

Exhibit "A"

To The Adjutant General.

Copy of Report
to Governor.
Colonel A. C. Tripp.
Race Dist.
East St. Louis, Ill.

1917

Oct. 25th filed as exhibit "A" with
by the Committee appointed under House Resolution 17,28 of the

Attest:

Miss [Signature] Clerk.

From Col. S.G. Tripp,

To His Excellency, the Governor, through the Adjutant General of Illinois:

Subject: Race riots at East St. Louis

1st. Pursuant to verbal instructions received from the Assistant Adjutant General of the State of Illinois at three o'clock on the morning of July 2nd, 1917, I proceeded to East St. Louis, Illinois, reaching there at eight o'clock, and immediately reported to His Honor, the Mayor, Fred W. Hollman, at the City Hall in the City of East St. Louis, and advised such Mayor that I was there by directions of the Governor to co-operate with him in matters pertaining to the restoring of order and the enforcement of the laws, and asked for instructions from such Mayor as to what orders he wished to give pertaining to the work in question; I also stated to such Mayor that there had been five companies of the Illinois National Guard ordered to proceed to East St. Louis and report to His Honor for the same purpose.

The Mayor stated to me that the situation was a dangerous one and also that he desired not to go out in the open as he had been advised not to do so; he also stated that it would be well for me to call upon the Sheriff and report my presence and mission. This I did soon after arrival, calling upon Mr. Logan Mellon, Sheriff of the County of St. Clair, and reported my presence and mission substantially the same as I had to the Mayor. I asked such Sheriff if I could be of assistance to him in any way in preserving order.

The Mayor suggested to me that patrols should be established as soon as they came in over the following streets, to-wit: On Collinsville Avenue between Broadway and Illinois Avenue, on Missouri Avenue from Relay Depot to Sixth Street, on Main Street from Broadway to Missouri Avenue, on Broadway from the viaduct to Sixth Street, on Third Street from Missouri Avenue to Illinois Avenue, on Walnut Avenue from Sixth Street to Tenth Street and at the east approach to the Free Bridge, with instructions to break up any unlawful assemblage, keep people moving and preserve order.

a. The first organization to report was Company G, 4th Infantry, at 8:40 AM. July 2nd, with three officers and 27 enlisted men. Such Company was under command of Capt. A.H. Cravenhorst. About this time I chanced to meet Lieut. Col. C.P. Clayton of the 4th Infantry and I stated to said Clayton that an effort had been made to get him at Vandalia during the early morning, and he advised me that he was out of Vandalia, and I told him to consider himself on duty and to report his presence to the Mayor and assume command of the troops upon their arrival and that I would also report his presence at East St. Louis; this Lieut. Col. Clayton did, and co-operated at once with the Mayor, by making a formal report to the Mayor of his presence and intention of taking charge of the organizations and enforcing the laws as pointed out by said Mayor.

The next organization arriving on the scene was Company H of the 4th Infantry, which reached East St. Louis at 10:20 AM. July 2nd, with two officers and 32 enlisted men, Captain Vance

Courtright in command.

The next organization reporting was Company I of the 4th Infantry which reached East St. Louis at 1:30 PM. with 3 officers and 44 enlisted men, with the organization under command of Capt. Fred Easterday. Major Wm. Klausner also arrived with Company H and at once reported to Lieut. Col. Clayton for instructions, this making a total of 9 officers and 102 enlisted men present on the scene up to and including 7 PM. Immediately on the arrival of the troops, Col. Clayton distributed them according to the suggestion of the Mayor and posted sentries along the following streets to-wit: Collinsville Avenue, from Broadway north to Illinois Avenue; on Broadway from the viaduct east to Sixth Street, on Missouri Avenue from the Relay Depot east to Sixth Street, on Main Street from Broadway to Missouri Avenue; on Third Street, from Missouri Avenue north to State Street and on Walnut Avenue from Sixth Street east to Tenth Street, with a detachment of some ten men at the east end of the Free Bridge; this is shown on the map of East St. Louis hereto appended and marked Exhibit A, which shows a blue pencil mark over the streets above described, this covering about 21 blocks in addition to the detachment on duty at the Free Bridge and leaving a small detachment at the City Hall for emergency purposes.

However, before any of the details were started out on this work, Col. Clayton, Maj. Klausner, Mayor Mollman, City Attorney Thos. L. Fekete, Jr., and the undersigned, met and went over the city map, pointing out the blocks where crowds were most likely to congregate, and Col. Clayton gave his officers in charge of

such organizations instructions to place sentries at such intervals as the number of men made it feasible, with instructions to keep all the crowd moving and to break up any unlawful assemblage. This order was carried out, according to the information received from the officers mentioned above and also from personal inspection of the line of blocks some hours afterward.

2. This left at the City Hall 2 officers and a small detachment of men for emergency purposes. The detachment placed at the Free Bridge were under instructions to prevent any rioting which we had in mind might occur. These sentries continued on their duty during the day, with only a portion of them relieved from time to time when it was necessary to call them in to participate in some movement against organized gatherings, where they acted with the officer in charge, and when such gathering was dispersed they returned to their sentry duty.

During this conversation with the Mayor I suggested that it would be well for the Mayor to go out with the undersigned and inspect the territory where he expected policing to be done by the militia, and said Mayor stated to me that he preferred not going, but suggested that Mr. Fekete, the city attorney, accompany me, who would represent his ideas in all matters and work with me and such orders as Mr. Fekete might give would be his orders.

a. Just before the sentries left the City Hall for duty on the streets and dispersed the crowd at the corner of Collinsville and ^{Missouri}~~Illinois~~ Avenue, a colored man was shot and wounded. Major Klausser was at once dispatched with all of Company H to the scene where he disbanded the gathering and posted sentries

as per instructions above, as well as taking into custody of Davis, who did the shooting, who was immediately sent to the city prison in charge of one policeman and one enlisted man.

The circumstances of this shooting were as follows: the shooting occurred some minutes prior to the arrival of Major Klauser, and the said Davis had been taken into custody by two officers of the police department; the gathering took said Davis away from the officers, who were holding his gun, but the prisoner was at large. Major Klauser, with his enlisted men, recovered the prisoner, and with the officers and enlisted men, sent said Davis to the police station.

b. There were no other disturbances until about 1:45. At this time the undersigned was in company with Mr. Fekete, going over the district and making an inspection as to the condition of affairs to see that the orders were being carried out; Col. Clayton and Capt F.P.Auld, surgeon of the 4th Infantry, were also with the undersigned for the purposes of this inspection. On reaching the Labor Temple on the east side of Collinsville Avenue between Illinois and Ohio Avenue, a crowd of some thousand in number had gathered at the corner of Illinois and Collinsville Avenues; a shot was heard there and all left the automobile at once and took part in the breaking up of the assemblage. At that point only two enlisted men were on duty, each officer acting independently in dispersing the crowd.

The undersigned, with one of the enlisted men, took a gun and using the same flatways, called upon the crowd to disperse in the name of the law. Here one colored man was shot, name un-

known; party or parties responsible for the shooting also unknown; the colored man was laying on the street.

With much effort on the part of all, the crowd practically dispersed. The undersigned then telephoned to the city hall for Major Klauser to proceed at once to the scene with all available officers and men; said Major Klauser immediately gathered up the four men at the city hall, as well as 18 men of Company G, who were at that time eating their dinner in a restaurant, and proceeded to the scene, reaching there some few minutes afterwards, where he took full charge of the corner and entirely dispersed the crowd.

At this time certain of the unlawful assemblage broke into the pawnshop owned and operated by a party named Kayser, which was located on the west side of Collinsville Avenue, between Illinois and Ohio Avenue, being about number 415 Collinsville Avenue, for the purpose of stealing arms and ammunition, and when the said Kayser made a protest against their entrance, he was shot and died several hours later at St. Mary's Hospital. During the breaking up, or attempting to break up this mob, each officer, as well as the undersigned, was roughly handled by the crowd.

The undersigned, immediately after telephoning to Major Klauser, got into communication with the commanding officer of the 6th Infantry detachment on duty at 19th and Illinois Avenues, and found Capt. Ernest P. Stahl in command; the undersigned reported the condition of affairs and asked that he send all available men to aid the militia in preserving order, and Capt. Stahl, some half hour after that time, reported to the undersigned at the corner

of Collinsville and Illinois Avenues, with two truck loads of men, and immediately distributed such men on Collinsville Avenue from Illinois Avenue north to St. Clair Avenue, and on St. Clair Avenue from Collinsville Avenue to the Black Bridge, also with instructions to break up any unlawful assemblage, to keep everybody moving and to take into custody anybody found with firearms or resisting the law. This Capt. Stahl personally supervised and kept such organizations on duty until a late hour during the evening.

c. After order had been restored in this district, the undersigned, with Capt. Stahl and a small detachment of his organization, together with Mr. Fekete, proceeded to the corner of Third Street and Illinois Avenue, where a large two-story brick structure was standing, and occupied on the first floor by a saloon and billiard room, with a rooming house above, where numerous colored people had taken refuge, prompted by information that this place was to be attacked by the whites next. Here all of the colored people were ~~xxxx~~ removed from such building, their arms and ammunition being taken up, and the colored people, numbering some fifty, were taken to the city hall for safety, and the breaking up of this mob and removing the colored people, in my opinion, broke up further trouble in that vicinity, as this location was marked and doomed for attack.

Before calling up the detachment of the 6th Infantry, the Mayor's office was communicated with and advised of such action, and recommendation also made to the Mayor that the saloons be at once closed, which was done. In the assemblage that was

dispersed, signs of liquor were in evidence. One of the number participating in such unlawful assemblage was Dan McGlynn, Jr., son of Dan McGlynn, a member of the Chamber of Commerce.

3. On reaching the station about 3 PM., the undersigned was called to the rooms of the Chamber of Commerce in the Arcade Building, located directly across from the City Hall on Main Street this on invitation from the Chamber of Commerce, extended to me through the Mayor of East St. Louis. On reaching the rooms I was introduced by the chairman and immediately informed by the club that they had just passed a resolution asking the Mayor to call upon the Governor to declare martial law and asked me to acquiesce in their request.

I stated to the gentlemen that in my judgment martial law should not be declared, as the mayor and his officers were working in conjunction with the officers and enlisted men of the militia, co-operating with them in every way, and I did not believe it would be for the best interests of the City of East St. Louis to declare martial law, but rather continue on with the efforts of the city departments and the militia, in harmony and working together, to bring about the results. I also explained to the Club about the unlawful assemblage and what had been done as related above.

At this time one of the members was in communication with the Governor's office by telephone, and after talking with the Governor's office, called me to the telephone, where I had a conversation with Mr. Sutton, the Governor's secretary, reporting to the Governor's secretary the happenings, and also talked to

the office in regard to declaring martial law as had been requested and recommended to the office that martial law be not declared.

I then returned into the rooms of the Chamber of Commerce and informed them as to what I had said over the telephone to the Governor's office. However, this conversation was heard by numerous members of the Club who were in a nearby office during the conversation.

The members of the Club stated that they wanted the law preserved and the people moved on, etc; I told them that up to that hour every effort possible had been made to do that and that same would be continued. I also stated to them that some 600 troops had been ordered into East St. Louis, and I believed that with the 600 troops we would be able to preserve order. Returning to the City Hall, I found numerous calls coming into the Mayor's office for detachments of troops to break up gatherings, and also reports to the effect that firearms were being stored in the Black Belt district. The Mayor at this time said that these places should at once be searched and the arms taken up, and the colored men told that they must not participate in any more of the shooting in that district.

He also requested that I go out into this district to verify these complaints, which I immediately did, in company with Col. Clayton, Mr. Fekete, Chief of Police Ransom Payne, leaving back at the City Hall in direct charge of the troops Major Klausser.

On reaching the northeasterly corner of 19th and Market

Avenue, a two-story brick structure was there occupied on the first floor as a negro saloon and billiard hall, and the second floor used for dwelling purposes. Here we found the saloon closed but the pool hall adjacent thereto was open and beer on the table.

They were at once ordered to discontinue dispensing any kind of liquor, close up the pool hall, and such occupants as were present, to return to their homes, there being some 15 in number, all colored. Before permitting such colored men to return to their homes, search was made of the persons of such colored men as were present, and one man was found to have 12 or 15 loaded shotgun shells, which were taken by the Chief of Police and he was then put under arrest and taken to the police station.

We then searched the building, particularly the dwelling quarters above these rooms, for arms which it had been alleged Dr. L. N. Bundy had stored at this place. We found that Dr. Bundy had sent two cartons of his property to this place for safekeeping and on opening the cartons, we discovered that they contained no firearms or ammunition, but contained automobile supplies and some stationery.

We directed these people to go to their homes and remain indoors and not go out on the streets; we searched the saloon downstairs which had been closed pursuant to the order of the Mayor, and found that the proprietor had a Winchester rifle, which was loaded with 15 ball cartridges, caliber 30. We took this rifle and turned it over to Chief of Police Ransom Payne, together with the shells removed therefrom. We then went across the street to the northwesterly corner of 19th and Market, and searched the

saloon operated by a white man and found one loaded pistol, which the Chief of Police took.

We then proceeded to the garage of Dr. L. N. Bundy, which is located at the corner of 17th Street and Bond Avenue, as it had been reported that there were arms stored in this place, where a conversation was had with the occupants of such garage, and questions asked as to the whereabouts of Bundy. The colored men in charge of such garage advised that Bundy had not been seen since 12:30 o'clock on the morning of July 2nd, he having left his home and removed his personal effects from the garage to the building named above, and his whereabouts unknown.

During this conversation his wife, Mrs. Bundy, also colored, appeared at the garage and stated that the whereabouts of her husband were unknown. This man Bundy was the one suspected of being the principal organizer of the colored forces which caused the shooting on the night of July 1st, which occurred at the corner of Tenth and Bond Avenue, where five police officers were attacked while driving in a small automobile, pursuant to a call from that neighborhood, to disperse armed colored men reported marching towards town, where Officer Sam Coppedge was shot and killed and four others badly wounded, one of whom has since died.

4. We then returned to the city hall, reaching there about 5:30 o'clock, and were informed by Major Klauser that an alarm of fire had been turned in, reporting that a fire was progressing in the rear of the International Harvester Company, at the southwesterly corner of Railroad Avenue and Main Street, and the said Major Klauser had dispatched the last four men in reserve

to the scene to preserve order and prevent other fires, if possible

At that point two or three colored men were shot while leaving the burning building, though no information reached the Mayor's office as to the persons firing the shots. Such shooting occurred before the arrival of the small detachment. Soon after that time another alarm was turned in by the citizens, stating that a pawnshop on the east side of Collinsville Avenue, known as Uncle Charlie's pawnshop, operated by one H.E. Cook, had been broken into by certain people for the purpose of obtaining arms and ammunition, and in dispatching help to this scene, took Major Klauser himself, the last officer and enlisted man available for duty, outside of Col. Clayton, the commanding officer who remained at the City Hall.

The investigation of Major Klauser was to the effect that the building had^{not} been broken into, as reported, though the proprietor of the place advised Major Klauser that an attempt had been made, though unsuccessful, to gain entrance to the building.

5. After returning from this last inspection, Mr. Fekete and myself went to the City Hall and then to the Illmo Hotel, where a quick meal was eaten and returned immediately to the City Hall, where information was received from the Mayor's office that a mob was gathering at the corner of Fourth Street and Broadway. I proceeded to this place in company with Mr. Fekete and Major Klauser and upon arriving there found that two negro men had been shot and their bodies were lying in the street and that

one had been shot and hung to a telegraph pole on Fourth Street at the alley in the rear of what is known as the Lovingsong Building. There were at this place perhaps 1500 people, none of whom were making any attempt to prevent the killings.

Finding only 3 or 4 enlisted men at this point, the undersigned in company with the gentlemen named above, directed the crowd to disperse at once and no response was received except a jeer. Knowing that the force was insufficient to make any attempt to arrest, the undersigned returned to the City Hall where a report had previously been received to the effect that Company B was in the city and en route to the City Hall. Gathering up said Company B, with 3 officers and 66 enlisted men, as well as taking in a certain number of other enlisted men who had returned to the City Hall from other details, making some 70 in number, and were immediately loaded on trucks and put in personal command of Col. E.P. Clayton, who the undersigned instructed to proceed to Fourth and Broadway where the above mentioned mob was gathered, with instructions to deploy his line and surround the mob; the undersigned, with Mr. Fekete, taking part in this movement and giving instructions for the arrest of the mob, and on reaching this scene, found that the mob had broke through between the alley and Fourth Street and was marching west on Broadway, dragging a negro with a rope around his neck on this street, where some 10 or 12 men had ahold of the rope and others following up and cheering their work.

The undersigned immediately ordered the soldiers to deploy and surround the mob, which was done, and those who had

hold of the rope immediately dropped it and two of the parties taken into custody by Col. Clayton, and the soldiers, surrounded the entire mob, numbering something like 350 to 500 persons.

The undersigned personally, while directing this movement on the part of the troops, personally and forcibly put some 40 or 50 persons within the hollow square that had been formed by the troops. The undersigned then ordered the troops to convey the rioters they had taken, to the police station, where all of the parties were confined and their names taken by the desk sergeant. Shortly after it was discovered that quite a number of them had escaped through the windows in the basement of the city jail. These people were searched and those who had firearms were relieved of same. They were then confined in the basement and second story of the jail building. Two of the parties who had hold of the rope by which they were dragging the negro up Broadway were placed in cells and charged with rioting. Others were booked awaiting the disposition of the States' Attorney.

Before all of the persons had been safely confined in the city jail, a second alarm was given to the effect that 200 negroes were armed in the district north of the old city park at 6th and Bond Avenue and Major Klausner was dispatched to the scene by Col. Clayton with Company B and all available men, where the district was thoroughly searched and found to be erroneous as to the 200 negroes, as only two armed negroes were

found and the officers then returned to the City Hall with the detachment. Shortly after the dispatch of Major Klauser for the investigation above related, a large mob was reported forming at Third and Missouri Avenue, and about that moment Capt. O. C. Smith and Co. F. of the 4th Infantry reported, with three officers and 41 enlisted men, and before he removed his blanket rolls and haversacks, he was dispatched in double time to the scene where the mob was at once dispersed. No other organized assemblage took place after that time, and in the opinion of the undersigned the taking in of the large mob at Fourth and Broadway broke the backbone of the organized mob spirit as some of the leaders of the mob were among those taken into custody.

6. Immediately after the performance of this duty, such of the enlisted men as were on duty were then dispatched to the fires, where they were engaged in protecting the hose against attack by persons cutting the same, and where they had to remain on duty during the time of the fires, this being about 8:30 PM. Other new fires were starting in remote parts of the city, especially in the colored districts, making it impossible for the city fire departments to cover the territory and furnish proper equipment for the extinguishment of the same. I then consulted with Mr. Fekete as to the advisability of getting assistance from St. Louis and communicated by telephone from the fire office for help. After several attempts had been made, the fire office in St. Louis was reached and the fire department stated that it would be impossible for them to come over here, though Chief Swingley did afterwards come to East St. Louis about nine

o'clock, when the undersigned requested him to get apparatus over here if possible, and which said Chief agreed to do if proper guard could be furnished. Proper guard was assured and a small detachment left with the fire chief for St. Louis some half hour after that time and returned with four wagons; efficient work was done by the St. Louis fire department in extinguishing the two large fires in the heart of the city, making it possible to relieve certain of the East St. Louis Fire Department to take care of fires that had started in other negro neighborhoods.

During all the time these fires were in progress, men were engaged constantly in keeping the crowd away from the hose to prevent its being cut, which had been the practice before armed sentries could be placed at the disposal of the fire department. After the two large mobs were dispersed, the undersigned remained at the City Hall and attempted to direct the work from that point up to 12 o'clock, when Gen. Dickson arrived and took personal charge of the situation.

At that time all disorder, with the exception of fire, had been overcome and numerous arrests had been made by the militia of persons caught in the act of starting the fires, rescuing men who had been attacked in different places, something like 400 colored people being recovered from the mob districts and escorted to the City Hall.

7. According to the records in the police department, there were 23 colored and 2 white persons killed during the time of the riot, and attention is invited to the fact that during all

the time of the great disorder, only 12 officers and 169 men were present to take part in the dispersing of the mobs, and only the timely arrival of Company F of the 4th Infantry at 8 PM. made it possible to completely disband the last mob gathered.

Attention is also invited to Exhibit A, which shows the large area covered by the small detachment of troops, both in patrol duty and distance necessary to travel on calls coming in from various parts of the city where disorder was in progress. Such places are traced on Exhibit A by blue pencil surrounding the particular districts.

After the inspection by Mr. Fekete and myself of the East Side Packing Company district, we found a complaint coming from a district outside the city of East St. Louis, and at once on returning to the City Hall I informed the Sheriff's office to that effect and asked them if they wanted the assistance of troops out in that district and they said they did and I asked them to file a written request to that effect, which is hereto appended, marked Exhibit B.

The following is a list of the time of the arrival of the organizations reporting for duty after order had been restored as far as the gathering of large organized mobs, to-wit:

- Co. A, arrived at 2:00 AM. July 3-1917, with 1 officer and 62 men, under command of Capt. John Barr;
- Co. C, at 2:30 AM. July 3rd, under command of Capt. C.F. McClure
- Co. D, at 1:45 AM. July 3rd, with 2 officers and 68 men, under command of First Lieut. Geo. Cassady;

Co. L, 7:30 AM. July 3rd with 27 men under command of Capt. Dale Kilburn;

Co. N, 3:30 AM. July 4th, with 3 officers and 63 men, under command of Capt. S.N. Cohen;

Co. L of the 3rd Infantry, at 4:15 AM. July 3rd, with 3 officers and 110 men, under command of Capt. Jas. Burns;

Six companies of the 2nd Infantry at 8:30 AM. July 4th, under command of Major Gerrad;

Prov. Company of the 5th Illinois, at 8:00 PM. July 3rd, under command of Capt. Reynolds and Capt. Porter;

Troop D of the 1st Cavalry, at 8:30 PM. July 3, with 3 officers and 77 men, under command of Capt. Styles;

and for the verification of this information, I hereunto attach report of Capt. J.H. Coady, Adjutant under the command of Col. Clayton, marked Exhibit D; also communication from the same officer as to the number of officers and men arriving and participating in breaking up unlawful assemblages before 8 PM. July 2nd, 1917, marked Exhibit E.

From my personal observation I found Col. Clayton and Major Klauser acting in conjunction with the Mayor of the City of East St. Louis and the undersigned in all matters. I also found them wide awake and vigilant in their efforts and doing everything in their power to dispatch troops to the best advantage. I also found that in so far as it was possible for them in the limited time, they gave proper instructions to their enlisted men as to their duties on the beat, and which instructions were to the effect that law and order must be preserved, and to use such force as was

necessary, both in dispersing the mobs and keeping the crowd moving at all times. The undersigned did not undertake the detail part of the work of telling the enlisted men as to their duties, but instructions were given to leave the matter of such detail entirely in the hands of the officers in charge of their troops.

The undersigned believes that it would hardly be possible, under the existing conditions, to have acted to a better advantage with the limited number of officers and enlisted men at his command. I invite your attention to the great area covered by such troops, as well as the large number of prisoners taken into custody, as well as safely recovering from the mobs and escorting to a place of safety at the City Hall a great number of colored people for protection, which numbered something like 600 people so escorted before ten o'clock in the evening.

I also invite your especial attention to the statement made by Mr. Thos. L. Fekete, Jr., City Attorney for the City of East St. Louis, Illinois, acting for His Honor, Fred W. Mollman, Mayor of the City of East St. Louis, Illinois, who was delegated for the purpose of co-operating with the undersigned, directing the work necessary for the protection of the city as we saw it, and which statement is hereunto appended and marked Exhibit F.

I also invite your especial attention to the statement from Lieut. Col. Clayton, officer in charge of the militia, as to the instructions received from the undersigned before dispatching his officers and enlisted men to the work, which is hereunto appended and marked Exhibit G.

I also invite your especial attention to the statement

made by Major William Klauser, second officer in command of troops on duty, which is hereunto appended and marked Exhibit H, in which statement Major Klauser outlines the work done by officers and enlisted men, as well as instructions received.

8. In summing up the cause of the riots the undersigned suggests the following:

1st. The riot started on the early morning of July 1st by an organized mob of colored men who were marching westwardly at Tenth and Bond about 12:30 AM., and when approached by officers of the police department fired upon them and killed certain officers.

2nd. White men seeking revenge for the killing of the white officers, but also for the number of colored people who have been coming into the City of East St. Louis for the past six months during time of labor troubles and that every possible effort on the part of the white men was organized with a view of not only taking the lives of many of the colored men, but also to burn them out of their respective districts.


The feeling between the whites and blacks at the time of my arrival was intense and constantly increased. I do not believe it would have been possible, even if all of the troops listed above and ordered to the scene, even if they had been on the ground at that time, to have prevented the killing of many colored people, which was done in many different isolated districts.

3rd. People responsible for the killing of a large number of such colored men taking advantage of the hiding place

of such colored men, where many of them were exterminated and evidence hard to secure. The rumor that one of the militia on duty was responsible for the killing of one of the colored men, was without foundation, insofar as I have been able to ascertain after making inquiry from the officers on duty, and I am therefore of the opinion, in the absence of positive proof, that the statement is erroneous, as only two shots were fired by militiamen on duty, insofar as information has reached the undersigned, and that was when a large mob gathered at Third Street and Missouri Avenue, where two shots are known to have been fired into the air.

The criticism of the Chamber of Commerce, in my judgment was prompted by no other reason than that I did not see fit to acquiesce in their desire and not communicating my desire to the Governor for martial law. I am sincere in saying that during every minute of the riot, until the time of departure, my best efforts were put forward for the very best interests in co-operating with the Mayor and enforcing the law, as well as getting the best work possible from the organizations of the National Guard on duty at this point, and the work personally done by myself in attending to a large part of this work was unusual for an officer to participate in.

Respectfully submitted,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. A. Webb". The signature is written in a cursive style with some overlapping loops and is positioned below the typed name.

I, THOMAS L. FEEKEE, Jr., of the City of East St. Louis, County of St. Clair and State of Illinois, do hereby certify as follows:

That I am the city attorney of East St. Louis; that on Monday, July 2nd, 1917, at about 10 o'clock AM. I met Col. S. O. Tripp in the outer apartment of the Mayor's office, who advised me that the Mayor expected me to assist him in detailing the placing of patrols in the City of East St. Louis for the purpose of preserving order and preventing rioting which it was suspected might take place:

That I then went into the Mayor's office and he personally instructed me to assist Col. Tripp in the work before mentioned, for the reason that he was not feeling well and for the further reason that he had been advised not to leave his office; that upon being so instructed by the Mayor, Col. Tripp, Maj. Wm. Klauser of the 4th Illinois Infantry, Lieut. Col. C.P. Clayton and myself retired to my office as City Attorney in the City Hall, and taking the map of the City of East St. Louis, we agreed upon the placing of the patrols or sentries on Collinsville Avenue between Broadway and Illinois Avenue, on Broadway between the viaduct and Sixth Street, on Main Street between Broadway and Missouri Avenue, on Walnut Avenue between Sixth Street and Tenth Street, on Third Street between Missouri Avenue and Illinois Avenue, and a detachment at the easterly approach to the Free Bridge:

At the time this was agreed upon there were in the City of East St. Louis three officers and 27 men of Company G,

and two officers and 32 men of Company H, 4th Ill. Infantry, and these men were distributed as far as they would go over this district; it was agreed that Lieut. Col. C.P. Clayton was to place other troops as they arrived at these various places heretofore mentioned:

During this conference Col. Tripp, as the representative of the Governor, instructed the officers to use their men in quelling all riots and to keep the crowds that might gather on the streets moving, to prevent any disorders or law-breaking, and to arrest any persons who might be suspected of having concealed weapons, or who might participate in an attack upon either colored or white people, and his instructions were that the line officers must carry these orders into effect:

That about 1:30 Col. Tripp, Lieut. Col. Clayton, Surgeon Capt. Auld of the 4th Illinois, and myself, started to make an inspection of the districts proposed to be patrolled, in my automobile; that we proceeded north on Collinsville Avenue to the Labor Temple, which is located on the easterly side of Collinsville Avenue, between Illinois Avenue and Ohio Avenue; that as we passed the corner of Illinois and Collinsville Avenues, I observed a mob gathering and we thereupon stopped the automobile in front of the Labor Temple and went back to ascertain the cause of the disturbance;

There were shots fired just before we got out of the automobile and going back we found that someone in this crowd had

shot a negro, who was lying in the street at this place. We also found that the parties in this crowd were stopping street cars and searching them for negroes; there were at least two and not more than four enlisted men in this neighborhood, and the crowd aggregated perhaps one thousand persons:

Although in civilian clothes, Col. Tripp undertook to disperse the mob and with the assistance of the few enlisted men, started the crowd to moving and scattered them in different directions; he personally took one of the enlisted men's guns, and using it flatways, pushed the crowd open and calling upon them in the name of the law and of the Governor of the State of Illinois, ordered them to disperse;

In assisting him Surgeon Capt. Auld and myself were roughly handled by the crowd, although there were a number in the crowd that knew me and some ~~as~~ with whom I was acquainted, but whose names I cannot recall at this time:

That just before alighting from the crowd in front of the Labor Temple, some of the crowd broke into the store of a party by the name of Kayser for the purpose of taking guns and ammunition, and he was shot and afterwards died:

Col. Tripp then hurried to a telephone at Schleuter's drugstore and called the City Hall and asked Major Klauser to send all available troops to the corner of Collinsville and Illinois Avenues, and for Major Klauser to assume personal charge of the breaking up of the mob at this place:

That after the conversation with Major Klauser, Col.

Tripp went back into the mob and found that they were gathering together again, and he immediately went to the same telephone and called up the camp of the Sixth Infantry, located at the corner of 19th and Illinois Avenue, and requested that they send all available troops immediately to the corner of Illinois and Collinsville Avenue; that on returning from calling up the Sixth Infantry, we found that Major Klauser had arrived and the mob was dispersing:

That after this disturbance we lost Lieut. Col. Clayton and Surgeon Capt. Auld, and Col. Tripp and myself then proceeded north on Collinsville Avenue, where it was reported that another mob had gathered at the crossing on St. Clair Avenue; however, on going to St. Clair Avenue we found that this rumor was untrue:

That at the corner of First Street and St. Clair Avenue, believing that the saloons being in operation were cutting some figure in the rioting, I went into the Drivers' National Bank and called up the Chief of Police Ransom Payne, and told him what I suspected with reference to the saloons, and he advised me that he had given orders that the saloons must all be closed at two o'clock, and the word was being sent to the saloonkeepers as fast as possible;

That upon coming out of the Drivers' National Bank, we met two truckloads of the 6th Infantry detachments, and Col. Tripp then ordered one truckload to unload and to patrol St. Clair Avenue from the Black Bridge to Seventh Street, and the other truckload was ordered back to Collinsville Avenue, to there unload and

patrol Collinsville Avenue from St. Clair Avenue to Summit Avenue, with instructions to break up any gathering and arrest any parties that might be suspected of inciting riot and any persons who might be attacking either colored or white people, and to arrest and send to the police station any persons who might be suspected of carrying concealed weapons; these instructions were given to Capt. Stahl, who thereupon proceeded to carry them out;

That after Capt. Stahl gave these orders to his men, he got in the automobile with Col. Tripp and myself and we proceeded south on Collinsville Avenue to Illinois Avenue where we had heard some murmurings in the crowd that had previously gathered there, that an attack would be made upon a two story brick saloon and dwelling house located at the northeasterly corner of Third Street and Illinois Avenue where a number of negroes had taken refuge to escape from the mob which had previously gathered on this corner;

That Col. Tripp, in company with Capt. Stahl and myself, and a small detachment of enlisted men, went to this building and called upon the proprietor to come down to the sidewalk and bring his people down and surrender their arms and we would see that they were conducted to a place of safety; that these negroes came out and surrendered their arms and a truck was then provided and the negroes were taken to the police station; that it was then decided that it would be best to take them to St. Louis and at our request the truck driver took them to St. Louis, under the protection of a small detachment of enlisted men, but as large

as the number available at that time would permit, a number of these colored people having said that St. Louis was their residence;

That Col. Tripp and myself then proceeded from the building at the northeasterly corner of Third and Illinois to the City Hall, to look after the negroes who had been loaded on the trucks and see that they were taken to places of safety and to direct their work; that while talking to the proprietor of the building at Third and Illinois Avenue, the truck started out and left him and it then became necessary for me to take this man to St. Louis myself, and I left Col. Tripp at the police station, where he again took up the ~~work~~ duties of directing the work of protecting the city;

That I returned in about an hour and learned from Col. Tripp that it had been reported that negroes were forming and had large quantities of arms and ammunition at a saloon on the northeasterly corner of 19th and Market Avenue; that at that time the small detachment of troops remaining at the city hall was loaded into an auto truck, and Col. Tripp, Lieut. Col. Clayton, Chief of Police Ransom Payne and myself, in my automobile, proceeded to the saloon and poolroom located at the northeasterly corner of 19th Street and Market Avenue, where it was reported there were large stores of ammunition and arms;

That we accompanied Col. Tripp into the building and found perhaps 15 or 18 negro men; that Col. Tripp ordered them to surrender arms, and there being no ready compliance with the

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order, he thereupon ordered them searched and found one man who had a number of loaded shotgun shells; this man was arrested by the Chief of Police and taken to the station by the enlisted men as the shells in his possession corresponded with those found at the place where the officers had been shot on the previous night:

That Col. Tripp then went upstairs, we accompanying him, and searched for the arms that it was reported had been stored in this place by one Dr. L.N. Bundy; that we found two pasteboard cartons in the front room, which the man in charge said belonged to Dr. Bundy, and on opening and searching the cartons, it was found that they contained no arms or ammunition, but did contain some automobile accessories and some stationery; that we then went downstairs and Col. Tripp ordered the proprietor of the saloon to open the door and on search being made, found a Winchester rifle loaded with 15 ball cartridges, which rifle and cartridges were taken and delivered to the Chief of Police;

That Col. Tripp then went into the poolroom and ordered the 15 or 18 negroes to go to their homes, if they did not live at this place, and to stay there and not participate in any rioting; that upon leaving this place we then went to the saloon across the street on the northwesterly corner of 19th Street and Market Avenue, which was operated by a white man, and searched his place for arms and found one revolver, which was delivered to the Chief of Police for safekeeping;

That upon receiving information from the proprietor of this saloon that in all probability arms and ammunition might be

found in the sheds in the rear of the building which we had just searched and in the automobile owned by the proprietor of that place, we went back and searched the buildings and the automobile and found nothing;

That after leaving the latter place we proceeded to the garage of Dr. Bunly, located at the southwesterly corner of 17th Street and Bond Avenue, and there Col. Tripp questioned the occupants as to the whereabouts of Dr. Bunly, but they said he had not been seen by them since 12:30 that morning; that a hurried search was made of this place but no arms or ammunition were found and the occupants were told to go to their homes and not to participate in any rioting; that after leaving Dr. Bunly's garage, we then proceeded to the City Hall where Col. Tripp and I reported to the Mayor what had taken place since the time we had last seen him and he evinced his approval:

That about six o'clock or shortly thereafter, Col. Tripp and myself went to the Iliac Hotel and had a hurried supper and returned to the City Hall, where we conferred with Col. Clayton with reference to the arrival of other troops and the disposition which was to be made of them and the duties they were to perform; that shortly after this it was reported that the mob was congregating at the corner of Broadway and Fourth Street, and that thereupon Col. Tripp, Lieut. Latham of the 3rd Illinois Artillery, and myself proceeded in my automobile to this place and found that a large mob had gathered and two negroes had been shot and one had been shot and hung to a telegraph pole:

That Col. Tripp immediately got out and ordered the mob to disperse in the name of the law and of the Governor of the State of Illinois, and ordered the militiamen there, some three or four in number, to use their bayonets in dispersing the mob; that there must have been at least 1500 people in this mob, and that Col. Tripp, realizing the futility of endeavoring to deal with them with so few troops, suggested that we return to the City Hall and pick up Company B, reported to have come in about that time; we returned to the City Hall, finding Company B with 3 officers and 66 men had just arrived, and Col. Tripp ordered them to board two trucks which were standing there and notified Col. Clayton to take personal command of this Company and such other men as could be found in the neighborhood, and to proceed at once to 4th and Broadway for the purpose of dispersing the mob;

That Col. Tripp instructed Col. Clayton to encircle the mob with his men and bring them all into the police station and that he, Col. Tripp, would be there to assist him in doing this; that we then returned to the corner of Fourth Street and Broadway and upon arriving there saw about 10 or 12 men dragging a negro west on Broadway, in the middle of the street, with a rope around his neck; that Col. Tripp immediately jumped from the automobile and ordered the troops to surround those who were participating in this dragging process and also those who were in the mob concentrated at this corner and those who were following the ~~mob~~ crowd and dragging the negro;

That a line of enlisted men was formed around the crowd

and not less than 50 of the crowd who were attempting to escape were pushed back into the hollow square formed by the troops, by Colonel Tripp himself; that Col. Tripp then ordered the troops to close in and permit no one to escape and to march the mob up to the City jail for imprisonment, and this was done under his personal direction:

That while Col. Tripp was engaged in locking up the members of this mob and putting them in custody, I turned my attention to loosening the rope from the negro's neck and afterwards took him to the hospital and did not see Col. Tripp for about three-quarters of an hour, by which time he had completed the task of taking these men, some 350 to 500 in number, to the police station;

That on returning from the hospital about 8:15, I found that Col. Tripp had just ordered out Company F of the 4th Infantry under the command of Capt. O.C. Smith to quell a riot at 3rd and Missouri Avenue; this organization had just reported and had not taken off their field equipment, and were sent to the scene in double time where they broke up the mob and this was the last mob that was formed during the trouble;

That I was then ordered by Col. Tripp to take some persons out to some of the various fires that were raging and was away for perhaps an hour and returned with a negro who had been shot by the mob, and after putting this negro in safety, I returned to Colonel Tripp, and he, having received a report that houses were being fired down in the vicinity of Tenth Street and Bond Avenue, asked me to take a detachment of soldiers down to this place in my automobile; I took five soldiers to this place

and stationed them and then assisted in putting out the fire; and after putting out a fire at the corner of 11th Street and McCasland Avenue, I then went to the place where I had stationed these enlisted men and while there was fired upon by some persons just east of 11th Street and south of Bond Avenue;

That with the soldiers we took these persons into custody and found three revolvers and two shotguns and arrested them and I brought them into the station. I then reported to Col. Tripp and found that Adjutant General Dickson had arrived and assumed charge of the situation: I then continued with Col. Tripp and General Dickson inspecting the various districts until 4 AM. July 3rd.

Up to the time that Col. Tripp took into custody the mob at Fourth and Broadway and prevented the hanging of one negro taken by this mob, Col. Tripp had 103 enlisted men and 11 officers; and at that time he had the assistance of Company B with 66 men and three officers, under the command of Capt. Eaton who assisted Col. Clayton in bringing in the mob and it was the first duty they had performed after arriving in East St. Louis:


I further certify that with the taking of this mob at the corner of Fourth and Broadway, I consider that the backbone of the rioting had been broken, outside of the small mob which had assembled at the corner of Third and Missouri Avenue, and which was dispersed by Company F under the command of Capt. O.C. Smith, who arrived at about 8 PM. and after that time there were no further mobs gathered in the city that I know of; that it would have been impossible for any man to have done any more with

the few men and the large territory to cover and the large number of rioters and the intensity of the mob spirit, than Col. Tripp did in this instance; he was handicapped by having no uniform, by not having enough troops at hand, by the large district that the mobs were operating in, by the distance between the places where the mobs were operating in the disappointment at not having the troops arrive earlier in the afternoon as had been expected and plans prepared for their duties;

Having been with him the greatest portion of the day and the night of the disturbance, I had opportunity to observe him and his method, and I can honestly and truthfully say that I do not believe any man could have done better than he did under the circumstances; at no time did he lose his head or evince any excitement but was at all times calm, cool and collected:

His personal courage and bravery under the trying circumstances which he encountered is entitled to the highest commendation and I believe that the citizens of this city owe him a debt of gratitude for the efforts he has put forth in protecting their lives and property at the risk which he personally took in so doing.

(signed)



City Attorney, of East St. Louis

I, E. P. CLAYTON, do certify that I am a resident of Vandalia, Illinois; I further certify that I am Lieutenant Colonel of the Fourth Infantry of Illinois National Guard, in command of the regiment.

I further certify that on the night of July 1st, 1917, I visited East St. Louis, and visited the officers in charge of the recruiting station; I then proceeded to St. Louis, Missouri, where I remained over night at the Maryland Hotel and returned to East St. Louis on the morning of July 2nd, in consequence of newspaper reports to the effect that there was rioting in said city, reaching East St. Louis at 9:00 AM. Upon my arrival I called at the City Hall where I chanced to meet Col. S.O. Tripp on duty, representing the Governor's office.

Col. Tripp advised me to the effect that the Adjutant General's office had made effort to get into communication with me at Vandalia during the early morning of July 2nd, and I told Col. Tripp the reason for my not being there was on account of my trip to St. Louis. Col. Tripp directed me to assume command of the military forces ordered into East St. Louis and gave me a list of organizations so ordered. At that time I was without uniform, but I at once assumed command and reported my presence officially to His Honor, Mayor Fred W. Hollman.

The Mayor reported to me the happenings of the evening before and the condition of the city at that time; there was a feeling of unrest prevailing with many threats of lynching and attacks upon the colored population by the whites and also threats

of attacks upon the whites by the colored population.

I asked the Mayor what were his orders as to the disposition of the troops and the services he wanted the troops to perform, and he instructed me to use the forces at my command to preserve peace and order in the City of East St. Louis and uphold the laws of the State of Illinois. I immediately commenced an investigation into the conditions as I could see them in the downtown portion of the city. I telephoned home for my military uniform and equipment and then held a conference with the Mayor, Col. Tripp and Mr. Fekete, City Attorney. After the conference with Mayor Mollman, at which his instructions were given, I went to the office of Mr. Fekete, the City Attorney, together with Col. Tripp, and we examined the map of the City of East St. Louis and agreed upon the placing of the patrols upon the arrival of the troops.

It was agreed that it would be best to place troops on Collinsville Avenue between Broadway and Illinois Avenue, on Missouri Avenue from Relay Depot to Sixth Street, on Main Street from Broadway to Missouri Avenue, on Broadway from the viaduct to Sixth Street, on Third Street from Missouri Avenue to Illinois Avenue, on Walnut Avenue from Sixth Street to Tenth Street, with a detachment at the east end of the Free Bridge, as at that time that was a portion of the city where people were congregating and appeared to be the points at which trouble was most likely to start.

The Mayor advised me that it was his policy to remain at the City Hall, as he had been advised to do so on account of

danger to his life and person, threats having been heard a dozen times that morning and the night before, and he designated Thomas L. Fekete, Jr., as his representative in this matter.

About this time Col. Tripp received word by telephone from the Acting Adjutant General at Springfield, that he would place an order direct detailing Col. Clayton as the senior field officer, and directing him to proceed to East St. Louis to report to the Mayor and carry out his orders, etc. Col. Tripp, being the senior officer present, and representative of the Adjutant General's office, as well as the Governor's office, conferred with me on all matters and worked with me in carrying out the orders of the Mayor.

I also conferred with Col. Tripp regarding the instructions to the troops, which were as follows; the company officers were to place their troops in the districts named and instruct them to use every effort at their command to preserve order and protect life and property and see that the laws of the State of Illinois were enforced.

I further certify that the first organization to arrive in East St. Louis for duty was Company G, Fourth Infantry Captain Gravenhorst in command, with three officers and 27 enlisted men. They arrived in the city at 8:40 AM. and reached the Cith Hall shortly afterwards. These men, except a small detachment kept at the City Hall and police department for emergency purposes, along Collinsville Avenue from Broadway to Illinois Avenue, making an average of two enlisted men to the

block.

The next organization to arrive was at 10:20 AM., being Company H commanded by Captain Vance Cortwright, with 2 officers and 32 men, and with this organization came Major Wm. Klauser, of the Fourth Infantry, and reported for duty.

This organization was immediately distributed as follows; one officer and 12 men to the east approach to the Free Bridge, as we had received reports from the police department that there were crowds gathering in that vicinity and trouble was likely to occur there; at that time we also placed some men on Broadway from the viaduct to Sixth Street, this taking up all the enlisted men present for duty for patrol work.

The line officers of both organizations were instructed by me to go over the line and instruct their enlisted men as to their duties and to take personal charge of the enforcement of the patrol work.

The next organization to arrive was Company I, which arrived at 1:30 PM. July 2nd, and reported to Major Klauser at the City Hall. Col. Tripp, Mr. Fekete, the representative of the Mayor and myself, at that time were going over the districts where trouble was likely to occur to make an estimate of the situation, so as to decide about the further placing of troops and the probable number of troops that would be required.

The streets at that time were thronged with people and while no organized mobs were formed, the people were in a very restless and apparently savage condition, moving rapidly up and down the streets and attempting to gather in groups

which the troops as far as possible, dispersed and caused the groups to break up.

Going up Collinsville Avenue with Col. Tripp, Surgeon Captain Auld and Mr. Fekete, in his machine, we found a crowd of perhaps 1,000 people at the corner of Collinsville and Illinois Avenues. We had gotten to the Labor Temple on the east side of Collinsville Avenue, between Illinois Avenue and Ohio Avenue, when shots were heard and we immediately got out of the machine and went back to the corner of Collinsville and Illinois Avenues and attempted to disperse the crowd which had gathered there and found that a negro had been shot and was lying in the street. The persons in this crowd were stopping street cars and searching them for negroes. We called upon three or four enlisted men who were present at the corner and attempted to break up the mob, and did scatter them to some extent, but it was immediately reformed at other places in the vicinity.

We also found that part of this mob had entered a store of a white man named Kayser and attempted to take arms and ammunition from his place, and he was shot and afterwards died. His place is located on the west side of Collinsville Avenue between Illinois Avenue and Ohio Avenue, being about No. 415 Collinsville Avenue.

In breaking up this mob, each of us used every effort in our power to disperse the members, aiding the four enlisted men, and Col. Tripp and myself both being in civilian clothes, were roughly handled in our efforts to disperse the mob and pro-

fect lives. Col. Tripp went to the drugstore at Schleuter's drugstore and called up Major Klauser and asked him to send all troops available to the corner of Collinsville and Missouri Avenues and to take charge of them himself. He came right up and the mob was then dispersed, but it was impossible to get the people in this mob to get off the streets and go to their homes.

At this time I was lost from Col. Tripp and Mr. Fekete and assumed immediate command of the officers and men as they reported, and when the mob was finally dispersed, made my way back to the City Hall, taking with me one prisoner that I had arrested near the corner of Illinois and Collinsville Avenues, and turned him over to the police department and directed that a charge of rioting be placed against him, leaving back all troops reported under command of Major Klauser, with directions to keep the street clear and people moving, and to arrest every man who refused to move on or in any way offered violence or attempted to destroy property.

I learned later that Col. Tripp had called on the commanding officer of the Federalized troops stationed at 19th and Illinois Avenue, for assistance, and they reported within a half hour, and were distributed under the direction of Col. Tripp on Collinsville Avenue from Illinois Avenue to St. Clair Avenue, and on St. Clair Avenue from Collinsville Avenue to the Black Bridge.

About three o'clock Col. Tripp and Mr. Fekete returned

to the City Hall and police station with a truckload of negroes whom they were conducting to places of safety.

In the meantime, not having been able to get in communication with Col. Tripp and seeing that the situation was entirely too bad for the number of troops ordered in, I called the Acting Adjutant General on the phone and advised him to send five additional companies and to hurry them to us as fast as possible, as it was my opinion, from observation at that time, that the number of troops that we had and that were ordered out, were entirely inadequate to handle the situation and immediately reported that fact to Col. Tripp on his arrival, who acquiesced in the action there taken; I also asked the Adjutant General to hurry forward the troops that had been ordered.

Col. Tripp informed me on his arrival that extra ammunition had been provided for through the Benton Company, who were ordered to bring all available ammunition. Soon after Col. Tripp's arrival at three o'clock, he and I were requested to meet with the Mayor and the Chamber of Commerce at a conference in the Chamber of Commerce rooms opposite the City Hall. Col. Tripp immediately proceeded there and I followed him as soon as I could possibly leave the City Hall, on account of details necessary to be worked out.

On my arrival at the Chamber of Commerce rooms, it appeared that a discussion was then being carried on as to the advisability of placing the city under martial law, the Chamber of Commerce having already passed a resolution requesting the Governor to do this.

Col. Tripp outlined to them the advantages and disadvantages of having martial law declared; that is, that under martial law, civil authorities and courts were all nullified, and that the Mayor and police departments would be absolutely without authority and we would lose the benefit of their experience, their knowledge of the people and the geography of the city; and he also told them that the Mayor and city authorities were working well in conjunction with the National Guard, and the Mayor at that time appeared to me to acquiesce in the opinion of Colonel Tripp.

The Chamber of Commerce then got in communication with the Governor's office by telephone and Col. Tripp was called to the telephone and he had a conversation with someone to whom he explained the situation and the stand he had taken in regard to placing the city under martial law, and came back and advised there would be no martial law at this time.

I returned from this meeting about four o'clock and in the meantime negro men, women and children were being brought into the City Hall for refuge by the officers and men of the National Guard. Many of these people had been beaten and injured and at that time there were probably one hundred in the court room of the City Hall. Reports were coming in from all parts of the city and troops were dispatched to the danger points just as fast as they arrived, and were unable to hold anything like the number of men in reserve that the situation required.

Company E arrived at 4:45 and at that time there were demands for troops far in excess of the number of troops available.

One of the reports was that the colored population were gathering in the vicinity of Nineteenth and Market Streets in large numbers and were reported to be preparing to march on the city, many of them being armed and numerous arms stored in a building in that vicinity.

Col. Tripp, accompanied by Mr. Fekete and Chief of Police Ransom Payne, with a truck and a small detachment of men that I was able to furnish him, immediately started to the vicinity where this trouble was reported. Reports of rioting at that time were general all over the city, and in all of the downtown districts that came under my observation, things were now in a condition of chaos; people were wandering in every direction, and at every point where troops were not actually present, much shouting and very often the firing of pistols was heard.

Along about five o'clock a fire was reported west of Broadway on Main Street in the rear of the International Harvester Company. The Fire Department at Station No. 1, which is located near the City Hall, immediately responded and reported within a short time after they responded, that their hose was being cut. At that time I sent every man available to their assistance to protect their hose, but the number of men available was not nearly sufficient to do what was required. The fire continued to spread and many people gathered in that part of the city, but there was still rioting and disorder going on along Collinsville Avenue and in all the downtown districts and reports were coming in every minute from outlying districts of negroes and white men gathering in mobs and arming themselves.

Along about 6:30 o'clock, Col. Tripp & Mr. Fekete returned, bringing one prisoner and a number of firearms and reported things quiet in that district in which they had been, and also reported that the people around the fire, which at that time had travelled in an easterly direction almost to Broadway were entirely too many for the troops on duty at that point, there being probably 1,000 men to every soldier in that vicinity.

Some troops, as many as could possibly be spared, were sent there from other points, but were not sufficient to cope with the situation. It was reported that lynchings were going on, and that the crowd who were not engaged in the lynching, were standing around and making no effort to prevent it, but were cheering and acquiescing in what had been done. They would move away when ordered by the troops, but immediately congregated when the soldiers had passed. Col. Tripp asked me to give him as many troops as I could possibly spare to take to this locality and to arrest the people who at that time were engaging in mob violence.

At the time Col. Tripp arrived from the inspection of that scene, there were no troops available, but Company B was expected at any minute, I having kept in touch with the railroad company as much as possible to ascertain the time of the expected arrival of the troops. About 7 o'clock, Company B, with 3 officers and 66 enlisted men, in command of Capt. Jas. Eaton, arrived, and were immediately brought to the City Hall, and under the direction and accompanied by Col. Tripp, went to the scene, picking up every available soldier along the route, who were at that time keeping

the crowds moving in their vicinity; I had them form in the rear of Company B and accompany us, and we proceeded to Fourth and Broadway, where the streets were thronged with people, and as we moved down the street towards the scene of the reported lynchings, and disorders, I saw eight or ten men running up the street dragging a colored man by a rope which was around his neck.

Col. Tripp directed that the soldiers be deployed from right and left flank and encircled the entire mob, he assisting Capt. Eaton to form a hollow square and personally supervising the proceedings, he arresting men himself and putting them into the square, Capt. Eaton working along the south side of the street and directing the troops in their movement and myself working along the north side of the street.

As soon as the men who were dragging the colored man up the street saw the soldiers, they dropped the rope and attempted to push into the mob. I was able to arrest two of them, who proved to be George Wood and Leo King, and handed them to two soldiers of Company B and directed them to take them immediately to the police station and turn them over to the police and hold them for my instructions as to the charges against them.

We surrounded the mob to as great an extent as the number of the mob and our men would permit, taking into custody something like 350 to 500 men. When we got the mob surrounded we perfected the hollow square and directed the soldiers to allow no man to pass out through the lines and started to march all the prisoners to the city jail, where they were immediately confined, filling the entire jail to its fullest capacity of standing room, then filling the basement of the jail building, and the

remainder were sent to the second story of the jail building.

Shortly after they were confined, the police department reported to me they were unable to prevent the escape of the prisoners, as they were getting out through the basement windows. I immediately furnished them enough troops to guard the windows of the basement and in the jail building, but in the meantime quite a number had escaped. While we were placing the prisoners in the jail, a letter was handed to Col. Tripp by the Mayor. Col. Tripp opened the letter and announced to the crowd assembled, and the prisoners, that the city was now practically under martial law, and directed them to go to their homes and stop all disorder and keep off of the streets of the city.

In the meantime the fire was extended and had also broken out in several different places, one of them being on Third Street about a block north of the City Hall. All the available fire fighting apparatus was then at work on the main fire and appeals were made to the City of St. Louis by Col. Tripp for help. They were also called up by a representative of the fire department.

Just at this time the crowd was seen rushing down Missouri Avenue from Collinsville Avenue north to Third Street. I immediately took all troops available and rushed them to the scene in person and headed off the mob and stopped them. At that time there were probably one thousand people in the two blocks in a very disorderly condition, shouting and running to and fro. While engaged in dispersing this mob Company F arrived at the City Hall

and reported to Col. Tripp and they came from the City Hall to where I was in double quick time, still carrying their blanket rolls and travelling equipment. I directed Capt. Smith to head off the mob and to arrest every man in it. In the confusion and the noise at the time he took his troops farther than I had intended, to head off the mob, which extended along Collinsville Avenue for a long distance.

Eis Company proceeded up Collinsville Avenue for probably a block, and he, finding that the entire street was filled with men, as far as he could see, immediately went to work to dispersing the mobs, and not having sufficient troops to arrest and hold the entire mob, I had an officer examine every one of them as they passed two sentries which I placed at the end of the street, for arms. He was not able to find any arms, but several were picked up on the sidewalk after the crowd left, apparently dropped to prevent having them found on their persons. This same thing occurred when the mob was arrested on Broadway.

These were the last large gatherings and the men had the mob spirit broken, or rather, they apparently feared to gather in large mobs for fear of wholesale arresting if repeated, and in my judgment this broke up the actual mob violence on anything like a large scale, but in the meantime the crowd had scattered into many small mobs and were practically all over the city. As fast as the troops arrived during the entire night, they were sent out to points of danger and to assist the firemen and the St. Louis firemen in their work, it being necessary to form lines of men

along their lines of hose to prevent them from being cut. In the meantime the electric light wires and part of the telephone wires leading to the City Hall were either burned off or purposely cut.

During all of this time the officers and men worked willingly and courageously and did everything in their power, as far as I could see, to preserve order and to prevent violence and I received no authentic reports of any dereliction of duty by either officers or men. I heard rumors at one time or another that soldiers had fired upon the mobs and also that soldiers had been shot, and several shots were fired to my knowledge by the soldiers in stopping the crowd rushing down Missouri Avenue, which had the desired effect of stopping the crowd, but no casualties were reported to me at that time as the result of firing on the part of the soldiers.

During all this time the number of colored people brought to the City Hall by the militiamen was increasing, there being many hundreds of them in the City Hall by midnight. In the meantime the Adjutant General called up and I answered the phone and he asked me in regard to the conditions and I told him the conditions were very bad; that there were reports of mobs all over the city and that two large fires at that time were in progress and that for the present, in my opinion, we had only enough troops to handle the downtown district, and that we were unable to furnish men to handle all the calls that came in from the outlying districts. If I remember correctly, I told him that I thought the main mob had been broken, but that conditions were

unsettled all over the city and that two large fires and many small ones were at that time in progress. He informed me that he would be in East St. Louis as soon as he could possibly get there. He arrived somewhere around twelve o'clock.

During all this time Col. Tripp was busy every minute, doing everything in his power, as far as I could see, to restore order, directing me to send troops to the different points just as fast as I could possibly get them there, and in general doing everything that he could do, in my estimation, to restore order; he personally participated in the breaking up of the largest mob and also in the one on Collinsville Avenue, going through the downtown part of the city and assisting and directing the troops.

The total number of troops reporting for duty before twelve o'clock was as follows:

Co. G, at 8:40 AM. with 3 officers and 27 men	
Co. H, at 10:20 AM. with 2 officers and 32 men	
Co. I, at 1:30 PM. with 3 officers and <u>44</u> men	
Co. F, at 8:00 PM. with 3 officers and 41 men	
Co. B, at 7:00 PM. with 3 officers and 66 men	
Co. E, at 4:45 PM. with 3 officers and 60 men,	
making a total of	17 officers and 270 men.

Handwritten calculations:

$$\begin{array}{r} 32 \\ 32 \\ 44 \\ 41 \\ 66 \\ 60 \\ \hline 275 \end{array}$$

Col. Tripp and I kept as close tab as possible on the time the trains were to arrive which were bringing troops, being in communication with the railroad companies as much as possible, but we were disappointed at their not arriving at a much earlier hour, and in several cases not arriving at the hour at which the railroad companies said they would arrive.

I, William Klauser, a resident of Shelbyville, in Shelby County, in the State of Illinois, do hereby certify that I am Major of the Fourth Infantry of Illinois, having served as an officer of such regiment for the last fifteen years, as well as service in the Spanish American war in the Field Artillery, as well as two years in the United States Army in the cavalry branch of the service previous to the Spanish American war; I am therefore cognizant of the duties of a field officer, either in the National Guard of the State or the United States Army.

I further certify that early on the morning of July 2nd, 1917, I was directed by the Adjutant General of the State of Illinois to proceed to East St. Louis and to report to the Mayor of said City, for the purpose of co-operating with the civil authorities in suppressing an insurrection and riot.

I further certify that I left my home station on the morning of July 2nd at 5:50, in company with Company H of the Fourth Infantry, with two officers and thirty two enlisted men reaching East St. Louis at 10:20 AM. on the morning of July 2nd, and immediately reported to Col. S.C. Tripp, representative of the Governor, my presence, who directed that I report to Col. C.P. Clayton, senior officer present, for duty.

I further certify that I also reported to Mayor Fred W. Mollman, stating that I was reporting for duty, and to co-operate with him in matters pertaining to the enforcement of the laws of the state.

I further certify that during my period on duty Col. Tripp was doing everything possible to cooperate with the Mayor and the

city authorities in attempting to preserve order, and that because of the large territory which it became necessary to cover and the great number of people taking part in the riot, and the small number of officers and enlisted men, it would have been absolutely impossible for Col. Tripp or any other living man to have done anything different than what he did. He not only assisted in cooperating with the civil authorities, but he even undertook personally to take in charge and did take in charge, the suppression of the mob which had gathered at the corner of Fourth Street and Broadway, in the City of East St. Louis, at 7:30 PM. July 2nd, 1917, where two negroes had been shot and one hung, and another was being dragged down the street by a mob, when Col. Tripp arrived and prevented the hanging of the latter, and took into custody some 350 to 500 persons who participated in the rioting, with a force of not to exceed 75 enlisted men under his direction. This was done while said Col. Tripp was working in civilian clothes and without any insignia of office or rank. In taking this mob, Col. Tripp personally arrested and forced into the hollow square formed by the troops, no less than 50 rioters who were endeavoring to break through the sides and the flanks of the organization.

I personally know from the number of telephone calls which came into me at the City Hall, where I was in charge, from Col. Tripp in various parts of the disturbing districts, where he was personally supervising the work, asking for details of men to report to him at those scenes, that he was in those districts at that time for the purpose of breaking up the mobs and restoring order.

I further certify that at all times during these disturbances, Col. Tripp not only displayed military talent, but also great courage in going into the mobs where bullets were flying and people being killed, as he did, personally directing the troops and rescuing those attacked, and that his energy and courage went far to stimulate both officers and enlisted men in carrying out their respective work, and by so doing, he enabled the organizations of the National Guard on duty in East St. Louis to take into custody large numbers of the rioters.

I also certify that during the time while the breaking up of the mobs was in progress, both during the daytime and the evening of July 2nd, Col. Tripp went into many houses as well as into the mobs and rescued many hundreds of colored people who were being attacked, and conducted them to places of safety.

I further certify that Col. Tripp gave proper instructions to the officers in charge, to be communicated to the enlisted men, as to their duty, as he saw it, in the enforcement of the laws by the military, in accordance with the wishes of the Mayor of the City of East St. Louis.

I further certify that after the fires were started in the evening, Col. Tripp gave instructions to lend every possible aid to the firemen, both officers and enlisted men, for the purpose of protecting the fire departments, their equipment and hose, and the property of the citizens of East St. Louis, which not only resulted in the safe operation of the fire departments, but also was the result of the organizations taking into custody many

persons caught in the act of committing arson.

I further certify that the criticisms on the part of certain members of the Chamber of Commerce is unwarranted, in my opinion, and the only motive for the same, in my judgment, was prompted by the fact that Col. Tripp did not acquiesce in their demands on the Governor for martial law.

(Signed) William G. Clauser

EXHIBIT B

SHERIFF'S OFFICE
St. Clair County

LOGAN P. MELLON, Sheriff

East St. Louis, July 2nd, 1917

Col. Tripp,

Dear Sir--

You will please see that the men employed in the packinghouse district are not interfered with in going to and returning from their respective places of employment and at the same time preserving law and order along St. Clair Avenue.

Yours very truly,

LOGAN P. MELLON, Sheriff

By W.E. Traubel, Dpty.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above and foregoing is
a true and correct copy of the instrument marked
Exhibit B



Notary Public

EXHIBIT C

CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS, ILLINOIS
Executive Department

Fred W. Mollman, Mayor

East St. Louis, Ill. July 2, 1917

Col. S.O. Tripp,
Asst. Adjt. General, State of Illinois

City.

Dear Sir--

This is to notify you that after conversing with Governor Frank O. Lowden that the City of East St. Louis is practically under martial law.

I hereby ~~request~~ call upon you to render all assistance in your power that is available, and take full charge of the situation.

Respectfully yours,
(Signed) FRED W. MOLLMAN
Mayor

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the instrument marked Exhibit C


Notary Public

EXHIBIT D

Co.	Time	Off.	Men	
A	2:00 AM. July 3	1-62		Capt. John Barr
B	7:00 PM. "	2	3-66	Capt. Jas. Eaton
C	2:30 AM. "	3		Capt. C. F. McClure
D	1:45 AM. "	3	2-68	1st. Lt. Geo. Cassady
E	4:45 PM. "	2	3-60	Capt. Sam Toler
F	8:00 PM. "	2	3-41	Capt. G. C. Smith
G	8:40 AM. "	2	3-27	Capt. A. H. Gravenhorst
H	10:20 AM. "	2	2-32	Capt. Vance Cortright
J	1:30 PM. "	2	3-44	Capt. Fred Easterday
L	7:30 AM. "	3	0-27	Capt. Dale Kilburn
M	3:30 AM. "	4	3-63	Capt. S. N. Cohen
THIRD INF.				
I	4:15 AM. #	3	3-110	Capt. Jas. Burns
2nd INF.				
6 companies	8:20 AM. "	4	600	Major Gerrad
5th ILL.				
Prov. Comp.	8 pm. July 3			Capt. Reynolds Capt. Porter
1st CAV				
Troop D.	8:30 PM. July 3		3-77	Capt. Styles

STATE OF ILLINOIS)
ST. CLAIR COUNTY, (ss.
CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS.)

I hereby certify, that I am Captain of the 4TH
Infantry I. N. G. stationed at Benton, Illinois.

That, I arrived at the City Hall in East St. Louis,
Illinois with forty-five men of my Company at about 8 P. M.
Monday, July 2nd, 1917.

That before I had time to formally report my
Company to the Commanding Officer, Colonel S. O. Tripp gave
me verbal orders to disperse a large mob, that was at that time
congregated on Missouri Avenue. He seemed very anxious that this
be done and ordered me to use all force necessary to attain
that object. He instructed me to use extreme measures, if
necessary. He was very busy at that time in confining some
one-hundred prisoners, that he had assisted in capturing just
previous.

Without taking time to have the men take off their
blanket rolls, I took the Company at double time to the scene
of the trouble and by using the bayonet and clubbed rifles,
we succeeded in scattering the said mob.

Dated this 6th day of July, A. D. 1917.

Oscar C. Smith

Capt. 4th Infantry I. N. G.
Commanding Company F.

Springfield, Illinois.

July 9, 1917.

I, Major H. H. Tuttle, M.C. Ills., do hereby certify that I was in East St. Louis, Illinois, from June 22 until July 6, 1917, detailed as Medical Officer, 3rd F.A. Ill., and on the scene of riot trouble all day and night of July 3, 1917, as a spectator and noted the following, to-wit:

Early morning of July 2nd, having read morning papers regarding killing of police by negroes I noted great excitement existing among all residents of city and retaliation seemed to be imminent. I was advised that troops were ordered and later met Colonel Tripp who was present to represent the State. Between nine and ten o'clock met officers of troops who had arrived. Groups were seen at various points and excitement increasing at eleven A.M. I was confident serious trouble was impending. The troops had been distributed to various localities but extent of area was so great and many new men made it difficult to make much headway. From noon on frequent volleys of shots were heard and about three o'clock fire was seen south of Broadway from tower of City Hall. An attempt was made to fire Black Valley north of City Hall in afternoon but failed. A military guard held back a hundred or more at entrance of Valley. A white woman, at some distance down the valley, was throwing bricks at windows across the street. Saw troops with fixed bayonets chase groups through alley to west of City Hall. By dusk fires near end of bridge and south of Broadway had burned low. At dusk two or three hundred men but great number of very young boys along the number started west from Collinsville Avenue along street north of City Hall yelling. About

twenty soldiers with fixed bayonets charged them rapidly and they disappeared from direction from which they came. I saw one soldier without arms and mingling with mob north of City Hall. I spoke to Colonel Clayton later regarding him and he had captured him or a man whom he supposed to be same man and who was a Missouri guardsman. By ten o'clock quiet seemed to rule and large groups were watching fire. At dusk great numbers of negro men, women and children of all ages were brought by soldiers to City Hall. Many were wounded and were dressed in office of City Clerk by Dr. J. L. Wiggins, Dr. Harney and myself. I removed a bullet from leg of one man. The number of refugees, I think would number six hundred.

I am confident with a force less than one thousand well armed and trained men it would have been impossible to cover the large area and preserve order. As it was the few men present captured and filled the city jail to overflowing.

H. H. Tuttle

Major, U.S. Ills.,

EXHIBIT B

F 4 3 - 60
B 7 3 - 66
I 12:30 3 - 44
G 8:40 37
H 11:00 32

229 8 PM.

at 7:30

G 27
H 32
B 66
I 44


169

I certify this to be correct

J. H. COADY

Capt. & Adj. 4th Ill.


I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above and foregoing
is a true and correct copy of the instrument marked
Exhibit B


Notary Public

*The Hub of the Steel Arteries
of Commerce.*

*The Great Commercial Gateway Between
the East and West.*

B



Compliments of

THOS. L. FEKETE COMPANY


REAL ESTATE, INSURANCE AND LOANS

Fekete Building, 324 Collisville Avenue

Great Commercial Gateway Between
the East and West.


EAST ST. LOUIS, ILL

ments of
THE COMPANY
ANCE AND LOANS
Collinsville Avenue



LOUIS, ILLINOIS


*The Most Advantageous Manufacturing
and Distributing Point in the U. S.*




S

*The Most Advantageous Manufacturing
and Distributing Point in the U. S.*

*Centrally Located: — An Inestimable Advan-
tage to Manufacturers and Distributors.*





**TWENTY-SEVEN LINES
OF RAILROAD**

WHAT EAS


TRANSPORTATION

Twenty-Seven Lines of Railroad *Enter East St. Louis, all connected by Belt Lines, which insures the Manufacturer Prompt Service, Lowest Freight Rates, Keen Competition, Fair Treatment.*



FUEL

285 Coal Mines *Producing 50,000,000 tons of coal annually, are located within a radius of 200 miles of East St. Louis. This is the Great Illinois Coal Field, now the largest available supply of bituminous coal in the United States. Our location with reference to this inexhaustible supply of fuel, insures to the Manufacturer Plentiful Supply of Coal at all Times. Choice of Grade and Quality. Positively the Cheapest Fuel of any*



WHAT EAST ST. LOUIS OFFERS MANUFACTURERS


WATER
 East St. Louis, all connected by Belt Lines, which insures the Manufacturer Fair Treatment.

coal annually, are located within a radius of 10 miles of East St. Louis. This is the Great Illinois Coal Field in the United States. Our location insures to the Manufacturer Plentiful Supply. Positively the Cheapest Fuel of any

WATER
 The Great Mississippi River at our door, insures to the Manufacturer a Pure and Certain Supply of filtered water. The Best Water for Boilers, Account of Non-Corroding. Also where, Furnishing Unlimited Supply at a very Small Cost.



LABOR
 One Million People Living Within a Radius of 10 Miles of East St. Louis, absolutely Solve the Important Problem of Insuring to the Manufacturer Skilled Mechanics Representing Every Line of skilled Labor at Reasonable Wages.



OFFERS MANUFACTURERS

WATER

Missouri River at our door, insures to the Manufacturer Abundant and Certain Supply of River Water, Boilers, Account of Non-Corroding. Also Deep Wells Everywhere at a very Small Cost.




LABOR

Living Within a Radius of 10 Miles of East St. Louis, Absolutely Solve the Important Problem of Labor Supply, Thus Skilled Mechanics Representing Every Line of Trade. Un-

In The Great Golden Circle *With* is and the Greatest Wealth Producing Area in the Agricultural, Mining and Industrial Activity and of the Population of the United States, Thus Ins Advantages Derived From Nearness to Center of and Market.

These and Many Other Advantages of a Subst St. Louis the Most Economic and Distributing Ce We cheerfully invite an investigation of or response or a personal inspection.

The East St. Louis Real Estate E



FACTURERS

THE SECOND LARGEST RAILWAY CENTRE IN THE WORLD

Abundant Water, Every-

In The Great Golden Circle Within a Radius of 500 Miles of East St. Louis is the Center of Population of the United States and the Greatest Wealth Producing Area in the Entire World. This is the Very Center of Agricultural, Mining and Industrial Activity and Within its Borders are contained 30,000,000 of the Population of the United States, Thus Insuring to the Manufactures the Inestimable Advantages Derived From Nearness to Center of Production. Center of Population, Supply and Market.


These and Many Other Advantages of a Substantial and Permanent Character Make East St. Louis the Most Economic and Distributing Center in the United States Today.

We cheerfully invite an investigation of our wonderful advantages and solicit correspondence or a personal inspection.

Respectfully submitted,

ouis, Abso-
ply, Thus
de. Un-

The East St. Louis Real Estate Exchange of East St. Louis, Ill.



MADISON

VENICE

BROOKLYN

NATIONAL CITY

MADISON COUNTY
ST. CLAIR COUNTY



MISSISSIPPI

LEADS BRIDGE

FIRST St. LOUIS CITY LIMITS

ORIGINAL TOWN

27 St. CLAIR
ST. CLAIR

MAP OF THE CITY
EAST ST. LOUIS, ILL.
 ST. CLAIR COUNTY.
 COPYRIGHT 1911 BY FRED GRAF, ST. LOUIS
 PUBLISHERS OF STANDARD MAPS.

N A

MADISON COUNTY
 ST. CLAIR COUNTY

STEAM RAILROAD.
 ELECTRIC STREET CAR LINES.


DOUBLES ITS POPULATION EVERY TEN YEARS.

1880	9,185	1900	29,655
------	-------	------	--------

27 Steam Railroads. 9 Electric Interurban Lines.

STREETS COLORED RED SHOW
 PAVED STREETS





N A M E O K I

Compliments of

THOS. L. EEKETE COM

REAL ESTATE, INSURANCE AND I

Eekete Building, 324 Collinsvill


CAR LINES.

YEARS.

29,655

Interurban Lines.

SHOW



A M E O K I

Compliments of


THOS. L. FEKETE COMPANY




MOUNTAIN COUNTY
ST. CLAIR COUNTY


COLLINSVILLE

REAL ESTATE, INSURANCE AND LOANS

Fekete Building, 324 Collinsville Avenue








THWEIN TRACT

LAKE

PITTSBUR



STOOKEY

PITTSBURG. 8

SIGNAL HILL.

BRIAR HILL

GRANVUE

DEWEY

BARKVIEW

GLEN ECHO HEIGHTS

MOUNT HOPE CEMETERY

MOUNT CARMEL CEMETERY

LAKE

LAKE

BLUFFS

LAKE BOULEVARD

BOULEVARD

MONT

WETCHAM

PLACE


STATS PARK

OAK PARK

R.S. SADDON

INDEPENDENCE PLACE





PITTSBURG. 8

STOOKEY

GAYVILLE

ST. CLAIR

1917
Oct. 25" filed as exhibit "B1" with
Congressional Committee appointed under
House Resolution #128 of the 65th Congress.
Attch: Allen P. Rebbage, Clerk.

Chicago, August 2, 1917.

FROM BOARD OF INQUIRY,
TO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL.
SUBJECT Report upon the Conduct of Officers and Men, I.N.G.
on Duty at East St. Louis, July 2nd, 1917; et seq.

1. The Board convened by S. O. No. 122 dated A.G.O.
Springfield, July 11th, 1917, at East St. Louis, Illinois, on the
morning of July 16th, 1917.

STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS.

2. After an inspection of the city, including the
burned district, sessions for the taking of evidence began in the
Court Room, City Hall, at 10:30 A.M. Monday, July 16th and con-
tinued with three sessions daily until 9:30 P.M. of Wednesday, the
18th. The work of digesting the evidence and drafting various
portions of the report was then distributed among the members of
the Board and the Board reconvened in Chicago on August 1st at 9:30
A.M. for further consideration of its report and conclusions, and
continued in session until August 2d at 5 P.M.

3. Seventy-eight witnesses were examined and two recalled,
making eighty depositions taken. A copy of these, together with
exhibits and statements introduced, is transmitted with this report.
The witnesses, in addition to the Officers and men of the Illinois
National Guard, included the Mayor of East St. Louis, the Chiefs of
the Police and Fire Departments, Police Commissioners, City Attorney,
the President of the Chamber of Commerce, manufacturers, merchants,
employers of labor, lawyers, doctors and other citizens prominent in

the community, including several women. The Board did not adjourn until every witness was produced and heard, who seemed to have knowledge of the facts under investigation.

4. The scope of the investigation.

The primary duty of this Board of Inquiry, as stated in Special Order No. 122, is "to inquire into and report upon the conduct of officers and men Illinois National Guard on duty at East St. Louis, Illinois, *** on the morning of July 2, 1917, and subsequent thereto", but that order also directs the Board to "investigate into and report upon the conditions giving rise to * * * or in any way affecting the situation." This report will therefore deal first with those collateral circumstances which bear indirectly upon the main inquiry.

5. East St. Louis, its location, industries and local government.

East St. Louis is a manufacturing city and covers a territory larger than its population seems to warrant. In some sections the business and factory buildings and residences are closely built up, but there are many clusters of business activity in sparsely settled sections and many of these centers are isolated not only from each other, but are remote from the City Hall. (See Map Exhibit B) There is also an unusually large area occupied by railway tracks and switch tracks passing through the city, facilitating the concealment and escape of the perpetrators of lawless acts.

The population is stated by Mayor Kollman to be about eighty-five thousand (85,000) (p. 629), of whom 14,000 or 15,000 are negroes (p. 169). There are about 300 saloons, which pay a tax of \$500.00 each. The total revenues of the city for the current year were \$375,000.00. The budget was \$450,000.00, and the Mayor reports an annual deficit of about fifty or sixty thousand dollars. This is due, in his opinion, to the deliberate under-valuation by the Board of Review in the assessment of property, real and personal, for

taxation. (p. 630) He stated also that there are some corporations, at least three, which by agreement with former administrations have been exempted from payment of city taxes. (p. 627).

No sinking fund is maintained for the retirement of bonds, but they are taken up by the proceeds of new bond issues. The financial condition of the city thus seems to be going from bad to worse and this condition reflects itself in the inadequacy of the police and fire departments.

FIRE DEPARTMENT: The City Fire Department seems to be efficient as to personnel but is lacking in equipment and apparatus. There are three (3) steam engines, only one (1) truck company, and seven (7) hose companies. There are about eighty (80) men usually employed. The city water pressure is normally sufficient to put out a small fire without a fire engine.

THE POLICE FORCE: The police force comprises thirty-six patrolmen, all told, of whom twenty-four are for day duty and twelve for night duty. (Kollman p. 9) In addition, the Police Force comprises officials - Desk Clerk, Sergeants, Chauffeurs, Janitors, and some sixteen plain clothes men (of whom ten are white and six colored), making the total force seventy in number. (p. 9) The total inadequacy of this force is attributed to the financial condition of the city above referred to, but the police force is not only inadequate in numbers but has proved itself to be inefficient and thoroughly demoralized. The Mayor testified that he had no control over his own police force. (Rec. p. 672) Its government and discipline was committed to a Board of Fire and Police Commissioners who could only be removed and appointed with the consent of the City Council. Even these commissioners were devoid of any power except to suspend an offender and order him to trial before a trial board. It is only just to say that since the conclusion of the taking of testimony by this board at East St. Louis, efforts which were then under way to reorganize the police force have re-

sulted in the appointment of a new Board of Fire and Police Commissioners and the reorganization of the police force itself, but the steps which have been taken at this late day ought to have been taken immediately after the conclusion of the riots of May 28th which will hereafter be referred to.

The police force in the riot of July 2nd did absolutely nothing to preserve and restore order and on account of the killing of two of their force on Sunday night under circumstances hereinafter more fully referred to, their sympathies were evidently with the rioters and against the colored people.

6. Causes of the disturbances.

The influx of southern negroes.

Beginning in the latter part of 1916 there was a marked increase in the number of negroes coming to East St. Louis, the heaviest influx being the first of the year 1917. (pp. 16, 18) Most of these colored men came from the south, attracted by the large demand for work at East St. Louis which negroes could do at wages beyond that which they were accustomed to receive in their southern homes, and which white men would not do. Mayor Hollman stated that during the past eight or ten months 5,000 or 6,000 negroes had come to East St. Louis, that these men did not displace white labor, that no white men were laid off because of this increase in negro labor and that there was no reduction of wages on that account. (pp. 16-18, 19)

It further appeared from the proofs that there has been no immigration of foreign labor (from Southern Europe principally) since the Bulgarian war several years ago and particularly since the present war between the Central Powers and the Entente Allies began in August 1914. The various plants claimed there was a shortage of labor in East St. Louis. Mayor Hollman said "I rather think that is true, - I think they need help." (p. 20) This is corroborated by other witnesses. (p. 224, et seq; p. 201-202)

It appeared from the testimony of other witnesses that there was no real competition between the colored and white laborers, that there was an abundance of work to be done in the slaughter houses, factories and elsewhere which white men would not do and which colored men were able and willing to do. (p. 524) There is no evidence that the influx of these negroes was prejudicial to white labor. (Rec. p. 166) It is true that they came to East St. Louis in larger numbers than could be normally and immediately absorbed in the city's activities. There is some evidence tending to show that there is some lawlessness among the negroes, - arrests having been made for the minor offenses and for "stick ups". There is no evidence tending to show that the lawless element among the negroes is large or is abnormal. The record shows no complaints or arrests for offenses other than larceny or robbery; and no complaints that white women were outraged or assaulted by colored men. (Hollman, p. 21) Upon the contrary, the evidence tends to show that the negro citizens of the community and those who have come into East St. Louis within the last six or eight months, are law abiding working people, having the usual characteristics of their race, perhaps somewhat accentuated by the fact that those coming from the south have not yet acquired some of the habits of the northern negroes. They rented homes or got boarding places and went to work in the industries located in East St. Louis. (Hollman, p. 17).

Complaints came to the Mayor that negroes were coming into East St. Louis in large numbers. These complaints came mostly from labor union officials, Committees writing on the Mayor, and asking him to prevent the further influx of negroes. The complaints were based "on account of color" and that they came in such large numbers. (Hollman, p. 23) Complaints also reached the Mayor, mostly by telephone calls from white citizens, to the effect that the negroes encroached upon or moved into residence districts occupied by white people. (p. 24)

Precedent labor troubles.

White men employed at the Aluminum Ore Company engaged in a strike which came out unsuccessfully for the strikers. All of the men with the exception of three ringleaders were restored to their positions of employment, notwithstanding the strike. The testimony tends to show that this strike and the refusal to restore the ringleaders was a source of irritation which was directly connected with the race troubles which ensued. It was testified before us that these unsuccessful ringleaders spread the idea that the influx of negroes was harmful to white labor and that the negroes were taking the bread out of the white mens' mouths. It was also testified to by reputable and credible witnesses (Rec. p. 522 et seq.) that at least two of the ringleaders above referred to were active participants in the race riots.

Riot of May 28th.

After the strike at the Aluminum Ore Company above referred to and after the complaints made to the Mayor that too many negroes were coming to East St. Louis, and were encroaching in the white residential districts, the white element began to take the law into their own hands. They attempted to make the climate of East St. Louis unhealthy for colored men and to drive them out of the white residence portions into which they had attempted to settle. The events of this riot are outside of the purview of our investigation except so far as they cast light on the riot of July 2nd. The National Guard was called out and order was promptly restored, but all intelligent men in East St. Louis knew that the cause of trouble had not been removed and that a recurrence of the disorder was to be expected, yet nothing whatever was done by the police department or by the city authorities after May 28th to strengthen the city's protective forces in anticipation of the expected outbreak. The blame for this lack of foresight is not to be confined to the city govern-

ment. The citizens themselves took no steps before the riot of July 2nd to cure the evils which caused the first riots or to prevent its inevitable recurrence. After the second riot the citizenship of East St. Louis began to take effective measures for the reorganization of their government which now promises to improve conditions there.

7. White men were the aggressors.

The acts of aggression on the part of white men date back to a time prior to the riots of May 28th, and were continued after that date. The testimony tells of numerous instances where black men, returning from their work, were hooted, pursued, stoned and beaten by white men. No arrests of such white men were made. (Rec. p. 159) There is no evidence of any such acts on the part of colored men against white laborers. On Sunday evening July 1st, at about 7 o'clock a negro was chased by white men from the neighborhood of the Free Bridge. He was pretty badly beaten up. (Rec. p. 156) The evidence shows that there were many disturbances in this location, so much so that the negroes had previously gone to the Mayor with the complaint that there was a bad nest of white fellows along Bond Avenue close to the Free Bridge and that ever since the riot of May 28th colored men who came over that bridge were abused, hooted, and chased. (Rec. p. 26) There is also reference in the testimony of witnesses to the presence of a small automobile with four occupants who rode through the colored district Sunday evening, firing into the houses of the negroes, but none of the witnesses could identify the car or name the occupants. This circumstance, however, was given as the excuse for the assemblage of armed negroes which occurred at midnight of July 1st and which is hereafter discussed more fully.

8. Organized reprisal on the part of colored men.

Feared evidence was presented to us to the effect that a

negro who had served with the colored troops in the Spanish-American war had been offered a considerable sum of money to organize and drill the negroes of East St. Louis, but that he declined so to act. Statements were also made that the negroes had accumulated large supplies of arms and ammunition. That these reports were in part founded on fact is evident from the mere circumstance that at midnight of July 1st after the chasing of the negro at the Free Bridge above referred to, a bell was rung in a negro church and several hundred negroes did actually meet, formed themselves into an organized body and marched down Bond Avenue toward the direction of what they had previously denounced to the Mayor as "a bad nest of white fellows close to the Free Bridge". (Rec. p. 26) These colored men were armed. Shortly after midnight, between Sunday and Monday, July 1st and 2nd, the Mayor and the police were separately notified by telephone that there was an uprising of negroes; that an armed body of negroes were proceeding down Bond Avenue and that there was shooting. The police automobile, occupied by the chauffeur, four policemen, two of them being police sergeants in plain clothes, and accompanied by a police reporter on duty at the police station, who jumped on the running board of the machine - proceeded up Bond Avenue toward the marching negroes. The police ordered the negroes to disperse and go to their homes, but the negroes fired on the machine, riddling it with bullets, killing Sergeant Cottinger outright, mortally wounding Second Sergeant Madley, and wounding the other two policemen in the car. The car returned to the police station.

The Mayor and the Chief of Police having arrived at the police station and learning of these facts, proceeded to 19th Street where several companies of the Sixth Illinois Infantry were on duty and asked the commanding officer to get his troops to patrol the district from Division to Tenth, on Broadway, and from Tenth to the Free Bridge. These troops, however, were in the Federal service and on duty under orders of Major General Harvey, Central Department U. S. A. Returning

to the police station, the Mayor learned by telephone at about 1:30 A.M. that two police detectives, colored men in plain clothes, had reported from their districts that "the negroes were all off the street and had retired", and that there was no further trouble at that time. (Rec. p. 12) These reports turned out to be correct - the riot was over for the night, (p. 13) and the troops of the 6th Infantry were therefore not put on duty that night.

The Mayor, however, was apprehensive of the situation - fearing trouble might occur the next day when the shooting of the white police officers by the negroes became known.

"I feared that there would be trouble the next day and that our inadequate police department would not cope with the situation." (Holliman, p. 15)

The Mayor then called upon the Governor for troops. Troops were ordered out.

9. The demand for martial law.

Many of the witnesses who appeared before us emphasized the fact that they had demanded that the Mayor call upon the Governor for the proclamation of martial law. These witnesses when asked as to what they meant by "martial law" as distinguished from the presence of a sufficient number of soldiers to restore and preserve order, confessed that they did not know what martial law meant in the legal sense of the word, but that they had an idea that the time had come when soldiers ought to act, not in subordination of the local authorities but as a superior force. Of course it is sufficient in this connection to call attention to the provision of our constitution which provides that "The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power", and to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in *Ex Parte Milligan*, 4 Wallace 2, cited with approval by our own Supreme Court in *Johnson v. Jones*, 44 Ill. 142, 157, which lays down the doctrine that "martial law can never exist where the courts are open and in the free and uninterrupted exercise of their

jurisdiction". The declaration of martial law would not only have been in conflict with the principles laid down by the foregoing decision of the highest court of the land, but would have entailed many other consequences unforeseen by those who insisted upon the demands.

This brings us to the primary subject of our inquiry.

THE SCIENCE OF THE TROOPS.

10. Time of arrival and numerical strength.

Immediately upon the call for troops made by Mayor Hollman, orders were telegraphed and telephoned by the Adjutant General to the commanding officers of all the available companies of the 4th Regiment and certain companies of the 3rd Regiment to proceed to East St. Louis at once for the protection of life and property and the preservation of order. Subsequently companies of the 5th and 2nd Regiments were ordered out.

The troops arrived in East St. Louis at the hours and in the strength indicated by the following table:

	Co.	Reg.	Time of Arrival.	Date.	Officers.	Men.
1.	G	4th	8:40 A.M.	July 2	3	27
2.	H	4th	10:20 A.M.	July 2	2	32
3.	I	4th	12:50 P.M.	July 2	3	44
4.	E	4th	4:00 P.M.	July 2	3	60
5.	B	4th	4:00 P.M.	July 2	3	66
6.	F	4th	8:00 P.M.	July 2	3	41
7.	D	4th	1:45 A.M.	July 3	2	68
8.	A	4th	2:00 A.M.	July 3	1	62
9.	C	4th	2:30 A.M.	July 3	3	50
10.	L	3rd	4:15 A.M.	July 3	3	110
11.	L	4th	7:30 A.M.	July 3	-	27
12.	Prov. Co.	5th	8:00 P.M.	July 3	3	100
13.	C 1st Cav.		8:30 P.M.	July 3	3	77
14.	M	4th	3:30 A.M.	July 4	3	63
15.	6 Co.	2nd	8:30 A.M.	July 4		600?
16.	F	3rd	3:00 A.M.	July 3	2	54

Colonel S. O. Tripp of the Quartermaster General's Department I.N.G. was sent to East St. Louis by the Adjutant General as the personal representative of the Governor and reported to the civil authorities

early Monday morning. Prior to the arrival of any troops, Lieut. Col. Elijah Clayton of the 4th Illinois Infantry, who happened to be in St. Louis, on reading the newspaper accounts of the killing of policemen in East St. Louis by a mob of negroes, went to East St. Louis and placed himself under the orders of Colonel Tripp.

During the forenoon of Monday the number of troops available was absolutely inadequate to handle the situation. As new accessions to the force came, conditions improved in this respect, but in the meantime the disorder had spread to such an extent that as each unit appeared it had to be divided up and sent to different and often widely distant posts. It was not possible at first to maintain any adequate reserve. New accessions had to be relied on for that purpose and they were immediately drawn upon in numerous small detachments.

In the light of present knowledge it can now be seen that it would have been better if the available forces had not been so widely dispersed. From a purely military point of view the employment of infantry on riot duty posted as disconnected sentinels separated from one another by distances which prevent immediate concentration of a cohesive fighting force or leave the individual soldier or group without communication or adequate leadership, is undesirable. In this case, however, the situation was peculiar. From widely distant points appeals came to the officers in charge to send men to save the lives of colored men who were being beaten by mobs. Such calls could hardly be denied, particularly in view of the fact that the expected arrival of new troops promised to cure the evils of this dissipation of forces. Later on the disposition of troops in this respect was admirable. Men were used as they should be in units large enough to form a fighting force. They were sent out on motor trucks and other means of conveyance, reaching points of disturbance promptly and in a condition which enabled them quickly to dominate the situation.

11. Length of service and experience.

Of the troops which reported for duty as shown in the foregoing table, only a small proportion were of those who had seen duty on the border in the recent border trouble. The greater part of the men who reported for duty were without any considerable military experience. The proportion of experienced and inexperienced men is shown in the following table:

"Roster of Troops reporting for duty in East St. Louis during the recent riot, showing men with Border Service; men with over two months service, and men with less than two months service.

	Enlisted Strength.	Border Service.	2 Mos. Service.	No Service
Non Com Staff and Supply Co 4th Ill. Inf.	5	4		1
Co. A, 4th Ill.	63	17	36	10
Co. B, 4th Ill.	73	24	20	29
Co. C, " "	61	25	14	22
Co. D, " "	71	20	13	28
Co. E, " "	79	19	30	30
Co. F, " "	49	22		27
Co. G, " "	41	8	18	15
Co. H, " "	55	26	6	23
Co. I, " "	45	29		14
Co. J, " "	62	18	16	28
Co. K, 3rd Ill.	56	30	11	15
Co. L, " "	128	42	69	17
Troop D, 1st Cav.	85	50	35	
San Exp. 2nd Ill.	15	5	4	6
Sup. Co. " "	16	5		11
Co. B, " "	92	43	37	12
Co. G, " "	109	26	46	37
Co. I, " "	71	26	9	36
Co. K, " "	90	37	34	19
Co. L, " "	71	24	31	16
Co. M, " "	74	46	19	9
Sgt. Maj. & Trumpeter,	2	2		
Totals	1211	558	448	405

Co. I, 4th Ill. Inf. reported with 24 men, submitted no report, and have now returned to their home station."

12. CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF THE TROOPS.

It has been charged that some of the troops present on duty Monday July 2nd took sides with the mobs against the colored men; that they did not adopt energetic measures for the dispersal of the white

rioters; that they permitted colored men in some instances to be beaten and killed in their presence without an effort to protect them and some have gone so far as to charge that white soldiers joined with the crowd in shooting colored men. All the witnesses, however, agreed that on and after Tuesday July 3rd the conduct of all the troops on duty was excellent, that their duty was efficiently performed and that the situation was well in hand.

The testimony of reputable citizens of East St. Louis establishes beyond doubt that colored men were beaten and killed in the presence of men wearing the uniform of soldiers and armed with rifle and bayonet, but none of the witnesses were able either to identify such soldiers or to state the company or regiment to which they belonged. In its examination of the commissioned and non-commissioned officers of each company on duty, this board exhausted every endeavor to determine the identity of these men, but it became evident beyond doubt that none of these offenses were committed in the presence of officers. It is by no means certain that these men were members of the regiments on duty at East St. Louis on Monday July 2nd. Not a few men dressed in khaki were present as spectators and were not on duty or subject to military command. This is particularly true of one instance in which a witness described two soldiers on horseback who saw colored men beaten and killed without making any effort to protect them. There were no mounted men on duty at East St. Louis on that date in any of the companies of the 3rd and 4th regiments. The testimony, however, does convince us that during the early part of Monday there were instances in which men on duty made no adequate effort to disperse the mob and protect life and property. The conduct of such men cannot be too severely reprobated and the board regrets that none of the witnesses were able to identify these men so that they might be adequately punished and the stigma of their

blame might be removed from the general body of the troops and put where it belongs upon the offending persons.

There are instances where colored men were killed in the presence of soldiers who were on duty, but where it is clear that nothing which the soldiers could have done would have saved the lives of those colored men. In one instance a colored man was taken away from the mob and a commissioned officer with drawn revolver was escorting him towards safety, surrounded by a tumultuous mob of threatening whites, a man from this mob behind the party, shot the colored man through the head and killed him instantly. The officer turned immediately to find the offender, but was unable to ascertain who in the dense mob surrounding him, fired the shot. (Rec. p. 347)

So far as the charge is concerned that white soldiers joined with the crowd in shooting colored men, we find this accusation totally unsupported by any proof. Only two colored men of the many who were received at the hospitals and morgues showed wounds characteristic of the projectile of the Springfield rifle. These two men were shot by the troops who returned the fire of a group of colored men who had opened fire on the troops undoubtedly in the belief that the soldiers were a part of the mob of white men who were setting fire to their houses and attempting to shoot them down as they emerged from their burning buildings.

The troops came provided with, or were promptly supplied on arrival, with sufficient ammunition, but with the single exception above referred to, no ammunition was expended or needed, and every company had more than it had occasion to use.

Only one witness testified that soldiers were disarmed by the mob. (Rec. p. 557 and see also p. 558) We made a particularly careful examination into the truth or falsity of this charge and found that it was not supported by the testimony of any other witness, and denied by all the officers who were examined on that point.

It has also been charged that the troops and their officers were to blame in not opening fire upon the crowds. We believe that in this respect the accusations were utterly unfounded. If the troops had opened fire, an infinitely worse condition of affairs would undoubtedly have been precipitated. These crowds were full of on-lookers, the streets were crowded with persons who were innocent of any evil intent. Even women and children were indistinguishably intermingled with the lawless elements, innocent persons would have been inevitably killed. If the troops had been soldiers of more experience, had been better acquainted with the possibilities of the bayonet and the butt, and had arrived in greater numbers, vigorous use of the rifle without the use of ammunition would have resulted in the prompt dispersal of the crowds and could have prevented much of the disorder which ended with the burning of buildings on Monday night. It is but just, however, to say that on the whole the troops employed at East St. Louis discharged the duty according to the best of their knowledge and ability. There were numerous instances in which these soldiers (many of them untrained) resolutely faced mobs which outnumbered them one hundred to one, took colored men away from these mobs, rescued them from burning buildings, went unhesitatingly into the face of fire from blacks and whites alike and carried the colored people to places of security. In all, hundreds of colored men, women and children were rescued by the troops from their burning houses, marched to the city hall or loaded on automobile trucks and escorted to places of safety across the river.

The conduct of the troops, taking into account their numbers and their lack of experience, was excellent. They displayed courage and energy. Many of them have been recommended by the reports of their commanding officers for individual gallantry and devotion to duty.

Credit must be given to Company B under command of Captain Eaton who under the orders of Colonel Trigg and with his active participation surrounded, arrested and marched to the city jail a mob of from 300 to 400 rioters who had hanged one colored man to a lamp post and were dragging another colored man with the intention of hanging him also. These men were dealt with very gently by the civil and judicial authorities of East St. Louis. Many of the members of this unlawful assemblage claimed to be mere lookers-on, and were discharged for want of evidence of participation. Even those who were identified as having hold of the rope by which the negro was being dragged were admitted to absurdly inadequate bail.

This arrest broke the backbone of the disorder and proved to be the turning point of the riots. From that time on the streets were kept clear of unlawful and riotous assemblages and there was no further trouble except that which developed on Monday night when houses in the colored districts were set fire to, under cover of darkness. The troops responded promptly and ably to the protection of the firemen. They dispersed the mobs and rescued colored men, women and children from the burning districts, and after these fires were quenched there were no further disorders.

15. The character of the rioters.

The testimony of all the witnesses agrees that the actual rioting was done not by the working men of East St. Louis but that the rioters were boys and young men; that by far the larger part of the men engaged in the riots were strangers to the witnesses and were not recognized as even residents of East St. Louis. There were, however, numbers of working men in the riotous assemblages.

(Rec. p. 163) We quote from the testimony of one witness whose phraseology is interesting and significant:

"We have got an element here which absolutely will not work - a big element here that won't work anywheres. That is a settled fact. They get a living, I don't know how. There is a big bunch of them fellows around here that won't work. They give them the name around here of 'Bar Flies', - fellows standing around saloons, looking for a drink at the expense of somebody else." (Rec. p. 525)

This element appears to have been engaged in the riots and disorders and there must have been a large infusion of men from other communities. (p. 172)

We have felt justified in delaying this report until we could re-read all the testimony taken at East St. Louis and fully discuss and confer concerning the matters referred to us for investigation by special order 122. We have come to unanimous accord in the findings of fact and conclusions expressed in the foregoing which we respectfully submit as our report.

(Signed) Henry R. Hill

Brig. Genl. 2nd Brigade.

(Signed) Taylor E. Brown

Col. Reserve.

(Signed) Hilton J. Foreman

Col. 2nd E.A.


(Signed) Edgar B. Tolman

Major Reserve. (Acting Recorder)

(Signed) R. H. Abbott

Major E.M.C.

I certify on honor this is a true and correct copy of report of the Board of Inquiry, wanted by the Governor of Illinois, on investigation and report upon the conduct of the officers and men, I. M. C. on duty at East St. Louis, Illinois, July 2nd, 1917, et seq.


The Adjutant General,
Chief of Staff.