by the staff from information supplied by the Library of Congress, the Department of Justice, and the Department of State.
Firearms Controls	Review of the different types of firearms controls, the effectiveness and enforcement of firearms laws, and the Constitutional questions concerning such laws. Materials supplied by the Library of Congress, the National Rifle Association, and firearms manufacturers. Crime statistics supplied by the FBI and police departments. Study conducted for the Firearms Task Force by Research Associates, Inc., of Silver Spring, Md. ("A Preliminary Cost Analysis of Firearms Control Programs").
Police Firearms Policies	An evaluation, based largely on a study ("Police Firearms Use Policies") by Samuel G. Chapman, Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma, prepared as a reference document for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1967.

VI. MASS MEDIA AND VIOLENCE

The mass media may be the most powerful social force at work in America today. If, as some scholars contend, there now exists in the United States a "national culture," it has been shaped largely by the mass media. The media, in treating virtually every subject ranging from sexual customs to international monetary policy, may have an important influence upon a broad range of beliefs and attitudes of the American public.

Statistical evidence generates concern for the potential effects of exposure to the mass media and particularly television. For example, a typical middle-income American male devotes from one-fourth to one-third of his sixteen waking hours to the mass media. Every day, he watches television from two to two-and-one-half hours, listens to the radio for about two hours, and spends thirty minutes reading his daily newspaper. He reads one magazine regularly but does not spend enough time on it to alter his daily total of about five hours on the mass media. He goes to a movie only once every three or four months.

Low income adults rely less on the print media. Low income white adults spend almost five hours each day watching television. Low income black adults watch television almost six hours a day.

The media habits of teenagers show that they are even heavier users of television than their parents. Moreover, recent studies have indicated that 40 percent of the poor black children and 30 percent of the poor white children (compared with 15 percent of the middle class white children) believe that what they see on television represents an accurate portrayal of what life in America is all about.

There are many different kinds of effects of the mass media which might be explored, but the focus of the Media Task Force's research is the effect of media content and practices on the level of group and individual violence in our society. This research effort, which is being carried on under the direction of Robert K. Baker, Esq., and Sandra J. Ball, Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Alberta, has three goals:

First, it seeks to provide an overview of the contemporary media through an examination of their origins and the forces which have operated at various times in history to mold their present structure and practices. Such an examination is essential not only to an adequate understanding of what the media are and do today, but also to the intelligent formulation of what they might be tomorrow.

Second, it examines the effects of media portrayals of violence on the media audience. Our basic question is: do media portrayals of violence contribute to violent behavior or attitudes supportive of violence on the part of individuals, groups, and societies?

Finally, it considers the role of the media in the process of social change. The concern in this area is whether present media content and practices promote or retard the nonviolent resolution of the important social issues which divide our country.

The chief issues in each of these areas of inquiry are discussed below in somewhat greater detail.

The examination of the development of the media in American life is designed to elucidate the competing considerations that are relevant to our examination of violence and the media. No attempt will be

made to summarize our study here. But it may be noted that the media in this century, like other major businesses, are dependent on profits and vulnerable to pressures which may affect revenues. They are heavily influenced by their entertainment function and the show-business ethic which that function encourages. And they are a pervasive part of American life to a degree never before experienced.

Although heavily laden with entertainment, the media continue to perform the traditional functions of the press. They provide information and ideas. They report the events of the world. They provide a unique check not only on government operations, but also the operations of powerful institutions in the private sector. These are the functions which earned the press the express protection of the First Amendment. They are functions of great importance and should be preserved. Thus an overview of the media enables us to approach the problem of violence and the media with a sensitivity to the complex nature and vital social role of the institutions we are examining.

The research effort on the second basic question—whether media portrayals of violence in entertainment programming contribute to violent behavior or attitudes supportive of violence on the part of individuals, groups, and society—revolves around an attempt to identify the relationship between the fictional world of media violence and the actual world of violence in American society. (Although there may be a few questions relevant to both entertainment and news media, essential differences between the two have made it necessary to study effects of entertainment separately from the effects of news. A discussion of the issues relevant to the news media will follow in the next section of this chapter.)

Concern over the effects of media portrayals of violence is not new. In the 1930's, for example, public concern was aroused and mobilized against the motion picture industry's portrayals of violence. During the 1940's and 1950's considerable private and public attention was given to comic book portrayals of violence. Public opinion was mobilized when claims were made that the grotesque images and incidents of violence found in a number of comic books cause some children to commit brutal acts of violence. Today the concern is directed primarily at the television industry.

The assumption that media portrayals of violence cause real acts of violence is common to all of these concerns. It is easy to be concerned when an expert points to an incident in which an individual shoots someone immediately after he has watched media violence. It is easy because it then seems as though media violence was the single and most direct cause of that individual's violence against others.

We are learning, however, that the problem of effects of media violence is not this simple. Most persons will not kill after seeing a single violent television program. However, it is possible that many persons learn some of their attitudes and values about violence from years of exposure to television, and that they might be more likely to engage in violence as an indirect result of that learning. We need to learn the probable effect of daily exposure to media portrayals of violence from infancy to and through adulthood. Just as the family is not the only factor which shapes the attitudes and behavior of children but instead contributes to the molding of individuals along with the churches, schools, friends and other sources of learning and socialization, so the effects of years of exposure to media violence may be more important than the short-run effects of exposure to one or twenty violent media programs.

The Task Force is considering the whole gamut of potential effects of media portrayals of violence in entertainment programming. It is attempting to identify what short-run effects occur and for whom they occur. For example, can exposure to media portrayals of violence "trigger" violent behavior on the part of an individual? The Task Force is examining the studies of several clinical psychiatrists suggesting that a small number of maladjusted individuals have committed acts of violence soon after exposure to media portrayals of violence. Another possible short-run effect—the "catharsis" theory—is that individuals can vicariously release their anxieties and tensions by watching media portrayals of violence, thus making them less likely to engage in actual violence. Major opponents and the major proponents of the "catharsis" effect theory have submitted their conclusions and evidence for study.

Most effects-research has examined the short-run effects of exposure to "aggressive" media content. The experiments of one group of investigators under review suggest that individuals who were exposed to aggressive media content experienced a heightened emotional reaction and were more likely to be aggressive toward others immediately after exposure. Another group of experimental studies suggests that individuals can learn how to be aggressive from exposure to portrayals of aggression in the media. Both groups of investigators conclude that there are in fact short-run effects of exposure to aggression in the media. But critics of these experiments have warned that caution must be exerted in the application and use of these findings until it can be shown that the term "aggression" refers to the same phenomenon as "violence."

As to the long-range effects of exposure to media violence, the Task Force finds that much less research has been done. The central issue here is the extent to which the media are agents of socialization—the process by which we acquire standards for personal conduct. Concern for socialization revolves around the questions of who or what inculcates the norms, attitudes, beliefs, and values which, in important measure, determine how people conduct their lives. With regard to violence, we need to know from what sources people learn that violence is or is not acceptable behavior. Specifically, can the media set or affect the norms for violence in our society? Are the media thus, as has been suggested, a kind of "school for violence" in which the entertainment programming is the "curriculum?" If this can be so, for whom is it so, and under what conditions?

As one step in investigating this crucial question, the Task Force is carrying out two major research projects.

One is a "content analysis" of a week of entertainment television programming in 1967 and a comparable week in 1968. This analysis will go well beyond a simple enumeration of the number of shootings, knifings, muggings and other acts of violence in media content, which tells us little about the way violence is presented, whether violence is rewarded or punished, or if the violence exceeds normative levels of acceptance. Instead this content analysis is seeking a broader range of more relevant information: (1) the extent of violence in adult and children prime time viewing hours for the three major television networks; (2) the way violence is portrayed—who initiated what act of violence towards whom in what context and with what result; (3) the norms for violence that are implicit or explicit in adult and child media programming; (4) how law enforcement officers are portrayed; (5) network comparisons of extent and nature of violence portrayed; and (6) comparison of the extent and nature of violence between 1967 and 1968.

In addition to this systematic assessment of television violence, we need to know more about the real world of violence that television viewers experience. Accordingly, the Task Force has also undertaken a national Survey of the American public's actual experience with violence and its norms for violence. Actual experience with violence was assessed by asking the respondents how often, when and in what context had they directly observed, been the victim of, or been the initiator of, a series of violent acts, including low level violence (e.g., slapping or kicking), medium level violence (e.g., punching), and high level violence (e.g., knifing or shooting). From the subjects' responses, it will be possible to construct a profile of the patterns of violence experienced by individuals, by significant subgroups in the society, and by the general teenage and adult population of the United States. A similar set of questions will give a good picture of the conditions in which low, medium and high levels of violence are acceptable behavior for the respondents. Some of the questions which can thus be answered are: (1) What, if any, segments of the American public generally support the use of violence? (2) Do subgroups with high experience with violence have different norms for violence than those who have little or no experience with violence? (3) Do subgroups who have norms generally supportive of violence prefer violent media programs?

The Task Force anticipates that the content analysis and the National Violence Commission Survey will provide new information vital to the problem of assessing effects of media violence and, in particular, understanding the media's potential for socializing segments of the audience into the media's norms for violence. To assist in analyzing this new information in light of existing knowledge, the Task Force has enlisted the aid of consultants from a broad variety of academic disciplines—psychiatry, psychology, social psychology, communications and sociology. For it is clear that this new information from the content analysis and the

Survey will not be sufficient by itself to draw definitive conclusions or to resolve the question of media effects. This information will give us knowledge of two worlds of violence, but the relationship between those two worlds can only be inferred on the basis of the general principles that appear to operate in the process of socialization. The interdisciplinary approach of our consultants, combined with the Task Force research data, should provide the most thorough analysis of the problem of effects of exposure to media portrayals of violence that has been accomplished to date.

Apart from the problem of the effects of media portrayals of violence in entertainment programming, there is a broader question which is receiving our attention: What is the effect of media content and conduct on the amount of violence which is used in attempts to resolve the social issues which divide this nation? There has been very little systematic study of this question, and the Task Force will not be able to examine all of the actual and potential effects. Instead, its work will be directed toward the ways in which the media, as an important institution in a changing society, can promote or retard the non-violent resolution of social issues which have a potential for violence. In particular, it is examining three central questions: (1) the effect of media portrayals of significant groups upon the nature of inter-group relations; (2) the extent to which limitations on access to the media may generate potential or actual violence; and (3) the practices and policies of news coverage, presentation, and dissemination and their relationship to violence or the threat of violence in our society.

As to the first question, race relations constitute one area where media portrayals may have had an important role. What part have the media played in the past in the formation and maintenance of a Negro stereotype? The media have been accused of contributing to the maintenance of the subordinate position of the Negro through stereotypic portrayals. What role are the media now playing by their portrayals of blacks and whites to each other, and what are the effects? Are the media portrayals promoting inter-group conflict or cooperation between blacks and whites? These are questions which the Task Force hopes to be able to illuminate, at least in some degree.

The second question it is addressing in this area is the thorny problem of "access" to the public through the mass media. The media in this country have developed a tradition of being a forum for the presentation of divergent views, a market place of ideas. What are the criteria for access to the public through the media today? The question is important for the study of violence, because one of the minimum requirements for non-violent resolution of divisive social issues is that interested parties be given an opportunity to be heard. In a democratic society where ultimate power resides in the people, access to the mass media is essential for groups desiring peaceful social change. If important, discontented segments of our society are denied the right to be heard, subsequent resort to violence by these groups may perhaps be expected. Moreover, if a high value seems to be placed by the media on conflict and drama, perhaps to attract the large audiences necessary to economic well-being, this may be a positive incentive for groups to engage in violence. Violence itself may thus become a medium of communication, a means of access to the market place of ideas.

These observations lead to a third question: If conflict or drama are highly-valued criteria for determining what is news, how accurate are our perceptions of the world as reflected by the news media? If the principal occasions on which blacks, or police officers, for example, make "news" are when they have engaged in unlawful or violent behavior, then the public's perceptions of these two groups and their attitudes toward them will be quite different from what it would be if the presentation were not so heavily weighted with violence—if it were instead a balanced portrayal of their total normal behavior. If what a young person knows about the police comes primarily from reports portraying them as brutal, corrupt, or vengeful, what will be his response during his next encounter with police officers? Will he call them "pigs"?

Related to this question is whether it is possible that the very act of reporting an event alters its character, perhaps indirectly through over-emphasis on its dramatic qualities, perhaps directly as the result of the actors' realization that conflict will insure coverage? If this is one of the effects of news reporting, does

the effect vary according to the method of coverage? Do photographers with cameras and lights, for example, invite responses which a lone reporter with pad and pencil does not?

Is it possible that public television, whose expansion and improved programming were recently recommended by the President and approved by Congress, may be especially beneficial by supplementing the commercial media with programs that delve deeply into all critical public questions, that give majority and minority groups an opportunity to be heard, and that create a heightened public taste for music, the arts, good books, and other nonviolent, constructive aspects of American life? In other words, if commercial programming lowers the public taste and attitudes, as some claim, can public television raise them?

These questions, though not exhaustive, do suggest the focus and scope of our study of the role of media on the interacting processes of violence and social change.*

*The Executive Director and Deputy Director did not participate in the formulation of this report on the work of the Media Task Force.

Research Summary

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Monica Blumenthal Mental Health Research Institute University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan	Conscience Formation and the Mass Media
Leo Bogart Bureau of Advertising, ANPA New York, N. Y.	How the Mass Media Work in America
William R. Catton, Jr. Department of Sociology University of Washington Seattle, Washington	Effect of Media Portrayal of Violence on Societal Values
Peter Clarke Communication Research Center University of Washington Seattle, Washington	The Problem of Access to the Media
I. William Cole Dean, Urban Journalism Center Medill School of Journalism Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois	Programs of Urban Journalism Schools Relating to the Media in the Process of Social Change
Seymour Feshbach Department of Psychology University of California Los Angeles, California	The Catharsis Principle, Including a Review of Relevant Research Literature
Walter Gerson Department of Sociology University of Toronto Toronto, Canada	Portrayal of Minority Groups by the Media & the Effect of Such Portrayal on the Way Different Segments of Society Respond to Each Other
Bradley Greenberg Department of Communication Michigan State University East Lansing, Michigan	The Content and Context of Violence in the Mass Media
Richard Goranson Department of Psychology York University Toronto, Canada and Leonard Berkowitz Department of Psychology University of Wisconsin Madison, Wisconsin	Review of Recent Literature on Psychological Effects of Media Portrayals of Violence

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Jack Haskins School of Journalism Syracuse University Syracuse, New York	Social Effects of Exposure to Violence in the Printed Media
Harry Kalven Professor of Law University of Chicago	Violence, the Media, and the American Traditions of Free Press
Jack Lyle Department of Journalism University of California Los Angeles, California	Contemporary Functions of the Mass Media
Marsha O'Bannon Television Consultant Washington, D. C.	Current Stated Media Policies Toward the Portrayal and Treatment of Violence and Current Media Policies Toward the Role of the Media in the Process of Social Change
Theodore Peterson and Jay Jensen College of Communications University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois	Historical Development of the Media in American Life
William Rivers Department of Communication Stanford University Stanford, California	The Role of the Press in the Process of Change and From Medium to Media
Alberta E. Siegal School of Medicine Stanford University Stanford, California	Effects of Media Portrayal of Violence on Interpersonal Relations

Contracted and Special Staff Research Projects

Annenberg School of Commu-
nications
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Content analysis to determine the frequency of violence portrayal
in television and the context in which the violent act takes place.

National Violence Commission
Survey

Survey to determine the extent of the viewer's actual experience
with violence as a witness, victim, and instigator and the context
in which the violent act takes place.

Otto N. Larsen
Department of Sociology
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington

Consultation in connection with media portrayals of violence.

Eleanor Maccoby
Department of Psychology
Stanford University
Stanford, California

Consultation in connection with media portrayals of violence.

Milton Rokeach
Department of Psychology
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan

Consultation in connection with the content analysis and NVC
Survey to determine effects of media portrayals of violence.

Arline H. Sakuma
Department of Sociology
Syracuse University
Syracuse, N. Y.

Consultation in connection with the content analysis and NVC
Survey to determine effects of media portrayals of violence.

Conference on the Role of the
Media in a Changing Society

Conference with newspaper reporters and editors, networks, wire
service representatives, television and radio station operators and
newsmen, magazine editors and correspondents, advertising agency
representatives, and others connected with or affected by the
media.

Gary Amo
Washington, D. C.

Consultation in connection with Media Conference.

VII. LAW AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

When violence threatens the personal security of our citizens, when the price of assuming leadership in society is a substantial risk of injury or death, when force is used to influence the vital decisions of government, then the basis of social order is threatened.

Many people believe it is dangerous to "make violence pay" by responding quickly to effect major social changes. There is equal danger, however, in proceeding directly from the indisputable need for effective social control of violence to the conclusion that such control can be achieved solely by strengthening our law enforcement institutions or dealing more sternly with those who commit violent crimes. Major increases in coercive legal control, unaccompanied by other measures, could intensify the anger of people already discontented and lead to an escalating cycle of violence and repression. Law is most effective when those subject to it believe that it sustains and regulates a just social system and that the operation of the legal system is itself consistent with their concepts of justice.

In recognition of the principle that the law must be just as well as effective if public order is to be secure, the Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement, under the direction of George L. Saunders, Jr., Esq., and LeRoy D. Clark, Esq., is dealing with the relationship of our legal institutions to violence on two distinct but related levels: (1) to determine how law enforcement agencies can deal more effectively with violent crime and violent aspects of mass demonstrations and protests; (2) to determine how our system of law and law enforcement might be improved to bring about greater respect for the rule of law by those who now engage in violent conduct.

On the first level we are building on the invaluable contributions of predecessor commissions, particularly the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. That Commission found that throughout the nation, the whole system of criminal justice is being frustrated and crippled because law enforcement agencies are underpaid, undermanned and undertrained. Four of that Commission's general findings are particularly pertinent:

- We still have too few police, too often underpaid and ill-trained, with too many duties unrelated to crime; many police forces are ill-equipped to cope either with crime or collective violence; and the conduct of some exacerbates community tensions and sparks disorders.
- Our courts are still understaffed and mired in an enormous backlog of cases; persons awaiting trial either remain at large on bail for protracted periods, during which many commit additional crimes, or else they are detained in jails for long periods of time without having been found guilty of a crime.
- Our correctional system still lacks the trained manpower, the programs, and the physical facilities deserving of the name "correctional"; as now constituted it seems as likely to produce as to correct criminals.
- The technological revolution which has affected nearly every aspect of our life has largely bypassed law enforcement; the principal reason is the low priority we as a people have placed on crime prevention research compared to other technological goals.

These findings have not gone unheeded. Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 bears witness to the growing public recognition that state and local agencies dealing with crime indeed suffer from all of these inadequacies and that federal assistance to the states and localities is required

to repair them. Title I of the new Act establishes the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in the Department of Justice and authorizes it to make planning grants to a state for the preparation of comprehensive plans for the improvement of the state's criminal justice system. The emphasis during this first year of the Administration's existence is on the planning function. After a state plan has been completed and approved, the Administration is authorized to make action grants to strengthen state and local law enforcement capabilities in accordance with the plan. The new Act also provides for the establishment of a national center for research into the causes of crime and their remedies, and it authorizes creation of programs of academic assistance for the benefit of law enforcement personnel.

Against this background of national study and planning for the future, the Task Force is endeavoring to contribute constructively to the effort that is now going forward. Necessary new investments are being made by our society in its system of criminal justice. The Task Force is examining how large these investments should be and how they can be used profitably. It is also studying possible administrative and substantive revisions of our legal system that might make it a more effective deterrent to violent conduct without impairing its fairness.

On the second level—how to improve our legal system to develop greater respect for law—we start with the proposition that systems of law are most effective when they are viewed as legitimate by those who live under them. Public order in a free society cannot rest solely on applications or threats of force by the authorities. Instead it must rest also on the general disapproval shown by the community toward those who violate the law. A member of a juvenile gang, for example, is not deterred from crime by the threat of punishment if the illegal conduct elevates the young man's prestige and status among those whose good opinion he values. Community disapproval will be expressed only if there is a widely-shared feeling of the justice and legitimacy of the legal order and of the society which maintains it. Since a foundation of peaceful order is widespread respect for the law, the law itself must be worthy of respect. The Task Force is studying attitudes toward law in black urban ghettos today. It is also examining the related phenomenon of the habitual adult offender who may be little influenced by heavy penalties for further offenses, because he has already suffered an apparently irreparable loss of social status and alienation from the community by reason of his earlier convictions.

If there is a declining sense of respect for the law among large groups of disaffected citizens' groups, defects in the fairness and efficiency of our system of criminal justice may bear some of the burden of responsibility. Many of these defects are ones which the President's Crime Commission brought to light and Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act makes a start toward correcting. The Task Force is studying other potential methods of improvement, and the size and direction of the investments required to achieve significant results.

The Task Force is also examining other elements of our legal system whose conduct has a profound impact upon respect for law. It is devoting particular attention to the police and to the extent of the force which police use in restoring order or in making an arrest. The Task Force is studying police tactics both in large demonstrations and in day to day law enforcement in the ghettos of our cities.

The policeman's job of maintaining order and preserving the peace is one of the most difficult in society: he exercises an enormous, fateful discretion in emotional and often dangerous situations. The policeman may find himself today, as the Kerner Commission observed, on the grinding edge of conflict between various groups in society. There are enormous pressures and provocations which he must handle with uncommon care. If police react with excessive force to these pressures, they destroy the moral authority of society's agencies of control.

Respect for law is also eroded when the law has a differential impact on the poor and the disadvantaged as compared to other elements of society. The criminal justice system can then be perceived as being "stacked against" the poor, the black, and the uneducated, who are more likely than other defendants to be held in jail awaiting trial because they cannot make bail, or to be sentenced after trial to a correctional institution which does not correct, rather than returned to their community on probation. The solution to the

bail problem may be much speedier trials, as well as the appropriate use of release on personal recognizance; the solution to the sentencing problem may be better rehabilitative resources in institutions, as well as careful use of probation. Whatever the solutions, the problem of differential treatment of the disadvantaged in the criminal justice system is a serious one that is receiving the Task Force's close attention.

Disadvantaged groups and many students of our legal system claim that the law fails to provide effective, affirmative redress for invasions of the legal rights of the poor and powerless. We are studying the basis of such contentions—for example, the claimed inadequacy of police protection for the poor. The Kerner Commission reported that a major complaint of ghetto residents is the apparent failure of the law enforcement apparatus to provide adequate police protection in the ghetto. There is some reason to believe that the police—rationing their limited manpower and facilities—maintain less rigorous standards of law enforcement in the ghetto, tolerating there activities such as narcotics traffic that they would not tolerate elsewhere and failing to respond to calls for help with the same urgency as in white areas.

Another area in which the law may fail the disadvantaged is the matter of practical, available civil remedies for abuses by landlords and exploitative merchants and for inaction or denial of rights by public officials. The studies of the Task Force suggest that our system has generally not performed this function very well. While the expense of legal counsel, the existence of procedural obstacles, the slowness of the civil justice system, and other like factors are frustrating for all classes of citizens, they fall with special impact on the disadvantaged who have the greatest need for legal protection. For the poor the rule of law may be seen as one-sided and oppressive. Making legal services widely available to the poor can in fact be an important part of the strategy of public order, for if the disadvantaged have little or no affirmative access to the courts, they may resort to other, more violent solutions of their problems.

The Task Force is also studying the question of whether the legal system fails the black community in enforcing the *School Segregation Cases*. If segregation is permitted to exist, then the law may well appear to many of the victims of segregation as powerless to achieve what justice and the Constitution require.

There are also broader social and political conditions which may have a particular effect on respect for law. The Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement is considering how respect for law may be affected by certain aspects of the political process such as the age requirements for voting, the convention system, political contribution practices, Congressional procedures, and the increasing concentration of decision-making power in larger government and quasi-government entities. Testimony before the Commission suggests that these are all focal points of criticism by many who, rightly or wrongly, are dissatisfied with the present governmental process.

The Task Force is also giving attention to the hypothesis that a relationship exists between the lack of respect for domestic law and the weakness of the rule of law in international affairs. It is further considering whether disrespect for law among young people may be affected by the existence and patterns of enforcement of some criminal laws which prohibit types of personal conduct in which large numbers of ordinary citizens take part, such as the laws against gambling, certain consensual sexual acts, and the use of milder narcotics.

Finally, the Task Force on Law and Law Enforcement has been studying one of the most perplexing types of disrespect for law—the idea that unlawful and perhaps even violent conduct is justified for the purpose of achieving a political goal. This view is shared and often acted on by many students, black citizens, and other groups pressing for social change in America today.

This view embraces far more than lawful methods of protest, such as the rights of petition and peaceable assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment. It goes beyond the violation of laws for the purpose of making a court test of their validity, such as laws or regulations forbidding peaceful assemblies, laws requiring segregation, or the use of the general trespass laws to enforce a public policy of segregation. This

method of appealing to a higher law to invalidate a lower law through a "test" case is a manifestation of respect for and faith in the legal processes of society.

A quite different problem is presented, however, when some advocates of social change purposely violate laws, not to challenge the validity of those laws, but rather to express their objection to some other policy they oppose. Examples are the blocking of streets, the seizure and occupation of buildings, or the destruction of property, not to challenge the validity of the laws prohibiting such conduct, but to protest against some unrelated policy of the existing social order.

It may be conceded that many of those who engage in such conduct sincerely believe they are performing acts of conscience to achieve a better social order. Thoreau, Gandhi and the suffragettes were widely admired for the peaceful practice of this tradition and for their willingness—indeed their eagerness—to accept the consequence of being jailed for their offenses.

But despite the bravery and sincerity that distinguish it, conscientious dissent must always compete against another value that makes dissent itself possible and potentially fruitful—the value of an orderly, representative society in which the rights of all are defined and enforced by law.

The Task Force is examining the legal and moral arguments on both sides of this controversy and is considering the kinds of official response which are appropriate. The Commission has heard testimony from student protest leaders who defend the legitimacy of such violent law-breaking, and who urge that the rightness of the ends they seek and the "illegitimacy" of the present social order entitle them to oppose both prosecution and punishment. It has also heard a distinguished academician say that from the standpoint of the social order it is unwise to prosecute and punish every act of civil disobedience.

The subject is a complex one, and shades of distinction between particular types of conduct may be critical. Set forth below are some of the hypotheses that have been advanced in an effort to isolate the relevant issues.

- There may be a difference between unlawful conduct that risks no injury or other harm to the public at large, and conduct which does risk such injury. Perhaps illegal sexual relationships between consenting adults risk no injury to the public, and such adults may claim a moral right to violate the laws against these practices. But clearly no one can logically assert a moral right to rape women in order to protest the laws against forcible rape.

- There may be a difference between unlawful acts of protest when committed by people who are denied the right to vote or to engage in peaceful protest, and when committed by voting members of a free and democratic society that guarantees the rights of lawful protest for all. By this standard, the followers of Gandhi and the suffragettes would fall on one side of the line, while American citizens who have an effective right to vote would fall on the other.

- Those who would violate valid laws to win rights they are now denied must stop to consider how those rights can be preserved in a society where their opponents are free to follow the same course. One must ask whether any society can survive if its members rely on genuine disobedience to law as a source of political energy.

- Those who believe in the rule of law cannot rest content with condemning those whose conscience commands them to defy the law. Law itself must be responsive to social change and to the correction of injustice. Our legal system has not yet corrected the injustices our society inflicts on minority groups, nor has it devised an acceptable method of permitting individuals to choose conscientiously not to fight in particular wars. Resolution of bitterly divisive issues like these is admittedly difficult, but it is not beyond us. If respect for law is to sustain the social order, we need to sharpen the ability of the law to clear the paths to peaceful change.


Research Summary


<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Jeffrey Albert George Washington University Law School Washington, D. C.	A Statistical Assessment of Disposition by the Supreme Court of Criminal Cases
Herbert E. Alexander Director Citizens Research Foundation Princeton, New Jersey	The Influence of Money in the Political Process
Gerald Anderson Department of Political Science and Bernard W. Marschner Vice President University Affairs Colorado State University Fort Collins, Colorado	Unfairness in the Selective Service System
David H. Bayley Graduate School of International Studies University of Denver Denver, Colorado	Non-Violent Civil Disobedience
Alfred Blumstein Institute for Defense Analysis Arlington, Virginia	Improving Police Performance Through Use of Technological Innovations
Albert Bottoms Director, Operations Research Task Force Chicago, Illinois	Present Capabilities of the Police in Handling Mass Disorders
Jerome Carlin Director of Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation San Francisco, California	Failures in the Court System Which Contribute to Disrespect For the Law
William Chambliss Department of Sociology University of California Santa Barbara, California	Defects in Law and Law Enforcement Which Contribute to Negative Attitudes Toward Law
Samuel Chapman Department of Political Science University of Oklahoma Norman, Oklahoma	Priorities for Improving Police Administration

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Karl O. Christiansen Institute of Criminology Copenhagen, Denmark	The Cost of Administration of Justice
Christine Clark Attorney New York, New York	Denial of Legal Rights to Minority Groups
Thomas A. Clingan, Jr. George Washington University Law School Washington, D. C. and Linda R. Singer Kurzman and Goldfarb Washington, D. C.	Procedural Inadequacies in the Legal System and Their Effect upon the Poor
George A. Coddling Department of Political Science University of Colorado Boulder, Colorado and William A. Scott Department of Psychology University of Colorado Boulder, Colorado	The Weakness of the Rule of Law in International Affairs
Fred Cohen University of Texas School of Law Austin, Texas	Improving Procedural Safeguards for Prisoners as a Deterrent to Recidivism
Herbert L. Costner Department of Sociology University of Washington Seattle, Washington	New Approaches to the Control of Juvenile Delinquency
Barbara Curran American Bar Foundation Chicago, Illinois	The Problem of Indigents' Access to Counsel
Roger H. Davidson Department of Political Science University of California Santa Barbara, California	Extent to Which Congress is Responsive to the Will of the Majority
Alan Dershowitz Harvard University School of Law Cambridge, Massachusetts	The Relationship Between Psychological Knowledge and the Concept of Legal Responsibility

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
Norman Dorsen New York University Law School New York, New York	Official Interference with First Amendment Rights
Harvey Friedman Staff Attorney Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law Washington, D. C.	The Administration of Justice under Emergency Conditions
Albert C. Germann Department of Criminology California State College Long Beach, California	A Critical Evaluation of Police-Community Relations
John J. Guidici Captain, Oakland Police Department Oakland, California	Major Problems Faced by Police in Prevention of Violent Crime and Apprehension of Criminals
Robert Johnston Department of Social Science U. S. Military Academy West Point, New York	The Role of the Military in Handling Mass Disorders
Randolph C. Kent Sussex, England	The Wolfenden Report and Its Consequences
L. Harold Levinson College of Law University of Florida Gainesville, Florida	Refusals by Public Officials to Obey Supreme Court Decrees
Theodore Lowi Department of Political Science University of Chicago Chicago, Illinois	The Concentration of Decision Making Power in Governmental Institutions
Thomas Lumbard Assistant U. S. Attorney Washington, D. C.	Expediting Disposition of Criminal Trials
Donald McIntyre American Bar Foundation Chicago, Illinois	Development of Law Enforcement Policy: Prosecutor/Police Discretion
Charles Monson Associate Academic Vice President University of Utah Salt Lake City, Utah	An Analytical History of the Theory of Civil Disobedience and the Right of Revolution

<u>Consultant</u>	<u>Project Title</u>
George W. O'Connor Director Professional Standards Division International Association of Chiefs of Police Washington, D. C.	Improving Police Effectiveness in Dealing with Violence Through Better Recruitment Standards, Manpower Allocation, Pre- and Post-Recruitment Training
Vincent I. O'Leary School of Criminal Justice State University of New York Albany, New York	The Problem of Recidivism in Corrections
Irving Pilavin School of Social Work University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	Operation of the Police in the Ghetto
Arnold and Louise Sagalyn Arthur D. Little, Inc. Washington, D. C.	Major Problems Posed by Mass Disorders and Recommendations for Their Solution
Ralph F. Salerno Woodside, New York	Organized Crime and Violence
Arlené Ulman Attorney Chevy Chase, Maryland	An Analysis of Recent Anti-Crime Legislation
Marvin G. Weinbaum Department of Political Science University of Illinois Urbana, Illinois	The Effect of Conventions on the Political Process





A CRITIQUE OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION
ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOT

A Pilot Project in University-Urban
Intergroup Relations in Los Angeles

Volume II

by

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Kent Lloyd, Ph.D.
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D. Richard McFerson, C.P.A.
William J. Williams, D.P.A.

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NOTE - (This report is not paginated since many of the papers were reproduced and submitted from various sources. These papers were then compiled by the PEDR Corporation along with the narrative for each session).

INTRODUCTION

As we prepare this report of a conference in which community leaders met together to explore ways of improving intergroup relations, we find a marked contrast between this approach and the recent front page newspaper headlines reporting a breakdown of community relations and the resulting race riots across the country. In Detroit alone -- now surpassing Watts as the nation's most costly riot -- there were 40 deaths, 2250 injuries, 4000 arrests and \$250,000,000 in property losses. The underlying causes of this holocaust are numerous and blame difficult to determine; yet in the lengthy investigations now being undertaken by the President's Commission and the U.S. Senate Investigating Committee into the causes of urban riots the nature of investigating committees themselves are on trial including their objectives, their approach to the study of underlying causes and their inadequate staff resources.

The report of the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riot (more widely known as the "McCone Report"), submitted in November, 1965, symbolized both the attempt and the failure to rebuild intergroup relations in this metropolitan area. It seemed appropriate, therefore, that the activities of the Community Relations Seminars Project be associated with its efforts. Having successfully completed the first two phases of the six-month Project consisting of Intergroup Relations Executive Seminar and the Watts Grass Roots Leadership Seminar described in Volume I -- the project staff then turned to the preparation of a culminating two-day conference on December 15 and 16, 1966, entitled "The McCone Commission Report Revisited."

This two-day conference as well as the two earlier Seminars were

supported by a grant under Title I of the Higher Education Act of 1965, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, through the California Coordinating Council of Higher Education to the University of Southern California, School of Public Administration.

The revisiting of the McCone Commission Report held on neutral university ground provided an opportunity to involve representatives, of both the ghetto and the public and private interests in the larger metropolitan community, in face-to-face communication; to evaluate the McCone Commission recommendations and achievements during the past year; and to explore as equals the basis for cooperative political, economic and social action in developing a mutually beneficial program to reduce racial conflict in Los Angeles.

The two-day conference was divided into five sessions. Each of the remaining five chapters of this report will focus on a session of the conference. Chapter 1 covers the opening session and includes the keynote address. Chapter 2 presents papers delivered by consultants to the McCone Commission. Chapters 3 and 4 present papers prepared by the participants of the two leadership seminars. The final chapter covers viewpoints from the business, labor, education and religious sectors.

Volume I, the initial report summarizing the six-month Community Relations Project, was published with funds from the government grant previously discussed. This report, Volume II, is being financed with private funds donated by Public Executive Development & Research, Incorporated, a non-profit organization. Four of the authors of this report are associated with P.E.D.R.

Dr. Kent Lloyd and Dr. Kendall O. Price originated this project and served throughout as co-project directors. Mr. Ellsworth Johnson was project coordinator and was assisted by Mr. D. Richard McFerson. Dr. Bill Williams, program administrator and community relations advisor, is now serving as Deputy Staff Director of the President's Equal Employment Opportunities Commission in Washington D.C.

CHAPTER 1

Chapter I

OPENING SESSION

At 10:00 A.M. on Thursday, December 15, at the Hancock Auditorium on the University of Southern California campus, Dr. Henry Reining, Jr., Dean of the School of Public Administration, officially opened the conference. Brief welcoming addresses were given by Dr. Norman Topping, President of the University; Thomas Bradley, Chairman, Conference of Negro Elected Officials of Los Angeles County and Los Angeles City Councilman; Dr. Sidney Grossman, Associate Director, California Coordinating Council on Higher Education; Senator Mervyn Dymally, California State Senate; and Assemblyman Leon Ralph, California State Assemblyman. Also recognized were representatives of Mayor Samuel Yorty of Los Angeles, who was in New York City; United States Congressman Augustus F. Hawkins, who was in the Far East; Lt. Governor-elect Robert Finch; and Los Angeles City Councilman, Billy G. Mills.

Following these welcoming remarks by City, County and State political officials, Dr. Kendall O. Price and Dr. Kent Lloyd, School of Public Administration Research Associates and Co-project Directors, described for the audience the Community Relations Seminars Project and outlined conference activities for the next two days.

The following remarks by President Topping, Dean Reining, and Dr. Price and Dr. Lloyd are taken from the actual tape recording of the opening conference session.

President Norman Topping:

"Some years ago, suggestions were made about moving the campus location. To those suggestions, President Bovard responded in the following manner: "There are two kinds of institutions both of which have their place. One is the small college, placed by itself and sufficient unto itself, with country surrounding and its campus remote. The other," Bovard continued, "is the city institution. The university which tries to help solve the problems of the city." Bovard concluded by saying, "The Board of Trustees decided that the University of Southern California should become and should remain a city institution."

"I think the fact that the University is sponsoring this two-day conference--I think the fact that the University over these years has supplied doctors, dentists, lawyers, educators, pharmacists, and social workers has indicated that we have been interested in this city. I think the fact that we have made contributions in many ways including staying in this location--and I think this is a fabulous location for the University--indicates our deep and sincere interest not only in you but in the problems of this urban center."

Dean Reining:

"I suspect that this conference is one in which everyone attending

should be introduced. This is not possible. However, we have many individuals who represent the breadth of interests attending the conference.

"You will find on your conference program a listing of those who have been the active workers on these seminars and on this conference. Let me present first of all the Conference Coordinator, who must take care of all the multitudinous details necessary to put on one of these conferences--Mr. Ellsworth Johnson. The Administrator of the total program has been Dr. Bill Williams, a possessor of a Doctor's Degree in Public Administration and whom I can therefore recognize as an alumnus of the School as well as the administrator of this program.

"As you know from your program, the session this afternoon will have on it members of the McCone Commission. One of those members who could not be here has sent a telegram which is so apt that I am going to take a moment to read it to you this morning. It reads as follows: 'I wish you every success with your Community Relations Leadership Seminar and deeply regret my inability to participate. May your seminar lead to an ever deeper knowledge and activity toward the achievement of one nationhood for all of us when there will be no more minorities and majorities but where we will all be simply Americans. Sincerely, Mrs. Robert G. Neumann.'

"I want to recognize the two persons who are the prime movers of the conference, Dr. Kent Lloyd and Dr. Kendall Price. These are two energetic, imaginative, able young academicians. Those of you who have had contact with them in the seminars preceding this conference, I'm sure, would agree with the use of those adjectives. They are downright irrepressible! When they have an idea, they don't rest until they have done something about the idea. They are well-trained intellectuals but they also have the capacity to do something about the products of the intellectual process. Let me introduce one of these men, who will give you the overview of this program: Dr. Kendall Price."

Dr. Price:

"Dean Reining and distinguished guests on this platform. I think as I view in this academic setting the purposes of the university, three come very quickly to mind--three which I feel close to but the last of which I feel more deeply involved in this morning. The university's obligation is obviously to convey and to teach what I might call 'old knowledge'; in addition, it has the responsibility of the creation of 'new knowledge' through research, which in turn becomes old knowledge. But there is a third and rather critical function of universities in our society today, and that involves some concerted involvement in our communities. That's the one that counts here this morning, and for me, that is the one that counts, period! Not to denote the university's other functions, but today I would like to stress that function.

"I have been on the faculty of the School of Public Administration, although I am not an administrator but a social psychologist, and I have felt a need to be involved in the training and working with people who are running the variety of administrative programs in our country today. I would guess that one of the great problems not only of the Great Society but of all

societies is not with the ideas and programs but in finding the qualified administrators to run these programs. Having taught on the faculty here for the past four or five years, I have come to realize that there is a great deal of new information about running complex programs and organizations--recent in that it has only been available in the last decade or so. Because this information is new, a number of people who are practicing administrators who have learned through the 'school of hard knocks' as well as previous academic training how to run a program are not fully equipped in some ways, because they lack information about administration and organizations based upon recent research findings.

"I tend to see my role in life--if each of us sees some place where he can make some small contribution--as to see what I can do in my small way to have an impact on the leadership of our cities. So I have enjoyed my teaching experience over the last four or five years, where I have learned something about running organizations. I've learned that management and organization can no longer be a 'seat of the pants' operation. Men have got to be skilled and trained in these areas. What has resulted is that I have taken leave of the teaching faculty of the University and with my colleague, Kent Lloyd, have turned to the area of what I would call 'executive and community leadership training.' And our responsibility has been to develop a program which we can take to public officials and help retool them in the new techniques of running organizations.

"We have found something interesting in these kinds of programs, in that we are as much the learners as the participants; we have found that a concern for values, what people stand for, can not be ignored even though our program consists in large part of the behavioral sciences and the kinds of things they have learned about management. But we have found that you can't leave out values, directions, and things people stand for. Those of you who are familiar with the development of science know that science went through a period called 'logical positivism,' where scientists were concerned only with what exists, not with what should exist; with how to get there, but not where to go. Tell a scientist you want to go to the moon and he'll tell you how to get there; tell him you want better cities and he'll ply his research to obtain it. But he won't tell you whether to go to the moon or to have a better city; they are goals, not in the realm of science. I think now science is turning a corner, and I am glad to be part of those who are turning it. In our program, we are as concerned with goals, directions and programs as we are with the skills of management.

"It seems that Kent and I became wandering professors looking for a place to go. Our mission was to move where the action was and there is no place where there is more action than in the Los Angeles community. What we did was to prepare a proposal to be funded by the Office of Education through the California Coordinating Council, to do several things. Let me review these very quickly with you.

"We told the Coordinating Council we would like to do the following. (I think we were pretty naive!) We said, number one, we would like to hold a seminar for race relations experts, intergroup relations experts, and the leaders of public, business, and voluntary community organizations which provide

services to the Watts community. We gathered together a group of advisors, who helped us select a group of top people who spent one day a week for eight weeks going through a consideration of personal and public values, effective executive practices, and new knowledges in the behavioral science of running organizations. The second objective was perhaps more difficult. We proposed another seminar with the same format, in which we would bring in the 'real leaders in Watts.' No one knows who the real leaders are, and it's a cinch that the white man doesn't know who they are, and we're white men. So our objective was to find those who could tell us who the leaders are and meet with them and establish enough trust to communicate, share ideas and all the information we know.

"Well, we called together a group of people who were important in the community. These advisors then told us from their perspective who they thought the real leaders in Watts were. They said to us, 'There have been too many white men saying who is running Watts; now let the Black man tell us.' The advisors were Robert Hall, Operation Bootstrap; Lincoln Hilburn, Teen Post; Tommy Jacquette, of SLANT; Opal Jones, of NAPP; John Shabazz, of the Nation of Islam; Lynn Shifflet, of the NAPP; and Cliff Vaughn, of SNCC. When they came together they had a lot of questions, but they had enough confidence to sit down and meet with us and help us select a group of people who, as far as we can determine, at least represent grass roots leadership in the Watts community. This group had certain conditions. They said they wanted to name the participants, have the opportunity to present information to the group to counter, if necessary, that which we might present, and finally to help in selecting the books. We agreed heartily with each condition and made only one condition of our own, that they select only the heads of organizations in Watts for the program, because impact can be made most effectively through the leadership. With that requirement, we came to an agreement on the list of participants and the format for the eight-week seminar. Let me give you some highlights of that program. (See Title I report for description of this program-Volume I)

"I would like to indicate to you the direction we are going. We are proposing that next year, beginning a few weeks from now, following the writing of the report of the two seminars and the culminating conference we are holding here, we will hold four additional seminars for minority target groups. We would like to turn to the Mexican American people in East Los Angeles and meet and share with their leaders the kinds of things we have done with the previous groups. We would like to take a second group from perhaps the Crenshaw area, which more immediately surrounds the University, and find out whom there we should be talking to and sharing with a concern for the community. Finally, we hope to bring together government and business leaders of Los Angeles and involve them in a seminar where we again can share information and ideas of building a better community. Then, we would like to culminate with a national conference, where national figures can join with national Negro leaders, Mexican American leaders, leading academicians, mayors of cities, etc., in a convocation that can concern itself with these kinds of problems on this level.

"Let me now introduce to you my colleague and friend, Kent Lloyd. Kent will describe for you how we see the next two days and what we hope will be accomplished in the activities planned."

Dr. Lloyd:

"It is a pleasure for me to be associated with Dr. Ken Price in this project. I think now that the brass of the University has departed to other things--and we appreciated their being here with us--we can let our hair down and talk to you about what this is really all about. I hope you will bear with us and stay through the next two days because we hope to have a lot of fun with this one. We are told that universities are places where people have encounters on ideas, and we think there is nothing quite so appropriate in this tradition as to have an encounter over the McCone Report, as we have planned for the next two days.

"This conference culminates several months of planning. Dr. Price has indicated the kinds of things we have been engaged in in the two previous seminars. We hope that the report which we are preparing of those seminars and this conference will have wide distribution throughout the United States. We think that in some way, some firsts have been set here which we hope will be duplicated across the country to open up communications between and among leaders of the ghetto areas, leaders of the larger community, and universities.

"Now, why did we select the McCone Report for a two-day dialogue on the University campus? It seemed to us that the Watts Riot, or Revolt, and the McCone Report are symbols of Los Angeles' failure in race relations. I think we would be less than frank if we suggested that the City of Los Angeles, including the University of Southern California, were great beacon lights in the forward progress of race relations.

"The McCone Report has been very controversial. Some have lauded it with praise for the fine work that was done. Some have thought otherwise. Over the next two days, we will take a very critical look at that report. It seems to me that the McCone Report was an attempt to come to grips with the problems in the Watts area. It highlighted some of the problems of the ghetto and made some far-reaching recommendations, many of which have been implemented, many more of which have yet to be acted upon. It seemed to us that this was a good opportunity to re-examine in the light of a year since the Report was issued some of the progress which has been made. We don't want to let Los Angeles off the hook! We think it is important to examine this question not only every year but every day, until we have solved our dilemma in race relations.

"More appropriate than just critiquing the McCone Report and what has happened in the past year is to consider what must happen in the future. We propose that this be a beginning to keeping our attention focused on the positive. Perhaps this conference should have been titled, "Beyond the McCone Commission Report." We are not anxious to just grind old axes but we are interested in moving ahead to see what we might all do here together. If I could try and describe to someone on the street three objectives of this conference, it would run something like this. First, it's an opportunity to bring together--perhaps for the first time--representatives of each of the major interest groups in Los Angeles who have direct responsibility for improving race relations in this metropolitan community. There are many individuals and organizations which are not represented on the panels over the next two days. There are some fifty or sixty represented, but this does not represent all of

those involved and interested in the problems we are considering here. We have been criticized about the kind of program we have here from many quarters. Some in the ghetto said this program looks too loaded with the white power structure. 'It shouldn't be at U.S.C. You are defeating your purpose by holding it at a conservative university.' On the other hand, we have received phone calls from some members of the Board of Trustees who said that the conference was loaded the other way--too many black faces on it, or too many leftists. That encouraged us, because it suggested we had a wide spectrum here and perhaps we had the people who could make this an interesting and memorable conference.

"Number two, it seems to me that this university offers a neutral ground on which to hold this public symposium, and even though there are not many numbers in the audience this morning, we hope that it will continue to improve. We think the wider audience represented by the news media here today will hear this story, often and frequently. Now, if this were Stanford, Michigan, Harvard, or California at Berkeley, these kinds of conferences would be more common. The representatives here would be passing back and forth freely and this would be an everyday kind of occasion. U.S.C. has not been known, however, for taking stands on controversial issues. I am proud today that they have decided to stick with this conference, and I might give President Topping full confidence for standing by his guns from the beginning. President Topping is interested in community affairs and his influence over the last few years has led the University into involvement in all kinds of community problems, including transportation, juvenile delinquency, and so forth. I think we are going to see a flowering of this interest in the years to come. Our own Dean, Henry Reining, has also given us lots of encouragement.

"Finally, this conference is an opportunity to recommit ourselves and our agencies to discovering a lasting solution to our dilemma in race relations in Los Angeles. We hope this can be a new beginning. Many of you have spent years of tireless effort on these problems and may I suggest we recommit ourselves as we listen to this conference to an even greater activity in this area.

"As to groundrules. This is a confrontation and a dialogue. We expect, encourage and hope for sharp differences in opinion and views. Universities are for that purpose and such differences are part of America's pluralistic society. We also expect to have the media cover all the disagreement and all the suggestions and positive contributions.

"I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Dr. Sidney Brossman of the Coordinating Council for their support of this project, the University for its support and facilities, and the fine staff of this conference for their tireless work.

"Without further comment, I would like to introduce John Buggs. Many will recognize John as the Executive Director of the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission. May I suggest that he is not here in that role today. John Buggs is here representing the National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials, of which he is the National President. For some of you who do not know this organization, it is an association of professional intergroup

services to the Watts community. We gathered together a group of advisors, who helped us select a group of top people who spent one day a week for eight weeks going through a consideration of personal and public values, effective executive practices, and new knowledges in the behavioral science of running organizations. The second objective was perhaps more difficult. We proposed another seminar with the same format, in which we would bring in the 'real leaders in Watts.' No one knows who the real leaders are, and it's a cinch that the white man doesn't know who they are, and we're white men. So our objective was to find those who could tell us who the leaders are and meet with them and establish enough trust to communicate, share ideas and all the information we know.

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BEYOND THE MC CONE REPORT

by

John A. Buggs, President

National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials

December 15, 1966

It is, perhaps, illustrative of the confusion and ambivalence that affected all who were in any way concerned with the holocaust that engulfed this community in August 1965 that the official Commission charged with investigating this matter placed at the end of its title of the report a question mark. We all recall that what is generally called the McCone Report was, in actuality titled "Violence in the City - An End or A Beginning?"

Even though the title of the report implied that there was a question in the minds of its authors as to whether or not the August riots or revolt (as some choose to call it) was in fact an end to violence in Los Angeles or merely the harbinger of things to come, the Commission, in the last sentence of its report stated the following:"through the implementation of the programs we propose with the dedication we discuss, and with the leadership we call for from all, our Commission states, without dissent, that the tragic violence that occurred during the six days of August will not be repeated."

From this last sentence in the Commissions' report which suggests firm confidence in the significance of its recommendations as the answer to future violence in the City, if properly implemented, one must conclude that the title of the report was, in fact, not the expression of confusion or ambivalence but a rhetorical question. On the other hand the Commission may have implied in its title, some question as to whether or not the community was prepared to take the measures it was suggesting as the answer to the prevention of future violence.

This paper is not intended to answer this question or is it designed to credit or discredit the findings and recommendations of the Commission. Undoubtedly, the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles riots was faced with not one but three major problems. The Commission was required to provide answers to seventeen questions raised by the Governor in his charge to the Commission - it was also required by the Governor to "develop recommendations for action designed to prevent a recurrence of the tragic disorders." In addition to these two direct charges it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the Commission was faced with another problem that to some extent, presented a more difficult task than those assigned it by the the Governor: the report had to be written so that the antagonisms, antipathies and the wounds that had surfaced during the riots would not be made ore difficult to overcome by the tone and tenor of the Report itself. If this latter observation is accurate one cannot challenge the basic promise of the Commission in deciding on this factor as one of its overriding responsibilities. One may question, however, the success it had in accomplishing this objective and the extent to which this objective interfered with its analysis of the problem and to the Commissions' recommendations for action to prevent a recurrence of the disaster.

There is no doubt about the Commissions' awareness of the potential for additional violence for in its own words it stated unequivocally that "we are seriously concerned that the existing breach, if allowed to persist, could in time split our society irretrievably. - So serious and so explosive is the situation that unless it is checked, the August riots may seem by comparison to be only a curtain-raiser for what could blow up one day in the future."

It is fortunate that this program will include papers from persons well equipped to discuss all of the areas covered by the Governor's Commission. It is not, therefore, intended that this keynote address should be an analysis of the Commissions' report in detail and in depth. The purpose here is simply to briefly analyze the extent to which positive changes have taken place in the months since the Report was issued - to assess the present situation in the South Los Angeles area and to highlight the basic problems that still exist which require the attention of the entire community.

Two conclusions are inescapable to anyone who is able to view dispassionately the events that have occurred since August, 1965 - First that there is more concern on the part of the community in general for the economic and social plight of the Negro in Los Angeles than has ever existed before. The power structure of the community has attempted to implement some of the Commissions' recommendations - especially those having to do with job opportunities. It is equally evident, however, that unemployment is still a major problem facing both the Negro and Mexican-American in Los Angeles. The other inescapable conclusion is that progress in the field of jobs, housing, and the physical rehabilitation of the area is more real than apparent. The progress in job opportunity is real to those who have found employment but this progress is not apparent or real to those who remain unemployed - and unemployment in the riot affected area of South Los Angeles is still at least more than five times the national rate. No man, willing and able to work can believe that the economic situation is better so long as he is out of a job and he is exposed to hundreds of others who are also unemployed.

Plans have been developed for the rebuilding and the rehabilitation of a portion of the Watts community. But until bricks and mortar begins to bind a building together the process of rebuilding is not apparent to those who inhabit the area. One can still see the burned out skeletons of some of the buildings that after more than 16 months have not yet been removed from view.

Transportation - and the difficulty and the cost of moving from one point in the community to another in search of employment or to get to one's job is still almost as much of a problem today as it was prior to August 1965.

Suggestions and recommendations of the Commission regarding a permanent pre-school program throughout the school year to provide education beginning at age three in disadvantaged areas are a long way from being implemented. The bond issues recently rejected by the voters may well herald less rather than greater opportunity for more and better educational programs for all children in the school district.

Perhaps most important of all is the fact that even if we have been able to implement most of the recommendations contained within the Commissions' Report there is serious doubt that the basic problem of potential conflict would have been effectively eliminated.

If there was a serious flaw in the Commissions' recommendations it was the failure to clearly see three things:

1. That full employment for the Negro is not the primary objective or the basic economic problem faced by this group of citizens.
2. That so long as the ghetto remains a fact of social life - making effective, creative communication across racial lines a practical impossibility, estrangement and tension will continue to grow between and among the various elements of our population.
3. That the problem of the Negro - and of the Mexican-American too is inextricably enmeshed with the problem of the complexity of urban life itself and that the one cannot be solved without solving the other.

The Commission, in the final paragraph of its report, stated that - "The problems are deep and the remedies costly." There is a real question as to whether or not the Commission really knew how deep the problems are and how really costly the remedies will be.

It is to the credit of the Governor's Commission that in that section of its report titled 'Summing up - the Need for Leadership' it pointed out the great difficulty faced by the Negro who finds himself ill prepared to cope with the complexities of our changing, automated society. The Commission pointed out that it was "convinced that the Negro can no longer exist as he has with the disadvantages which separates him from the rest of society, deprives him of employment and causes him to drift aimlessly through life."

We doubt though that the recommendations advanced to deal with the situation went far enough. For the disturbances that shook Los Angeles in August of 1965 represent one of the most dramatic evidences of the twin problems facing all metropolitan areas today. Those problems are the fast-growing non-white population which tends, for a variety of reasons, to be concentrated in the core of the Central City and the growing complexity of urban life itself. These twin problems cannot be solved in isolation of each other. They influence and interact with each other. The one can only be solved by successfully attacking the other.

The problem is one of gigantic proportions, for the entire structure of our society is intimately involved in and responsible for its development. Only through a thorough understanding of the economic, social and political factors that contribute to the peculiar nature of the urban complex can we determine the proper cure for the many problems it presents to us.

Almost seventy percent of the American people now live in a world far different from any ever inhabited by man throughout the ages. Never before have more than 130 millions people (our current urban population) lived in such close proximity to each other.

Social scientists and physical planners have, for more than twenty years, been writing on the phenomenon that is the city. New words such as "megalopolis" have had to be coined to differentiate our present urban areas from those of the past. Hans Blumenthal, writing on "the Modern Metropolis" in Scientific American, states that the city "has undergone a qualitative change, so that it is no longer merely a larger version of the traditional city, but a new and different form of human settlement."

All great cities throughout the world face severe problems due to their phenomenal growth and qualitative changes. But in our nation the problem is compounded by the fact of a large minority group population which historically has been isolated from the mainstream of American social, economic and political life. In Los Angeles this "compounded" problem is further complicated by the existence of not one but two large, surging, frustrated minority groups: the Mexican-American and the Negro groups that are not only in conflict and in competition with the dominant group in our society, but are sometimes in conflict and competition with each other in their attempt to improve their respective economic, social and educational position.

Fifty or seventy-five years ago we were much more capable of dealing with our problems than we are today. Communities were much more self-sufficient, our political structure and our economic system were more or less geared to our needs. The political boundaries of cities and counties were much more meaningful, and the problems communities faced could often be solved through the political and economic machinery that has developed over a long period of time.

Such is not now the case. Problems of transportation, communication, law enforcement, physical planning, smog, water, education, employment, and human relations no longer lend themselves to solution solely within the political boundaries of a single city or community within the urban complex. Either a much higher quality of cooperation must be developed between our political jurisdictions or we shall be forced to develop a more workable political structure.

We know these things but we do not yet fully know all the factors with which we have to deal in the solution of the problems faced by the megalopolis; nor do we fully understand the interaction of these factors as a total process.

Those of us who labor in the field of intergroup relations have sought to solve problems of intergroup relations by working directly on the symptoms of the problems. We have sought to deal with the problems of residential segregation by promoting the enactment of legislation and by demonstrations, and by the utilization of other forms of direct action. To a limited degree, these actions have brought some measure of relief; but in each of our great cities--even those with good civil rights legislation and active organizations--the problem of residential segregation continues to grow, rather than to diminish. In short, the harder we work the more difficult the solution of the problem becomes.

This type of frustration is not confined to the intergroup relations professional. Others who attempt to deal with different aspects of this social problem face a similar dilemma.

With thousands of social case workers now in the field, the problems of social welfare are more difficult to solve. With the great growth in personnel laboring in the field of the prevention of crime and delinquency, we are told that these problems are increasing in a geometrical rather than in an arithmetical ratio to population increase. With the vast expansion of our industrial productivity and the constant increase in our gross national product and personal income, we seem unable to provide jobs for millions of men and women. And so it goes in almost every area of social concern.

It would seem that, with all of our progress as a nation, there are those who are exposed to the fact of progress but who are never participants in it. In short, millions of our citizens are effectively isolated from participation in the affluent American economy. Their frustration grows not so much out of the isolation itself as it does from the knowledge that a better life for them is possible and that the high expectations they have been told lie "just around the corner" are as yet unachieved.

We are now in a situation in which those who have, throughout their past history, had only the crumbs of life are not only aware of the existence of "a full table," but are demanding their share of it.

Since August many individuals and organizations in this community have sought to deal more effectively with those problems. It is not a sign of incompetence but a mark of intelligence, we believe, to admit that we do not fully know how to deal with those basic problems. We do know what many of the problems are. We are aware of the history, the tradition and the current situation that gave rise to the conflagration. We are convinced that these problems, in our present era, are intimately involved with the problems of the metropolitan area itself. We are even wise enough to know that we must deal with the problems of the metropolitan area itself. We are even wise enough to know that we must deal with issues and conditions of the metropolitan area itself if we are to be successful in preventing another holocaust. We are also humble enough to know that neither we nor any other group of individuals have the intelligence or the internal capacity of knowing how to analyze all the social, economic and political factors effectively enough to get a well-defined picture of the ills of our social system.

But this we do know--and know it well. No lasting solution to the problems of minority group persons in our nation is possible until we do understand more intimately our social system, our motivations and behavior as human beings living in a society with other human beings, and the necessity to create a mechanism through which we can begin to work effectively with all who are involved in planning for and dealing with the physical and social development of our society. Our problem, then, like all others dealing with man and his social structure, is to find a way not only to know all of the elements of the problem, but to discover a means of fitting the problems together in such a way that they can be dealt with effectively.

Earlier in this paper it was suggested that full employment would not be the answer to the problem faced by the Negro or the Mexican-American in our community. America is a capitalistic society and its greatness has been based upon an economic system of free enterprise.

We must be candid and honest as we interpret the underlying causes of the August riots. The selectivity with which the destruction of property took place was plainly a protest - irrational though it may have been - against exclusion from being a full partner in our economic system. We must, therefore, provide an opportunity not just for full employment, but for ownership in our system of free enterprise for Negroes and Mexican-Americans on a scale hitherto unknown in this country. People do not burn what they own - they do not destroy that which they have been instrumental in creating.

It is an almost unbelievable fact that less than 250 million dollars represents the total ownership stake of business enterprises by a Negro population in Los Angeles County of more than 650,000 persons. This ownership stake is represented by one insurance company, four savings and loan associations and one bank. It is significant that there is no substantial retail or wholesale business of any kind nor is there any significant business enterprise producing goods for sale owned wholly or partially by any Negro individual or group in the County. I suspect that this same statement could be made concerning the Mexican-American community.

It would be an interesting experiment if one of the large nationally operated firms in our county would form a wholly owned subsidiary to market the identical retail products as does the parent company; that this subsidiary be organized on an interracial basis, with Negroes and Mexican-Americans in high administrative and executive positions; with the parent company providing the necessary training and business guidance to this minority group personnel until, through experience, they become proficient in the operation of the business.

Such a business could and should have outlets in every section of the County--not just in minority group areas. The personnel to be trained should be, as far as possible, indigenous to this community. A public relations program of major proportions should be entered into to "let the people know" that American business and industry is helping them to own and operate a slice of the free enterprise structure, and not confining them forever to be simply workers in the system.

If private industry of a highly diversified nature could mount ten such projects, and locate their initial business sites in the Mexican-American and Negro communities--all on an interracial basis, with regard to both management and workers--we will have begun to create a new pattern of economic opportunity that we believe would make well nigh impossible a repetition of the August riots, so far as the economic base of those disturbances is concerned.

But beyond the economic problem lies the issue of the ghetto itself. It is unfortunate that the Governor's Commission did not deal directly with this problem, for unquestionably, in the minds of many persons working in the field of intergroup relations, the dissolution of the ghetto is a sine quo non to the reduction of interracial tension and the creation of a stable community in which peace and harmony can, with almost absolute certainty, be achieved, so far as interracial conflict on a broad scale is concerned.

This problem would be difficult enough to solve without the new and complicating factor of a significant group in the Negro community who now reject housing integration as an immediate goal. There are also those who reject it as a long term goal - thus joining the more reactionary elements in the dominant society who would wish to keep the ghetto inviolate--albeit for different reasons. There are those among us who feel, at the very least, that integration is of secondary importance and that the first order of business is making ghetto a decent place in which to live and helping those in the ghetto find the good life where they are--to look inward to only their own group for solace, comfort, acceptance and progress, to forego the dream of a society in which all men can live together as equals. There are those who have become so frustrated that they can no longer see that integration and the uplift of the masses are not mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary, neither of these two goals can be accomplished without working toward both. We can make life meaningful and fruitful for those who live in the ghetto--at the same time we must remove the symbol of Negro inferiority which a segregated society implies.

We contend that these three things: Bringing minority group persons into the mainstream of our free enterprise system, finding a solution to the problem of urban life itself--and working toward the dissolution of the ghetto--represent the real challenges that face us.

The overriding need is to create an economic and social climate in which every person can feel that he is an integral part of this community while maintaining his own diversity and his own cultural heritage.

These are, I humbly submit, the tasks that confront us today. We must see beyond providing palliatives to keep the masses quiet - we must bring them into the stature of full acceptance as human beings with no limitations on their involvement in any sphere of community life. To do this effectively and with dispatch is to insure to ourselves peace and harmony in our time.

CHAPTER 2

Chapter 2

McCONE COMMISSION CONSULTANTS' PERSPECTIVES

The second session, from 2:00-5:00 P.M., Thursday afternoon, was chaired by Mr. Thomas Sheridan, General Counsel and Executive Director, Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riot, and featured papers written by several of the McCone Commission Consultants. The first paper, by Dr. Joseph Boskin, Associate Professor of History, University of Southern California, presented a history of race riots in the United States in which he identified several factors associated with conflict between Caucasians and Negroes and the rise of a second, more recent form of aggression which he defined as "riots of release and recrimination directed against police and property." Dr. Kent Lloyd, himself a McCone consultant on human relations agencies, had recommended the creation of a joint city-county anti-discrimination commission with enforcement powers, and considered the action taken by the Los Angeles City Council as a five-year step backward. He also argued that the absence of behavioral scientists and intergroup relations experts as consultants or staff members to the Commission seriously limited the scope of the Report. Mr. Paul Bullock, of U.C.L.A.'s Institute of Industrial Relations, and McCone Commission consultant on unemployment, observed that simply recommending training and job placement programs while dealing only superficially with some of these critical and complex problems, the Report manages to strike the worst possible balance.

Mr. Chauncey A. Alexander, Executive Director of the Los Angeles County Heart Association, read a paper prepared by another McCone consultant, Dr. Frances L. Feldman, USC Associate Professor of Social Work, in which she accused the commissioners of not only failing to suggest specific measures that might have led to improved effectiveness of welfare programs, but also of restating stereotypes, which tends both to reinforce hostility toward public welfare agencies and recipients and to increase barriers obstructing the attainment of generally accepted public welfare objectives.

Dr. Kenneth Martyn, Vice President of Academic Affairs, California State College at Los Angeles, defended the Commission's recommendations in the field of education as "surgery--not aspirin" and insisted that the Commission's recommendations to begin teaching poverty area children at age three, to drastically reduce class sizes and increase the number of personnel handling emotionally disturbed students in minority regions "is the radical remedy that is needed". Since the Commission had no consultant in the field of Law Enforcement, author Paul Jacobs, Staff Member, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, was invited to participate on the panel as a special guest. Mr. Jacobs characterized the Los Angeles Police Department as technically efficient although visualizing itself as a "combat unit" above scrutiny by the public. He criticized the McCone Report because of its narrow, limited and too legalistic view of law enforcement. (See below for complete texts of papers and panel commentary).

A HISTORY OF RACE RIOTS IN URBAN AREAS

by

Dr. Joseph Boskin*

One of the most profound themes in American history is the estrangement between Caucasians and Negroes. Despite the plethora of studies into White-Black relationships, few social scientists have delved into the nature and history of race riots and racial outbursts in the twentieth century. This article is a chronological and analytical study of major riots which have occurred in urban communities involving Negroes from 1900 to the summer of 1965.

Two different types of riots have occurred in the twentieth century. The first involved the direct clash of Caucasians and Negroes and have been described as "race riots." With the exception of the Harlem riots of 1935 and 1943, these confrontations comprised the main expression of racial violence from the turn of the century to the summer of 1964. The second type of rioting initially occurred in the summer of 1964 and has been the prevailing form of Negro aggression to the present. With few exceptions, these riots may be defined as riots of release and recrimination directed against police and property

Urban Riots, 1900-1964: From the beginning of the United States' entrance into the First World War until 1964, there were many large-scale urban disturbances which reflected social violence. The most intense conflict resulted when the minority group attempted to disrupt the accepted accommodative pattern or when the dominant group defined the situation in which such an attempt was being made.

What were the elements in East St. Louis, Washington, D.C., Chicago, Harlem and Detroit which brought about these riots? Several general patterns emerge:

(1) Without exception, some extraordinary social condition prevailed at the time of the outbreak; i.e., it was either wartime, a period of postwar readjustment, or a depression.

(2) Coupled with extenuating social conditions are the facts that five of the riots began on weekends, in the hot months of June, July, and August. These physical circumstances resulted in the accumulation of a large idle population upon which a riot could draw.

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The author is an associate professor of history and co-director of the American Studies Program at the University of Southern California. He is one of several faculty members who made reports to the McCone Commission.

(3) The role of rumor is important when we consider the frequency with which exaggerated versions of events (or wholly fabricated stories) contributed to already strong antagonisms.

(4) The frustration felt by Negroes who moved North only to find a more subtle form of discrimination than that which they experienced in the South was a factor in both the Detroit and Harlem Riots of 1943.

(5) The police have been more widely criticized than any other authority-bearing group involved in these riots. Only in New York did nonpartisan observers endorse the conduct of the police. In the other cities, there was much fault-finding in connection with police brutality and discrimination against Negroes, and their concomitant lenience with white rioters.

(6) The most important variable in the six riots appears to be the factor of aggression. Regardless of the immediate causative factors which initiated the riots, their character was essentially determined by the race of the aggressor group. In the two Harlem riots, for instance, the aggressors were Negroes; in the remaining riots it was the whites who attacked Negroes or invaded Negro neighborhoods. In the former, rioting took the form of action against white-affiliated businesses; in the latter, violence was conducted against Negroes by semi-organized bands of whites. The Harlem riots, therefore, may be characterized as primarily economic, and only subordinately racial. In the other four incidents of rioting, the primary factor seems to have been that of racial prejudice.

Riots of Summer, 1964: In 1964, the Northern ghettos of the United States were beset by rioting, bloodshed and apparent chaos. The violent disturbances occurred at a time when the Negro population was said to be gaining considerably in America because of the pressures of the civil rights movement. What were the elements in Harlem, Rochester, Jersey City, Elizabeth, Paterson, Chicago, and Philadelphia which brought about these riots?

The patterns of the riots showed remarkable similarity--thrusts at police and white businessmen characterized by the destruction of property with missiles and Molotov cocktails. The areas which spawned them likewise contain similar conditions: immediate complaints of police brutality, poor housing, unemployment, control of economy by whites, lack of political power, and a blind assault upon the "system" which appeared to be the inaccessible origin of the multitude of miseries which Northern Negroes faced.

Each of the riots which took place in the summer of 1964 was characterized by a kind of desperation. The riots raised a question which seemed peculiar: Why did the violence occur in the North where Negroes do not face blatant segregation as in the South? Why have Southern Negroes (whose oppression is apparently greater) been able to fight for improvements through non-violent demonstrations if Northern Negroes were forced to turn to destructive violence? A variety of factors are included in the answer. They range from the subtlety of Northern discrimination and the apparent progress in an era of prosperity to the depth and complexity of the economic and political problems and the psychological

depression of alienation from the power structure. Any solutions to the crisis in the ghettos is infinitely more complex than the crisis itself.

A key element in the Northern Negro's situation is the lack of clarity in his relationship to the white society. Dean Harper, analyst of the Rochester riots, explains:

"In the South, the Negro knows what he can and cannot do, but in the North, his position is less clear. . . . If he applies for a job and is not hired, is it because he is not qualified or because he is a Negro?"

Civil rights activists note the difference in the protest of the Northern Negro. In the words of a Negro leader, it is "much looser. There is an overabundance of leaders . . . The attack is . . . on a social system based on indifference and a white power structure that is often hard to define."

Related to this is the lack of obvious legislative recourse in the North. The pressure of the Federal government through Congress and the courts is evident in the South, but has little effect in the North. In New York, where the riots were most severe, the legislation just passed by Congress was relatively meaningless. The New York Times reported in early July that "essentially every provision of the new Federal law had been previously adopted by the state legislature. Most of these state laws against racial and religious discrimination are broader and stronger than the Federal statute." These laws meant little in terms of removing the stigma attached to the ghetto.

Kenneth Clark makes a point which is significant in the situation of the Northern Negro:

"No totally oppressed people ever revolt or rebel. Now I use your word 'revolt' in this sense: The Negroes' revolution comes as a consequence of what white liberals call progress. The closer a human being gets to a goal, obvious the more restive he gets in wanting that goal.

"Accelerated impatience and the lowering of the threshold of frustration toward remaining inequities, paradoxically increase the chances of racial tensions and ferment and conflict. Failure would reinforce the sense of stagnation and despair and establish as fact the sense of personal and group powerlessness."

Thus, the gains which have been achieved by the civil rights movement in the last five years, and not the atmosphere of agitation created by the movement have heightened the impatience of the Negroes in the North.

Compounding the problem is the relative prosperity of the American society as a whole. The Negro sees whites becoming richer around him. He sees his own condition improve less rapidly. His expectations in sharing the prosperity are naturally high. One sociologist comments:

"Negroes are improving their material conditions of life but are not doing so at the same rate as whites. This is the perfect situation to create feelings of relative deprivation leading to rebellion."

This economic situation is the result of several factors: the problem of securing a job, with or without discrimination, the reluctance of labor unions to assist, the white ownership of Negro-area businesses, the high cost of living in the slums, and the connection that the Negro cannot help make between his economic deprivation and his race. In the areas where rioting took place, the unemployment rates were noticeably higher than in other areas of those cities.

Exacerbating this is the Northern Negro's alienation from the white economic structure and the white ownership of most businesses in Negro ghetto areas. This complaint was heard in many of the riot zones. In Dixmoor, the riot was centered around a white-owned business. Stores and businesses which were owned by Negroes were often left undisturbed in the looting.

This description of the Northern Negro as a member of the lower economic class of the society is compounded by his racial existence as a "second-class" citizen. In an interview, Oscar Handlin states he believes the Negro is basically trying to escape the "slum" rather than the "ghetto" but that "the slum in this circumstance is also the 'ghetto' and he sees the two things together." Kenneth Clark comments also on the seriousness of this combination of economic repression and racial suppression:

"The poor are always alienated from normal society, and when the poor are Negro, as they increasingly are in American cities, a double trauma exists-- rejection on the basis of class and race is a danger to the stability of the society as a whole. . . The social dynamics of the dark ghettos can be seen as the restless thrust of a lower-class group to rise into the middle class."

The riots in the Watts area in the summer of 1965--a disturbance which shocked most Caucasians because they had been largely unaware of the psychological and economic plight of the Negro--had as its source the identical causal factors which underlay the riots in other cities. Resentment against the police whom the Negroes regarded upon as an occupying army, frustration in their inability to find employment, anger at the increasing prosperity of American society in which they did not share, bitterness at being economically exploited, and anguish at being kept at the lowest rung of the social ladder, all combined to create the conditions which led to the explosive outburst in Watts. It is significant that the Negroes of Watts (and in the Northern cities in 1964), did not leave their area to attack whites but remained within the confines of their community to register the protests. Similar to the riots of the previous year, the Negroes in Watts systematically destroyed the businesses of merchants and of professionals whom they felt were discriminating against them. Although unorganized, Negroes spontaneously converged and attacked stores and shops which had been exploiting them for many years. Unfortunately, other men lost their establishments when the fires raged beyond control.

Thus, all of these factors point to a feeling of alienation and powerlessness on the part of the Northern Negro which leads him to a resentment of the white community and its "system." In every aspect of his life, he feels the power structure seems to militate against him. The channels for social redress described above are, for the most part, closed. The riots of the present would appear, then, to be the result of release and rebellion against the past.

HUMAN RELATIONS AGENCIES AND THE McCONE COMMISSION REPORT:
FOR LOS ANGELES, AN END OR A BEGINNING?

by

Kent Lloyd

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During the past decade white citizens have witnessed a revolution in the rights of Negro Americans. Beginning with the historic Supreme Court decision on school desegregation in 1954, the invalidity of state-imposed discrimination has been legally proclaimed wherever called into question--in public recreation, public housing, public accommodations, the administration of criminal justice, voting, employment and education.¹ For most Negro Americans living in city ghettos, however, the wheels of social change move slowly and painfully. The ideals of equal opportunity spoken of in the American creed fail to materialize in daily contacts with members of the white community who have been unable to resolve their personal dilemma in race relations; furthermore, it now appears that deep-rooted racial discrimination cannot be separated from such inter-related issues as poverty, public education, unemployment, health, transportation, juvenile delinquency and crime--all characteristic of exploding urban populations. In frustration some Negroes have turned to slogans like "black power" that clearly frighten many white Americans, intensifying feelings that most urban communities have not yet passed their crisis in black and white.

The Urban Race Riot as a Symptom of Deeper Social Problems

One consequence of community failure in race relations is illustrated most dramatically in a modern urban phenomenon--the race riot. During the summer of 1964 Negro communities in New York City, Rochester, Jersey City, Paterson, Elizabeth, Chicago and Philadelphia were stricken; in August, 1965, Los Angeles was terrorized by the worst riot in the nation's history, in which 34 persons were killed, 1,032 more were injured, 3,952 were arrested and property damage was estimated at \$40,000,000.² The third straight riot summer, in 1966, saw boarder clashes between races in Chicago, Brooklyn, Baltimore, Cleveland and San Francisco, demonstrating that widespread racial unrest was not restricted to Los Angeles. There were also signs of a growing backlash; in Chicago angry homeowners threatened Negro marchers in suburban neighborhoods. Nearly half of the whites interviewed by Newsweek pollsters--59 per cent in the cities--admit feeling uneasy on the streets, and the specter of violence has turned 63% of them against even peaceful protest demonstrations.³

The major argument of this paper is as follows: one practical stop-gap alternative to a decade of race riots is the effective public administration of legally enforceable widely supported local community anti-discrimination agencies. It rests on three assumptions: (1) Americans generally support the concept of equality of opportunity for all citizens regardless of race, color or national

origin; (2) urban race riots represent community failures in intergroup relations and (3) at least ten years will pass before political, economic, educational, religious and family institutions have adjusted to the Negro revolution in America

During the past two decades lawmakers at the federal level, in some twenty-nine states and in more than fifty municipalities, have enacted legislation patterned after New York's 1945 pioneering fair employment practices act (FEPC), designed to eliminate discrimination because of race, color or religion.⁵ These federal and state laws are seen by supporters as simply an initial step to broader coverage that eventually will include housing, public accommodations and education.⁶ On the local level, by 1965, 263 municipal human relations committees, councils, and commissions had been organized in a number of larger metropolitan areas. Some of the more active agencies are to be found in Baltimore, Cleveland, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Paul and Toledo.⁷ Most observers agree that such local approaches have succeeded in reducing community tensions through education, conciliation and persuasion activities; officials representing older agencies, however, believe that success is possible only when local enforcement ordinances have been enacted.⁸

The full set of conditions that make for success in community relations appear to be varied and complex. Most public and private administrators continue to operate their organizations without valid indicators that measure and evaluate performance in terms of publicly stated goals and objectives. Nevertheless, some progress has been made. In a recent comparative study of state civil rights commissions, top officials and minority, economic and political interest group representatives in New York, New Jersey, Michigan and Oregon were asked to identify factors by which to judge the performance of their agencies.⁹

The observations of these intergroup practitioners, representing more than two decades of human relations experience, have been incorporated into the following proposal for a municipal human relations agency where minority group members comprise at least ten per cent of the urban population. Most anti-discrimination agencies at the federal, state and local levels in the past twenty years were created to protect middle class Negro citizens who have skills to compete in middle class American life if given an equal opportunity; this proposal is also designed to begin dealing with the more critical problem of our urban centers-- the generation of Ghetto Negroes trapped in a downward spiral of frustration, dependency and despair.

A Stop-Gap Proposal

A local Human Relations Commission should be established, composed of nine part-time members with four-year overlapping terms and power to elect their own chairman. Each commissioner should be selected for his training and experience in research, employment, housing, education, justice, youth problems, and community organization. The commission should appoint a qualified chief administrative officer who is responsible for developing an over-all philosophy and for the general administration of all agency programs approved by the commission. Other administrative officers should include directors of a research division; an educational division; an employment division; a housing division; a justice division; a youth and economic disadvantaged division; a public information division; a

community organization, tension control and conciliation division; and a secretarial and auxiliary service division.

The City Human Relations Commission acting through its chairman should be empowered to: (1) develop a comprehensive community education program designed to enlist the cooperation of all community groups, both public and private, in human relations programs and campaigns devoted to eliminating group prejudice and discrimination in all areas of employment, housing, education, public accommodations, justice, and special programs designed for youth and the economically disadvantaged; (2) develop a comprehensive research program by recruiting or contracting technically qualified personnel to build adequate documentary resource materials on racial discrimination in all countries, conduct statistical studies of discrimination practices, determine indicators of effective compliance by public and private organizations, and analyze internal agency performance; (3) develop a competent legal staff to assist in building an enforcement program designed to receive and investigate complaints of discrimination and make studies and recommend legislation to city officials; and (4) develop a personnel recruitment committee to identify qualified commissioners, agency executives, staff consultants and specialists, and advisory committee members together with an ongoing program to encourage colleges and universities to both provide executive development training for agency personnel and encourage graduates to seek careers in the intergroup relations field.

To undertake a serious program of this magnitude in our major urban centers would require a local budget of at least \$750,000 annually. The major components of such a budget would include: personnel salaries for approximately fifty professionals at \$470,000; secretarial staff personnel salaries at \$50,000; a college fellowship and agency executive training program at \$60,000; commissioner per diem expenses of \$20,000; and general office expenses of \$150,000.

Some, of course, will object that the price of operating such a specialized agency is too high. The price of any service depends on how highly the community values prevention as opposed to the cost of a civil disaster. In Los Angeles, a city that was ranked first in terms of ten basic aspects of Negro life among sixty-eight cities that were examined by the Urban League in 1964, the lesson is most striking. The McCone Commission report of that city's last riot estimates property damage alone at \$40,000,000; City Administrative Officer C. Erwin Piper estimates that it cost the city approximately \$2,411,745.10

Action in Los Angeles: A Five Year Step Backward

On November 1, 1965, the consultant working paper, "Public Administration of Human Relations Agencies: An Analysis and Proposal for Los Angeles County," was submitted to the McCone Commission staff by this writer. It contained a recommendation, based on research experience with federal, state, and local anti-discrimination agencies, to establish a joint City-County Human Relations Agency much like the model described as a stop-gap proposal above. This proposal was designed to improve the performance of the nationally recognized Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission by enlarging its functional jurisdiction, backing its activities by enforceable legislation, continuing the rationale for county-wide human relations planning, programs and activities, expanding its

professional staff capabilities without duplicating facilities, and providing for a greater financial base of operations by equal contributions from City and County sources. The report also argued that to establish a new separate city human relations commission would in effect be to cripple the operation of the County Commission by limiting its jurisdiction, splintering its major activities, threatening its financial and personnel resource base, and generally setting back professional intergroup relations activity in Los Angeles about five years or more.

In its final report, on page 83, the McCone Commission reversed the recommendations of its consultant and called for the creation of an independent city agency,

With particular respect to the City of Los Angeles, we urge the immediate creation of a City Human Relations Commission, endowed with clear cut responsibility, properly staffed and adequately funded. We envisage a commission composed of a chairman and six members with special competence in the fields of research, employment, housing, education, law, youth problems and community organizations. This City Commission would develop comprehensive educational programs designed to enlist the cooperation of all groups, both public and private, in eliminating prejudice and discrimination in employment, housing, education, and public accommodations.¹¹

Acting on previous attempts to create a city human relations agency and encouraged by the recommendations of the McCone Report, the Los Angeles City Council established an independent City Human Relations Commission without enforcement powers, nine part-time commissioners, and executive director, two professionals, and two secretaries; and a 1966-67 fiscal year budget of \$50,000. Although scheduled to begin operation in February of this year, the agency actually began operation on September 1, 1966, when the newly appointed executive officer took office. Two weeks later, at the first organizational meeting of the new city commission, as anticipated by the earlier consultant report, the chairman set the record straight by declaring, "Let me make it very clear that the Los Angeles City Human Relations Commission is the official and jurisdictional authority over human relations matters in the City of Los Angeles. We feel the County Human Relations Commission will have ample work in the county area without being necessarily involved in city problems."¹²

Conclusions

The long road to better intergroup relations is narrow, difficult and uncertain; but for those living in urban centers there is no other path. Pioneer lawmakers at the federal, state and municipal level have charted the way. Despite two decades of state experience with anti-discrimination legislation, however, attempts to improve performance of municipal, state and federal agencies have met with frustration. This frustration undoubtedly reflects some hard realities associated with both politics and administration of civil rights legislation. Getting legislation enacted is clearly one thing; getting it enforced is another. Where decision-makers see their values threatened by basic changes in the social, economic and political life of their community, they are likely to

react by creating impotent paper tiger human relations committees designed mainly to pacify troubled citizen groups.

It seems incredible that political leaders in the Los Angeles community could so completely misread signs posted in every urban center in the United States during the past two-year period. In the wake of the bloodiest race riot in our history, with few exceptions, the response of the Los Angeles City Council, the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors, the State of California and the private community institutions to the challenge of Watts has been a denial of the basic problems associated with the role of the Negro American in a poverty-ridden community. It appears that few public and private leaders have come to fully understand that all community institutions--political, governmental, economic, educational, religious and family--must undergo basic long-range changes if we are to solve our American dilemma in race relations and poverty. And yet, three summers of dramatic race riots demonstrate that today's urban leadership can hardly wait for such long-range social adjustments.

Lessons from past state and local experience mean little where policy-makers and public administrators fail to develop effective prevention programs at the community level as an alternative to the modern urban race riot. On the operating level, it appears that the intergroup relations expert has thus far failed to sell himself to policy-makers, public administrators and the general public as an expert worthy of consultation before or during the outbreak of community hostilities. The recent example of Los Angeles is illustrative; both in the months preceding the riot and during its initial stages neither Mayor Samuel Yorty nor his police chief, William Parker, thought it appropriate to seek the advice of state, county, or city agency or neighboring university intergroup relations experts. In appointing a panel of experts to the McCone Commission investigating the causes of the riot, Governor Brown failed to appoint a single intergroup specialist or behavioral scientist as either a commission member or permanent staff member. Such oversight reflects a serious gap between the policy-maker on one hand and the professional and academic intergroup relations expert on the other.

It appears that in the coming decade, while institutional resources are being "tooled up," policy-makers and public administrators will be forced to handle intergroup tensions on a daily crisis-to-crisis basis, always with the specter of a major race riot should they fail. Immediate steps, then, should be taken to coordinate efforts of professional intergroup relations experts now administering a variety of federal, state and local public and private anti-discrimination programs. A stop-gap proposal to achieve these short-range objectives includes the creation of a dynamic human relations commission on the urban level with adequate enforcement powers, qualified policy-making commissioners, professionally trained administrative and intergroup specialists in research, public information, community organization and tension control, enforcement, employment, housing and education. Cooperative sponsorship by citizens groups, community seminars and conferences such as we are holding on the University campus here today, together with visible political commitment and major financial support by elected leaders will make our next few years' journey down that road to better urban race relations shorter, less difficult for those who follow, and our destination more certain.

FOOTNOTES

1. This paper is taken from a larger article, "An End or a Beginning? Urban Race Riots vs. Effective Anti-Discrimination Agencies," to be published in the British Journal of Public Administration, Spring 1967, and the consultant report, "Public Administration of Human Relations Agencies: An Analysis and Proposal for Los Angeles County," submitted November 1, 1965, to the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riot.
2. Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riot, "Violence in the City--An End or a Beginning," (1965), pp. 1-2.
3. See William Brink and Louis Harris, The Negro Revolution in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964); also see special Newsweek issue updating the survey of U.S. racial attitudes today, August 22, 1966.
4. Terminology for these agencies apparently depends on traditions that have developed at each governmental level. For example, federal officials attempt to stress the concept of "equality" in titling such as "The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity," "The Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission," and "The President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in Housing." State government officials, following the New York pattern, refer to "anti-discrimination commissions" with formal titles that refer to "Fair Employment Practices Commissions," and "The Governor's Code of Fair Practices." Meanwhile, New York officials have moved another step by re-titling their agency the "New York State Commission for Human Rights." At the municipal level, where public agencies usually lack enforcement provisions, the term "Human Relations Commission" has been most common for denoting non-enforcement, conciliatory and persuasive approaches to community intergroup tensions.
5. Some question the wisdom of passing laws as a means of solving what Gunnar Myrdal has referred to as "An American Dilemma," in which white Americans experience a "moral uneasiness" in their failure to practice their belief in the American Creed. In questioning the utility of law as an educational tool we often fail to distinguish properly between a person's prejudice and his acts of discrimination. Most authorities would argue that civil rights laws, like other types of social legislation, are designed to strike only at discriminatory behavior; for example, the courts have consistently upheld legislation designed to regulate zoning, building standards, smoke control, minimum wages, workman's compensation, payments, collective bargaining, and public health programs, where private attitudes or property rights appear to be in conflict with the public interest. The importance of civil rights law, then, is not that it prohibits or eliminates prejudiced attitudes, but that it alters social institutions and behavior that encourage harmful community practices. Experience over the past twenty years with local, state and federal anti-discrimination legislation, enforced by independent regulatory commissions which stress techniques of conciliation and persuasion but with ultimate recourse to public hearings and court-enforceable cease-and-desist orders, generally supports this point of view.

For a comprehensive review, see Paul H. Mоргren and Samuel E. Hill, Toward Fair Employment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Jacob

Javitz, Discrimination, U.S.A. (New York: Washington Square Press, 1962); Jack Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); and Kent M. Lloyd, Solving an American Dilemma: The Role of the FEPC Official: A Comparative Study of State Civil Rights Commissions (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Stanford University, 1963).

6. Following the enactment of FEPC in New York in 1945, similar state laws were enacted in New Jersey in 1945; Massachusetts, 1946; Connecticut, 1947; New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island and Washington in 1949; Michigan, Minnesota and Pennsylvania in 1955; Colorado and Wisconsin in 1957; California and Ohio in 1959; Illinois, Kansas and Missouri in 1961; Alaska, Hawaii and Indiana in 1963; and Arizona, Iowa, Montana, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming, all in 1965. Delaware (1960), Idaho (1961), and Vermont (1963) all have FEPC laws without administrative agencies to enforce them. Oklahoma and West Virginia have voluntary acts, while Nebraska forbids both unions and suppliers of military goods to discriminate in collective bargaining.

At the federal level, a number of executive orders have been issued by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson, advancing the cause of non-discrimination in the Armed Forces. The President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) was also created with power to eliminate employment discrimination in the federal government and among government contractors.

In Congress, the first civil rights legislation to protect Negro voting rights in almost one hundred years was enacted in 1957, strengthened in 1960, 1964, and again in 1965. Federal agencies created by these acts include the United States Commission on Civil Rights (1957), which investigates denial of the right to vote and appraises federal policies relating to the equal protection of the laws in other areas; the Community Relations Service (1964) a unit of the Department of Commerce that assists communities in resolving disputes arising from discriminatory practices which impair rights guaranteed by federal law or which affect interstate commerce; and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1964), which investigates charges and seeks to resolve disputes involving discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin by conciliation with employment agencies and large employers and labor unions.

For a summary of Federal Civil Rights Legislation (together with federal agencies responsible for enforcing civil rights legislation), see Revolution in Civil Rights (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 76.

7. Norgren and Hill, op. cit., p. 94; Municipal Human Relations Commissions: Organizations and Programs (Chicago: ICMA, July 1966), Report #270.
8. Guidelines for Municipal Relations Committees (Washington, D.C.: The National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials, 1964).

9. Conclusions presented in this section have been drawn largely from the study by Kent Lloyd, Solving an American Dilemma: A Comparative Study of State Civil Rights Commissions.
10. "Violence in the City--An End or a Beginning?" Report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riot, pp. 1-3. City Administrative Officer C. Erwin Piper is quoted from the August 28, 1965, issue of the Los Angeles Times.
11. Op. cit., "Violence in the City--An End or a Beginning?" Report by the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riot, p. 53.
12. Los Angeles Times (September 14, 1966), p. 26.

December 15, 1966

The McCone Report Revisited: Employment
(Paul Bullock, Assistant Research Economist, Institute of Industrial
Relations, UCLA)

Despite our boasted sophistication in economic and technical matters and the strides in computer technology, the incontrovertible fact is that we have little precise knowledge of the amount and severity of unemployment or underemployment by subareas of the county (such as Watts). We did not know at the time of the August, 1965, riot, nor at the time the McCone report was prepared, nor do we know today with any real precision, the figures on unemployment rates, extent of physical and emotional deprivation, effectiveness of existing retraining programs, or any of the other critical information needed to evaluate progress and form the basis for decisions. The statistics on unemployment offered in the McCone Commission report are essentially guesses, much above the "official" figures from the 1960 regular and 1965 special censuses, but probably not too far off the mark.

The simple fact is that the poor (especially the minorities) apparently do not show up in full measure in the censuses or surveys; they are harder to reach, suspicious of poll-takers, and conscious of real or imagined threats to their security if the "wrong" answers are given. The special census conducted in November, 1965, counted almost 5,000 fewer people in Watts than the population estimate for the same area by the City Planning Commission as of October, 1965; every indication is that the estimate is much closer to the truth than the census.

Of course, we are now inundated by figures on governmental and private programs which allegedly are placing large numbers of the south Los Angeles

unemployed (or underemployed) in employment and training: the Neighborhood Youth Corps under the antipoverty program; special services by the State Employment Service; the private business operations sparked by Harold McClellan through the Management Council for Merit Employment, Research, and Training; the new Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC) initially funded by the Ford Foundation; "Operation Bootstrap;" the Community Skills Center, the Watts Skills Center, and other programs administered through or under contract with the U.S. Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW); the Urban League's on-the-job training program; and countless other activities. In some cases, these are still in the development stage; in cases where programs actually are in effect, the figures on placements made, jobs developed, or trainees enrolled contrast sharply with the seemingly general lack of awareness of such efforts in the poverty pockets like Watts. The reason apparently is that the most disadvantaged persons--those with police records, little or no skill and education, infirmities of health or age, emotional problems, and so forth--are insufficiently reached. In most cases, there is no way of knowing how many people in these difficult categories are included in the superficially impressive statistics. My suspicion is that the proportion remains relatively small.

To oversimplify somewhat, the unemployment problem in south Los Angeles can be divided into two rather distinct parts: (1) unemployment (or underemployment) among those whose problems in the labor market have arisen mainly from racial discrimination or from purely economic forces, and (2) unemployment among those who carry additional burdens as well, related to cultural or environmental limitations imposed by existing society. The measures taken so far, insofar as they have been effective at all, relate primarily to the

first group, and predominantly to those persons who are already qualified (or near qualified) and can readily be placed in available jobs with larger employers in the area. This is a genuine achievement, not to be minimized in any respect, but it fails to meet the core of the fundamental socio-economic problem in the disadvantaged sections of south Los Angeles. The complex problem we now confront is linked with the pervasive and sometimes subtle discrimination in employment against persons whose cultural backgrounds are different from those of most employers.

This is not to suggest, of course, that racial discrimination in the conventional overt or legally actionable sense has become unimportant; though the factual evidence is difficult to obtain, it would appear that discrimination remains intense in the smaller and medium-sized firms and even in some of the larger enterprises not under immediate pressure from government agencies. The point I make is that even in the absence of discrimination in this sense, the major economic needs of those in the "hard core" category are not satisfied by governmental or private programs directed entirely to persons who, except for skin color or Spanish name, could readily pass for Anglos. Further, when inferior education and other characteristics of enforced ghettoization are used by employers as a justification for not hiring or not promoting Negroes or Mexican Americans, the factor of discrimination has simply assumed a more obscure and indirect form. The society which imposes housing segregation and ineffective education upon certain minorities cannot then disclaim responsibility when employers use these deficiencies as plausible reasons for preserving an all-Anglo work force.

The problems of the unskilled and uneducated adult in south central Los Angeles are especially acute, because many of the existing programs are

directed mainly to the youngsters. Institutional training does not seem to have reached a sufficient number of persons in this category, nor is it likely to do so. Quite correctly, the emphasis recently has shifted to more training on the job, which is infinitely preferable for those many residents of the ghetto whose experience (if any) in the classroom has been unhappy. In my judgment, however, something additional is required if the needs of this group are to be met realistically. There are many areas of public service-- in education, health care, recreation, probation and parole, vocational counseling and job placement, as merely a few examples--in which useful and valuable work opportunities could be created for persons not "qualified" for the conventional jobs open in private industry or elsewhere in government. No one can dispute the fact that the frustration and alienation of the so-called "unemployables" produce overwhelming social costs, in terms of a reduced national output, more crime and delinquency, added welfare assistance, and so on. Of course I am aware that the present neurotic fear of inflation and the escalation in Vietnam make it exceedingly difficult to gain legislative support for necessary domestic programs, but new strategies could well be developed.

Physically, the south central community is very much the same today as it was in late August of 1965; various urban renewal plans are being developed, but the planners and administrators can give no guarantee that the new facilities will provide any jobs at all to the vast majority of unemployed or underemployed persons in the area itself. The USC clinic now being developed for Watts, incidentally, has pioneered in a refreshing way by giving priority to the employment of local residents in as many jobs as possible. However, few persons, either in public agencies or private businesses, are now prepared

to take the necessary risks and responsibilities entailed in tailoring jobs to the needs of the hard-core unemployed or underemployed. It should be emphasized, in this regard, that employment as such does not inevitably solve the problem of poverty. Many employed persons in the Watts area fail to earn enough over an average year to raise their families above the "poverty" level, and much employment is irregular or "dead-end" in the sense that it carries little or no opportunity for advancement. Some jobs are being automated out of existence.

The psychological and emotional problems in the ghetto are related importantly to the economic problems discussed in this paper. The McCone Commission report probes some of these problems in a very tentative and cursory way, and the nature of its probing sometimes conveys an unfortunate impression, in my judgment, that a major share of responsibility for the unemployment problem must be assigned to the attitudes and behavior of the Negroes themselves. At times, this philosophy is linked with the absolutely sound premise (which I fully endorse) that the Negro community should participate more actively in the planning and administration of programs affecting that community. By dealing only superficially with some of these critical and complex problems, the report manages to strike the worst possible balance. Personally, I would opt for cultural pluralism rather than homogeneity based only on the dominant Anglo norms and values, but space precludes an extended analysis of this issue and I must plead guilty here to the same superficiality of which I am critical in the McCone report.

To sum up, even without the apparently rising "nationalism" in the Negro community, the bigotry and just plain stupidity in the white community, the tensions related to police practices, and so forth, the economic problems

would be difficult. One thing is certain: the past training and employment problems have hardly touched the core of the difficulties in the poverty areas, and civil rights laws have mainly benefited the middle class. With a gross national product now running in excess of \$750 billions a year, an all-time record, the answers obviously must lie in the political and institutional spheres. It is still easier politically to commit more troops to Vietnam than more jobs to Watts.

A LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF SOCIAL SERVICE REVIEW

by

Frances Lomas Feldman*

To the Editor:

The McCone Commission report (Violence in the City--an End or a Beginning?), on which you so cogently commented in the last issue of the Review,¹ surely must be prime evidence in support of Ambrose Bierce's definition of a consultation: "to seek another's approval of a course already decided on." The McCone Commission held scores of formal hearings; it reviewed the distillate of the full-time probings of more than two dozen lawyers and law-oriented investigators and thousands of words of solicited and unsolicited testimony; and it called upon academic consultants drawn from various universities to provide data and depth to facilitate understanding in specific areas of special relevance.

Nevertheless, the commissioners remained remarkably true to the stereotypes they had held when they were appointed to carry out the governor's charge to "prepare an accurate chronology and description of the riots and attempt to draw any lessons which may be learned from a retrospective study of these events," to "probe deeply the immediate and underlying causes of the riots," to consider what "can be done at any level of government or by any agency of the government to prevent a recurrence. . ." (pp. i-iii). In clinging to stereotypes about welfare programs and about those who seek the help of such programs, the commissioners not only failed to suggest specific measures that might have led to improved effectiveness of welfare programs; their published restatement of unfounded attitudes tends both to reinforce hostility toward public welfare agencies and recipients and to increase the height of the barrier obstructing the attainment of generally accepted objectives of public welfare programs and services.

I served as the academic consultant on social welfare (the other six academic consultants dealt with health, housing, employment, education, certain legal issues, and the history of race riots in the United States). It was my task to consider the impact of the public welfare programs on the people in the Los Angeles riot area--on those who sought and/or needed help that was or was not forthcoming--and to identify some of the community and program needs and problems that warrant attention and remedy. I was given complete freedom (except in the matter of time, which totaled approximately three weeks) in the conduct of my study--sources, scope, style; and the several commission staff members whose time in large measures was focused on welfare matters were very cooperative. So were individuals, groups, and official and voluntary organizations

*This Letter to the Editor from USC's Dr. Frances L. Feldman was published in the June 1966 issue of Social Service Review (University of Chicago). The material was the basis of the presentation made in Mrs. Feldman's name on the Thursday afternoon program of "McCone Report Revisited" December 15, 1966.

¹"An Objective and Dispassionate Study?" XL (March, 1966), 86-87.

in the community. The data in my final report were derived not only from reports, ordinances, and laws, but also from interviews with individuals and groups who were or had been public assistance recipients or applicants; with present and former employees at various hierarchical levels and in various classifications in county and state agencies primarily concerned with the administration and extension of public assistance (California's public assistance programs are county-administered, state-supervised); with state referees who hear appeals from county decisions; and with representatives of other organizations, agencies, and departments whose work brought them into contact either with recipients or staff of the public welfare agencies.

My meetings with members of the Commission staff and with the Commission itself offered ample indication of the direction of Commission thinking and the difficulties entailed in persuading some of the staff as well as most of the commissioners to examine the evidence objectively and not through the haze of preconceived notions about who accepts assistance and why. It is undoubtedly true that not even the police phase of the McCone inquiry was invested with more of the personalized feelings of the commissioners than was the welfare phase.

For social workers and for others interested in social welfare there are special implications both in the facts about the welfare situation in the Watts riot area (which actually encompassed more than the geographic area known as Watts) and the interpretation of these facts by the Commission. Without repeating here all that is contained in my fairly lengthy report, I would like to comment on several items.

At the time of the August, 1965, riots, about 14 per cent of the population of the riot area consisted of recipients of public assistance--nearly one hundred thousand persons, or 27 per cent of all public assistance recipients in Los Angeles County, although the area accounts for less than 10 per cent of the population of the county. Nearly three-fourths of the recipients were dependent on Aid to Families with Dependent Children, an increase of twenty thousand persons during the three years immediately preceding the outbreak of violence. During August in excess of \$3 million was paid to these families in the form of assistance grants. More than 90 per cent of the recipients were Negro, which was not surprising since more than 90 per cent of the population in the area also was Negro. Both father and mother were in 9 per cent of the aided households--an increase in two-parent families over the 1962 situation, which undoubtedly reflects in large measure the broadening of AFDC eligibility to include children of unemployed parents. About half of all the AFDC parents had lived in Los Angeles County for more than ten years; approximately 15 per cent had been in Los Angeles for fewer than five years, and an equal proportion had been born in the county. Of those born outside California, 72 per cent had come from southern and south central states.

As the Review noted, the Commission expressed its concern over "the accelerating trend of expenditure" and whether the "generosity" of the California welfare programs "is not one of the factors causing the heavy immigration of disadvantaged people to Los Angeles."

Certainly, \$3 million is a sizable sum of assistance payments in a single month. Certainly, aid is being given to many people who have come to California from southern states at some time. Certainly, assistance grants are higher in California than in many other parts of the United States--and so are wages and so are the living costs, both of which contribute to the level at which assistance is pegged if the needy person's minimal survival needs are to be met.

The commissioners also had these facts before them: (1) The growth of the population on assistance has been slower than the growth of population in the county as a whole. (2) Residence requirements for eligibility preclude the granting of AFDC to non-residents or of general relief to non-residents who are ineligible for federally aided assistance and who are not willing to return to the state in which they have legal settlement. (3) The proportion of native Californians among the recipients was similar to the proportion among the commissioners. (4) Statutory limits on the amount of individual AFDC grants are unrelated either to the minimum standards established by the State Department of Social Welfare as essential for adequate care or to the steadily rising costs of living. (5) A substantial part of the increased caseload has resulted from reduced work opportunities for those who are unskilled, untrained, uneducated, or without work experience--particularly minority group members, and from action by Congress and by the California State Legislature broadening the definitions of need in connection with the several federally aided assistance categories; and (6), while the average monthly payment per family has risen a little faster since 1960 than the cost-of-living index, the payment per person has actually declined--so that the AFDC recipient, in the riot month, typically was receiving a smaller proportion of what he needed than if he had been receiving aid five years earlier (and, generally, he had not).

The McCone report also voiced the Commission's skepticism that "many of the recipients would rather have work than welfare," and commented, albeit parenthetically, on the girl who "may have considerable incentive to become a mother herself so as to be eligible. . . as the head of a new family group" (p. 72). On what "facts" could such a statement be based? That 36 per cent of the mothers in the riot area caseloads are not and never had been married? That there were one or more illegitimate children in 69 per cent of the aided families in this area? That the designation "illegitimate" makes no distinction between children born of casual relationships and those born of long-standing stable relationships? That out-of-wedlock children are evidence more of the mothers' impulsivity or other limited social competence than of her planfulness and concern about a future even only nine months away? That, regardless of one's acceptance or skepticism about the Moynihan report and similar interpretations or apologies of cause, such out-of-wedlock children are an irrefutable consequence of social and cultural forces unrelated to relief status per se?

Indeed, the commissioners had "facts" to support their printed statements: The convictions of some of the more persuasive members of the Commission were reinforced by the volunteered "testimony" of persons whose positions were indicative of their competence to render judgments--ministers, landlords, an assorted group of taxpayers, and "social workers" in the employ of state and county public welfare departments, the county's probation department, and some

voluntary agencies. They knew that the high standards of relief attracted transients to California; they knew of husbandless women who deliberately increased the size of the family in order to increase the amount of the assistance grant. These social workers had several things in common: none, when asked for details, could provide them; none had either professional education for the jobs they held or other educational or experiential backgrounds that might have contributed to their knowledge about social welfare programs or human behavior.

It is not my intention to imply that the Commission's report makes no positive contribution. I believe it does in many respects. Nor is it my intention to imply that the material I brought to it as its "academic" welfare consultant was entirely ignored in favor either of the commissioners' own opinions or those of "experts" functioning outside the "ivory tower." Sprinkled throughout the Commission report are recommendations that are consistent with the data I had presented or based on those I had proposed. Furthermore, like the fish-that-got-away concept, the contents of the final report reflected some modification--at least to the extent that they were omitted--of ideas of staff and commissioners that I unhappily had expected they would not relinquish.

But many areas of trouble to the recipients, to the taxpayers, and to the administrators and staffs of the agencies involved were not dealt with in the McCone report and, as a consequence, a locus of considerable unrest, hostility, and potential violence was not put in the sharp focus that might have led to important change. It is true that, in general, California's public welfare program is relatively generous; it holds considerable opportunity for attainment of public welfare objectives of improved social functioning; it offers a broad array of services and, in many ways, is constructively innovative, seeking improved or new ways to help families and individuals to cope effectively with problems impeding their attainment of social and economic and emotional goals that are acceptable to themselves and to the wider community; and, by and large, these services are competently and humanely given.

Yet there is strong evidence that, particularly in the riot area--but not only there--many desperately needy people either were denied public aid or were harshly treated in their successful search for it. They were pinned under the apex of an inverted pyramid constructed of myriad elements: Some policies stemming from federal and/or state laws and/or regulations, either by their original intent or their interpretation, shifting or intact in the progression through the hierarchy to the point of final application, are either cumbersome or confusing or restrictive with respect to particular population segments; they tend to be more debilitating than rehabilitative. County ordinances, particularly those governing the totally county-financed general assistance program, are strongly reminiscent of the more negative aspects of poor relief. Financing arrangements throw a disproportionately heavy burden on local property owners whose taxes finance not only a share of the federally aided assistance grants but all of the non-federal share of administration. (This is a factor that serves not only to reduce the supervisory effectiveness of the state social welfare agency in a variety of ways; it also curtails the effectiveness of the local agency by influencing such issues as quantity and quality of manpower, structure and operation of the agency.) The complexities naturally inherent in the administration of public assistance in an urban center with a population that exceeds the

entire population of each of 43 states are compounded by problems in manpower, by community stereotypes about assistance--which are shared not only by the commissioners but also by some personnel employed in the public welfare agency and by departments (like the District Attorney's Office) that, for legal, if not for other reasons, must work closely with the public assistance agency. They are compounded further by distrust that characterizes many important relationships: federal-state; state-county; community-agency; County Board of Supervisors-Bureau of Public Assistance; administrators-workers-clients. All of these elements, and others, contribute generally to the degree of the effectiveness with which the public welfare programs in Los Angeles County fulfil their social purposes. In the Watts riot area, their pressures and impact were considerably heightened.

The McCone report rightly stresses the importance of jobs, education, and law enforcement. It advocates "costly and extreme measures" for these three priority areas. But it overlooks the impact of inadequate physical and emotional nutrition in preschool (even pre-Head Start) children upon their readiness to absorb what the educational facilities might offer, upon ability to learn spatial and time concepts that ultimately will enable them to go to school with some regularity as children, to report to jobs on time, etc., as adults. It overlooks the fact that the need for "costly and extreme measures" may be less in the future if adequate investment is made now in reasonable standards of assistance and in the availability and accessibility of adequate (qualitatively and quantitatively) social services for the dependent families that in the Watts area alone contain more than fifty thousand children--and for the numbers of uncounted families with children who are needy but not aided. It is a questionable economy of money and human values to defer the innovation of "measures" until the child's potential for learning has already been impaired, his potential for holding an adequate job already has been restricted, and his potential for contributing to law enforcement problems already has begun to blossom.

The approach of the Commission to the social welfare phase in its assignment was, as you noted, to ignore the real issues. Indeed, although the original plan of the Commission was to publish the reports of the academic consultants as a companion volume to the Commission's report, following the release of the latter it substituted a plan whereby the consultants' reports were placed in nine depositories: the state archives and selected university and public libraries. Copies of the several consultants' reports were made available either to agencies, or to others involved or interested, only as an individual consultant was able to make personal arrangements to reproduce and provide such copies.

Nevertheless, there was an immediate and continuous surge of interest in the content of the reports. Television, newspaper, and periodical news media--even before I had received a copy of the McCone report--were eager to know what facts, if any, supported the welfare comments of the commissioners. For the most part these media provided opportunity to comment on the relevant points of difference between the commissioners and this consultant. But some seized eagerly on the Commission report's statements to reiterate convictions that public welfare programs serve primarily to contribute to dependency and immorality (which are equated) at the expense of the hardworking tax-paying upright

citizenry (which seemingly includes a paucity of social workers). And, in this election year, some persons have found in the McCone report's unsupported statements about welfare programs and recipients an "authoritative" source for demanding new restrictive requirements--and even abolition of the state unemployment insurance program.

But it is not only some of the news media that have been interested in the basic welfare issues that directly and indirectly have played a part in the prelude, conduct, and aftermath of the Watts riots. The welfare report has been under careful examination by the county welfare department's administrative staff and the implementation of some recommendations is in process or contemplated. The report also has been taken under consideration by members of the governor's staff, although any outcomes of this consideration remain to be seen. And the Los Angeles Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers has given the report careful attention, basing some actions on it--including implementation of a plan for the reproduction and widespread distribution of the three consultant reports dealing with welfare, health, and the history of American riots.

Social workers and others interested in social welfare have a special stake, I am sure, in the report of the Commission, the reports of the consultants, and the conditions--still extant--that led to the preparation of these documents. The student of history may well wonder at the extent to which pre-colonial attitudes still influence expectations and actual policy in public welfare. The student of administration will discern vital issues in state-local relationships, state control versus local autonomy, fiscal policy. The student of human behavior and problem-solving will observe a relationship between the present and missed (for reasons good or bad) opportunities for improving social functioning, and the misery and despair; they will note that, although the welfare situation probably did not trigger the Watts riots, it did contribute heavily to the process and consequences. The student of social work as a profession--and its interpretation to the community--will take special cognizance of the meaning for a profession when pronouncements of persons carrying the title of social worker are accepted as competent and definitive even though those pronouncements are not consonant with social work values or social welfare goals.

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ASPIRIN OR SURGERY?

by

Kenneth A. Martyn*

Some of you may recall the comments of one critic of the McCone Commission, reported in the Los Angeles Times. He said, "We needed a recommendation for surgery, and they gave us aspirin."

Aspirin ordinarily represents not a cure, but temporary relief from pain--a symptomatic and inexpensive treatment. Typically, surgery represents a fundamental, drastic or radical, and more costly attempt at cure. The question thus raised must be examined thoroughly, because it is of vital importance that the painfully inadequate education of children in disadvantaged areas be treated radically and fundamentally toward a cure--not symptomatically for temporary relief. The question then becomes, "Are the major education recommendations of the McCone Commission mild and aspirin-like or surgical and fundamental?"

Why did the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots believe that its recommendations in education were directed toward the roots of the problem--toward a cure? Why did they feel that the approach they recommended gave the greatest promise of providing a radical improvement in the education of disadvantaged youth?

An understanding of the Commission's recommendations in education requires an examination of the facts, as viewed by the Commission.

1. The school achievement of students in disadvantaged areas is shockingly low--particularly in reading, writing, and language skills.
2. Literacy--the ability to communicate and use reading and writing skills--is crucial to the development of effective intellectual, economic, political, and cultural participation in our contemporary society.
3. So-called cultural deprivation, low IQ scores, or poor environment is no excuse and must not be the basis for accepting low achievement and illiteracy on the part of students in disadvantaged areas. The corollary of this is that the schools must expect, require, and provide the means for effective reading and writing achievement from students in disadvantaged areas. It is an invidious form of discrimination for teachers or administrators to expect, condone, or excuse the low level of achievement and illiteracy of disadvantaged students. So-called cultural deprivation and the low IQ scores should be used instead as an indication of the need for early cultural enrichment.

George W. Beadle, Nobel prize-winning geneticist from the University of Chicago, said it this way (quote): "It has recently become increasingly clear that early learning is much more significant than we have previously thought." He went on to describe the advances in genetic research and environmental modifications and then concluded (quote): "We believe that by requiring a child to attend a formal school beginning at age 5 or 6, we can mold him or her in the cultural pattern of our choice. Our knowledge of the parent-to-child chain of cultural transmission that works so effectively during the pre-school years of the child speaks out clearly and eloquently to the contrary.

"Even if the school such a child attends from age 5 or 6 were as good as it could possibly be made, I seriously doubt if the cultural conditioning that takes place at home and on the street in pre-school years, and that continues thereafter, can be completely counteracted.

"I am convinced that the process of change can be enormously speeded up if we can find ways of replacing or supplementing early cultural experience, especially that prior to normal school age." (End of quote)

The Commission viewed, as a fact, that cultural deprivation must not be viewed as an excuse for low achievement but as a basis for providing early school-centered cultural enrichment to overcome environmental deficiencies and build a base for more effective learning.

4. The Commission viewed, as a fact, that competent teachers are leaving disadvantaged areas; that this is true increasingly in Los Angeles, as well as in other large cities; and that no forced system of assignment, or a system of extra pay shows any promise of success in overcoming this migration of able teachers to the middle class, advantaged, and suburban areas.

5. The Los Angeles school personnel at the policy-making level are not consciously discriminating against Negroes. While schools in many large cities may, in fact, discriminate against students in disadvantaged areas, this is not so in the Los Angeles City Schools in the normal definition of discrimination.

This is not to say that there are no individuals within the system who discriminate on the basis of race, religion, color, or economic status, nor does it say that there are not many forms of discrimination based on low expectancy of achievement of students in disadvantaged areas, but conscious discrimination that assigns inferior teachers, textbooks, buildings, instructional equipment, and financial support to schools in areas on the basis that "these parents don't count," or "these students are of less value," or "that this community won't protest" has been essentially overcome in the Los Angeles City System.

The Commission did find differences in libraries, cafeterias, double sessions, and advanced subjects for the gifted, but it did not view these differences as being purposefully discriminating nor as basic to the important problems of level of school achievement and teacher effectiveness. They did, nevertheless, recommend that these differences be eliminated.

6. De facto segregation is harmful, particularly to Negro children; de facto segregation must be eliminated, and that the schools contribute to it both directly and indirectly. The schools contribute to de facto segregation

directly in perpetuating the neighborhood school concept that affects attendance boundaries and indirectly by participating in the cycle of low school achievement, school dropouts, poor jobs, poor economic status, poor housing, poor neighborhoods, welfare, etc.

7. So far, no practical, extensive, immediate solution for de facto segregation in large cities has been effected, or proposed, that would overcome the intransigence of the white community. This is not to say there are not examples of solutions in smaller communities, or partial solutions, that are helpful--but rather that no fundamental change in large cities appears immediately to be effective.

8. There exists a practical and apparently effective means to correct low achievement in disadvantaged areas now, although such means are enormously expensive, require massive changes in the organization of public schools, and in the outlook and policy of the School Board.

This possibility includes: (a) Concentration on education of children in the earliest years; (b) Providing maximal opportunity for children to learn to read and write and participate successfully in the academic and intellectual curriculum of the schools; (c) Attract and hold the most competent and professionally dedicated teachers to teach in disadvantaged areas; and (d) Reduce the schools' contribution to de facto segregation, and perhaps provide the vehicle for breaking the spiral of failure and its contribution to de facto segregation.

9. In Los Angeles, as in other urban areas, an emergency exists; that correction of the cycle of failure must not be delayed to wait for additional studies, trials, experimentation, or excuses; but must be effected now in all of the disadvantaged areas, no matter what the cost.

These facts, then, formed the basis for the Commission's recommendations in the area of education. All recommendations, it felt, had to show promise of major improvement in level of achievement of students, attract and hold the most effective teachers in disadvantaged areas, and successfully reduce the school contribution to de facto segregation. Finally, the Commission felt its recommendations had to be practical, massive, and immediate. It considered recommendations for additional studies, demonstration projects, remedial "gimmicks," and exhortations "to do good" to be inappropriate to the mood and need of the communities involved.

Are the recommendations drastic enough? Some critics have cited the need for changes in teaching methods, changes in curriculum, remedial programs, after-school activities, motivational counseling, and vocational training as being more fundamental. There is no fundamental difference in curriculum or methods presently available that cannot be tried now, if we get competent teachers in classrooms with students able to communicate effectively.

Clearly, in this sense, getting at the basic root cause of a disease--the lack of an ability to communicate and participate in the economic, cultural, social, and civic life of the community--is directly related to the attainment of basic communication skills of reading, writing, and speaking and the use of these tools for life-long education. The Job Corps, the remedial programs at

high school level, group therapy, and counseling centers already underway in the City of Los Angeles are excellent examples to show that such provisions may "buy" time, but they do not break the cycle of failure.

The direct teaching of job skills and remedial teaching for dropouts are the "patch-up" temporary, aspirin-like treatment. If we wait until the student is already an extremely low achiever in high school or a dropout, we will have missed the opportunity to provide a basic change to give the youngster the flexibility and skill that is required in the demands of the dynamic economic and cultural life of today. The best vocational skill the schools can successfully teach in the most appropriate compensatory curriculum are the fundamental intellectual skills of language, including reading, writing, and speaking. With these tools the student can profit from the same middle-grade and high school comprehensive curriculum afforded all students. WITHOUT these fundamental tools the disadvantaged student is sentenced to an intellectual ghetto for life.

The McCone Commission stated, "We propose that the programs for schools in disadvantaged areas be vastly reorganized and strengthened so as to strike at the heart of low achievement and break the cycle of failure. We advocate a new, massive, expensive, and frankly experimental onslaught on the problem of illiteracy. We propose that it be attacked at the time and place where there is an exciting prospect of success."

This leads to the second criticism of the McCone Commission education recommendations--that the cost is too high.

The estimates by the Legislative Analyst of the State of California (January 14, 1966) indicate that the total statewide cost to implement the McCone education recommendations for disadvantaged children is \$344 million, including \$181 million for capital outlay. This amount would be reduced by appropriations from funded programs, such as Title I and Title II of the Elementary Education Act and the Pre-School Program of the EOA, leaving a combined total of \$249 million. If the Basic Reading Act of the 1965 Legislature were funded, it would cost \$60 million. Thus, the total additional cost to provide the program implementing the McCone Commission recommendations statewide for disadvantaged children would then be \$189 million, including capital outlay costs.

There is no question that the program is expensive, particularly if provided for all disadvantaged children. In the words of the Commission (quote): "It is clear that the proposed programs will be costly, but not as costly, however, as failure, delinquency, loss of productive manpower, and social dependency."

The third area of criticism is that the recommendations support the position of providing separate but equal schools, and therefore perpetuate the status quo in de facto segregation.

The Commission stated (quote): "It is our belief that raising the level of scholastic achievement will lessen the trend towards de facto segregation

in the schools in the areas into which the Negroes are expanding and, indeed, will tend to reduce all de facto segregation. It is our conclusion that the very low level of scholastic achievement we observe in the predominantly Negro schools contributes to de facto segregation in the schools. In turn, school segregation apparently contributes importantly to all de facto segregation. We reason, therefore, that raising the scholastic achievement might reverse the entire trend of de facto segregation."

The Commission's own statement makes it clear that it was not their intent to support or condone de facto segregation, but rather to reduce and eliminate it. They do believe, however, that reduction and elimination of de facto segregation in the schools cannot be separated from the problem of improvement in the quality of the schools. Kenneth Clark, in his book Dark Ghetto, stated (quote): "The goals of integration and quality education must be sought together; they are interdependent. One is not possible without the other. A number of individuals prominent in the civil rights movement claim, however, that a demand for excellence in ghetto schools is really camouflage for acquiescence in segregation. On the contrary it is, given the intransigence of the white community and the impossibility of immediate integration, a decision to save as many Negro children as possible NOW."

Nevertheless, the movement to implement the McCone Commission recommendations would be strengthened if their intent to eliminate the schools' contribution to de facto segregation, in conjunction with the drastic reorganization in the quality of schools in the disadvantaged areas, was made clear to all. Such a move would increase the support of civil rights groups and provide even more united support from the public and the teaching profession.

It is true that, in many respects, the Commission's recommendations parallel the approach of the More Effective Schools Program in New York. It is also true that the More Effective Schools Program, while intensive and expensive, is only now in its second year. All of the signs up to this point, however, indicate an exciting possibility of success.

In some instances, the recommendations of the Commission on education, though clearly stated, have been misunderstood by those who have not read them carefully. Let's read them carefully now, as they appear in their broadest sense on pages 58-60 of the original edition of the McCone Report.

"First, school services in disadvantaged areas must be extended down to the ages of three and four, in order to give these children the background and reinforcements, particularly in language skills, that they have not received in their "informal" education prior to school. These programs for disadvantaged three and four-year old children must be provided throughout the regular school year and they must be permanently maintained. Classes must be more than child-care or baby-sitting services; they must be carefully programmed to provide the background these children need to develop verbal and language abilities."

The second recommendation of the McCone Commission is: "Class size must be significantly reduced for children now in elementary and junior high schools in disadvantaged areas. In order to maximize opportunity for effective teaching, class size in these schools should be reduced to a maximum of 22; a less drastic

reduction from the present average class of 33 would still be expensive but would offer much less promise of success."

The third of the major education recommendations of the McCone Commission reads: "Additional personnel to cope with disturbed and retarded children, and special problems of the disadvantaged child should be made available in these schools. The energies and services of the teacher can be dissipated if she has to work with a myriad of special problems that are much greater in number and extent than they are in the more advantaged areas. To be effective, the teacher in disadvantaged areas needs much more immediately available help with guidance, welfare, health, and social and emotional problems than do teachers in advantaged areas."

The Commission's recommendations also showed its hope for the effect of such recommendations on teacher assignment, as follows: "A sharp reduction in class size, together with provision for special supporting services and materials, would offer teachers a more professionally rewarding assignment and would be likely to attract dedicated teachers to seek positions in schools in disadvantaged areas. The Commission's study as well as experience elsewhere support this conclusion. If we can provide the most effective possible learning situation for the student and attract able teachers to teach in these areas, we will have made the most important step toward solving the problem of low educational achievement."

Unfortunately, too few of those who are concerned with the need for radical improvement in the education of children in disadvantaged areas have recognized the important and revolutionary nature of the McCone Commission recommendations in education. These recommendations are not only practical and based on a realistic view of the facts, they can be put into effect immediately. What is needed is a willingness to try such an approach here in California. It is such an approach that Francis Keppel has called the "Necessary Revolution." This revolution in the quality of educational opportunity for all is the radical remedy that is needed. Those who would dissipate our resources with patch-up, temporary, "make do" approaches have much to learn.

Evasions, excuses, and superficial remedies are not enough. The McCone Commission concentrated approach is the immediate action needed for the school disease in our cities. Roy Wilkins recognized this in his April 18, 1966, column in the Los Angeles Times when he wrote (quote): "The main areas of civil rights struggles in the next years will be in education, employment, and housing. Schools are basic and school men, more so than others, should adopt the 'revolutionary attitude' recommended in the McCone report." (Unquote)

This is surgery, not aspirin.

LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES*

by

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I'm delighted that Dr. Martyn gave such an interesting defense of the McCone Commission and the staff of the Commission, because I was beginning to feel sorry for them, and in my natural tendency to rise to the defense of the underdog I was almost ready to put away the notes that I have and come to the Commission's defense! But now I can continue with what everybody knows to be my "impartial" views about society and show you that I am not always on the side of the underdog!

As Mr. Sheridan indicated, I am a special guest here, since I was not a consultant to the Commission. In the unlikely possibility that I had been chosen as a consultant on the law enforcement problem, what I am going to say now is a small part of what I would have said to the Commission and what, in my opinion, the Commission would have ignored.

I should like to point out that this is the second time in recent weeks that I have been a special guest. I was a special guest some weeks ago of the police department in my home town of San Francisco, and the experience of being incarcerated, arraigned, tried, and subsequently acquitted on charges of inciting a riot, committing a public nuisance, and violating a curfew convinced me that what I would have said to the McCone Commission about the police department in Los Angeles might have been said in general about the police department in San Francisco and in probably every other city of any size in the nation.

I would like to begin by reading to you--and occasionally I will be reading to you--from a chapter in a book about Los Angeles which will be coming out and from which this police department material is drawn. I would like to begin by reading to you from a report of a citizens' commission in June, 1943, which was appointed by then Governor Earl Warren to investigate the so-called "zoot suit riots" in Los Angeles. That commission, which consisted of eminent citizens, stated among other things that "...most of the persons mistreated during the recent incident in Los Angeles were either persons of Mexican descent or Negroes." The commission then went on to say, talking about the general attitude of the Los Angeles police: "Law enforcement agencies should provide special training for officers dealing with minority groups." And I take it that there is a kind of special note of bitter irony that more than twenty years later in the month preceding the Los Angeles riot, revolt, disturbance, or whatever you want to call it, the Los Angeles Police Department was still not acting on a recommendation which had been made in 1943.

*Transcription of a recording.

Now, in fact, the Los Angeles Police Department is efficient, technically well advanced, and almost completely incorruptible. It is also almost completely inadequate to deal with the problems of proper police work in its relationship to racial situations and minority groups. I believe that the basic philosophy of the Los Angeles Police Department is not unique to it, however. On the contrary, there is no doubt that the Los Angeles Police Department accurately reflects the views and prejudices held by a majority of the people in the community. They, too, see the primary function of the police as the protection of life and property and the preservation of order through the active repression of crime, the apprehension of suspects, their arrest and speedy conviction. A great many people in Los Angeles--citizens of Los Angeles--have only a little regard for concepts of crime prevention through positive social action, or for the preservation of individual rights which may interfere even substantially with the efficient apprehension of criminals. And that fact is reflected in the Los Angeles Police Department, just as the feelings of the police toward Negroes and Mexican-Americans are derived from the general community's view of these groups.

I would submit as one evidence of the general attitude of the police the attitude of its chief for many years, William Parker, who, in my judgment, dominated the Department and set the character and tone of the Department. So far as the general view of the racial situation is concerned and what was going on here in Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police Department reiterated over and over that racial conflict could not occur in Los Angeles, where the minority groups were, according to the Department, part of what it described as "the compatible community." The Department said that compatibility between the community and the police was well established, and that statement was made in January, 1964. As late as January, 1965, the Department asserted that those "detractors of law enforcement" who were predicting an outbreak of violence within the city were, in its words, false prophets who failed to consider that many conditions which contributed to chaos in other parts of the country did not exist in Los Angeles. And, in July, 1965, only one month before the outbreak which shook up the whole country, the Police Training Academy was still offering only a totally inadequate range of courses in problems dealing with race relations and community relations.

Now, in addition to this basic philosophical problem, I would suggest that the Department is handicapped still further by an internal value system which is of little value in dealing with the problems of minority groups. That internal value system has an image of the Department as a combat unit. It is not accidental, in my judgment, that the efficiency reports of the Los Angeles police patrolmen are based on a form developed by the United States Marines. It is almost a duplicate of the United States Marines report form. That is a handicap, in my judgment, in dealing with racial situations. In addition, the internal value system places high stress upon a protective system--which protects the members of the Department. I would submit that there are not two systems of justice in Los Angeles, one for the rich and one for the poor, but three systems of justice: one for the rich and one for the poor, and still a third for the police. And, while that system of justice for the police is sometimes more harsh on the police than would be their treatment if they were civilians (for example, the personal, moral behavior of police officers is under greater scrutiny by their own Department because they are police officers than would be the moral behavior of people who are not policemen), in addition to that the Department--like all police departments--seeks to protect its

members, and does so very effectively. (So effectively that in Los Angeles we have a situation in which there is a police officer now still a police officer on active police duty who was convicted in court of an offense involving planting false evidence upon a man who had been shot by this police officer and his buddy. The other police officer has left the Department but this police officer is still here. He drew a 180-day suspension and was returned to duty at the end of that.) In addition, I would suggest that the attitude of the Police Department toward its critics and towards those who raise questions about it, which is to describe those critics as "the detractors of law enforcement," is also a handicap to the proper functioning of this institution, since it seems to consider itself above the scrutiny and criticism of the public.

Finally, I would suggest that the stress in the Department upon productivity and efficiency and technology, rather than on social utility, creates a situation where the notion of the apprehension of the criminal has a far greater priority than the notion of the prevention of crime. In addition, the Department has been handicapped in the past by its own internal pattern of what I believe was distinct prejudice and discrimination against minorities inside the Department and outside the Department. This I take to be a reflection of the general public attitude towards minority groups, but I would suggest that the police, whose contact with the public is of a different character than that of other institutions, must be like Caesar's wife, above all kinds of reproach. The internal history of the Department so far as its own relationships to minority groups is clear. It was detailed to the McCone Commission by Councilman Bradley, who was himself a member of the Department for twenty years; by others; it was discussed by John Buggs, in his testimony before the Commission; it was conceded by Department officials themselves, including Deputy Chief Murdoch.

In addition, in the past, the police have been handicapped--as all police must necessarily be--by the skewed view of society that one gets when one is a policeman. As a police officer it is inevitable that such a view will develop since the primary contact that the police have at the moment is with criminals, and when you deal with the world of criminals you begin to conceive of a picture of the whole world. That picture, the view of the Los Angeles Police Department was stated very accurately, in my judgment, by Chief Parker, who said: "If you just want to believe that the human being will respond to kindness, that he's not an evil thing, you are just living in a fool's paradise." Now, when a policeman has this view of the world, it is inevitable that the skewed view he is going to have because of the nature of his work coupled with the fact that he has very little contact with the minority communities will place him in a very difficult position of trying to evolve some attitude toward the minorities.

In addition to that, the Los Angeles Police Department has been handicapped in the past by a resistance to internal education which was not concerned with what is known as fundamental police work. Under Chief Parker, not even a mental health film was allowed to be shown to the Department officers. There was a general resistance to the bringing in of outsiders to present a view to the police, a different view from what they might get. And there was an immediate springing to the defense on all questions of police brutality without an understanding being developed in the Department that the notion of police brutality encompasses not only physical brutality, of which there may not be very much, but psychological brutality, of which there is a great deal. The demeanor, the behavior, the stance, the posture, the tone of voice of the police officer towards the minority groups is what gives rise to a great deal of the notion of brutality.

And, finally, I would suggest in this respect that there is the notion of the self-fulfilling prophecy, and that notion has also been true of the Police Department. In its concern for crime statistics and the development of computer operations, crime statistics then began to fulfill themselves because it began to be looked for in minority areas where there may have been what was in the police judgment an increase in crime. And the result of this was the roust, the interrogation of people in minority groups on occasions when Caucasians would not have been interrogated or rousted.

Now I think that the Commission--and I say this with some deference because the Commission was made up of men and one lady who devoted a great deal of time out of good will alone to their work with no compensation and out of a public service--at least so far as the police report on law enforcement is concerned (and I would enlarge this to include other areas), I believe that the Commission did a disservice to the community. With all good will, perhaps, but a disservice, nevertheless. I believe that the Commission's disservice in its report sprang from what I believe to be a narrow, limited, and too legalistic view of the problem. I believe that the stress of the Commission was on the gathering of facts, of what it believed to be hard facts, and investigating the rioters rather than the riot. And I would say, parenthetically, that I believe that even in their investigations of the rioters the report was rather inadequate. Now, specifically, I think that this grows from a constellation of factors which took place in the way the Commission operated. First of all, I think the character of the staff--and I am not talking now of the personal character of the staff, all of whom I believe to be extremely capable and honest people, but the character of the staff in the sense of its professional character--almost made inevitable the kind of report that it came out with. Primarily the staff of the Commission was drawn from former investigators for the FBI or for other law enforcement agencies. The attorneys--and it was almost completely staffed by attorneys--who served the Commission were primarily, almost exclusively, men from prosecution agencies, from the United States Attorney's Office or from other prosecuting attorneys' offices. And they, inevitably, because of their close relationships to the police and from what I take to be a rather limited view of what the problem was, were almost forced, I think, to make the kind of report they did. In addition, I would suggest that the Commission members, public-spirited citizens that they are, came to the Commission with generally fixed notions about what they were going to come up with, and these notions were really what dominated the Commission report.

I would like, without going into a great deal of detail, to cite simply two examples to you of this. For example, on the question of police brutality, Chairman McCone, in a Commission hearing, discussed this in the following terms: "As the Director of Central Intelligence, I was familiar with many insurrections and disturbances in many parts of the world--Panama, the Dominican Republic, Saigon and elsewhere. And in every one of these, police brutality was the cry. This raises a question in my mind," he said, "if this isn't a device, and if you are not supporting a device that is designed to destroy the law. And, after all, law is just the thin thread that holds our society together, and nothing would be more beneficial to our adversaries--those who would like to destroy the freedom that this country stands for--than to destroy the enforcement of law and bust this thin cord that holds us together."

So, too, in the question of the Civilian Review Board--the whole notion of the Civilian Review Board (and this is a question about which there can be a

great deal of discussion)--I would say that on the basis of reading the testimony and the discussion and the cross-examination and the questions on this topic that the Commission members came to the hearing with notions about civilian review boards which were not changed. And there is a good deal of evidence in the character of the questions that they asked about this.

Finally, I would say on this general question that I believe there is in the report a defense of Chief Parker which I believe to be an incorrect defense. The Chief had many fantastic qualities, and for those qualities all of Los Angeles could be grateful to him. He converted this police department from a graft-ridden one into an incorruptible one. But the Chief also had many qualities which in the case of race relations served to hurt the cause for which all of us are striving. And the fact is that the history of the Department which was given to the Commission belies what the Commission said of Chief Parker's role in relationship to the minority people inside the Department. And this, I want to suggest to you, was not because I believe Chief Parker was bigoted or anti-Negro; Chief Parker simply said anybody who criticized his department was wrong, and the fact is that much of the criticism of the Department, in my judgment justifiable criticism, came from Negroes, and, therefore, he had this view of Negroes.

Now I want to go quickly in my further brief analysis of the Commission by stating that I think the Commission failed to investigate adequately the charges made against the Department by people who came to the hearings. It turned over, it says, seventy complaints about police brutality to the agencies involved. There is no discussion about what happened then, or where these issues were. Finally, I think on this question that the Commission report attempts to share responsibility for the difficult situation in which we are confronted here between the police and the Los Angeles Negro community. It so to speak says, "Well, there perhaps is fault on one side but there is equal fault on the other side and it is the Negro community which must come to understand the problems of the police." But the power, in fact, in this situation rests in the hands of the police and not in the hands of the community and therefore the stress, in my judgment, was placed in the wrong way. I understand, I believe I understand the motivation for it, and I believe that motivation was probably a high motivation; however, I believe it was wrong.

I think that since the report there are things that have happened here which are very encouraging, or at least somewhat encouraging. I would subscribe to what the Commission said about law enforcement, with the exception of its proposal for an Inspector General to handle complaints, since I believe that this solves no problem. The entire issue about complaints against police officers is one that has to be taken, in my judgment, by people outside the Department; all the Inspector General does is simply to introduce another police officer, another police agency into the system. I think, too, that the recommendation of a commission for community relations and an increase in community relations is very good, and there are signs that this is happening and that this will be better in the future. And if a new Chief comes in who has some notions of the importance of such work I think we will have a vastly improved police department here in Los Angeles.

Finally, I would say that I believe that the emphasis ought to have been on making the same kind of revolutionary changes in the nature of police work and the relationship of police to the community as the Commission made in the

case of education and the educational system, because, in general, since we have heard a good many medical parallels here, I would characterize the Commission's report on this question and on some other questions in the following fashion: it is my belief that the City of Los Angeles is a very sick city. I believe that there is a cancer in this city. And I took it to be the responsibility of the Commission to say to the City and to the world that this cancer does exist. Instead, in my view, the Commission came to the conclusion in the case of the law enforcement problem that it could not, even if it did believe it--and I'm not sure it did (I think probably the Commission would have disagreed with everything I said or almost anything I would say), but had it believed it as it might believe other things in other parts of the report--it would have said, it would have justified its report by saying: "Perhaps this patient does have cancer, but if we say this to the patient and to the patient's family and to the community, the diagnosis will be rejected and, therefore, the very best that we can do is to convince the patient and the people taking care of the patient, the community in which the patient lives, that what the patient is suffering from is a very bad cold, and we will treat the very bad cold--perhaps even more than a cold, influenza; perhaps even more than influenza, pneumonia."

But I think that unless the City is told it has a cancer, it will die.

PANEL COMMENTARY

Subsequent to the papers and before opening the session to general questions and comments from the panel and the audience, Chairman Sheridan made a few comments. He directed them at those who had heavily criticized the McCone Commission and their report. He stressed that each critic had seemingly attacked the Report from his own set of particularistic expectations but that few had challenged the correctness of the Commission's analysis. It is true, Mr. Sheridan admitted, that the commissioners had approached their assignment from a set of fixed ideas and biases. Mr. Sheridan noted that the commissioners worked under several handicaps including: the lack of an established format, the fact that they were not a court of law and had no power of enforcement, the short time in which they were expected to complete the report, the primary charge which had been given them by the Governor to be practical and realistic, the fact they were not aware of their budget limitations when the hearings began, the problem of conflicting testimonies and recommendations from some commission consultants, and finally the emotionally laden, controversial, and public nature of the investigation in contrast to other investigating commissions.

Given these handicaps, Chairman Sheridan praised the Commission for the conscientious way it proceeded in the investigation, the long hours worked, and the product which resulted. After these brief remarks, Chairman Sheridan indicated the balance of the time would be for discussion. He then introduced Judge Broady, a member of the McCone Commission, for his observations. The Judge primarily addressed his remarks to the criticisms of the Report raised by Mr. Paul Jacobs. In reference to suggestions made by Mr. Jacobs regarding the functions of the police department, Judge Broady disagreed with Mr. Jacob's notion that police should be involved (first and foremost) in the function of crime prevention. He said, "when the apprehension of criminals and the protection of the man in the street becomes secondary to crime prevention as a police function in Los Angeles, I will leave this city." He noted that police work is a highly professionalized function and that the Commission did not intend, nor did it have the knowledge, to make recommendations for revolutionary changes in police work in Los Angeles. Some recommendations were made which were designed to improve relations between the minority groups and the police. Judge Broady also said, "if what I hear is correct, the tension that used to exist between the police and the Negroes in Watts has been greatly reduced." As to the recommendation made by Mr. Jacobs for a civilian Police Review board, "the commissioners felt the Inspector General provided a more advantageous system. In fact, our feelings about a review board seem to be consistent with the view expressed by the voters in New York who repudiated the idea at the polls."

Chairman Sheridan then recognized Dr. Kent Lloyd who responded to both Commissioner Broady and earlier remarks made by Mr. Sheridan. "The major limitation of the McCone Report," stated Dr. Lloyd, "was the failure to recognize the behavioral sciences either in the appointment of the commissioners or in the selection of the staff. Only in hindsight was the behavioral scientist recognized in a consultant's role. Those

responsible were unwilling to recognize the tremendous revolution in the behavioral sciences and the contributions which they can make to the understanding and resolution of problems such as those reflected in the Los Angeles Riot."

Mr. Chauncey Alexander was then recognized by Chairman Sheridan. He acknowledged the Commission's courage in accepting the responsibility for studying the riot, but expressed personal disappointment in the fact that the report did not add in any substantive way to the dialogue on the social conditions which lead to the riot. "In fact," argued Mr. Alexander, "the Report supported some of the prevailing prejudices and myths about welfare stereotypes rather than taking the opportunity to dispell them."

Following these remarks, Mr. Paul Jacobs reiterated a basic point which he made earlier in his paper, namely, that there should be a differentiation in the role of the police when handling racial hostilities as compared to apprehending criminals. "The skills required to perform one function are not necessarily appropriate for the other," suggested Mr. Jacobs. He also noted that Los Angeles is lagging behind other major cities in experimenting with new approaches to these kinds of problems.

Criticizing the report generally, Mr. Jacobs pointed out that the ghetto is spreading and the deterioration in the ghetto is increasing. Yet one seeks in vain for an adequate analysis of this problem in the report even though the commissioners had available to them the consultant report by Professor Fred Case, an outstanding authority in the area of housing and real estate in metropolitan areas. "For this reason and others, the report was a disappointment," said Mr. Jacobs.

After thanking Mr. Jacobs, Chairman Sheridan asked Mr. Paul Bullock for his comments. Mr. Bullock stated that "a general feeling among many of the consultants was that the report did not reflect much more than the preconceptions of the commissioners. The only exveption to that indictment would be in the field of education," he observed.

Mr. Bullock expressed his concern as to the procedures used by the Governor's Commission in investigating the riot. "First, the deadline was much too pressing and resulted in problems being handled superficially or not at all. Second, if a quick report was deemed necessary, provisions should have been made for follow-up studies and subsequent reports which could make a more searching and scholarly analysis of the problems. Third, there was a tendency to accept information on its face validity without a careful and objective attempt being made to determine its accuracy. For example, the charges of police brutality were never thoroughly investigated. However, there was no time provided to make such a study," Mr. Bullock stated.

Chairman Sheridan concluded the session by thanking Judge Broady for representing the commissioners and the consultants for their well prepared and provocative remarks.

CHAPTER 3

Chapter 3

CITIZEN AND POLITICAL GRASS ROOTS PERSPECTIVES

During the third session, a panel of elected Negro officials under the chairmanship of Senator Mervyn Dymally responded to papers presented by two members of the Watts Grass Roots Community Seminar, Dr. William J. Williams and Mr. Ron Everett-Karenga.

Members of the panel were Yvonne Brathwaite and Leon Ralph, California State Assemblyman; Charles E. Knox representing the office of Congressman Augustus F. Hawkins, and Thomas Bradley, Los Angeles City Councilman; Assemblyman Bill Greene was unable to attend this session.

Chairman Dymally began by complimenting the University for allowing a somewhat controversial conference to be held on its campus and expressed his feeling that it was a particularly opportune time to invite political, business, grass roots, and intellectual leaders to discuss the issues which had been raised by the Governor's Report. He noted that the Civil Rights revolution was visibly changing into a black power revolution due in large part to changes in state apportionment laws and the increased political sophistication of Negro leadership. This new emerging force, observed Chairman Dymally, "will be 'calling the shots' as Negro efforts turn from the courts to the political arena."

Chairman Dymally then introduced Dr. William J. Williams and Mr. Ron Everett-Karenga. See subsequent pages for the complete texts of these papers

THE MCCONE REPORT REVISITED

A BLACK DISSENT FROM WATTS

By: Dr. William J. Williams

and

Panel Members

Lynne Shiflett
Edward Flown
Johnnie Tillman
Bashir Muhammand
Ahmad Herbert

December 15, 16, 1966

THE McCONE REPORT
A BLACK DISSENT FROM WATTS

OVERVIEW

Upon observing the contents of the McCone Commission Report, a need has been felt by members of the Watts Community Seminar, held from October 8, 1966 through November 12, 1966, to point out the fact that the community has had no representative voice in this report and the fact that they feel that the report is inefficient in the commissions recommendations of the solutions to the problems. These members of the seminar have given a psychological view of Watts and the problem of the ghetto from a grassroots level.

The first participant on this board of findings was born in Los Angeles of middle income family, works for a utilitarian agency which covers poverty areas throughout the county. Its second member was born in Little Rock, Arkansas, is the mother of six children, is a volunteer community worker and also plays a major role in poverty programs. The next panelist is a lifetime resident of geographical watts! i. e., the area under curfew! a small businessman of modest success--is presently employed as an administrator on a poverty program in the ghetto, and is presently a representative of middle class civil rights and community improvement organizations. Its fourth member was born of a religious family. His father has been a minister for fifty-four years and he has currently been a minister in the Nation of Islam for the past ten years.

The next panelist was born in El Paso, Texas, and is a devoted community leader in improvements of the black ghetto. The last participant is a militant, a poet, and one time editor of a small youth newspaper. Born in New York, he is devoted to the education and understanding of the black masses.

As the reader may note by the heterogeneous background, the panel is impartially composed to present the alternatives as they see it from different levels.

Thought these participants were instrumental in helping to develop the first draft, they are not to be held accountable for changes and errors occurring in the second two drafts and final copy. Some changes were minor, some were substantive, but, all were in line with the basic frame of reference originally agreed upon.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper we do not make a frontal attack on the Political Power Structure which produced the McCone Report. It does not mean that we accept the structure. It simply means that we are making a distinction between short range objectives and long range goals. We believe that an indepth attack upon the system is necessary - to attempt a deep analysis at this time would be confusing long range objectives with short range goals. A superficial attack upon the political institutions is merely a start and should open the way for a more thorough and professional analysis. With the opening statement, we reserve the right to make the confrontation at a later date. We shall, however, superficially deal with the question of whether it is possible to integrate, but at the same time take the world as we find it and begin with the proposition that life and the world are cruel. We must also begin with the premise that there is more than one theory or concept. This theory of integration is one, another is the theory of accomodation, the theory of isolationism is one, and the theories of conflict and power are others, put together we come out with not an either or situation, but a theory of building and an acceptance of integrationists the non-integrationists, the black power advocates, the black bourgeoisie, Negro politicians and Friends to the cause.

Realizing that all have a role to play and that goals cannot be achieved without all efforts, we conclude that no group should be denounced.

We realize we need nothing short of a revamping of our total system, a change in attitudes. But, a proper consideration of human nature and behavior leads us to the conclusion that these can only be accomplished by first focusing our attack on short range Economic and Political Objectives. We must build a base of power which will enable us to directly confront the establishment with the inevitable challenge. Hence, our critique of the McCone Commission Report.

FRAME OF REFERENCE

In his charge to the commission, the Governor did not raise the issue of the growing discontent between the establishment and the people affected by decisions made by the power structure. If we miss this point, and it has been missed, we miss the most crucial issue involved. Clarifying of this issue would have set the tone for what was to follow; would have been in touch with reality and the real question facing us today. In short, accurate recommendations and solutions cannot be developed unless the question or problem is adequately defined. The report, instead, was set upon a course of dealing with primary effects rather than causes at a basic level. We shall deal with some of these statements and lack of relationship to the real issue, the real question or the reality process.

As we stated we find that the report is fairly forthright in stating many of the secondary causes; but, used language which diluted the strength of those same statements and simultaneously neglected to suggest bold solutions. In the area of housing for example, this statement was made: "Many negroes here felt and were 'encouraged' to feel that they had been affronted by the passage of Proposition 14." It is an insult to the black man when one states that he has to be "encouraged" to feel affronted. The fact is whether he expresses it or not he feels affronted and insulted without being told. In addition, no real mention was made of the evils of segregated housing which is at the heart of defacto segregation in most areas, and at most levels.

The Report continues, "throughout the nation, unpunished violence and disobedience to law widely reported, and almost daily there were exhortations here and elsewhere, to take the most extreme and even illegal remedies to right a wide variety of wrongs, real and supposed." In that same vein, "Yet however powerful their grievances, the rioters have no legal or moral justification for the wounds they inflicted."

These are examples of fuzzy thinking. First of all, the commission seeks to make unpunished violence and disobedience to the law responsible for the Watts demonstration. This is not only weak thinking; but, contemptible and insulting to the intelligence. While it may be a factor it is certainly unwise to emphasize it as a major element. It focuses attention on the wrong area and denies the public accurate information, this is neither healthy nor practical. Secondly, the commission looked for moral or legal justification for the demonstration.

CONFLICT

The report states further, "it is our belief that raising the level of scholastic achievement will lessen the trend toward defacto segregation in schools and tend to reduce all defacto segregation.

Dear as the concept of attainment is to our culture it does not come to grips with the differences between the negro migration and the earlier european immigration. These are differences of kind not of degree. Therefore, attainment is not enough; it does not come to grips with negro hatred of "The Man" and of himself; and it leaves white prejudice completely untouched. In short, the European ethnic group could move into the main stream of American life without forcing beforehand any drastic re-arrangements of attitudes of institutions. For the negro to move, it will require the most radical changes in the whole structure of American Society. The mere presence of a negro in a white residential neighborhood unleashes fear and hatred of the most elemental sort, and leads almost without exception to an exodus of the white residents. Goodwill, in this case, can never be relied upon to solve this hard problem, and the question of the negro's place in America is the hardest problem this country has ever faced.

If physical violence is accepted in the south as a means of resolving conflict nobody cares much; but, in the urban community such acts become felonies, with much more serious consequences. This is not to condone violence, but to indicate that it is almost inevitable under the circumstances.

White men who cannot wait until the light turns green to cross the street are becoming annoyed at negro impatience. They are upset by the current state of race relations to be sure. But what troubles them is not that justice is being denied but that their peace is being shattered and their business interrupted. But white Americans are discovering to their surprise and horror, how deep is the store of anger and hatred three and a half centuries of humiliation have built up in the American Negro, and how quickly that anger can explode into violence. The real danger, however, is not a permanent alienation from American Society. Unless they may come to regard their separation from American life as an isolationist in order to find respite from the ever gruelling battle for equality.

LEADERSHIP

In summing up the report reads, "If the recommendations we make are to succeed, the constructive assistance of all negro leaders is absolutely essential. No amount of money, no amount of effort, no amount of training will raise the disadvantaged negro to the position he seeks and should have within this community, a position of equality - unless he himself shoulders a full share of the responsibility for his own well being.

This reminds one of the old saying - you must pull yourself up by your own boot strap - which is virtually impossible; but, can be done if there is power in the community - the main issue the commission skirted. The commission talks about leaders but not about meaningful involvement of the people.

Another section of the report is of urgent concern; "That the Mexican American Community did not riot is to its credit; it should not be to its disadvantage." The report adds, "Although the Commission received much testimony from witnesses, we also heard statements of the most extreme and emotional nature."

Nowhere is it written in the history of our nation that conflict cannot be constructive in the solving of problems. There is a concern with symptoms rather than in connection with other symptoms. They have focused on the problems of adjustment rather than upon conflict - concerned with maintenance of existing structures, rather with social systems that deny individual dignity and status. The failure to legitimize social conflict as a way of resolving social problems is not only erroneous but fool hardy. It lulls the majority into complacency and angers the suppressed. The very military that whites find so upsetting is indispensable if negroes are to shuck off their traditional bonds of dependency and become truly free and equal... When whites express a yearning for responsible leadership, the question must be asked: Responsible to whom"

For a hundred years, white americans have clung tenaciously to the illusion that if everyone would just sit still--if agitators would just stop agitating--time alone would solve the problem of race. It hasn't and it never will, time is neutral, it is neither good nor bad. It is how that time is used.

There is an attitude throu hout the report that government has been "generous." Government is not "generous", neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution suggest that equality be parcelled out sparingly and that it be earned. It is a right of citizenship be you lazy or smart, blacks or others need make no apologies for demanding now what they have always been entitled to.

CONCLUSION

Our argument is both with the individual treatment of issues, and the frame of reference from which these issues were treated.

The ambiguities in logic, the inability to come to grips with the reality process, and the fervent desire to protect the establishment made the document mediocre. There was a chance for greatness and glory. The commission had an opportunity to lay the ground work for generations to come; To establish lines of communication which have never existed between races. An accurate course of action could have been mapped by utilizing new findings and solutions advocated by the behavioral scientists. Instead, it (The Commission) preferred to protect and delude. The legalistic approach is not within keeping with the reality process of human behavior.

Finally, the main failure the commission did not grasp the gravity and depth of the problems.

The question of whether or not negroes want integration, or whether they should keep banging on the doors of a white society that much of the time seems determined to keep them out. Is it necessary to integrate oneself into a burning house ? Lorraine Hansberry (author of Raisin in the Sun) has asked with considerable bitterness. There is only one United States. Some say there can be no solution of the negro problem anywhere but in the United States or in anyway other than full integration into the main stream of American life. Others are contending that this kind of integration is impossible. There is a push for negotiation on the part of the alienated blacks rather than integration. While this is a difficult problem, it is nevertheless the dilemma we face and should have been dealt with by the commission

McCONE COMMISSION REPORT

A BLACK POWER VIEW
of the
McCONE COMMISSION REPORT

A CULTURAL APPROACH

INTRODUCTION

This paper was prepared by advocates of the cultural organization, "US", in the Watts Grassroots Seminar at U. S. C.

As a brief introduction to the paper, we suggest you be informed of three things. First, we are a cultural organization, and thus relate everything we say to the question of culture which we define as the major problem of black people in America; and we define culture as a composite system of ways of looking at and doing things. We say that unless blacks create a culture of their own they will always be marginal men in America disrespected, rejected, brutalized and forced into positions of protest - vocal and physical, non-violent and violent.

Secondly, we say that a Sine qua non of culture is self-determination, the power to define and speak for ourselves instead of always being defined and spoken for by others. This is indispensable in our creative efforts to build and maintain a culture. Moreover, we must determine the legitimacy of our thoughts, acts and achievement, not others. Thus we do just this in the paper, regardless of how outsiders view us.

Finally, we are black power advocates, for we see black power as a means to obtain three things: Self-determination, self-respect and self-defense, and we must build a culture in order to respect ourselves, and we must defend ourselves against people and problems that threaten us daily to move in any direction.

We define ourselves as a cultural nation as distinct from a political nation. Thus we speak as Afroamericans rather than Americans.

Ron Everett-Karenga, Chairman
Clyde Daniels-Halisi
Tommy Jacquette-Mfikiri
Karl Key-Hekima
Ken Seaton-Msemaji
Sam Carr-Damu
Jimmy Doss-Tayari

The Commission's Report seems to fall down in several areas. And though we realize the disadvantages under which they worked they nevertheless made some serious errors in their attempt to report on the Revolt in Los Angeles in August, 1965.

Our first reaction to the Report is that it refuses to accept the political and psychological relevance of the Revolt. This was done by using terminology and concepts which minimized its extent and scope and relegated it to the position of a "Spasm" of lawlessness.

In terms of its scope, it represented to blacks, we feel, a means to obtain three things: Self-determination; Self-respect; and Self-defense. These concepts nor the revolt as means to achieve them are neither new nor strange to the world or America. America itself was founded by a revolt which turned into a revolution, a "successful" and more extensive revolt. Revolts are inevitable where men are forced into a position of defending themselves, their self-respect. At this point they lay down their own rules by which they will play the political game - regardless of the consequences. Here we discover a manhood in men - to move in spite of consequences in answer to their needs and how they define them. In a word, we have here a exercise of self-determination, an attempt to regain self-respect and a thought of self-defense. For we have it from the Master's Mouth, Brother Frantz Fanon, a black psychoanalyst, that such a move, such action is "a cleansing force. It frees the native of his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction. It makes him fearless and restores his Self-respect." Witness the American Revolution, if you can forgive the Sacrilege and see how white people with sticks and stones attack fearlessly the British Soldiers armed with superior weapons and having greater numbers. Or again check out carefully the destruction of property during the so-called "Tea Party". But the question then was not one which the British could address themselves to objectively. For Americans were colonialists, citizens of a sort, in-side the mainstream of British life receiving not quite as many benefits as they were burdens, but at least they were better off in the British Empire than anywhere else - and besides, things were getting better.

The Americans, however, decided they must move and obtain self-determination, as a matter of principle on self-respect, and if the British fired on them they would have to defend themselves with whatever they could. Black people in Los Angeles felt the same way, even if white people cannot understand this and refer to their actions as momentary relief from the malaise of American society.

Moreover, the Report tried to minimize the political relevance of the Revolt by saying only "2%, a violent fraction" of blacks participated in it. But we all need not take political science 1A to discover that all such actions are

begun and pushed at first by a minority, a vocal, more organized, more active minority. If we but look at the history of such moves, it would reward our research. One could start with American history and discover they too were at first in the minority.

The question of lawlessness versus legitimacy is one that the Report failed to deal with in any way. And yet, it is a fundamental point in understanding the political and psychological relevance of the Revolt. To say that an act is illegal is simply to say that it is against the legal system in existence at the time. It does not deal with the question of whether the system has been challenged in a way and allowed by the system itself. Legitimacy, on the other hand does deal with the right or wrong as decided by the people affected. It is a position based on what a people as a matter of self-determination, decide is good for them which may or may not be good for the system: For systems are made to perpetuate themselves. Therefore, we find the American Colonists feeling that the legal system of the British was not good for them and therefore illegitimate. No one doubts that black people in general feel that laws that perpetuate discrimination and racism are illegitimate. Therefore, we have had since the beginning of the Slave Revolts through the non-violent civil rights demonstrations to the revolts in the urban areas an expression of illegal acts against the system which were nevertheless legitimate in the eyes of the black people. And after all, it is a matter of self-determination that a people define what is legitimate to them, not the system they move against. But, the commission could not understand this, and therefore, tried to undermine the legitimacy of the revolt. If they did not wish to consult us, they might have at least read Fanon who is the foremost authority on the political and psychological implications of a revolt.

The next short coming of the Report is that it refuses to blame the police at all. Their recommendation was one of "greater emphasis on crime prevention" and a need of blacks to understand law enforcement agencies. They refused to discuss police brutality and neatly placed it in quotes when referring to it in order to give it an unreal character. They made a grave psychological error when they said that blacks resent the police as a symbol of authority. A more correct conclusion is that they resent the police as a symbol of racist authority. For to the black man the police have become a foe not a friend. They can be compared, as Baldwin suggests, to troops of an occupying army. They are seen as people who come to enforce a racist system, by any means necessary. For when a black man sees an officer late at night, it is not as a whiteman sees him. To the whiteman he represents security but to the blackman, another way and means of the system to humiliate and brutalize him.

Thirdly, the commission did not address itself to the roots of racism, which have a strong hold in this society, this is a fatal blow in the report, for racism in America is a daily reality to black people. Psychological and political implications of this should have been discussed in terms of how this

limits the movement and motivation of blacks toward achievement. It was passed over with the contention that Los Angeles has been a sort of haven for blacks for some time and that "the opportunity to succeed is probably unequaled in any other major city." But, the question remains of how can blacks move to change these racist institutions which frustrate, limit and destroy.

Fourthly, the commission did not make adequate use of grassroot consultants. They only used effectively people who were a part of the structure and therefore could not condemn it. That is a major problem with america on any such system. It cannot condemn itself. Therefore, it makes excuses for its' racism in the four hundred and fifty year history of exploitation of black people. Yesterday it was because we were savages - that is - we could not make bombs; today it is because we are too civilized, too educated in american political history not to want freedom now. In a word, as Fanon said yesterday the European claimed we were going to slow, now, they are outraged that we are going to fast. Only we can condemn the society and our credentials are based on our long history as victims.

Fifthly, the Report made an attempt to compare us with what it call "other disadvantaged groups" moreover, it contended that it was to their "credit" not to have revolted in a similar manner. Thus, we maintain that they did not have to. We did it for them. We say this not for thanks, but for information. For too long has our position as forerunner for other minorities been minimized. We cannot expect the legitimacy of the comparison either in scope or content for the history of blackman in america is unlike any other minority. We can only be compared to other people in terms of our desire for and move toward self-determination and self-respect and self-defense. If a comparison must be made compare us with the American Colonists on these matters. And if whites do not flatter themselves into thinking that no one can compare himself with them on political aspirations they have again missed the point.

But perhaps the greatest fault of the commission is that it did not concern itself with the question of the lack of culture among blacks, and the subsequent self-alienation and anomies. If there is one reason for a revolt against this system, it is because, we have been stripped naked and pushed against a wall. We feel illegitimate for our symbols our history, our social structure, our art and literature, i.e. our culture has been labeled savage and destroyed by white america, To talk about employment solving the problem is to miss the question of dignity and self-respect which only a culture can give. For money can buy only material things; it cannot buy legitimacy. It is a culture that legitimatizes the thoughts and actions of a people in a word, the people itself.

To talk of education as an answer is to be more theoretical than practical. For, even if education is accessible, the question is, why should we take advantage of it. To value education must be a cultural value, if it is to have any real and permanent meaning. Moreover, to talk about political rights in terms of the right to vote, one supposes a valid interest in some aspect of building and maintaining a chosen community. It presupposes also an alligence to a

community of people as well as, values. Black people, somehow, fall deficient in this area. We say with our brother Senghor: "Cultural liberation is an essential condition of political liberation."

Finally, if the commission understood that statement it made concerning the crimes of blacks against blacks, it would know that these fraternal blood baths are due to the psychological need to fight against oppression. However, this need is misdirected for two reasons. First, because the enemy seems too strong, and secondly because there is a lack of strong cultural values that would prevent this collective auto-destruction, as Fanon has so rightly termed it. For, the white man has labeled the blackman a "Nigger."

It is in this way and others that our cultural values have been undermined and destroyed, we believe in few things that white people have not taught us. And they have never tried to teach us to be proud of our being black; or even that we were human. With no cultural values we cannot build a community and a community we did not build or share in the building of, we cannot have an allegiance to.

Culture is a composite value systems. It includes a mythology, a history, social system, a political organization, economic organization an art and literature and a cultural ethos, which would distinguish a people in terms of where they put their emphasis. As for a mythology, whites supplanted it with a white god, and reduced our myths to savagery. Our history was written by white history writers instead of historians, who added us in American History as historical contribands only. Sociologists have confirmed the fact of which we were always aware that our social organization is all but non-existent due to the lack of a visible family structure. Therefore, allegiance to a family or community comes rare, as do concomitant values. Politically we do not have any self-determination and are a semi-colonial people. Moreover, our political burdens outweigh our benefits and because of this we question our stake in this society. Economically our ghetto economy is controlled by outsiders. We do not burn our own stores. Where we own them they were preserved, showing that what we feel is ours is not destroyed. As for Art and literature, it is only now being made. And in talking of our Ethos, we have not established that firmly either. We would like to have a dual ethos of "soul and education; "soul" so that we will not exchange our spiritual values for money and machines; and education so that we can function better in an era of science and technology.

So then the problem is, to "US", a cultural one. And until Afro-Americans can build and sustain a culture, which contains values which legitimize them, they will never function effectively around people who possess these very things. They will always move between a position of attempted assimilation and resentment. But for a man who is sure of himself and his role, both resentment or others and attempted assimilation are out of the question. He is too busy creating beautiful things for himself and posterity.

In conclusion we feel that the commission's report was a waste of money. For it only informed us of what we already knew, and told whites what they wanted to hear. We might have used the money to start a cultural center, with bi-functional aims: to develop employment possibilities and teach the values needed to build, develop and maintain a community. Moreover, commissions always claim an objectivity which is all too often used against us. We are not impressed with whites explanation of our life; we are too busy moving to a position of really living. i.e. working and creating for ourselves in the way that we define as good for US.

PANEL COMMENTARY

After the speakers finished, Chairman Dymally invited the panel to make any remarks they felt were pertinent to the papers.

Councilman Bradley opened the panel's remarks. He observed that the McCone Report legitimized many of the concerns and complaints of black people among the white conservative population. In this way, it served an important purpose even though it did not go as far as black leadership would have liked it to go. For this reason, he found it necessary to caution those who are quick to condemn the whole report.

Councilman Bradley also took issue with Mr. Karenga concerning the sources of Negro culture and values which should be encouraged. He stressed the beneficial aspects of public education and also the importance of the example set by Negro leaders who through their efforts have attained prominence in the whole society. He referred particularly to Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts.

Assemblyman Yvonne Brathwaite began her remarks by discussing a decision she had to make regarding an offer to work on the staff of the McCone Commission. "Reality," she contended, "dictates against Negro isolationism and particularism as a workable solution to Negro problems. Negroes must direct their efforts, ideas, and political power toward moving into the main stream of American life, not out of it," she concluded.

After Assemblyman Brathwaite had finished her remarks, Chairman Dymally introduced Assemblyman-elect Leon Ralph. Assemblyman Ralph took the opportunity to disagree with the report by observing that many important facts and ideas were withheld particularly those that deal with the indignities which the black people have suffered in this society and the lack of progress made in restoring the Negro's dignity, self esteem, and pride in his family and community. Taking a lesson from his own life, he recalled the impact that a course in Negro History had on his own appreciation of the contributions which the Negro had made to American culture and development. He stated, "the reason white people do not respect the Negro is because he does not know what the Negro has done, and similarly, the reason the Negro does not respect himself is because he does not know what he has done either."

Charles Knox, the last panelist, represented Congressman Hawkins who was out of the country. Mr. Knox vehemently objected to the McCone report because it did not represent the opinions, attitudes and perceptions of the residents of Watts. If they had been consulted from the beginning, the Commission could have saved most of it's money, Mr. Knox suggested.

Turning to Negro problems in general, Mr. Knox took the opportunity to attack "Uncle Tom politicians" who do not represent real Negro interests but only "do as they are told by the white man. He was not referring," he said, "to those who were there but to those who hadn't appeared this evening.

Turning to the problem of black and white relationships, he took issue with those who would refuse the white man's help but he emphasized that the Negro must lead the way. Finally, he said if the cries of the black people are not heeded, that violence, as unfortunate as it may be, will be resorted to again in the great tradition of the American revolution.

Chairman Dymally excused Assemblyman Bill Greene who wanted to appear on the panel but was detained in Sacramento on urgent personal business. He then turned the time to general questions from the panel and audience.

Dr. Williams responded by suggesting that the McCone Report must be criticized because it did not represent the views of the Ghetto nor did it contain many important findings and information prepared by the consultants which the McCone Commission had retained to investigate the riot. Dr. Williams stressed that the Report could have been a historic document by making a significant contribution to uncovering the causes of Negro unrest. However, it took a strictly legal approach to the Riot ignores the insights that the behavioral sciences bring to understanding racial tension.

Dr. Williams then took issue with Assemblyman Brathwaite's position that Negroes must move into the mainstream of American life. He observed that they had made very little progress using this philosophy and that it would seem appropriate to try a new approach.

Ron Karenga then responded to an earlier question regarding his opportunity to testify before the commission. He questioned the validity of the Commission's so called open invitation to testify but stated that he would not have appeared anyway since they would not have allowed him to write the report.

Mr. Karenga went on to disagree with Assemblyman Brathwaite's contention that Negroes cannot compete with the white man in isolation but must join with him. He contended that "black culture meant political, economic and social organization for black self-determination and that to suggest that the black man could not compete begs the question of whether blacks must compete. If there is a need, the black man will do the impossible," he concluded, "even if it means destroying himself."

He finally objected to the word isolationism and suggested heatedly that Jews, Chinese, and Japanese are not called isolationists, "what is needed is a black culture which can take its place among a society of plural cultures," he concluded.

Assemblyman Brathwaite countered by calling on those present to move out of ideology and conflict to the consideration of concrete methods of dealing with Negro problems here and now.

Chairman Dymally opened questions to the audience. The first question, addressed to Assemblyman Brathwaite, asked if she had ever seen any historical examples of minority groups achieving dignity through integration with its implication of inferiority? She responded that she didn't know of such examples but suggested that Negro advancement in this country, though slow, was also unprecedented in history and that what was needed is that Negroes take the opportunity to shape their future and take the piece of the pie which they are entitled to.

Another question addressed to the panel asked for comments upon the relevancy of the McCone Report for white people. Chairman Dymally responded by stating that the report was a "white report" pragmatically written for "white acceptance" and for these two reasons, it is more relevant to the white community than the black.

Chairman Dymally in adjourning thanked the members of the panel, the two speakers, and the audience for a very stimulating and provocative evening.

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 4

INTERGROUP RELATIONS PROFESSIONAL'S PERSPECTIVES

The second day of the conference, Friday, December 16, featured a morning panel on "Intergroup Relations Professionals' Perspectives in which the papers prepared by members of the Intergroup Relations Executive Seminar were presented. Curt Moody, Executive Director, Community Relations Conference of Southern California, delivered a paper on law enforcement calling for (1) improved communications between police officers and minority group members through creation of a Police Community Relations Advisory Committee; (2) greater support for community relations programs by police officials; (3) more effective steps to recruit and select minority persons for positions in law enforcement agencies, and (4) greater flexibility in dealing with youthful minority group offenders. Burton Powell, Director, Department of Community Services, County of Los Angeles, recommended immediate construction of medical care facilities in the Watts area, plus the addition of mobile health clinics and educational programs to the County Health Department program. "Consumer education and protection programs for the citizens of the ghettos are desperately needed," said Powell, who also asked for "relaxation of welfare rules to provide immediate assistance for families out of food or threatened with eviction or who don't have bus fare to get a sick baby to the hospital."

In a third paper, Charles Posner, President of the Los Angeles Chapter of the National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials and Associate Director of the Community Relations Committee of the Jewish Federation-Council of Greater Los Angeles, called for a total commitment of the school system to integration of both student bodies and teaching staffs, plus extra programs to equip teachers to deal with individual and group differences; and pointed out the lack of an explicit philosophy of education in the Report. In a final paper dealing with employment, Larry Lucks, Regional Director, California State Fair Employment Practices Commission, observed that the McCone Report ignores the relationship of housing discrimination to unemployment, the future impact of automation on low-skilled jobs, and the fact that new jobs are now being created which barely accommodate the influx of new residents into the poverty areas. He recommended consolidation of job training and re-training programs, now spread among eight departments, into one agency.

Contents of the consultant papers were reacted to by a panel of practitioners administering action programs in the poverty areas. The panel was chaired by Reverend Cornish Rodgers, President, Federation of Community Coordination Councils, and included Commander Dennis Nelson, Director, Los Angeles City Bureau of Human Relations; James Fisk, Inspector, Coordinator of Community Relations Activity, Los Angeles Police Department; Robert Purdy, Associate Superintendent, Los Angeles City Schools; Howard Earle, Chief, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department; Kenneth Morris, Executive Director, 28th Street Y.M.C.A. substituting for Robert L. Curry, Chairman, Los Angeles Delinquency and Crime Control Commission. (See subsequent pages for complete texts of papers and summary of commentary)

THE McCONE REPORT:

A Critique of the Section on Law Enforcement

The McCone Report opened the section on law enforcement with the following statement of Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator, made in 1837:

"As the patriots of seventy-six did to the support of the Declaration of Independence, so to the support of the Constitution and laws let every American pledge his life, his property, and his sacred honor - let every man remember that to violate the law is to trample on the blood of his father and to tear the charter of his own children's liberty. Let reverence for laws...become the political religion of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, the grave and the gay of all sexes and tongues and colors and conditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its alters."

Ironically and tragically, a militant descendant of those emancipated, author James Baldwin, wrote in 1966, 129 years later:

"...the police are simply the hired enemies of ... (the Negro) population. They are present to keep the Negro in his place and to protect white

#Baldwin, James - The Nation, July 11, 1966

business interests, and they have no other function. They are, moreover--even in a country which makes the very grave error of equating ignorance with simplicity--quite stunningly ignorant; and, since they know that they are hated, they are always afraid. One cannot possibly arrive at a more surefire formula for cruelty. This is why those pious calls to 'respect the law,' always to be heard from prominent citizens each time the ghetto explodes, are so obscene. The law is meant to be my servant and not my master, still less my torturer and my murderer. To respect the law, in the context in which the American Negro finds himself, is simply to surrender his self-respect."

The task of the McCone Commission might be briefly described as that of comprehending the riots of August, 1965 as a violent clash of these polar views of the law and law enforcement, and of proposing the means for a creative reconciliation of views. How well did it succeed in this task?

In a first cursory reading of the section on law enforcement, one is impressed with the apparent reasonableness and impartiality of the writers. There is a genuine and commendable effort to explore and treat the issues of "police Brutality", police-community relations and complaint procedures, and to develop constructive recommendations for action.

Unfortunately, a further and more searching reading of the section reveals certain underlying assumptions, preconceptions, and a narrowness of vision on the part of the writers which defeats them in their task.

The Nature of Man

In any analysis of social problems, and in any program of remedial social action, the conception of the nature of man held by the analysts and the planners is of central importance, for it largely predetermines how they will define the causes and conceive the solutions. What, then, is the conception of man held by the writers of the law enforcement section?

Page 29 of the Report contains the following sentences:

"If police authority is destroyed, if their effectiveness is impaired, and if their determination to use the authority vested in them to preserve a law abiding community is frustrated, all of society will suffer because groups would feel free to disobey the law and inevitably their number would increase.

Chaos might easily result." (Emphasis added)

This conception of man, and the definition of social problems which results from it, has been treated at length in a paper by sociologist Richard A. Cloward.# The following is quoted from this paper:

"The Conception of man which has dominated Western civilization generally emphasizes his
#Cloward, Professor Richard A. - Social Problems, Social Definitions, and Social Opportunities. Columbia University, School of Social Work, New York.

inherent malevolence. This ancient conception is still potent today...In these belief systems, the role of social institutions as repressive devices is central. Only as man is subjected to rewards and punishments within the context of a stable institutional framework can the deviant behavior of his natural and primitive state be avoided."

As Cloward notes, this simplistic explanation of man and man's behavior has become largely discredited among sophisticated thinkers, although it is still embraced by many people.

Obviously, it is embraced by the McCone writers, despite the fact that in this metropolitan community they had available to them an abundance of social science consultation which might have tempered their naivete.

"It is characteristic of human societies that social problems of many kinds are defined as resulting from the presumed moral, social or psychological defects of the people implicated in these problems rather than from institutional inadequacies. To the extent that these definitions are successfully imposed, a criticism is deflected from the social order, and the existing system of social arrangements is protected..."

Thus, the way in which the McCone writers view man led them inexorably to the defense and justification of the status quo and the fixing of blame upon the people protesting against the status quo. Their analysis led to recommendations for some amelioration of the status quo, but not for creative and fundamental change.

The Nature of Negroes

As noted above, the McCone writers make a very great effort at objectivity and fairness. Perhaps they were simply unaware of how their uncritical use of "facts" led them to unwarranted and highly prejudicial statements about Negroes. The following is a flagrant example:

Page 30 of the Report contains the flat statement that "over half of all crimes of violence committed in the City of Los Angeles are committed by Negroes." This statement is objectionable on several counts. In the first place, we do not know the data source for this statement, and have no way in the world of knowing whether or not it is in fact true. If it is based upon arrest reports, all we know is that of crimes of violence reported or detected more than half occur among Negroes. We have no idea of how many crimes of violence go unreported or undetected, nor what differential patterns of detection and reporting may exist as between the white and Negro populations. If the statement is based upon convictions, then we must recognize the inequities existing between white

and Negro populations in resources for for defense. As Cloward says:

"Justice may be blind to many things, but the economic status of the offender is not one of them. How one fares with the police and the courts is in large measure a function of the skill of legal counsel, and it hardly needs to be noted that the capacity to obtain competent legal defense is largely a function of one's economic position. Another economically based technique of defense is restitution, for those who can afford to make restitution frequently find it possible to have charges against them withdrawn or dismissed."

If the McCone writers felt called upon the treat of differential crime statistics among Negroes and whites, it is most unfortunate that they did not utilize the opportunity to enlighten the public on the nature of the problems. In addition to what has been said above, they might have observed the differential incidence of embezzlement and other white collar crimes among Negroes and whites, noting that Negroes are rarely responsible for this type of offense. After all, people commit the kinds of crimes which they have an opportunity to commit, and Negroes have few opportunities to commit crimes other than those of violence, robbery, burglary and theft. Caucasians, on the other hand, have opportunity to commit crimes of financial

trust, such as embezzlement, but these are relatively immune from prosecution.

Thus far, then, we have indicated how the McCone writers, whether consciously or uncounsciously, propounded a naive conception of the nature of man, leading to a definition of social problems. such as the Watts riots, as residing in the oppressed peoples rather than in an unworkable status quo; and made an uncritical use of "facts" about high crimes rates among Negroes which could only inflame the prejudices of the larger community and contribute to a continued stereotyping of the Negro rather than to a compassionate comprehension of the problems of poor minorities. What of their treatment of specific issues and their recommendations?

Police Brutality

The McCone writers acknowledge the "recurring charge" of "police brutality" as evidence of "a deep and long-standing schism between a substantial portion of the Negro community and the Police Department". They also acknowledge "police brutality" as an issue in the 1964 riots in other northern cities and in the Watts riots. Their treatment of this issue is therefore of great potential significance.

It is a great disappointment, then, to find the Report somewhat evasive as to judgment, shallow as to analysis, and timid and unimaginative as to recommendations.

The Report states (p. 27), "... One witness after another has recounted instances in which, in their opinion, the police have used excessive force or have been disrespectful and abusive in their language or manner." The writers then say that "... the more than seventy cases of alleged police brutality which were submitted to the Commission contributed to our understanding of the depths of the feelings of a segment of the Negro community toward the Police Department", but that "... because our responsibility has been to review the general policy and procedure for handling citizen complaints rather than to review individual cases, we have referred all of the cases to the appropriate and responsible agencies."

It may well be that the McCone staff had neither the responsibility nor the capability of investigating and judging these charges. Yet surely it had responsibility for doing something more than

referring the cases "to the appropriate and responsible agencies." This in the face of its own analysis of the deficiencies in existing complaint procedures!

Elsewhere (p. 29) the McCone writers, referring to "police brutality", state: "... The fact that this charge is repeatedly made must not go unnoticed, for there is a real danger that persistent criticism will reduce and perhaps destroy that persistent criticism will reduce and perhaps destroy the effectiveness of law enforcement." Are we to

understand, then, that the reason for attending to the charge of "police brutality" is that it will have an adverse effect upon law enforcement, rather than that there needs to be an honest determination of facts?

A few lines further on (p. 29) we find this: "Much can be done to correct the existing impressions..." (emphasis added). One is left to his own conclusions as to whether this is careless writing, or expressive of the judgment which the writers had privately rendered as to the issue.

The McCone writers never do state clearly what they feel should be done about the "police brutality" issue. At the bottom of p. 29, after their inconclusive discussion, they state: "... Basically, on the one hand, we call for a better understanding by the law enforcement agencies of Negro community attitudes and, on the other hand, a more widespread understanding within the Negro community of the value of the police and the extent to which the law enforcement agencies provide it with security." Strangely, they follow this statement with the highly prejudicial statement about the high incidence of crimes of violence among Negroes. Presumably, then, recommendations offered later in the Report are considered by the writers to be relevant and adequate to the issue of "police brutality".

We do not intend by the foregoing remarks to impugn the good intentions of the McCone staff or writers, nor in any way to imply our own judgment on the "police brutality" issue. The

point is that they were so concerned with fair and inoffensive that their discussion is at best harmless and ineffective, and at worst, albeit inadvertently, prejudicial. How might they have undertaken to enlighten the larger community on the background of "police brutality" charges and to develop more creative resolutions?

They might, for example, have noted how the police system itself operates to isolate and alienate itself from the community which it serves. In the interest of efficient and economical enforcement, foot patrols have been eliminated, and patrol cars substituted. Personal relationships with residents have been virtually eliminated. Patrolmen concerned about status and advancement are under organizational pressure to write citations, to make field interrogations, and to make arrests, for this is one tangible way in which their work is evaluated. When police work has been largely depersonalized, and when citations, interrogations and arrests weigh particularly heavily on a population group short on economic and other resources for defense or bail, feelings of discriminatory treatment and police brutality are inevitable. When this condition is coupled with inadequate channels of appeal and the knowledge that police systems contain few representatives of minority groups, these feelings are doubled and redoubled to an explosive degree.

We are ourselves not undertaking an exhaustive treatment of the background of charges of "police brutality," nor of solutions.

The point is that more than palliatives are required. More fundamental changes in the systems of law enforcement are required. In subsequent sections we will suggest other changes.

Board of Police Commissioners

We subscribe to the recommendations of the McCone Report for strengthening the Police Commission. We also subscribe to the observation of the McCone Commission in its later report of August 17, 1966: "... we continue to doubt whether the Board...is fully responding to the opportunity and the responsibility contained in the Charter."

Complaint Procedures

The McCone Report presents a sound analysis of deficiencies in procedures for the investigation of citizen complaints regarding police actions. It follows this analysis with a rather incongruous defense of the results obtained from these procedures as they relate to disciplinary actions against individual police officers, and then states: "Despite these facts, the impression that citizen complaints are ignored continues because of deficiencies in the existing procedure." (Emphasis added). Here again, out of their zeal to offend no one, the McCone writers leave the reader wondering where they really stand on an issue.

The Report then rejects the establishment of a civilian

review board, feeling that it "would endanger the effectiveness of law enforcement." We do not here advocate the establishment of a civilian board, but do note again the inordinate fear of the McCone writers that somehow law enforcement will be undermined based upon their conception of man as inherently malvolent and in need of repressive institutional controls. Further, we suggest that effective law enforcement depends ultimately upon the support and confidence of the citizenry, and that the contribution which a civilian board of review might make to such support and confidence, among minorities in particular, might outweigh its alleged challenge to enforcement.

The Report ultimately recommends, "to insure independent investigation of complaints, "the establishment of an "Inspector General", under the authority of the Chief of Police but outside the chain of command." The Chief would then report findings and recommendations to the Board of Police Commissioners, which "would pass on whether the complaint is or is not sustained."

Implementation of this recommendation would indeed improve existing procedures. It would, however, leave the police in the position to investigate, judge and discipline themselves. It would not automatically make the procedure more visible to the public nor better understood by the public. Nor would it be likely to increase public confidence in the procedure of complaint investigation and disposition.

As the McCone Commission observes in its later report of August 17, 1966:

- 1) The concept of "inspector general" recommended in its Report is not in operation.
- 2) Its recommendation that the Board of Police Commissioners should act on all complaints to determine whether the complaints is or is not sustained has not been implemented.
- 3) The Board of Police Commissioners has never utilized Hearing Officers on citizen allegations of police misconduct, despite its authority to assign such such civilian Officers, independent of both the Police Department and the Board.

We would suggest then, that there is room for constructive actions on complaint procedures, short of establishment of a civilian review board, if there is in fact a will on the part of the police and the public. We make the additional suggestion that, in addition to more adequate procedural safeguards, complainants should be provided, through public resources, with competent assistance and counsel in the preparation and adjudication of complaints. As a matter of fact, the establishment of such an "ombudsman" role in relation to governmental agencies in general is being increasingly advocated, and implementation of such a concept would do much to take the sting out of a civilian review process which would otherwise apply to police agencies only.

Until such actions are taken, citizens frustration and resentment, particularly among minority groups, will continue to fester and constitute a far greater danger to social tranquility and the rule of law than would the actions themselves. Especially important in any new procedure established in adequate provision for assuring that persons originating complaints are fully informed as to the disposition of such complaints.

Community-Police Relations

The McCone Report recommends that the Police Department institute expanded community relations programs, proposing four major actions:

1. More intensive in-service human relations training for officer personnel;
2. Youth programs such as the now defunct Deputy Auxiliary Police;
3. Periodic open forums and workshops involving police and residents of the minority communities in discussions of law enforcement;
4. Frequent contact between the police and students in junior and senior high schools.

We agree with the need for the implementation of all four actions. In-service training in human relations has been a key to successful police-minority relations elsewhere. But what curriculum would be most effective? We recommend the establishment of an advisory group of intergroup relations agency professionals and educators to review the existing training programs for the purpose of updating

them and strengthening them.

There is a need for more than periodic" dialogue between police and residents of minority communities. In order to establish effective communication we recommend that regular, ongoing dialogue be established on two levels. First, the chief of Police and the Sheriff should provide an opportunity for discussions with heads of established civil rights groups in order to keep abreast of changing feelings in the minority communities and to establish mutual respect with them.

Second, there should be developed, at the Divisional level, a pattern of monthly meetings with minority people from various walks of life: business, professional, blue-collar, civic groups, housewives, youth. The purpose of the meetings would be to assist with the formation of police-citizen responsibility for crime prevention. There would be benefits of better understanding of the police role and the police would gain from the rapport established with citizens in their areas.

In order to effect the two levels of dialogue, we recommend the establishment of a Police-Community Relations Advisory Committee representing business, labor, education, and key governmental agencies, advised by competent intergroup relations professionals.

We also see value in periodic polls conducted in the community concerning police relationships. This feed back would be helpful in determining progress made or areas that need help.

It should be noted that the actions suggested above, by both the McCone Report and ourselves, can become mere manipulative gimmicks, a facade, unless other changes in the police system

itself are inaugurated. We have previously observed that an emphasis upon "efficiency" as such can bring about overzealous enforcement behavior on the part of the individual policeman - the apparent harrassment of a community to meet organizational requirements for citations, interrogations and arrests. Patrolmen in cars are inevitably isolated from the community they patrol. To a great extent, the image of the police is a reflection of their behavior.- at least, the citizen's interpretation of that behavior. In short, there must be real change, not merely the show of activities which might induce or promise change.

There must no longer be in existence the attitude that "the police have all the answers and we can operate our own community relations departments without assistance." The problem is too complex and difficult. The Police Department needs to listen and deal with its critics as well as its friends and supporters.

A community relations program, above all, must have the strong support of the chief executive of the police agency. He must articulate the importance of it to all under his command and must, himself, exemplify the spirit and letter of the training regulations designed to uphold the principle of "equal treatment for all citizens".

More Negroes and Mexican-Americans in Law Enforcement

The McCone Report deplors the fact that only four percent of the Los Angeles Police Department and six percent of the Sheriff's Department are Negroes, and even fewer are Mexican-Americans. It acknowledges efforts of those Departments and other agencies and persons to recruit minorities, and makes

recommendations for more active recruitment. It fails to observe how critically the anti-minority image of the agencies themselves militates against the recruitment of minorities. In a very real sense, the recruitment problem will ameliorate as this image and community-police relations more generally improve, and not until then.

Still, it might be worthwhile to consider how system innovations might be used to address both recruitment and community-police relations problems. Successful community self-policing experiments, such as that carried out by the Civilian Alert Patrol and the Sons of Watts in connection with the August Watts Festival, and that carried out by the Civilian Alert Patrol and "US" in connection with the November appearance of Stokley Carmichael, suggests that residents of the community might be employed to perform routine social control activities in their own neighborhoods, where they know they are accepted by the people. Usual rigid selection standards as to education, physical condition and arrest records might well be modified.

CONCLUSION

We have not meant to be hypercritical of either the McCone Commission Report nor of law enforcement in this statement. Rather, we have tried to present another view - that of inter-group relations professionals - on the complex social problems of concern.

Law enforcement in Los Angeles County has achieved a level of incorruptibility and efficiency to be emulated and aspired to elsewhere. Yet it is evident that these characteristics in

themselves do not produce a capacity for dealing with racial and economic tensions, except by violent repressive measures. New approaches to social control, based upon openness to change and criticism, are required. These new approaches will come only as both police and public attitudes about police work, and about the causes and cures of social tensions, change.

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COMMUNITY RELATIONS SEMINAR
for
INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND SOCIAL SERVICE EXECUTIVES

Report Prepared
for
McCone Report Revisited Conference
Health, Welfare, Leadership Development
and
Community Organization

INTRODUCTION

A review of the report of the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots brings out what continues to be a major source of problems, the lack of understanding on the part of the majority community of life in the ghetto in general, and of poverty areas in particular. This report contains specific recommendations pertaining to some areas of community concern which it is believed will take the commission's report several steps further in the direction of meaningful solutions. The fact that most of the people in the County have limited knowledge of life in the ghetto cannot be over emphasized when considering their reaction to the report of the Governor's Commission. The fact that the people of Los Angeles County do not have a common language nor common life experience makes it very difficult for them to carry out meaningful discussion and realistic planning. This separateness, more often than not, leads to judgments about one another rather than joint action to improve understanding. In this light, a critique of the McCone Commission Report is in reality a critique of a process of which the report is a part; a process in which people are brought together who are poorly informed about one another's perceptions, and who lack a common language.

The Seminar Committee, for which I am spokesman, probably falls within that process too, although it has made a conscientious effort to speak out on certain matters on the basis of what its members know to be the feelings of people living in the South Central part of Los Angeles, rather than on the basis of what the majority community thinks the problems are.

I might identify those persons who worked in preparing the material:

Mr. Wade McClain, Manager
State Service Center
103rd Street

Mr. Clyde Madden, Director
Economic Opportunity Planning Project
Welfare Planning Council, Los Angeles Region

Mr. Edward Reinig, Director
Health Education
Department of Public Health, County of Los Angeles

Mr. Lorenzo Traylor, Director
Los Angeles Field Office
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

We also received advisory support from:

Mr. Bill Williams, of the Seminar staff
Mr. Wesley Brazier, Executive Director
Los Angeles Urban League

RECOMMENDATIONS

HEALTH

1. Even though the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots, its consultants and local government officials have recognized and acknowledged the urgent need for expanded and improved health care and hospital services in the curfew area, now, in December 1966, adequate local medical care facilities are still non-existent! We agree with the residents of the area that services are needed now. It is true that the Board of Supervisors has appropriated funds for preliminary plans for a hospital; however, conservative estimates are that completed facilities are at least three years away.

We recommend that an urgent, high priority rating be set on this project. Further, we urge that the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor and City Council of Los Angeles jointly act to insure the earliest possible completion of needed medical facilities.

2. Despite some increased action and services by public officials and governmental agencies, and by health agencies supported by public philanthropy since August 1965, the expansion of services and facilities is certainly not noticeable. Consequently, the residents of the South Central area are doubtful that any significant improvements will actually occur.

We recommend that every health agency and medical care organization mentioned in the report of the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots provide an accounting to the public clearly spelling out the services they have been providing and what additional services they plan to institute and when.

3. Residents of the South Central area contribute to the support of philanthropic services such as those supported by the United Way and those provided by Red Cross, the Heart Association, the Cancer Society, the Tuberculosis Association, Crippled Childrens Society and others. All of these agencies purport to provide services to the areas of greatest need.

We recommend that the governing boards of all these private agencies reassess the distribution of their respective service programs and present a public report to indicate whether in actuality their services are going to critical problem areas, and what redeployment of funds they contemplate making.

4. The County Health Department provides important services and is a valuable community health resource. The fixed nature of the Department's facilities, however, makes this resource inaccessible and therefore useless to many families in need of care.

We recommend expansion and increase of County Health Department services through the use of mobile health clinics.

5. In urban slum areas, conditions contributing to the development of public health problems are especially prevalent. A practical stop-gap measure to be taken, while slum conditions are being eliminated, is increased health education services.

We recommend health education services be increased with nutrition, decreasing accidents, and preventing the spread of disease.

6. The physical conditions of a community affect the physical and emotional condition of its inhabitants. We would call upon local residents, individually and in groups, to do all in their power to improve the physical condition of their homes and property. In order for such local self-help efforts to be effective, we recommend they be backed up by vigorous, consistent, continuous, and dependable City and County programs for street cleaning, streets and lighting maintenance, garbage and rubbish collection, rodent control and equal enforcement of anti-litter and sanitation laws. Los Angeles Beautiful should actively aid, participate in, and give recognition to local self-help efforts.

WELFARE

1. The McCone Commission report and critics of family conditions in the South Central area decry the fact that there is such a high proportion of broken, absent-father families. We would point out that State legislative regulations and various administrative procedures of our public assistance system serve to increase and perpetuate these conditions. Bluntly speaking, the public-at-large helps create what it criticizes.

Therefore, if change is to occur, the public must change its attitudes, its laws, and its methods of providing assistance.

2. Unemployed fathers sometimes absent themselves from their families, permanently or surreptitiously, in the belief that this is the only practical way to obtain financial aid through the Bureau of Public Assistance.

A legislative amendment in 1963 provided that unemployed, employable parents living with their children could, if they met other eligibility requirements, receive aid to families with dependent children. This legislation tended to reduce the "necessity" for the father to leave home; nevertheless, the effect of current requirements and procedures on a significant number of unemployed fathers is to conclude that leaving home is still the surest way to assure some regular income for their families.

Therefore, if we expect the male parent to be the primary breadwinner, and if we truly desire to help increase his sense of responsibility, our public assistance services should continue to seek means to increase his sense of worth and eliminate any practices that degrade his status in the eyes of the mother and children. His ability and desire to support his family should be encouraged through individualized rehabilitation and training programs, some of which do exist, but not in sufficient quantity or nature to meet the needs of many long-term unemployed or under-employed fathers.

3. The cutback in the rehabilitation program undertaken by the County last year is inexcusable when the need is so acute. This is a State legislative matter.

We recommend, therefore, that the new state administration reinstitute, expand and adequately finance this program as has been requested by the Board of Supervisors and by the Bureau of Public Assistance.

4. We believe that persons in need of help have a right to receive help.

We, therefore, support the extension of the principle of presumptive eligibility. In other words, when a family or individual expresses the need for help and is willing to sign an affidavit to that effect, help should be made available without delay. At present, the widespread belief is that the policy, or at least practice, of the Bureau of Public Assistance is for the worker, supervisor or district director to search for any possible reason to deny or delay the provision of assistance. Such a condition can be expected to preclude in most instances the B.P.A. worker being viewed as a person who is truly interested in the well-being and rehabilitation of the individual or family in need.

5. Until such time that the policy, practice and image of the welfare system can be improved, we recommend the establishment of a system of advocates for the rights of the poor.
6. "Welfare" and "persons on relief" have been periodically utilized as scapegoats or whipping-boys for publicity or popularity-seeking individuals and groups. The McCone Commission report repeats two of the most commonly repeated and least-verifiable "myths" about welfare recipients; namely, that our "liberal" welfare laws encourage poor persons to migrate to California and that young women have children out-of-wedlock as a means for qualifying for public assistance or increased grants.

We note the publication "A Look at A Welfare Family in Los Angeles" produced by the Citizens Advisory Committee on Public Assistance and recommend that the committee report regularly to the public the facts on who really is receiving public assistance in Los Angeles County and what are the critical issues in public welfare demanding public understanding and support. For example: What percentage of the total funds are being spent to aid the unemployable aged, the handicapped and children? How much is really being spent to aid newcomers? How much is being spent to aid employable adults for whom jobs are actually not available?

This same citizens commission should also review the actual adequacy of grants. In our experience, the funds granted are frequently inadequate for minimal subsistence and certainly do not provide funds to permit effective job search, training or placement efforts.

7. A major redesign of our entire public assistance or welfare system is called for, we believe, as we analyze the criticisms, shortcomings and inadequacies of the present system. The Aerospace Industry report on this matter will be published sometime in March or April.

For the unemployable, a system of consistent, adequate income must be devised to be received as a matter of right and not in such a manner as to pauperize the recipient. Extension and expansion of old age and survivors insurance, disability insurance and unemployment insurance programs are practical and immediate steps that should be taken.

For the unemployed and underemployed, employable persons and for the employed persons whose incomes are insufficient to support their dependents, we suggest the establishment of an agency separate and distinct from the income maintenance, relief agency for unemployable persons. This new agency could be called a Training and Economic Opportunity Center. Some employees would be known as training and rehabilitation specialists; others would be careers and job development specialists. The function of the new agency would be to provide an individualized, planned program of job training and preparation for employment for all of these persons and to aid them until they were successfully placed in a work situation. Maintenance for the trainee and his dependents should be provided as a matter of right and as is commonly practiced when a young persons attends college on a private scholarship or state aid, or when a recruit is paid during basic training, or a serviceman receives full maintenance during prolonged periods of specialist training or officer candidate school, or when a public service employee is paid during several weeks or months of job training.

8. We believe that present office facilities and procedures and the working conditions in some B.P.A. offices are degrading to the persons requiring help and are demoralizing to the workers who are supposed to be of assistance. Therefore, we believe that if these matters were improved, this would serve to alleviate some of the greater aggravations until the changes recommended in item #7 could be made.

We recommend (1) multi-discipline, social psychological research on the effects of present procedures and facilities on the attitudes and behavior of persons seeking help, (2) similar research in relation to attitudes and behavior of agency employees providing assistance, (3) consultation by behavioral science-trained public administration and management systems experts on possible methods for increasing worker effectiveness, and (4) consultation by architect-artist-decorator type experts who could recommend modification of office environments.

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

1. Recognize that in the South Central area, as in all other areas, that there is no single leadership group. There is a multiplicity of "networks" or groupings of people established for a variety of purposes, and within each of these many groups are leaders for the particular system or situation.

Therefore, do not condemn a leader in one system as being irresponsible or ineffective if he is not the leader in another system. It is necessary to identify the respective leaders in the various systems so that when advice or assistance is needed the right person can go to the right leader in the right system.

Encouragement should be given to efforts to bring together leaders of the various systems to work on problems and matters of mutual concern.

2. The South Central area should be encouraged (and technical assistance be provided as needed and requested) to concentrate on the discovering and development of innumerable individuals with latent talents, skills and experience that should be used to plan and implement self-help activities and projects.
3. Recognize the reasons many individuals are going to appear apathetic in relation to proposed cooperative action for community improvement: (a) if the family is out of food or is threatened with eviction or has no bus fare to get the sick baby to the hospital, that family is not able to generate much enthusiasm for some community project unless it holds real promise of meeting that family's pressing needs, or (b) no group develops enthusiasm for working on a problem or project seemingly forced on it by an outsider. The citizens in the neighborhoods of the South Central area know best what "bugs" them. Group action, with acceptable expert assistance, must be directly related to doing something about the problems so identified.

4. Intensive, basic, down-to-earth education -- beginning in the earliest feasible school grades and continuing on to adult classes -- to teach persons how to secure their rights, how to contribute to the enhancement of their personal and community esteem, and how to effect needed community changes through effective social action and practical political participation must be undertaken. This, obviously, is an educational program. However, if the public schools cannot or will not undertake this educational task, other auspices and funding must be found.
5. We recommend the development of a consumer protection program. In some communities, the Better Business Bureau provides part of this needed service by exposing fraudulent promotion schemes and dishonest contractors. But what is needed in the South Central area is an agency or program that will fight on a community-wide basis against discriminatory prices, installment purchase exploitation and prohibitive interest and insurance rates and that will also be an advisor and advocate for individuals.
6. The South Central area has both the need and potential for unity of action throughout the development of a sense of community pride and identity.

Elementary schools serving as multi-purpose community centers have helped achieve this in some communities.

Increased opportunities for home ownership and improvement would contribute to community pride.

Public festivals, art exhibits, and other special cultural events should be continued and expanded.

7. Increased manpower will obviously be needed to provide the additional services recommended. To this end, we most strongly recommend that the Board of Supervisors and the City Council provide the minimal local contributions to qualify for available Federal grants so that from thousands of local, low-income residents can be trained and employed in new career opportunities, such as health education aides, community sanitation aides, home nutrition service aides, information and referral aides and clinic aides.
8. We believe that the Negroes who have advanced economically, professionally and socially and who have achieved special resources, should reassess their role in relation to the improvement of the South Central area. The improvements needed are certainly not their sole responsibility. But it is true that those who have successfully "escaped" from the ghetto have a special opportunity to aid those who remain; and those who remain desperately need, can well use, and must have the talents and resources of the "escaped" brothers.

EDUCATION

COMMUNITY RELATIONS LEADERSHIP SEMINAR

THE McCONE COMMISSION REVISITED

On Wednesday evening, August 11th, 1965, a series of events began that was to make an area known as Watts a byword, not only in this City and State, but in our Country and throughout the world. The crisis which began on that evening was to end on the next Tuesday, August 17th, when Governor Edmund Brown ordered the curfew lifted from the area.

Immediately following the announcement by Governor Brown that he would appoint "a Commission of distinguished Californians to make an objective and dispassionate study of the Los Angeles riots", the President of the Los Angeles chapter of NAIRO, the National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials, immediately wired the Governor offering the full assistance and cooperation of the members of NAIRO and expressing the hope that the Governor would use the skills and knowledge of the NAIRO members in the fields of human intergroup relations.

On August 24th, 1965 Governor Brown announced the appointment of a distinguished Commission to "make inquiries and recommendations". The Governor, in his charge to the Commission set forth three areas of concern: first, "that the Commission should prepare an accurate chronology and description of the riots and attempt to draw any lessons which may be learned from a retrospective study of these events. The purpose of this would not be to fix blame and find scapegoats, but rather to develop a comprehensive and detailed chronology and description of the disorders." Secondly, "the Commission should probe deeply the

immediate and underlying causes of the riot." And thirdly, "the Commission should develop recommendations for action designed to prevent a re-occurrence of these tragic disorders."

One hundred days later, the Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles riots headed by John A. McCone submitted to the Governor their report. The report was dated December 2nd, 1965 and was titled "Violence in the City - An End Or A Beginning?"

Before beginning the critique of the McCone Commission Report and its recommendations, perhaps it's best that we point out here that not one member of the Commission could be said to have had either the skills or the experience of a professional in the field of human or intergroup relations. If one was to examine the members of the staff and consultants to the Commission, one area that seems to have been totally overlooked is that of human or intergroup relations. It is rather obvious that the so-called Watts riots dealt with the relationships of individuals and groups, yet no one seemed to be concerned enough with these relationships to use the skills and experience of competent intergroup relations professionals available to the Governor and to the Commission.

Our hope was best expressed by the Commission when it stated "our report will bring into clear focus for all the citizens to see the economic and sociological conditions in our city that underlay the gathering anger which impelled the rioters to escalate the routine arrest of a drunken driver into six days of violence".

Yes, that was our hope, but we are sorry to say that our hope was never realized, and our frustration was best expressed by the California Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights in January of 1966, when they said, "we are sorely disappointed by the McCone Commission Report. Although there are a number of constructive suggestions which the Commission proposed, we feel the Report falls far short of even the Commission's own view of its role. Certainly, it does not begin to deal adequately with the underlying problems. It prescribes aspirin where surgery is required. ...The Report is elementary, superficial, unoriginal and unimaginative".

For as Bayard Rustin has said, "...The McCone Report is a bold departure from the standard government paper on social problems. It goes beyond the mere recital of statistics to discuss, somewhat sympathetically, the real problems of the Watts community - problems like unemployment, inadequate schools, delapidated housing - and it seems at first glance to be leading toward constructive programs. It never reaches them, ---."

We have set forth this background on the McCone Report because it expresses specifically our evaluation of the Report and leads to our discussion of the specific section of the Report dealing with Education.

The section on Education is entitled "Education - our Fundamental Resource". The section opens with the statement "education is the keystone of democracy ... Hope centers on education." Having set this as their premise, the report

continues without ever trying to define what it means by education or even to set forth any kind of basic philosophy of education.

Before delving into the findings of the Report, we would like to point out that the section on Education suffers from some of the same basic faults that are inherent in the total McCone Report, that of isolation. For example: The McCone Commission tries to explain the riot as if riots had never happened before, and without putting it in any kind of context of history or development.

The Commission having stated that "Education is the keystone of democracy", proceeds to study the field of education as if education by itself would solve the problem. Education is vital to our democratic society, but education does not live in isolation. It is part of our total structure, but the Commission failed to look at or to understand the effects of housing or employment on education as part of the total problem.

It seems that the Commission had decided that if it could solve the problem of education, every other problem would solve itself. We certainly agree on the importance of education, but in our complex society and in our complex metropolitan area, the answer that education by itself could solve the problem, was too simple.

Therefore, it seems necessary that in order to understand the needs of the community in the areas of education or to measure its accomplishments, we must first define, or at

least set forth a philosophy of education. We must set up guidelines on which to judge the validity of the present program, and on which to base our recommendations for new programs and new developments. In order that we might critique the McCone Commission Report on Education as well as take a look at the education per se, we feel it necessary to set forth our "philosophy of education".

We believe that education is a basic human right and an important instrument of individual and social change and that the goals of education apply equally to all human beings.

We believe that the goals of education should include:

1. Helping every person realize his full potential and develop into the best that he is capable of becoming.
2. Recognizing persons as unique individuals characterized by individual and cultural differences with a variety of needs and interests.
3. Developing in each person the ability to perceive accurately the world in which he lives and to create an environment for sensitive human relationships among people of various races, religions, backgrounds and social classes.

We believe that these goals can best be pursued in integrated and not segregated schools, not even de facto segregated schools. This is equally applicable for students in all majority group schools and all minority group schools. Both groups, when segregated, are in a very vital sense disadvantaged. The definition of "racial balance" will not be the same in every

circumstance but must take in account different problems in different situations.

Public schools have the obligation to lead students towards ways of thinking and feeling about people that will make it natural for each to regard and respect the other as an individual and to be evaluated as an individual without regard to racial or other characteristics irrelevant to individual worth.

Looking now at the specific section on Education of the McCone Commission Report, we find it very difficult to evaluate the Report, or measure the statistics or even the recommendations, because as we stated earlier, the Commission failed to set any philosophy of education or even any guidelines by which one could judge their findings.

We have reviewed the report prepared by Dr. Kenneth A. Martyn, the Consultant on Education for the Commission, and we have no way of knowing why certain statistical tables from the original Martyn study were used and why others were not used. We believe sincerely that a better selection of the tables, as set forth in the original study, would have helped clarify a number of issues, but we have a suspicion that subconsciously or otherwise, the Commission decided that education was to be the whipping boy for the so-called Watts riot.

We wish it were that easy - for had the Commission really understood the role of education and its relationship to the other forces in the community or its relationship to the power structure, it would have made recommendations that really contained meaning and direction and not recommendations

that dealt primarily with physical problems and excluded almost totally the relationship of the schools and its personnel to the community.

The report failed completely to concern itself with the inter-personal relationships and the inter-actions between the administrators and teachers, administrators and parents, teachers and parents, administrators and students and teachers and students. The report failed to perceive the difficult problem of teachers and administrators coming from a middle-class culture to understand the problems and mores of a low-economic culture. The report fails to take into account that the teacher may be excellent in her subject material and her methodology, but if she can't understand the actions and the motivations of a student coming from another culture, or can't stand the so-called "cultural smell", how can that teacher teach or help the student involved?

If a counselor is not really trained to be a counselor with the necessary academic qualifications for a counselor, but comes from some other discipline with no background in inter-group understanding, how can he counsel a student on the basis of that student's needs when he does not understand the culture or the background of that student?

The Report failed to take into account the failure of many of our educational institutions and Schools of Education to teach prospective teachers anything about intergroup relations that would even give them a smattering of knowledge about the human problems that they will meet in the classroom. Nothing was said in the recommendations about the greater

need for inservice training to take up the lack brought on by the failures of the Schools of Education to adequately prepare our teachers to handle students of different backgrounds and cultures.

We believe at this point some clarification is necessary of our inference that education was used as a whipping boy to explain the Watts riots.

We do not wish to overlook the role of the schools and we find much to condemn and commend them, but we believe that the Commission took the easy way out by using the schools rather than attacking the real bread and butter issues. We believe that the statistics used in the Report can be made to balance out, if one so desires, but we are not concerned with statistics. We are concerned with individual children and people. Although we are concerned with the size of the classroom, we are more concerned how the one child was handled or helped, rather than if there were 22 in one classroom and 23 in another.

We believe that our public school systems, not only the Los Angeles School District, but all of the other Districts in our County failed to really be imaginative and innovative in planning education for the latter half of the 20th century. Our school systems are making changes. They are neither fast enough nor drastic enough, if we are to meet the needs of an ever-growing metropolitan area with the problems never before faced by any school system in our country.

We believe that the McCone Commission failed to understand the conservative role of educators today and the even more conservative role of the power structure. The Commission failed to take the opportunity to shake the community out of its lethargy by really demonstrating how low on the value scale our community has put education.

The Report failed to take into account the fundamental needs of our community. It failed to even deal with the problems of education - for example, training for adults and adolescents who are no longer in school.

We believe that the major conclusion reached in the Education system of the McCone Commission Report is based on a false assumption and indicates erroneous reasoning or at best a failure to understand the dynamics of the problem. The McCone Commission concludes that "the very low level of scholastic achievement we've observed in the predominant Negro schools contributes to de facto segregations in the schools". If the foregoing is accurate, then high scholastic standards of minority students in some schools should have played an important role in furthering integration in those areas. We believe that this is not borne out by fact, that the McCone Commission's conclusion is not based on fact but on an erroneous assumption that has about the same validity as if we were to say "the poor want to be poor".

Finally, the two recommendations of the Commission will hardly serve to correct the imbalance. We believe that they are tools in the education of our future citizens, but certainly fall far short of presenting a major attack on the problem.

Thus the Commission's explicit statement that "education is the keystone of democracy" has not been faced in this report. We believe that Bayard Rustin has set forth our concern with the Report when he said, "the Commission's imagination and political intelligence appears paralyzed by the hard facts of Negro deprivation it has unearthed and it lacks the political will to demand that the vast resources of contemporary America be used to build a genuinely great Society that will finally put an end to these deprivations".

Having criticized the report and its findings, we believe that as professionals in the field of intergroup relations, we owe an obligation to the community as professionals in the field of human relations to set forth our recommendations.

1. We believe that for our democratic structure to survive, we cannot have good schools and bad schools, but all schools must be of the highest quality and in a democratic society, integration is an important component of quality education.
2. We believe that in order to achieve quality integrated education, the entire school system, lay and professional, must have a positive commitment to integration in contrast to desegregation. It is important to note that integration should not mean physical proximity alone, although that is necessary, but rather it should develop a continuing growing condition of mutual esteem and social interaction. In order to achieve such integration, integrated teaching staffs are essential to this entire process.

3. We believe that as these goals are achieved and that as integration takes place, there will continue to be a large number of students who are educationally disadvantaged because of prior experience, cultural differences, factors of class and caste and or of discrimination. It is therefore essential that every school district's program of integration be accompanied by a massive program of "differential education" or what has become known as compensatory education.

Integration and differential education within individual schools or individual classes are not mutually exclusive, rather they are most effective when used one with the other. If these programs of differential education are to be effective, we must use all possible resources, funds and techniques to overcoming blocks to learning and to encourage aspiration and motivation. This cannot be limited to curriculum offerings, but must include sensitive and individualized teaching and counselling with teachers trained in the area of human relations. It must also include physical facilities and equipment, such as libraries and cafeterias, and finally, there must be no superior or inferior schools.

4. The public schools must develop programs of instruction and attitude formation that will lead students to accept their differences and to develop emotionally secure attitudes toward themselves and their fellows. Students must be helped to appreciate each other as individuals and most important to the successful pursuit of such a

program of intergroup education is the maintenance of democratic relationships within the schools among teachers, pupils and administrators. This relationship can be achieved only if there is a genuine commitment by the entire system and its personnel.

5. Teaching training, both preservice and inservice, must be designed to develop an intensified sensitivity and skill in dealing with individual and group differences in the classroom. This means developing in all teachers the ability to see and respond to human beings as human beings, deal constructively with prejudices as well as with tensions in the classroom and the community. This means training not only for the teacher, but also the preparation of adequate and accurate teaching material. We believe that the school systems must at once begin full programs of inservice training, not as extra-curricular activity, but as a basic part of the teacher's employment.
6. We believe that the goals that we have outlined of the educational programs necessary to achieve them not only benefit all members of society, but are also the responsibility of all members of our society. We believe therefore that there is an urgent need for broad community understanding and support in order to bring about the gigantic and costly coordinated effort by all agencies of the community that will be required to make this vision a reality. We believe, however, that no effort and expense can be deemed too great to assure the future of our greatest resource, the American people.

December 14, 1966

COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT
COMMUNITY RELATIONS SEMINAR

It is anomalous that while the American gross national product is at an all-time high and the unemployment rate, currently estimated at less than 4 per cent, is constantly shrinking, the unemployment level among Negroes continues at a rate almost double that of the national level.

While the national unemployment level of the Negro presents a dim view, the level of unemployment for Negroes in Southern California, the scene of the August, 1965 Riot, is much more disturbing. The U. S. Department of Labor, in its publication, "Area Trends in Employment and Unemployment," September, 1966, classified the Los Angeles-Long Beach area in the "C" zone. A "C" classification means that the unemployment level is moderate and in the 3 to 5.9 percent range. The actual unemployment ratio in this area fell from 6.1 per cent in July, 1965, just before the August Riot, to 4.8 percent one year later. However, by contrast, the unemployment rate among Negroes in the heart of the riot-stricken section of the city has been estimated at 25 to 30 percent just prior to the August, 1965 Riot.

Thus, while the unemployment rate was declining in Southern California, just prior to the Riot, the number of Negroes on the unemployment list was increasing at an astounding rate. Efforts to reduce the unemployment level of Negroes in South Los Angeles have been made since the Riot of last year, but the effect of these efforts in the hard-core unemployment area of "Watts" has not been substantial. Notwithstanding the 1.3 percent decline in unemployment in the general Los Angeles area during the past year and in spite of the efforts of public and private groups to find jobs for the willing and able within the "Riot Curfew" zone of the city, the unemployment rate of the residents of "Watts" itself remains at about 15 to 20 per cent.

Much of what is said about the unemployment conditions in the predominately Negro section of Los Angeles can be said with almost equal force about conditions in the Mexican-American community of East Los Angeles. This suggests that efforts are needed for both sections of Los Angeles and that such efforts ought to be equally applied.

This report will examine the McCone Report as it deals with the problem of unemployment and proceed to evaluate the effectiveness of the recommendations found in the Report in light of the ability or inability of the suggested measures to deal with the chronic unemployment conditions in South-Central Los Angeles which, admittedly, contributed greatly to the precipitation of the August, 1965 Riot. The report will offer a number of additional proposals that might be implemented in dealing with the present unemployment situation. These proposals will encompass both short range and long range objectives, the former to be geared towards rapid and massive attacks on the immediate pressure for jobs and the latter to be directed towards effective measures dealing with the larger problem of insufficient training on the part of a significant number in the jobless category.

The initial report of the Commission makes reference to the need for affirmative action by industry and labor. This is very much to the point. However, we felt that more could have been said of the need for a greater affirmative role of labor. There is, for example, no reference to the matter of apprenticeship

training, on-the-job authorizations or the limiting aspects of the sponsorship system of some unions which serve to keep minority union membership at a low level.

In reviewing the Commission's report, we were struck again as with our earlier reading, by the superficiality of much of it and its attempts at muddling through rather than at boldness. It seems in great measure to come up with oversimplified answers to extremely complex questions and problems.

We found it depressingly significant that none of the Staff Attorneys and none of the Staff Investigators came from the field of Intergroup Relations and hence could offer nothing from that discipline. This is true also of the Consultants to the Commission in large part. We found only two or three who, to our knowledge, had had intimate prior concern with this field. We stress this because we feel at the heart of much of the problem is the matter of relationships between the White majority and the Negro minority. Another disheartening factor is that except for a brief comment about the Mexican-American Community, little attention is paid to its present problems or to future plans to forestall similar explosions to those of the Negro.

We realize that the term "planning" has often been anathema in the United States, yet without adequate social planning we will continue to exist with discrimination, inadequate housing and at the least a lack of sensitivity to American minority groups. The hopelessness of these groups will continue if the analysis of the problem and recommendations toward solution exemplified by the McCone Report are any indication.

Now to our Analysis & Recommendations: The present mass of training programs lack direction, coordination and any real sense of urgency or priority. There is no clear evidence that the vocational training programs now operating have taken into serious consideration the factor of automation in the selection of job categories for trainees. Nor is it obvious that the variety of training programs at the institutional level have any direct link to the needs of the job market. The McCone Report refers briefly to some of these problems but few if any visible guidelines emerge from the Report itself to deal with the problems. The recommendations that follow are designed to help bring about some sense of order in the area of job training for the unemployed.

1. There is need for Coordination of Training Programs in the State: At the present time, some eight different agencies or departments are involved in ~~the administration of the multi-faceted state and federal training programs~~ in California. Included in the training effort are such programs as training through the State Vocational Rehabilitation program, training through the Federal Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, training through Unemployment Insurance Retraining Benefits, and training through the state apprenticeship program. There is a certain amount of waste involved since each of the various programs is administered by a different department or agency. The training programs are not always efficiently administered since their operation is seldom the primary function of the agency involved. An additional problem created by the diversity in training programs is the frequent inability of the prospective trainee to discover which training program he qualifies for or where to look for the information. The McCone Report's suggestion that local centers of information be established is a good one. But what is needed in addition is the creation of a single department or agency within the state to coordinate or administer the now separately run training programs.

2. The matter of Directing Training According to Need: All of the recent studies on unemployment in Los Angeles point out the special problem of the "hardcore" unemployed, those who are unable to find or keep a job for any number of reasons. This problem is made more difficult because the "hardcore" unemployed are also the most difficult to reach. Training programs should be directed on a scale that attempts to help those who need the help the most. The first group to be helped should be the "hardcore" jobless. The second category should be the group that is out of work because of the process of automation or some other job-elimination process such as decline in demand. The third category should be those who are "seasonally" unemployed such as farm workers or construction workers. The fourth category should be those workers who are unemployed for only short periods of time (1 - 4 weeks), a group that includes the large body of in-between-job seekers. A fifth category involves those who are not unemployed in the technical sense but may be said to be underemployed. A close study of the present poverty-directed programs would reveal that few participants come from the hardcore jobless category. It is very likely that the underemployed have taken advantage of the poverty programs more than any other group. Some efforts have been taken by the Economic and Youth Opportunities Agency (EYOA), the key poverty administration agency for the city to give a more specific definition to the hardcore unemployed in a resolution adopted by the EYOA Board on September 6, 1966. (See Appendix A)

3. The Development of Effective Follow-up in Training Programs: Few of the training programs are equipped to follow the trainee after he has completed his training to see if, in fact, he does enter or remain in the labor force. The working relationship between the job-placement program of the Management Council for Merit Employment and the training programs of the Opportunities Industrialization Center (OIC) is a beginning, but, admittedly, only a beginning.

A suggestion for effective follow-up that should be adopted comes from UCLA. This plan calls for the use of job counselors for the trainees. The counselors would work with the trainees while on the job providing a vehicle for the expression and sharing of problems common to all workers. As a second phase, the counselor would continue to work with the trainee after the completion of the training period to see if he enters and remains in the labor force. In terms of meeting the cost of such a program, the activity would pay for itself in terms of reducing greatly the percentage of trainee drop-outs and in terms of helping to keep a trained person in the work force. It is obvious that the cost of training is wasted if, after training, the individual fails to enter or remain in the labor force.

4. On-The-Job Training: Employers should be encouraged to use on-the-job trainees in their operations. Such employers should be paid a basic fee for training such persons and additional incentives to the employer could be made if (1) the trainee stays in and completes the training program and (2) if the trainee succeeds in entering and remaining in the labor force. The on-the-job training programs could operate at two levels: (1) Where employers use trainees when a job opening develops within the firm and (2) Where employers embark on training programs beyond their normal work schedule such as on weekends or at night.

There are several reasons why on-the-job training programs are superior to institutional training programs. First, in cases where trainees fill actual jobs that have opened up within a company, there is a direct link between the training and the job need. Such a training program shortens the training period because only the training to fill a specific job would be provided. Institutional training programs tend to prepare the trainees "in general," and often the period

is unnecessarily long or involved. The on-the-job training programs would greatly facilitate follow-up and thus carry a built-in evaluation device lacking in most training programs.

A special problem involving labor unions comes into play when on-the-job training programs are involved. Poverty program officials have estimated that approximately 50 per cent of the unions won't approve on-the-job training programs in companies where they hold union contracts. Many unions still adhere to old paternal practices with respect to new members which serve to bar minority-group members or effectively eliminate minority aspirants through testing devices. There is some evidence of union willingness to cooperate with such programs. The problem is not insurmountable.

5. Compensation for Trainees on Welfare: Where necessary, additional compensation should be made to the trainee on welfare. If this is not done, there will be little incentive for such trainees to attempt to escape the welfare rolls.

In the efforts to reduce unemployment and expand the economic opportunities of the underprivileged groups, it is important that we know more about these underprivileged groups, including reliable ways of identifying them and assessing their needs. There is a need for the development of reliable census data on unemployment in hardcore poverty areas of the city. More must be known about the nature and cases of hardcore unemployment. Specific information on individuals residing in and migrating to urban poverty areas of our city is essential.

1. Development of Reliable Census Data: Unfortunately, much of the discussion concerning unemployment in the South Central section of Los Angeles and more specifically "Watts" centers around the use of reliable census data. An example of the discrepancy in census reporting is the fact that the special census conducted in South and East Los Angeles by the U. S. Bureau of the Census in November of 1965 shows that "Watts" had a decline in population (about 4,000 persons or about 12 per cent) while the regular estimates of population for the area made by the City Planning Commission for October of 1965, shows an increase in population for Watts of about 5,000 more than the special census. The special November Census also places the unemployment rate somewhat lower than the figures used in the McCone Report. However, it has become increasingly obvious that the individuals existing in the most adverse circumstances are also the most difficult to reach in any census study. So any survey would fail accurately to reflect the extent of deprivation in this group.

2. Knowledge of the Nature and Causes of Hardcore Unemployment: Efforts have been made in recent years to gain more insight into the nature of hardcore unemployment. The Institute of Industrial Relations of UCLA made a comprehensive study of "Hard-Core Unemployment and Poverty in Los Angeles" in 1964. This study was a welcomed addition to the literature on the subject. However, much more must be known about the problem and current government expenditures for job training and development should be coupled with a "serious attempt to learn more about the nature and causes of 'hardcore' unemployment by case and survey method," as suggested earlier this year by the National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress.

3. It is Essential that Information on the Skills and Education of New-comers to Los Angeles be compiled: Background on the education and skills of new arrivals would help in development programs of specific need and would help to eliminate the unemployment cycle perpetuated by migration of a high number of low-skilled individuals to the same urban poverty area.

We felt the following additional recommendations to be to the point of the problems with which we are faced:

1. Development of new government-connected jobs: It has been variously proposed that new types of sub-professional jobs be developed; especially in such public service areas as education, urban renewal, welfare, probation and parole and recreation. These would not be "make work" jobs but rather useful occupations that would serve to enhance the quality of service offered by the agencies affected and immediately provide income for unemployed persons. This program could follow the plan advanced by Governor Brown referred to in the McCone Report but dismissed by the Committee as unlikely to succeed. Or it could follow a similar suggestion made earlier this year by the National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress that:

".....a five year program be established, with the amount of public service employment increased each year, depending upon previous experience and labor market conditions; that an initial sum of perhaps \$2 billion be appropriated to provide about 500,000 additional full-time public service jobs; and that the program be coupled with a serious attempt to learn more about the nature and causes of "hard-core" unemployment by case and survey methods."

2. The Development of Public Works Programs in the Poverty Communities: A walk through the South Central Section of Los Angeles suggests immediate needs to improve street paving, lighting, painting and repair of homes and other structures. A journey through this section of the city also reveals that there is little in the way of recreational and entertainment facilities (e.g. theaters, skating rinks). There is a need to build pride in the physical environment as well as in the individual. A public works program similar in nature to the projects of the 1930's but smaller in scale would revitalize the area as a community and would bring immediate employment to a sizeable number of the jobless while others could pursue needed training for jobs in industry and government. Such a program might run into union restrictions in the building trades financed through state and federal cooperation but such problems would not be insurmountable.

3. The Creation of a Cadet Program for Future Police and Firemen: We felt a program should be launched at the high school level similar to the armed services Reserved Officers Training Corps (ROTC) that would enlist high school students in a Police or Firemen's Cadet Corps. Such a program could combine the training facilities of the schools with an "in-service" program within the two departments and could operate either as part of the public relations program of the two City Departments or through a separate program set up within these departments. It is obvious that such a program operating within a school in the minority communities, would help to create interest of Negroes and Mexican-Americans in future careers with the Police and Fire Departments. By starting the Cadet Program in the 10th grade, students could be made aware of the requirements and qualifications along with the benefits of these occupations.

4. Attracting Industry to the Unemployment Area: Efforts to bring job-producing firms to areas of heavy unemployment should include incentives from federal and state government. These inducements could range from providing special interest rate loans or tax concessions to the use of the powers of condemnation to help secure the needed land for such building activity. The range of inducements might also include government encouragement to its prime contractors to award sub-contracts to qualified companies operating within the target areas. The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and other business organizations

should work with government agencies in such efforts. The feasibility of this approach to unemployment seems more likely to succeed than the efforts to relocate large labor forces in areas where there is a labor shortage.

5. Designation of Urban Pockets of Poverty as a Redevelopment Area: The proposal of the Institute of Industrial Relations at UCLA to the old ARA (now EDA) in 1965 to declare urban pockets of poverty eligible for assistance under the Economic Redevelopment legislation should be adopted. Such a designation would be a great stimulus to numerous government works projects in the area. An alternative to adopting the institute's proposal would be for Congress to adopt one of the two bills now before it that would bring about the necessary amendment to the legislation to enable Los Angeles to be eligible for special assistance as a redevelopment area under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. (Both Congressman Hawkins of Los Angeles and Congressman Farbstein of New York have introduced such amendments.)

6. The Employment of Persons with Arrest Records: The inability of persons with arrest records of any kind to secure employment presents a serious problem for those seeking jobs from an underprivileged minority community where arrests are more likely to occur. In assessing their hiring practices, industry should incorporate the recent recommendations of the sub-committee of the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission.

7. Government Aid to Small Businesses with Employment Potential: Redirection in the current government-leading programs for small businesses should be made to give special attention to those small businesses that have employment expansion potential for members of minority groups. This would involve taking a closer look at those businesses located within the Negro community and a look at those small businesses that produce goods which are labor intensive but require a minimum of skill to perform the tasks.

The attitude of the Commission seems summed up on page 41 of its report. This is worthy of quoting in full:

"Failure of these (job development and training) programs to provide enough jobs led Governor Brown to order a survey of the state to determine how many useful jobs could be created. His survey found many in such fields as law enforcement, education, public health, and conservation. Thus, he advocated a national program estimated to cost the federal government 2.5 billion dollars annually (\$250,000,000 for California) which would provide some 50,000 jobs within our state and a proportionate number of jobs elsewhere throughout the nation."

The above, it seems to us, is the beginning of recognition of a critical problem in our state--the training for and provision of jobs to those with minimal skills. It is creative and it faces reality. However, the McCone Commission Report dismisses this proposal in a brief manner, stating:

"Obviously, such a program is bound to encounter tough sledding in Washington, especially as the Vietnam costs escalate....."

This seems to sum up much of the Commission's attitude and approach. It's interesting to us that present costs in Vietnam are at the rate of \$2 billion per month. Governor Brown's proposal would have amounted to only one-eighth that amount per year.

We have always found the money for those things we consider worth-while. If we can find the money to wage an undeclared seemingly endless war overseas, we submit we could find the money to wage what we consider a much more important war against poverty and hopelessness here at home--at far less cost and with more tangible results. This can be done only if we are really concerned--if we really care. Based upon the relative lack of involvement by government, industry and labor thus far, the question of whether we care remains a question.

PANEL COMMENTARY

Following the presentation of these four papers the panel was asked to respond by Panel Chairman, Reverent Cornish Rodgers, President, Federation of Committee Coordinating Councils. The first panel member replying was Dennis Nelson, Director of Los Angeles City Bureau of Human Relations. Mr. Nelson stated "that even though the McCone Report lacked thoroughness, it was responsible for the establishment of the City Bureau of Human Relations. Up to that time," Mr. Nelson observed, "Los Angeles was the only major city without a Human Relation program." Mr. Nelson concluded his brief remarks by offering the resources of his organization to implement the recommendations suggested in the papers.

The next panelist to comment was Inspector James Fisk, Coordinator of Community Relations Activity, Los Angeles Police Department. Inspector Fisk emphasized that the role of the law enforcement officer is to act as a protective device and, therefore, deals mostly with effects rather than the causes. However, he indicated that there is a growing sensitivity in police work regarding race relations. Administrators are trying to build into the Los Angeles Police Department methods by which the people can identify and communicate personally with the law enforcement officers.

Dr. Robert Purdy, Associate Superintendent, Los Angeles City Schools, complimented Mr. Posner on his excellent paper, but reminded participants that there is no such thing as "instant education." Rather, the key to good education is fine teachers instead of good buildings, books, programs, etc. Dr. Purdy emphasized that education is a personal matter between the teacher and the pupil.

Chairman Rodgers next recognized Chief Howard Earle of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. Chief Earle expressed satisfaction that additional recommendations have been made by the panel for law enforcement. He said the McCone Commission Report was a start and that it caused people to understand that police do need regular contact with the public.

Chief Earle indicated that there is a need to reform the welfare system to keep the family intact. He further said that the people who need the money should be getting it. Regarding education, the Chief agreed with the idea that teachers need to know more than just teaching techniques; they need to know a great deal about the community. Turning to employment problems, Chief Earle indicated that any kind of idleness breeds crime.

The final panel member to speak was Mr. Kenneth Morris, from the 28th Street Y.M.C.A., who was substituting for Mr. Robert L. Curry, Chairman, Los Angeles Delinquency and Crime Control Commission. In the limited time remaining, Mr. Morris indicated that the new Delinquency and Crime Control Commission is pioneering new methods and approaches in with anti-social behavior at the grass roots level.

Chairman Rodgers thanked all panel members for a substantial and penetrating discussion and adjourned the session.

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER 5

PRIVATE INSTITUTION PERSPECTIVES

The final session of the conference brought together leaders from business, labor, education, new media, religion and public and private agencies. These leaders discussed the contributions that their respective areas of speciality have made and can make to the disadvantaged areas. A special paper by Mr. John McCone, Chairman of the Governor's Commission, was delivered by Mr. Thomas Sheridan, General Counsel and Executive Director of the Commission.*

As an introduction to the paper, a letter from Mr. McCone to Dean Henry Reining, Jr., of the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California was read in which Mr. McCone explained that only those proposals from the two-day conference which are practical and offer hope of being effectively carried out should be considered. According to Mr. McCone to do otherwise would raise the expectations of the disadvantaged and cause further frustration and disappointment. He further indicated that few of the people appearing on the panels actually appeared before the Commission and made their recommendations known. "We found no short-cuts or easy answers; all recommendations were carefully considered," he said. The letter concluded by emphasizing that great progress has been made in employment, education, police-community relations, etc. since the riot. The complete text of this letter and the paper is as follows:

* The paper which Mr. McCone presented was delivered two days earlier on Wednesday, December 14, in New York City, where he received the 1966 Public Service Award of the Advertising Council at their annual awards dinner in the Plaza Hotel.

COPY

John Alex McCone
612 South Flower Street
Los Angeles 90017

December 16, 1966

Dean Henry Reining, Jr.
School of Public Administration
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California 90007

Dear Dean Reining:

For the reasons expressed in my letter of 13 December, it was impossible for me to accept your invitation to appear at your forum. However, I am following your proceedings with great interest, and while I am not sure that you will conclude your seminar with specific recommendations for courses of action, it would be my suggestion that if you are to do so, you consider only conclusions and recommendations which offer proposals which are practical, and hence offer some prospect of being effectively carried out. To do otherwise would serve to raise the expectations of the disadvantaged and cause further frustration, disappointment and, at times, rage.

The Governor's Commission to investigate the Los Angeles Riots, of which I was the Chairman, was charged with the responsibility of making recommendations to correct sociological and physical conditions which brought on the incidents of violence. In examining your panel of witnesses, I find that with few exceptions the individuals either appeared before our Commission with their recommendations, or were members of our staff or consultants, and made their recommendations through these channels. All suggestions made to the Commission were carefully and thoughtfully considered--and from these proposals and from proposals of others not appearing before your meeting, we drew our conclusions and our recommendations. In doing so we were guided by the fundamental principle of advocating the steps which could be taken within our community and which, if pursued energetically and with determination, would raise the level of the disadvantaged negro to a position in our society which he seeks and in our opinion should have.

We found no short cuts and no easy answers, nor did we find any practical way to implement certain of the ideological approaches suggested by certain witnesses and advisors.

By confining our recommendations to practical programs, great progress has been made in our community in the past year, and this must not be overlooked. Progress has been made, and will continue, in employment of those able and willing to work; in the training of the unemployable; in education, as evidenced by the bond issue to eliminate double sessions; in Police community relationships; in transportation and in health, as evidenced by the County Supervisors' determination to build a needed hospital in South-central Los Angeles.

COPY

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16 December 1966

I know of no better way to bring to the attention of your panel my views on the distressing problems of disadvantaged negroes than to ask that a speech that I made in New York at the Advertising Council Dinner on Wednesday last, 14 December, be read into the record of your meeting.

Again, I regret my inability to appear before you personally.

Yours very truly,

SIGNED

John A. McCone

Address by

THE HONORABLE JOHN A. McCONE
Accepting the 1966 Public Service Award

of

The Advertising Council
at the Annual Awards Dinner

Plaza Hotel, New York City
December 14, 1966

I am pleased that the learned government of this Council suggested that I address my remarks this evening to one of the unsolved problems of our nation--the negro problem and the crisis it poses to our cities and to our country. This problem has not escaped the attention of the Advertising Council for, through your constructive and enlightened efforts, you have consistently urged positive actions designed to break the barriers that now divide the people of our country into two groups--to use a term adopted by sociologists--the advantaged and the disadvantaged.

Of the disadvantaged, the largest group are the negroes. But they are not alone, for the difficulties of life in our present day society apply equally to all disadvantaged minorities--from the Puerto Ricans of New York City to the Mexican-Americans of Los Angeles or San Antonio. The helping hand must not be extended to one group while the conditions of others are ignored.

In the final analysis, what is at issue is an American problem which involves negroes, but concerns other groups as well.

As a member of Governor Brown's Commission, appointed to investigate the causes--both sociological and physical--which brought on the violence in Los Angeles last year, I have focused on the negro problem and the threats that it poses to our nation.

The Los Angeles riots differed from those that occurred throughout our country the year before--and from others that have occurred in recent months--only in that the Los Angeles riots were more extensive and more violent. More fatalities--34 killed and 1,000 wounded; more damage--\$40 million worth of property destroyed; more arrests--almost 4,000 jailed; more public concern--the entire population of six million people terrified.

No special situation existed in Los Angeles to cause the negroes to strike out in such insensate rage. Seven cities were stricken by riots the year before--the fundamental causes for each incident of violence were largely the same--and these same causes existed in Los Angeles.

The long list of complaints by the negroes is all too familiar to you.

However, we found two conditions at the root of most complaints, and these two--which I will discuss this evening--demand correction.

They are --

Not enough jobs to go around and within this scarcity, not enough by a wide margin of a character which the untrained negro can fill.

Not enough schooling designed to meet the special needs of the disadvantaged negro child whose environment from infancy places him under serious handicap.

Our Report states that the violence which broke out in Los Angeles in August of 1965 was a symptom of a sickness in the center of our cities. A sickness existing in almost every city in the United States where negroes are pressing evermore intensely into the central city, occupying large areas vacated by the white population in its flight to the suburbs--forming a "society within a society." Here the negroes cluster in areas which have become rundown--where law and order have only a tenuous hold--where conditions of life are marginal--and the idleness that prevails leads to despair and, finally, violence supplies a momentary relief.

Our conclusion--the distress we witnessed must be remedied--the disorders halted--for the existing breach, if allowed to persist, could in time split our society irretrievably. However, before suggesting remedial steps in the two basic areas--education and employment--let us consider the dimensions of the problem.

The United States is the first society in modern history to adopt as a national ideal the full economic integration and social equality of different races. No one except the most prejudiced will question this objective. But our challenge is to chart a course of equal opportunity without at the same time sacrificing the very special quality of excellence that has made America great. Our competitive society has produced one and only one aristocracy--the aristocracy of achievement. This high goal must never be lost. It follows that what is involved therefore is to raise the level of ability, of skill and accomplishment of all disadvantaged groups--most particularly the negroes--to the average of all others so that the standards of performance which have carried our nation to a position of preeminence will be maintained.

Progress--great progress--has been made in the thirteen years since the Supreme Court struck down the "separate - but equal" doctrine and established the principle of "equal opportunity for all."

Many feel that the negro has made great gains in this relatively short period. They counsel that what he has won should now be consolidated.

At the same time others, both black and white, consider progress far too slow. Among this group has grown a feeling of frustration, and from this has developed the philosophy of the new "black militancy."

Without attempting to evaluate either position, let us look at the facts.

It is true that the negroes have made progress--real progress--and their advance continues. It is a fact that two and one-half times as many negroes are employed in the professional and technical fields today as there were ten years ago; that negroes are finding employment opportunities as policemen, firemen, nurses, clerks and teachers, and that almost a quarter of a million negro youths are now attending our colleges and universities. It is undeniable that there has been a sharp rise in the income of the growing negro middle class.

But nevertheless, the hard facts revealed by dependable employment surveys tell us in indisputable terms that unemployment of negroes--both male and female--is more than twice the national average, and in areas referred to as "ghettoes," negro unemployment exceeds twenty-five per cent of those able to work.

Moreover, growth of negro employment that has taken place in recent years has been largely in government jobs. For example, negro employment by the City of Philadelphia has risen to forty per cent of all city employees, New York City twenty-three per cent and, today, over thirteen per cent of the nation's civil service employees are negroes. During this same period, the number of negroes at work in the private sector has not increased proportionately by a wide margin. Failure of the private sector of our economy to provide adequate employment opportunity for negroes has, at once, failed to answer the negro unemployment problem and raised the cry of discrimination on the part of both employers and labor unions.

At the root of the problem is education, for our educational system has left the average American negro far behind. This is understandable, for during the long period that the negro has been a part of the economic and social structure of America, he has, for the most part, lived in rural areas--deprived of the more progressive of this country's educational efforts.

Studies of the relative levels of scholastic achievement in advantaged and disadvantaged areas dramatically demonstrate the serious handicap of the negro youth because of the years--let us say the generations--during which the educational system available for him failed to provide the means to acquire the knowledge essential for his progress.

A recent test conducted by the Armed Forces provides dramatic evidence of the deficiencies. Eighty-one per cent of all those that took the test passed, but sixty-eight per cent of the negroes failed. The test equates to little more than fifth grade average.

This experience is not unique. Year after year a high percentage of all negro youths examined for military service have been declared unacceptable.

Today some five million young men, ages 19 to 34--a substantial majority of them negro youths--are deferred, principally because of failure to pass qualifying mental tests. Double this number for the women--and one reaches the conclusion that we have in our country today many millions of negroes who are sadly deficient in scholastic attainment.

The unemployment which follows can all too readily be attributed to lack of education and training essential to hold productive jobs in our competitive society.

These are the dimensions of an American problem--millions of the disadvantaged negroes lacking the most elementary basic education and therefore unable to secure and hold productive jobs. This condition is the consequence of decades of change, during which the historical pattern of urban and rural life--which for years existed side by side, each complementing and supporting the other--has been violently and irreversibly altered--a consequence of progress in an advanced society--progress in production, in mechanization, in communication and in transportation.

The reasons the problems of our negro community must be solved, and solved permanently, are manifold. Four stand out--

First, it is morally wrong for an advanced people to permit a situation to long exist under which minority groups representing over fifteen per cent of the total population--two-thirds negroes--live under extreme disadvantages while the balance of society moves forward.

Second, segregation grows and despite all efforts to halt it, it will continue to grow as long as the level of achievement of the disadvantaged--the literacy, the basic skills and the ability to earn and constructively perform--is far below the average.

Third, as de facto segregation unfortunately grows--the hearts of our cities--the areas surrounding the centers of business, of commerce, of finance, become the "ghettoes." Such is the trend in many cities today. Observe our own Capitol--Washington, D.C.--with over sixty per cent of its metropolitan population negro--up from thirty per cent in twenty years. But the trend is moving rapidly in other cities as well. The negro population of Chicago has risen from less than ten per cent to over twenty-five per cent in a little over a decade.

Fourth, economists now conclude that our rate of economic growth will be limited in the future by available skilled labor. Hence, it is argued that growth can continue at the rate we have recently experienced only if the nation's total work force--the advantaged and the disadvantaged as well--make their full contribution to our nation's productivity. If one segment of society cannot--or will not--then the dynamics of our economy will be adversely affected.

Although, as I have said, there are many reasons to act, and act decisively to solve the gnawing problem of the disadvantaged negro, it is my conviction that the dynamics of our economy, the preservation of our city as a symbol of our nation's greatness and the moral responsibility of a great people to all segments of its society are sufficient reasons to give the perplexing problems of the disadvantaged constant attention.

Before discussing the remedies that we as a nation should adopt, it is, I believe, appropriate to raise the question of the determination and motivation of the negro himself. It was an observation of our Commission that no amount of money, no amount of effort on the part of others, will raise the disadvantaged negro to the position he seeks--and should enjoy--unless he is determined to help himself.

The long struggle for civil and human rights has brought the negro to a point where he must now stand shoulder to shoulder with all others in a competitive society.

It can be said with justification and accepted with compassion that the negro's long history of deprivation and discrimination has placed him at such a disadvantage that it is not reasonable to expect him to stand up and meet the rigors of today's competitive life. I can understand this viewpoint. It is in recognition of the negro's handicaps--the sad consequences of a chapter in our history--that prompts our nation to adopt the costly programs now being undertaken. But determination and acceptance of responsibility must be demonstrated by the negroes--individually and as a community--or efforts of others to help will be for naught.

Let me now turn to solutions to the two problems we as a Commission felt lay at the root of most, if not all, the complaints we heard.

For the short-range--more jobs. A determined effort by private employers to employ the employable negroes and to assist in training and subsequent employment of the unemployables.

Perhaps our experience in Los Angeles will demonstrate what can be done.

Employers in our city have, in the past year, accomplished important results. In less than a year the major employers in the area--organized voluntarily and working closely with the California State Employment Service--have placed over 14,000 negroes in productive work. The great majority of these were unemployed last Fall. The result--almost all of the negroes willing to work and qualified for employment have been removed from the army of the unemployed. In short, the employables now have jobs.

But this is only a start. What is further needed is to train the thousands who are not qualified to fill the available jobs. These are the unemployables. They lack education, necessary skills and motivation. The answer to their problem is more difficult--but also essential. In Los Angeles our solution rests on a large training program designed to train fifteen thousand men and women each year.

Training will range over all skills required by industry, by commerce and in service. Machinists and tool makers--welders and metal workers--stenographers and office clerks--department store sales representatives--cooks and waiters. Financed by Federal, State and local governments, by industry and private sources as well, many training or skill centers have been established and others are now under construction. Coordination of the training effort; tailoring the courses to the employment opportunities; breaking down the well-known tendency of each government agency to go its own way and alone--are all challenges that face businessmen, labor leaders and government officials.

Two important considerations are basic to this effort--

First, it is essential that each trainee have a job when he completes his course. Nothing is more defeating than to have a young man say, "Train for what? I took the course and still no job." Thus, the courses must be designed in cooperation with industry to meet the growing employment needs. To the extent possible, employers, in turn, must accept the qualified trainees into their work forces. Restrictive labor union practices must be set aside.

Second, the negro must be motivated to accept training. This part of the job must be done by the negroes themselves. It is apparent from experience that only the negro leaders can create in the man who has failed and has sunk into apathy and despair--or the school dropout--a desire and a determination to train and to work.

To meet this problem, an all-negro organization has been established known as the Opportunities Industrialization Center. Initially financed by the Ford Foundation with a generous grant of \$450,000--OIC, as it is called, operates under an all-negro board of directors and negro management. It was created for the purpose of recruiting trainees and encouraging them to take advantage of the opportunities that await them. OIC at once feeds properly motivated recruits into the training centers and also trains some of their own in certain crafts.

The elements of this imaginative and dynamic program which I have only briefly described must all go forward concurrently. If any one fails, the program will come to a grinding halt, and the dangers of failure are manifold.

In my city efforts to mold one solid, unified program have met with reasonable success, and while one can never be complacent, it is my personal opinion that freedom from our troubles of last year and those that have beset other cities this year can be attributed in a large measure to the efforts now being made in employment and training.

A program similar to the one I have briefly described should be initiated and energetically pursued in every metropolitan center.

For the long range--education.

Education holds the greatest prospect for breaking the cycle of failure among disadvantaged groups. Without a frontal attack on the problems of ignorance and illiteracy, none of the social problems that today face our country can be corrected or eliminated.

In studying the sickness of our cities, what has depressed and stunned me most is the spiral of failure that awaits the average disadvantaged child. His home life fails to give him the elementary experience with words and ideas so necessary to a child from the moment he enters kindergarten. Unprepared, he finds himself totally unable to cope with his subjects of study. He passes from one grade to the next, not on a basis of achievement, but by age. After a period of frustration and disillusionment, he becomes a discipline problem--and finally a dropout--destined to join hundreds of thousands of others like himself--untrained, uneducated and for these reasons, unemployable.

What is the answer? Some advocate the melding of the advantaged and the disadvantaged by transporting one group into the environment of the other. But the consequences of this scheme disturb me. It appears feasible only when the level of achievement of the two groups of children is about the same. Otherwise, the disadvantaged youngster of lower scholastic attainment cannot cope with his new and unnatural environment. He is lost--others of his own age exceed him in achievement--his despair increases and he slips backward--not forward.

The advantaged, on the other hand, also suffer as the dedicated teachers struggle to teach students of widely disparate abilities--to help the disadvantaged who have fallen behind--and at the same time to maintain normal progress for the others. Inevitably, the quality of education deteriorates because it must accommodate the less able. Sensing this, parents of the advantaged children send them elsewhere for their education. The result--more segregation--not because of racial prejudice, not because of hatred or dislike, but simply because it is natural to arrange for your children to have the best obtainable education.

The consequence is disheartening--Washington, D.C., a sixty per cent or more negro population, has ninety-five per cent negro public school attendance; Baltimore, sixty-five per cent and St. Louis, sixty-four per cent. An identical pattern is evolving in all cities throughout our country. In integrated areas, the local school attendance becomes predominantly negro as white children are sent off to private schools, and eventually, the family moves elsewhere. The so-called "ghetto" expands.

Another answer must be found. The level of scholastic achievement of the mass of negroes must be raised to the present city average. Emergency measures are necessary to accomplish this.

The starting point is the pre-school period--at ages of three to four--to give the child deprived of informal education normal to most children in their home environment some ability with language, the alphabet and a smattering of other knowledge. This is the "Head Start Program." This program must be integrated into the school system of our cities and conducted on a year-round and permanent basis. With this, the child so trained will start his kindergarten possessing the elementary knowledge common to any child, and thus he will be equipped to go forward, not slip backward.

Concurrently, a new and revolutionary approach must be made at every grade level. This calls for smaller--much smaller--classes to maximize effective teaching. It calls for the best of the teachers--for counseling and for specially trained personnel to cope with disturbed and retarded children. In short, a dramatic change in our traditional pattern of education must be undertaken as the only hope of arresting and correcting this growing problem--the low scholastic achievement of the disadvantaged boy and girl.

The programs that I have discussed are costly. But I ask the question, "Can we afford not to make the effort, regardless of the cost?" Can this nation stand by and permit hundreds of thousands--yes, millions--of the young men and women to grow up and pass into the stream of society totally unable to cope with their future? Can we hope to eliminate de facto segregation; to extinguish violence in our streets; to halt riots and disregard for law, unless we raise the level of achievement of this vast minority to the average of all other Americans?

I believe that our nation is prepared to close with these problems.

I believe it is prepared to provide the necessary revolutionary educational system.

I also believe that the private sector--industry and commerce--across this nation are prepared to engage in dynamic, imaginative programs for the employment and training of those negroes who are willing to work. This I believe to be a preferable alternative to the make-work programs so often suggested and always dependent on large and uncertain government appropriations.

Accepting the opportunities thus unfolding is a challenge to the negro leadership. It is clear to me that the time has come for the negro leaders to now persuade their followers that the negroes' way up and out is not through unrealistic demands, ugly threats and violence. Rather, it lies in the iron determination and unending pursuit of improvement and ultimate perfection.

It is my belief and my deep conviction that the problem I have been discussing--qualifying the disadvantaged to meet both the needs and responsibilities of society--is so essential to the future of our country that it is an issue beyond controversy.

The problem will not go away, nor can it be submerged by peripheral controversial issues. The so-called "white backlash"--if it exists--and I believe it to be greatly exaggerated--exists because we as a nation have not gone to

the very root of our problem. We have failed in education and ignored employment.

I know there are deep differences of opinion and burning emotions on such issues as Civil Rights, on Federal Aid to Education, on the Poverty Program, on Fair Housing, and on the rules and regulations of Fair Employment Practice. However, in my opinion, there is no room for differences over the central issue of establishing logical and appropriate roads to the improvement of the conditions of the disadvantaged negro.

I need not exhort you in this room to use your efforts and your very great influence to encourage solutions to a problem so basic to our national interest. All that you have done to serve the interests of our nation and to advance the welfare of our people are hallmarks of accomplishment which will endure to your great credit. However, educating the disadvantaged and affording them opportunities for employment--equal to the opportunities afforded all others of the same qualifications--will call for programs demanding a persistent effort, and experience and a selfless determination found among you, the nation's leaders, and among you alone.

We, as the people of a great nation--must all accept the hard work, the cost, and the dedication of purpose necessary to solve the problems that gnaw at the structure and threaten the very existence of our country. This is the unfinished business of our nation--to fail to meet the challenge is to weaken ourselves at home and to destroy the true meaning of America abroad.

The format of the Private Institution Perspectives Session called for remarks to be made by six men representing private enterprise, news media, education, labor and religion. Their remarks were responded to by seven panel members; the eighth panel member, Mr. Dan Kimball, Chairman of the Executive Board, Aerojet General Corporation, was unable to attend.

Chairman of the session was Mr. Dwight Zook, Corporate Head of Personnel, North American Aviation Corporation. Mr. Chad McClellan, Chairman of the Management Council for Merit Employment and also Chairman of the Board of the Old Colony Paint Company began the panel discussion by stating that there were 25,000 unemployed in the curfew area of which one-half were qualified to work. Through the non-profit employment organization which he heads literally thousands have been taken off the unemployment roles. Job training centers also are operating, with more under construction, to accommodate the additional thousands waiting for this opportunity to learn new skills. Over 2,600 employers are working with Mr. McClellan's program and have jobs waiting for the new trainees.

Mr. Jake Jacobs, Newscaster-Reporter for KNX Radio-CBS, remarked that he wished that a report similar to the McCone Report had been published three to five years ago in which case the riot could possibly have been prevented. Mr. Norman B. Houston, Vice President of Golden State Mutual Life Insurance Company as well as past President of the local N.A.A.C.P. Chapter, said that too few Americans really have a deep concern for the Negro problems. He further stated that private enterprise must provide community leadership as well as demonstrate that the free enterprise system can work. For example, the employment problem should be resolved thru private enterprise rather than allowing the government to assist.

Mr. Max Mont, Civil Rights Coordinator for the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, AFL/CIO, disagreed with Mr. Houston as to the approach to solve the unemployment problem. He stated that the labor movement should address itself to the problem of placing the individual in a much larger program which would require the government to provide the leadership and many of the needed jobs.

Dr. Ira Robinson, Professor and Chairman, City and Regional Planning, University of Southern California, stated that a physical symbol of reconstruction in the Watts area is needed so that people can point to it with pride. "Therefore," Dr. Robinson said, "the University got involved and with the assistance of grass roots citizens attempted to identify some specific physical need in the Watts area, cultural or economic. This group is still meeting together to find the legal and financial ways to accomplish such a goal. Another example of University involvement will occur in the spring semester of 1967 when a laboratory student workshop will attempt to define, develop and solve some specific community problem in Watts such as has been done in other communities in prior semesters," concluded Dr. Robinson.

Reverend Carrol L. Schuster, President-elect of the Council of Churches of Southern California and Executive Director, Synod of California, Southern Area, United Presbyterian Church discussed the tangible and intangible

ways in which the church can assist. He discussed the many programs in the Watts area sponsored by various Churches. "All churches have a tradition of direct involvement, as stated in the Bible, in matters concerning civil rights and racism. This responsibility cannot and should not be ignored," he said.

Several panelists responded to these remarks. Mrs. Aileen Hernandez, Former Commission, Federal Equal Opportunity Commission, indicated that she had heard nothing new or imaginative thus far. "We must get out of the rut and become creative and imaginative if we ever hope to resolve and eventually eliminate our problems," she admonished. She suggested that, if Mr. McClellan has enjoyed success thus far, why not increase the aid to his program and enlarge his staff to accommodate the backlog. In response to a question addressed to the panel from the audience, Mrs. Hernandez said "the real estate people must be involved if all people are to enjoy free access to move into all areas of the community and in time develop integrated communities that aren't segregated on a racial or economic basis."

Mr. James Goodrich, Editor of the Los Angeles Sentinel, was critical of the McCone Commission. "They never tackled the real problems," he said. Mr. Lin Hilburn, newscaster-reporter for the KPOL News Bureau said that you must break up the ghetto to really solve the problem. He also agreed with Mrs. Hernandez that some creative new thinking must be done. Mr. Jack Jones, Reporter for the Los Angeles Times inquired of Mr. Daniel P. Bryant, President of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and also President of Bekins Moving and Storage Company, "Why haven't other companies like Aerojet General Corporation built more plants in the Watts area?" Mr. Bryant responded that many companies are investigating this type of relocation or plant addition and that a few companies have even announced such plans. Mr. Bryant further stated that during his term as President of the Chamber of Commerce, much progress has been made in establishing communication lines with a Negro community. Mr. McClellan, himself a former president of the Chamber of Commerce said, "Many business leaders have been approached regarding land ownership in the Watts area; the land is flat, low-priced and close to railroads and other business."

At this point, Mr. Baltimore Scott, Executive Director, Inter-Racial Council for Business Opportunities, raised the issue of the minority business man and indicated that his organization provides professional assistance to minority businesses in the disadvantaged area. "According to a survey conducted by our office, only 15 percent of the businesses in the disadvantaged areas are owned by minority people," Mr. Scott said. Mr. Irving Mazei, President, Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, AFL/CIO explained that his organization has always had a platform of non-discrimination. "Our office is considering the possibility of opening four centers in high poverty, unemployed and underemployed areas along with a mobile unit to provide the services to the people that they need. The services rendered would be along the lines of answering questions regarding social security, welfare benefits, the apprentice programs, etc," said Mr. Mazei. "We want to help the people with their individual problems rather than referring them to a union hall," he said.

Mr. Zook, chairman of the session, summarized by emphasizing that more had been done in the past few years for the disadvantaged person than has

ever been done before. He said, "the communication lines are still weak, there is a lack of trust still existing between the Negro and the White, as well as many other serious problems. Conferences such as this one being conducted at the University of Southern California will certainly help to solve these problems.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

PROGRAM

Thursday, December 15, 1966

OPENING SESSION 10:00 A.M. - 12:00 NOON
(Hancock Auditorium)

Introductions Henry Reining, Jr.
Dean of the School of Public Administration,
University of Southern California

Welcomes Norman Topping, President
University of Southern California

Samuel Yorty, Mayor,
City of Los Angeles

Thomas Bradley, Chairman,
Conference of Negro Elected Officials of Los Angeles County

Sidney Brossman
Associate Executive Director
of Federal Programs, California
Coordinating Council on Higher Education

Mervyn Dymally, Senator,
California State Senate

Bill Greene, Assemblyman
California State Assembly

Kenneth Hahn, Supervisor
County of Los Angeles

Augustus F. Hawkins
United States Congressman

Billy G. Mills, Councilman
City of Los Angeles

Leon Ralph, Assemblyman,
California State Assembly

Orientation and OverviewKendall O. Price
Co-Director of the Conference
School of Public Administration,
University of Southern California

Kent Lloyd
Co-Director of the Conference
School of Public Administration,
University of Southern California

PROGRAM (Continued)

OPENING SESSION, Thursday, December 15, 1966 (Continued)

Keynote Address John Buggs
National President
National Association of Intergroup Relations Officials

AFTERNOON SESSION 2:00 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
(Hancock Auditorium)

Theme: McCone Commission Consultants' Perspectives

Address: Progress Report

Papers: "History of Race Riots"..... Joseph Boskin
Associate Professor of History,
University of Southern California

"Welfare"..... Francis L. Feldman
Associate Professor of Social Work,
AND Chauncey A. Alexander
Executive Director,
Los Angeles Heart Association

"Human Relations Agencies"..... Kent Lloyd
School of Public Administration
University of Southern California

"Employment"..... Paul Bullock
Research Economist,
University of California at Los Angeles

"Education" Kenneth Martyn
Vice President for Academic Affairs
California State College at Los Angeles

"Law Enforcement" Paul Jacobs
Writer and Member,
Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, Santa Barbara

Panel: Chairman Thomas Sheridan
General Counsel and Executive Director,
Governor's Commission on the Los Angeles Riots

MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE LOS ANGELES RIOTS

PROGRAM (Continued)

EVENING SESSION 7:00 P.M. - 9:30 P.M.
(Bovard Hall)

Theme: "Citizen and Political Grass Roots Perspectives"

Papers: William J. Williams
Community Relations Seminar Project
University of Southern California

Ron Everett-Karenga
National Chairman of US

Panel: Chairmen:..... Mervyn Dymally,
California State Senator

Yvonne Braithwaite, Assemblywoman,
California State Assembly

Bill Greene, Assemblyman,
California State Assembly

Leon Ralph, Assemblyman,
California State Assembly

Thomas Bradley, Councilman,
City of Los Angeles

Kenneth Hahn, Supervisor,
County of Los Angeles

Friday, December 16, 1966

MORNING SESSION 9:30 A.M. - 12:00 NOON
(Hancock Auditorium)

Theme: "Intergroup Relations Professional's Perspectives"

Papers: "Law Enforcement" Curt Moody,
Executive Director,
Community Relations Conference
of Southern California

"Welfare" "Button Powell," Director
Department of Community Services,
County of Los Angeles

"Education" Charles Posner, President
Los Angeles Chapter of NAIRO

PROGRAM (Continued)

MORNING SESSION, Friday, December 16, 1966 (Continued)

"Employment" Larry Lucks,
Regional Director, California State FEPC

Panel: Chairman.....Rev. Cornish Rodgers, President
Federation of Community Coordinating Councils

Dennis Nelson, Director
Los Angeles City Bureau of Human Relations

James Fisk, Inspector,
Coordinator of Community Relations Activity,
Los Angeles Police Department

Robert Purdy, Assoc. Superintendent,
Los Angeles City Schools

Howard Earle, Deputy Sheriff,
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

Kenneth Hahn, Supervisor
County of Los Angeles

Robert L. Curry, Chairman,
Los Angeles Delinquency and
Crime Control Commission

AFTERNOON SESSION 2:00 P.M. - 4:30 P.M.
(Hancock Auditorium)

Theme: "Private Institution Perspectives"

Chairman:..... Dwight Zook
Corporate Head of Personnel,
North American Aviation Corp.

Remarks: Chad McClellan, Chairman
The Management Council for Merit Employment

Jake Jacobs, Newscaster-Reporter,
KNX Radio - CBS

Norman O. Houston, President,
Golden State Mutual Life Insurance Company

Max Mont, Civil Rights Coordinator,
Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, AFL/CIO

PROGRAM (Continued)

AFTERNOON SESSION, Friday, December 16, 1966 (Continued)

Ira Robinson, Professor and Chairman,
City and Regional Planning,
University of Southern California

Rev. Carrol L. Schuster, Executive Director,
Synod of California, Southern Area,
United Presbyterian Church, and President-Elect,
Council of Churches of Southern California

Panel James Goodrich, Editor
Los Angeles Sentinel

Aileen Hernandez,
Former Commissioner,
Federal Equal Opportunity Commission

Lincoln Hilburn, Newscaster-Reporter
KPOL News Bureau

Jack Jones, Reporter
Los Angeles Times

Daniel Kimball, Chairman of the Executive Board,
Aerojet General Corporation

Irvin Mazei, President
Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, AFL/CIO

Baltimore Scott, Executive Director,
Inter-Racial Council for Business Opportunities

NOTE: The program detailed above is as it was set forth in the conference brochure; The few changes which occurred are described in the various chapters.