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OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
UNITED STATES

CAPTION: WARDS COVE PACKING COMPANY, INC., ET AL.,
Petitioners V. FPANK ATONIO, ET AL.

CASE NO: 87-1387

PLACE: WASHINGTON, D.C.

DATE: January 18, 1989

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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WARDS COVE PACKING COMPANY, :
INC., ET AL., :
Petitioners :
v. :
FRANK ATONIC, ET AL. :
-----x

No. 87-1387

Washington, D.C.
Wednesday, January 18, 1989

The above-entitled matter came on for oral
argument before the Supreme Court of the United States
at 1:58 o'clock p.m.

APPEARANCES:
DOUGLAS M. FRYER, ESQ., Seattle Washington.
ABRAHAM A. ARDITI, ESQ., Seattle, Washington.

C O N T E N T S

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ORAL ARGUMENT OF:

PAGE

DOUGLAS M. FRYER, ESQ.

On behalf of the Petitioners

3

ABRAHAM A. ARDITI, ESQ.

On behalf of the Respondent

24

REBUTIAL ARGUMENT OF:

DOUGLAS M. FRYER, ESQ.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (1:58 p.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: We will hear
4 argument next in Number 87-1387, Wards Cove Packing
5 Company v. Frank Atonio.

6 Mr. Fryer, you may proceed whenever you are
7 ready.

8 ORAL ARGUMENT OF DOUGLAS M. FRYER

9 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

10 MR. FRYER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, may
11 it please the Court:

12 This Court has granted certiorari to review
13 three important questions.

14 I would like to discuss the questions in the
15 order presented in the petition.

16 The first question really goes to the heart of
17 this case. And that is, whether comparative statistics,
18 which show only a racial imbalance in the work force are
19 to be preferred as a matter of law, over the trial court
20 findings of fact as to the relevant labor market. There
21 is a stark contrast between these two measurements.

22 Petitioner's labor market analysis is widely
23 used in civil rights litigation and it has been backed
24 by every level of the federal judiciary, including this
25 Court. It is explicitly adopted by the very

1 EEOC guidelines which are relied upon by the Respondents
2 in their brief.

3 Indeed, it is ironic that in order to prevail
4 in this case, the Respondents, and the amicus supporting
5 them, are urging this Court, to urge as a matter of law
6 that one of the most formidable tools that we have to
7 measure employment discrimination, namely the labor
8 market analysis, is to be discarded.

9 QUESTION: You say, Mr. Fryer, that your labor
10 market analysis is approved by the EEOC. Can you give
11 us a couple of sentence description as to what your
12 labor market analysis is?

13 MR. FRYER: The labor market analysis was
14 based upon the one percent sample from the Census. It
15 was drawn from the large geographic areas, where the
16 employees were drawn from -- from the western United
17 States, in the areas that supplied people for this
18 industry -- Alaska, Oregon, Washington, and California.

19 QUESTION: Well, Mr. Fryer, I gather the
20 district court relied on your expert's suggestion of
21 just using Census data for a very wide area of the
22 Pacific Northwest --

23 MR. FRYER: That is correct.

24 QUESTION: -- as the relevant labor market?

25 MR. FRYER: That is correct.

1 QUESTION: Now, the Ninth Circuit rejected
2 that and relied upon the pool of workers -- the cannery
3 workers themselves -- and a more restricted pool and
4 said that was determinative, is that correct?

5 MR. FRYER: That is correct.

6 QUESTION: They just looked at the labor force.

7 MR. FRYER: The internal work force, yes.

8 QUESTION: The internal labor force of the
9 cannery workers.

10 MR. FRYER: The internal labor force,
11 including the cannery workers.

12 QUESTION: Including the cannery workers.

13 MR. FRYER: Yes.

14 QUESTION: Now, if we were to reject the Ninth
15 Circuit's view of the appropriate pool, we then go back
16 to what the district court found?

17 MR. FRYER: That is correct, Your Honor.

18 QUESTION: And even your expert said that the
19 figure should not include college professors and
20 construction workers and other groups which are not
21 reasonably available for the jobs at issue. And yet,
22 the district court accepted that Census data, even
23 though your own expert said some of these groups
24 shouldn't be included.

25 So what do we do with that? What if we

1 think the district court erred, too?

2 MR. FRYER: Well, first that is a finding of
3 fact. It has never been challenged. It is clearly
4 erroneous.

5 QUESTION: So, we just accept it?

6 MR. FRYER: I think the Court should just
7 accept it. And a person could, if they wished, get into
8 the nuances, the evidentiary nuances as to why or why
9 not some of this labor market analysis might or might
10 not apply in a given situation.

11 But you see, with the broad numbers, and the
12 various methods that Dr. Rees took into consideration --
13 It really doesn't make any difference and those are
14 credibility arguments. The attacks on the statistics
15 are credibility arguments. The Respondents did not
16 challenge those findings under the clearly erroneous
17 standard. They challenged those findings as a matter of
18 law.

19 And --

20 QUESTION: And, and the Ninth Circuit said, as
21 a matter of law, the relevant pool is all the workers?

22 MR. FRYER: Yes, that is correct.

23 QUESTION: And nothing outside?

24 MR. FRYER: And nothing else.

25 QUESTION: You would take the labor force

1 anddo what with it? You would compare what?

2 MR. FRYER: We would compare the employer's
3 hiring practices against that measure of racial
4 composition.

5 QUESTION: And you would compare how many
6 minorities were hired -- compare that with how many
7 minorities there were in the labor force?

8 MR. FRYER: That is correct, Your Honor.

9 QUESTION: I mean not in the labor force, the
10 market.

11 MR. FRYER: The labor market.

12 QUESTION: The labor market.

13 MR. FRYER: Yes. The discrete finding of fact
14 is finding of fact number 123, of the trial court.

15 QUESTION: What would you do -- would you take
16 the cannery and non-cannery workers together to compare
17 with the labor force -- market statistics, or would you
18 do them separately?

19 MR. FRYER: Well, you do them separately but
20 you do them separately for a distinctive reason and that
21 is the cannery workers are a part of this labor force,
22 this labor supply for the entire industry. And I think
23 that is one of the ways the Ninth Circuit seemed to get
24 off track here.

25 You have to look at the labor supply as

1 awhole. Now, there is a very small slice of that labor
2 supply that is represented by Local 37 of the ILWU.
3 That is the union that has the contract for jurisdiction
4 over particular jobs.

5 Now, now the way this industry operates -- you
6 have to understand the way the industry operates to
7 understand the statistics. I think the error of the
8 Ninth Circuit was a misunderstanding of the industry
9 which the trial court apparently understood very well.

10 Now, the way that people are hired in this
11 industry, first you have to start with the basics. The
12 canneries are located in remote areas of Alaska, that is
13 a given fact. The seasons are short. They are very
14 intense. There is no time during the season to train
15 skilled people. Once that cannery is in operation and
16 the fish are coming in, the fish have got to be canned.

17 That season is over in from three weeks to two
18 months. As soon as the canning stops, the cannery
19 workers go home, the rest of the workers put the cannery
20 away and then everybody is terminated and they return to
21 their homes.

22 Now, over the winter months, the employer
23 faced with this industrial situation has determined that
24 since he doesn't have time during the season to train
25 people for the skilled jobs, he has got to look to

1 a labor market for those jobs.

2 - And it is a given fact that he has to deal
3 with that that labor market is 10 percent non-white and
4 90 percent white. That is --

5 QUESTION: That is if you say the relevant
6 market is the whole Pacific Northwest and you rely on
7 Census data. This is a disparate impact case, right?

8 MR. FRYER: That is correct.

9 QUESTION: Now, in such a case, do you think
10 that the use of a particular hiring channel or market
11 can be a facially neutral practice that is subject to
12 disparate impact analysis?

13 Suppose there is an employer who has the
14 factory, in let's say the Harlem section of New York,
15 and that employer chooses to do all of his hiring out in
16 Westchester County, and the result is largely a white
17 work force.

18 Now, is that a practice subject to disparate
19 impact analysis?

20 MR. FRYER: Well, it certainly could be
21 subject to disparate treatment analysis.

22 QUESTION: That is not my question.

23 MR. FRYER: Yes --

24 QUESTION: And if so, what does the Court do?
25 Is the Court's first task to draw an ideal market out

1 of which the employer must draw the work force as a means
2 of testing it; is that the first step?

3 MR. FRYER: Well, perhaps, perhaps I could
4 answer it this way -- for disparate impact we have got
5 to have some -- disparate impact analysis is
6 statistical. It has got to be statistical on some basis.

7 So, we have to look to some objective measure
8 to judge the employer's practice. And then the question
9 is what is that measure?

10 Our case is not a situation where we look to a
11 discrete area dominated by whites. That is not the
12 situation. We look to broad areas in the western United
13 States.

14 QUESTION: Well, what does the plaintiff have
15 to do and how does the Court get into it on a disparate
16 impact analysis; that is what we have. What does the
17 plaintiff have to show for the market?

18 MR. FRYER: The plaintiff has to develop some
19 measure of the employment practices, obviously.

20 QUESTION: This Plaintiff says, we want to
21 look just at the in-house work force.

22 MR. FRYER: At the internal work force, yes.
23 And our position is that that is not really relevant.
24 That the internal work force is only a small measure of
25 this overall labor market. You see, it takes months

1 tofill the at-issue jobs.

2 QUESTION: The what jobs?

3 MR. FRYER: The at-issue jobs.

4 QUESTION: The ones that issue in this lawsuit?

5 MR. FRYER: The ones that issue in this
6 lawsuit -- it takes months to draw these people in.

7 When those jobs are filled --

8 QUESTION: Are you talking now about the
9 cannery workers or about the non --

10 MR. FRYER: No, the non-cannery workers, Your
11 Honor. Those jobs are all filled by early spring.
12 After those jobs are filled and after those people are
13 sent to Alaska to open up the canneries, then Local 37
14 which has a contract, is contacted to supply cannery
15 workers.

16 QUESTION: Was there a claim in this case,
17 that people who were cannery workers should have been
18 promoted to the non-cannery jobs?

19 MR. FRYER: That was a contention early on in
20 the case period, yes, it was.

21 QUESTION: So far as you know, does the
22 respondent still take that position?

23 MR. FRYER: I think it is implicit in their
24 position, yes, that -- I think it has got to be implicit
25 in their position that the employer should have

1 trained people in the cannery worker position to take
2 other jobs and should have promoted --

3 QUESTION: And what was your position in
4 response to that?

5 MR. FRYER: First of all, the employer did not
6 promote from within as a matter of practice, because of
7 these industrial circumstances there was just no time to
8 train people. And because of the lack of training, when
9 you needed the ability to train, when you needed
10 somebody you had to go to this outside labor market.

11 Those are the facts of our case and that was
12 our response. You see it's not --

13 QUESTION: Was there a finding of fact to
14 support you in this?

15 MR. FRYER: Yes, there is, Your Honor.

16 QUESTION: Or was this a contested issue?

17 MR. FRYER: This was a contested issue and it
18 is in the findings and it is in the 80 to 90 series some
19 place, I believe. There is a whole series of findings
20 on hiring practices, that is one of them.

21 QUESTION: Is this anything more than a hiring
22 case? I mean there are other allegations here, having
23 to do with housing and the feeding arrangements and
24 nepotism, and one thing and another.

25 Suppose that we were to determine -- I

1 meanjust make that assumption -- that no prima facie
2 case was made out here as to the hiring claims. Are
3 there still other claims on which a remand is
4 appropriate?

5 MR. FRYER: I don't think so. The --

6 QUESTION: Status claims? I mean, is it
7 possible that housing people in the fashion that was
8 done here could amount to a status claim under Title VII
9 -- treating minorities worse than non-minorities in
10 housing and in food?

11 MR. FRYER: Those claims were dismissed under
12 the treatment analysis and that dismissal was affirmed
13 so that the --

14 QUESTION: Yes, but this is now a disparate
15 impact case, and I, I gather from the briefs that the
16 respondents say somehow that if you are right that there
17 was no discriminatory treatment, that the assignment
18 according to neutral principles, nevertheless has a
19 discriminatory impact. It treats them worse, because
20 they are minorities.

21 MR. FRYER: Well, I, I think that the argument
22 is yes, yes, that there is impact. But it is brought up
23 in the context of how those practices may affect the
24 hiring and that is the way that the court of appeals --

25 QUESTION: And you think that is all -- that

1 there is nothing left, in and of itself, on these
2 other claims?

3 MR. FRYER: That is the way that the court of
4 appeals appeared to address it in its last opinion. It
5 said that --

6 QUESTION: Did the respondents ever press
7 those claims as status claims, employee status claims,
8 independent of hiring?

9 MR. FRYER: They did press them as status
10 claims and the district court analyzed those claims
11 under the disparate impact model as well as the
12 treatment model and it found business necessity for the
13 housing; it also found that the messing claims were a
14 matter of individual taste.

15 The key on messing is the evidence that an
16 employee could opt into another mess hall if he so
17 chose. So the district court disposed of them that way
18 and the way the court of appeals appears to have dealt
19 with it on the third opinion is to direct the party's
20 attention to those allegations as they may have affected
21 hiring.

22 The court of appeals talks about how the
23 minorities may have been deprived of the web of
24 information but there was no evidence on that. The
25 specific finding of fact of the trial court expressly

1 states that there was no deterrence to minorities,
2 Intèrms. of applying for any job.

3 And, of course, that is one of the critical
4 findings of fact of the trial court that really goes to
5 all of these allegations. The trial court made findings
6 that there was no deterrence; that each employee was
7 free, at any time, to apply for any job he wished; that
8 the employees were evaluated on the basis of job-related
9 criteria.

10 QUESTION: Were any of these findings set
11 aside by the Ninth Circuit as clearly erroneous?

12 MR. FRYER: No, they were not, Your Honor, and
13 none challenged as such. Now, the challenges were made
14 by the Respondents as to the findings being incorrect,
15 as a matter of law, but they were not challenged and not
16 held to be clearly erroneous.

17 QUESTION: But would you correct me on thing?
18 This is a hard case to keep all the facts in mind, and I
19 read the briefs a little while ago, so that I am a
20 little rusty.

21 MR. FRYER: Yes.

22 QUESTION: But I recall that the error the
23 district court made, the basic error of law, was that it
24 thought that disparate impact analysis did not apply to
25 subjective employment decisions, subjective employment

1 hiring practices?

2 MR. FRYER: That is correct.

3 QUESTION: And it was wrong in that regard?

4 MR. FRYER: It was.

5 QUESTION: And are you saying -- and
6 therefore, the court of appeals said go back and take
7 another look at it.

8 And you are saying that even without that
9 basic error, the findings are adequate to make it
10 perfectly clear that there is no prima facie case?

11 MR. FRYER: Yes, I agree. I think so.

12 I think that --

13 QUESTION: That that finding was not an
14 essential part of the district court's analysis, it was
15 just kind of thrown in as an alternative ground of
16 decision?

17 I am a little puzzled by how that could work.

18 MR. FRYER: Well, the error of the district
19 court was as to the legal theory on how to deal with the
20 findings.

21 QUESTION: Right.

22 MR. FRYER: Our position is that once you have
23 got those findings in place, as to the statistical
24 results of hiring practices, once those findings are
25 made, it simply doesn't make any difference if you

1 change legal theory.

2 QUESTION: Did you argue to the court of
3 appeals that there is no need to review the legal
4 question of whether the -- you know, the subjective
5 aspect of the case?

6 MR. FRYER: We did.

7 QUESTION: You did? I see. But the court of
8 appeals disagreed with you on that then? They thought
9 that you ought to have, you know, needed a further
10 hearing in view of the rather different change in the
11 view of the law.

12 MR. FRYER: They did not really seem to direct

13 --

14 QUESTION: Well, Judge -- as I remember Judge
15 Sneed wrote a separate opinion.

16 MR. FRYER: Yes.

17 QUESTION: Which he said as to some issues, he
18 thought you were dead right and other issues you
19 weren't, but you say he was even wrong on those where he
20 thought there was a trial?

21 MR. FRYER: We do. Our position is that if
22 you accepted the trial court's findings, and they are
23 really not challenged, once those findings are accepted,
24 it simply does not make any difference if you change
25 legal theories to go to an impact analysis.

1 QUESTION: Well, your theory, as I
2 understand it, is that the district court accepted as the
3 relevant labor market this wide geographic area and the
4 Census data showing 10 percent minority population.

5 MR. FRYER: Yes.

6 QUESTION: And in the Jobs at Issue, the
7 employer hires 24 percent minority workers, is that
8 right?

9 MR. FRYER: That is right.

10 QUESTION: So you say, gee, we are way over
11 the numbers and the population so that you lose, as a
12 prima facie case on disparate impact. Is that --

13 QUESTION: Yes, but then they say that there
14 are three job categories so that it works the other way
15 even your own figures, as I remember.

16 MR. FRYER: Well, they do. But, you see, all
17 of those three job categories show is a standard
18 deviation of more than two and less than three which is
19 about what you would expect if you pick out about 60 job
20 classifications. You see, you figure that one in 20
21 times, purely by chance, you are going to have the two
22 standard deviations.

23 Now, secondly, two standard deviations is not
24 equal to discrimination. All it infers, all it supports
25 for an inference, is that something did not happen by

1 chance. And you see there was other evidence that
2 the district court could consider that these things did
3 not happen by chance.

4 QUESTION: See, the thing that troubles me
5 frankly, is that you are asking us to make an even more
6 detailed, factual view of the district court's findings
7 and the evidence, than any judge on the court of appeals
8 was willing to make, even though they heard the case en
9 banc.

10 No judge on the Court of Appeals bought your
11 theory, and there were a lot of them heard the case.

12 MR. FRYER: Well, that is true.

13 QUESTION: You may be dead right. I mean
14 there is just kind of a little inertia that kind of
15 troubles me in a case with this big a record, and this
16 many issues.

17 MR. FRYER: Sure. We are willing to take on
18 the inertia. I think the -- I think the court of
19 appeals, the last time around, was so focused on the
20 legal theory of the subjective employment analysis being
21 tested under the disparate impact model, that they
22 really didn't address the facts that well.

23 And if --

24 QUESTION: Well, if you are saying it is a
25 matter of law, the court of appeals erred in finding --

1 in saying that it must look just to the labor force.

2 MR. FRYER: Absolutely. That is a flat out
3 error and --

4 QUESTION: They may be making an error, but
5 you also may be making an error in what you should start
6 off with. And are there only two choices -- labor force
7 or labor market?

8 MR. FRYER: There are not only two choices,
9 but these were the only choices posed to the trial court
10 and you have to --

11 QUESTION: But aren't you also saying that the
12 court of appeals erred as a matter of law in what the
13 employer must do?

14 MR. FRYER: Yes, yes.

15 QUESTION: That they shifted the burden of
16 proof incorrectly?

17 MR. FRYER: Yes, Your Honor.

18 QUESTION: Those are two legal issues, at
19 least here, I think.

20 MR. FRYER: Absolutely.

21 QUESTION: Can you describe in a couple of
22 senses the difference, as you see it, between labor
23 force and labor market?

24 MR. FRYER: Labor force are those hired. The
25 labor market are the people available for hiring.

1 QUESTION: And one of the arguments between
2 you is what labor market you should look to, to compare
3 the labor market with the labor force, is that fair?

4 MR. FRYER: That is correct, that is correct.

5 You see the Respondent's position is that you
6 look at the labor force as the measure of the labor
7 force.

8 QUESTION: Yes, but the issue in this case is
9 the non-cannery positions.

10 MR. FRYER: That is correct.

11 QUESTION: And the court of appeals said to
12 find out if there is a disparate impact, you compare the
13 minorities in the labor force, the entire labor force,
14 with the minorities in the non-cannery positions.

15 MR. FRYER: That is correct.

16 QUESTION: And when, when you say that they
17 should have compared the non-minority people -- the
18 minority people in the non-cannery positions with the
19 labor market composition.

20 MR. FRYER: Yes. With those that were
21 available.

22 QUESTION: Exactly.

23 QUESTION: You explain it very well.

24 QUESTION: Mr. Fryer, what if I think you are
25 both wrong; how does the case come out? I mean what if I

1 check neither of the above?

2 (Laughter)

3 MR. FRYER: You would have to tell me how,
4 some how.

5 QUESTION: well, suppose I think that your
6 description of the appropriate labor market is
7 unrealistic because it takes -- it assumes that you are
8 dealing with people who are employable for a whole year,
9 but it is a very distinctive kind of a character your
10 employer is looking for -- he is looking for somebody
11 who will -- needs work during the spring and is willing
12 to take a job to go to Alaska just during the spring and
13 not during the rest of the year.

14 Now, suppose I think for that reason that your
15 labor market was not the correct one? But I also think
16 that your opponent's labor market was not the correct
17 one -- do you win because it is their burden to
18 establish a labor market?

19 MR. FRYER: Yes. And further, --

20 QUESTION: I thought you were going to say
21 that.

22 MR. FRYER: And further, of course, if you
23 thought that was the better source, I would respond by
24 saying, that is a finding of fact; and we, we really
25 should leave that kind of decision to the trial court.

1 This trial judge spent a lot of time
2 analyzing this labor market and the various experts, and
3 that is a fact-finding function.

4 Going to the next question -- well, I would
5 like to pause and say one thing about housing and
6 messing, because I do think that, again, there is a lack
7 of clarity on this.

8 The employees in the at issue jobs, more than
9 20 percent of whom were minorities, were housed together
10 and fed together and they worked together, side by
11 side. Now, if it were not for this large number of
12 minorities dispatched by Local 37, a fact over which the
13 employers had no control --

14 QUESTION: In the cannery position?

15 MR. FRYER: In the cannery position, nobody
16 would criticize the employer's practices regarding
17 housing and messing for the at-issue jobs.

18 QUESTION: Or with the housing and messing of
19 the cannery positions?

20 MR. FRYER: Yes, yes. And our position is
21 that how we fill the cannery worker jobs is simply
22 irrelevant to how you are to be judged as to filling the
23 at issue jobs.

24 QUESTION: You have not got much time for your
25 other -- if you are going to argue it at all.

1 MR. FRYER: Well, I better save the rest of
2 mytime for rebuttal.

3 QUESTION: Mr. Arditi?

4 QUESTION: Could I ask first?

5 Do you agree w'ith the United States on the
6 second issue? You -- I guess you can save that.

7 MR. FRYER: Okay.

8 QUESTION: You can tell us on rebuttal, yes.

9 QUESTION: Mr. Arditi?

10 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ABRAHAM A. ARDITI

11 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

12 MR. ARDITI: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice and
13 may it please the Court:

14 This case involves patterns of segregation by
15 race, in jobs, housing and messing at three Alaska
16 salmon canneries, two of which are in remote locations.

17 The work is of a migrant, seasonal nature, and
18 that means, as a practical matter, that the employer
19 provides housing and messing facilities. The
20 segregation, as a result of that fact, completely
21 pervades the lives of employees at the cannery. What
22 you have is, in effect, a company town, where virtually
23 every aspect of the employee's life is dominated, and
24 controlled and set by the employer.

25 QUESTION: What is the number of employees?

1 MR. ARDITI: The total number of
2 employees? There are probably 200 at the cannery in a
3 given year. It varies depending on the fish run and it
4 also depends on the canneries. One cannery, in
5 Ketchikan, hires a lot of employees on an as-needed
6 basis for a day or two at a time. The others don't have
7 that option.

8 The largest department at the cannery is the
9 cannery worker department and that is 37 percent
10 non-white to 70 percent non-white, depending on which
11 cannery we are talking about. Despite this very heavy
12 concentration of non-whites in this, the lowest-paying
13 department, there are five-to-seven -- again, depending
14 on which cannery we are talking about -- departments
15 that are at least 90 percent white and many of those
16 jobs and many of those departments have been 100 percent
17 white for the entire case period concerning -- that this
18 litigation concerns.

19 QUESTION: Your opponent says that that is
20 because the cannery is seasonal, hired on the spot, and
21 that the others aren't.

22 MR. ARDITI: They all hired for seasonal
23 work. I think that Mr. Fryer was saying, and
24 incorrectly I might add, that the concentration of
25 non-whites in the cannery worker jobs is due to dispatch

1 practices of Local 37. There are, for union purposes,
2 two types of cannery workers -- non-resident cannery
3 workers who reside in the lower 48; and resident cannery
4 workers who reside in Alaska during the rest of the year.

5 First of all, Local 37 represents only the
6 non-cannery -- non-resident cannery workers. Even the
7 hiring for the resident cannery workers, where there is
8 no Local 37 involvement, is very heavily non-white. In
9 fact, of the five canneries that this case initially
10 covered, the most heavily non-white cannery was Ekuk,
11 which hires only resident cannery workers.

12 QUESTION: Well, the residents of Ekuk, how
13 are they broken up by minority status?

14 MR. ARDITI: How are they broken up?

15 QUESTION: Yes.

16 MR. ARDITI: The primary minority group at
17 Ekuk is Alaskan native. And the cannery workers are
18 almost all Alaskan native.

19 QUESTION: Well, that seems reasonable to me.
20 I don't understand why that is a criticism of the fact
21 that -- you say you can't attribute the high minority in
22 the cannery workers to the fact that the union sends
23 mainly Filipinos, I gather.

24 MR. ARDITI: Right.

25 QUESTION: Because a lot of the people are

1 hired locally, but then you tell me that the people
2 available to be hired locally are also minority
3 people, not Filipinos, but Alaskan natives.

4 MR. ARDITI: That is correct. That is
5 correct. We are saying --

6 QUESTION: But why is that good for you? I
7 think that is bad for you.

8 MR. ARDITI: Why is that good?

9 QUESTION: I mean it seems to me that this
10 employer is doing what a reasonable employer would do --
11 he hires who is available to be hired.

12 MR. ARDITI: The difference, Your Honor, is
13 that this employer hires, in cannery worker jobs,
14 virtually all non-whites and has other departments that
15 pay more, substantially more, sometimes three or four
16 times more than cannery worker jobs, that are almost all
17 white.

18 The problem is that --

19 QUESTION: Are there such skilled people
20 available in Ekuk or these other towns? Are there
21 carpenters and so forth?

22 MR. ARDITI: There are, absolutely. The
23 recruitment of Alaska cannery workers, the Alaska
24 natives, comes primarily in coastal villages. And the
25 cannery workers -- I am sorry, the residents of those

1 coastal villages grow up around the water. They have an
2 enormous amount of fishing and boating experience
3 that would imminently qualify them for even the most
4 difficult fishing jobs at the cannery and tender jobs.
5 And the tender is the vessel that brings the fish in
6 from the fishing boat to the cannery docks.

7 So there is really no question about the
8 availability of skilled personnel.

9 QUESTION: well, does the plaintiff have the
10 burden of establishing the appropriate labor market from
11 which the employer must do the hiring for the jobs at
12 issue?

13 MR. ARDITI: No.

14 QUESTION: who has that burden?

15 MR. ARDITI: First of all, if I can, I would
16 like to try to explain how I am going to use these terms.

17 Labor market is the area from which people are
18 hired.

19 QUESTION: Yes.

20 MR. ARDITI: Okay. The labor force is a
21 combination of those hired and those available to be
22 hired, and the work force is those hired.

23 QUESTION: Yes, and the district court
24 accepted as the relevant labor market, the whole Pacific
25 Northwest, using Census data figures?

1 MR. ARDITI: Right, and we contend that that
2 finding was induced by three errors of law, and, as
3 a result, is clearly erroneous.

4 We also contend that one need not make a labor
5 force or a labor market finding because the wording of
6 this statute here, prohibits job segregation on its face.

7 And Section 703(a)(2) just simply says that it
8 will be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
9 to classify, limit, or segregate employees in a way that
10 denies them opportunities on the basis of race.

11 QUESTION: Well, you may have a separate
12 status claim under that section for housing, or feeding,
13 or something, but we are talking about hiring,
14 primarily, aren't we?

15 MR. ARDITI: Yes, we are.

16 QUESTION: Hiring in certain higher paying
17 jobs?

18 MR. ARDITI: Right.

19 QUESTION: That is what is at issue?

20 MR. ARDITI: Right.

21 QUESTION: And to decide that, you think we
22 don't -- that the Court doesn't have to establish a
23 relevant labor market to look at the figures?

24 MR. ARDITI: Not in all instances.

25 First of all, we are dealing with --

1 QUESTION: Well, doesn't the Court have to do
2 it here for the hiring problem?

3 MR. ARDITI: No. I think that the Court can
4 look just to the Internal statistics in a case like this.

5 QUESTION: Look just at the cannery worker and
6 other worker pool and nothing else?

7 MR. ARDITI: Yes. The Court can do that in
8 this case.

9 I would like to emphasize --

10 QUESTION: Well, why is that appropriate, if,
11 in fact, the employer hires from a broader area and
12 says, the market, in fact, is from a broader area?

13 MR. ARDITI: Perhaps I misspoke, when I said
14 that it can confine its examination, I meant to the work
15 force -- namely those hired, rather than those around
16 the cannery.

17 And it is permissible to do that simply
18 because that is what the wording of the statute.

19 QUESTION: I don't see that Mr. Arditi. It
20 seems to me that you are reading out the last part of
21 the statute. You are saying that if you simply
22 segregate in a way which would deprive or tend to
23 deprive an individual of employment opportunities, that
24 that's -- that that's enough.

25 It seems to me, you have to limit, segregate,

1 or classify because of such individual's race, color, or
2 religion, sex or national origin?

3 MR. ARDITI: Yes, I would like to explain what
4 I understand that phrase to mean. The phrase, because
5 of such individual's race, sex or national origin
6 appears both in Section 703(a)(1) and Section
7 703(a)(2). All that phrase does is introduce the
8 prohibited bases for discrimination.

9 In other words, Title VII prohibits
10 discrimination on the basis of race, but not age, and
11 not handicap.

12 QUESTION: Right.

13 MR. ARDITI: If it meant something more, then
14 we would have a situation where the phrase, because of
15 which might suggest intentional discrimination, means
16 something, in fact, different in those two sections.

17 QUESTION: No, but still in all, to establish
18 that the classification has been because of the race,
19 color, religion, sex, or national origin, you have to
20 get to labor market. Because the mere fact that these
21 people turned out to be segregated in jobs in this
22 fashion doesn't mean anything. It doesn't prove that
23 they are segregated there because of race, color,
24 religion, sex, or national origin, unless you can show
25 by a statistical showing, compared to the labor market

1 that this would be very unlikely to happen otherwise.

2 MR. ARDITI: Perhaps I could emphasize the fact
3 that this is a very unique industry. We are fortunate
4 in this case to have statistics that go all the way back
5 to 1906 on the racial composition of people in the
6 industry.

7 From 1906, all the way through 1978, the
8 composition of those employed in the industry was far
9 more heavily non-white than the racial composition of
10 individuals in the labor market.

11 When we start with a labor market analysis and
12 look at the racial composition of people in areas from
13 which the employer hires, we do so, at least as
14 Teamsters explains to us, because over time we expect
15 the work force, absent discrimination to reflect the
16 racial composition of the labor market.

17 We don't have a situation like this here
18 because we know that historically that has never been
19 true. And, in fact, it is true in a number of migrant,
20 seasonal industries that those employed in the industry
21 are far more heavily non-white than those in the areas
22 from which people or workers are drawn.

23 QUESTION: Couldn't have anything to do with
24 better transportation now, than was the case in 1905?
25 Or the fact that there are many more whites in Alaska

1 now than there were in 1905?

2 I find --

3 MR. ARDITI: I think that it has very little
4 to do with that. Then, as now, people were transported
5 from the lower 48. If transportation were an issue,
6 then you would have expected some change in the hiring
7 patterns and there really hasn't been a change in the
8 hiring patterns, at least as far as the number or
9 percent of non-whites in the industry as a whole.

10 So, it is an unusual situation. It is not a
11 situation that crops up in the kind of cases that the
12 courts are accustomed to dealing with -- namely those
13 that involve full-year employment at a fixed location.

14 QUESTION: Maybe minorities were unduly
15 favored in prior times. There was no law against that.
16 Maybe they worked for less. Maybe there was no
17 unionization, so that the -- so that the fisheries found
18 that they could hire minorities cheaper.

19 MR. ARDITI: Well, no doubt that they found
20 that they did. A high percentage of non-whites in the
21 industry has persisted from the time before unions were
22 formed, through today, when we now have unions.

23 The fact is that those minorities are in the
24 industry and it is simply not fair, nor does it comport
25 with Title VII, to say that they can, on this long-term

1 basis, be confined to the low-paying, menial jobs.

2 QUESTION: Mr. Arditi, what if we disagree with
3 the Ninth Circuit's look at just the labor force of this
4 employer as the source of the employees, perspective?

5 What if we disagree and we think that that was
6 an error as a matter of law?

7 MR. ARDITI: It would be possible for the
8 Court to vacate the finding and remand for additional
9 findings in light of the five factors mentioned in
10 Hazelwood, which the district court here, did not
11 consider.

12 QUESTION: And Hazelwood does contemplate the
13 location of a market from which employees can be drawn?

14 MR. ARDITI: Yes, it does.

15 Another alternative for the Court is to ask
16 the district court to reexamine the expert testimony
17 that we offered on labor supply that is, we believe,
18 better tailored to this industry. And that look not at
19 the geographical areas, but at the historical percentage
20 through to the present of non-whites in the industry as
21 a whole, rather than --

22 QUESTION: The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
23 studies?

24 MR. ARDITI: Yes.

25 QUESTION: That ended in 1955?

1 MR. ARDITI: It ended in '55, and then for
2 the later years, we offered statistics on a sample of
3 those employed in the industry through 1978. It
4 comprised about 50 percent of those in the industry, and
5 the statistics showed the same percentage of non-whites.

6 QUESTION: As long as I have you interrupted

7 --

8 MR. ARDITI: Sure.

9 QUESTION: This was presented mostly as a
10 hiring claim, wasn't it?

11 MR. ARDITI: Hiring and promotion. It is hard
12 to draw the line in a seasonal industry.

13 QUESTION: Well, what do we do with these
14 housing and feeding allegations? They were tried below
15 under the disparate treatment theory and you lost.

16 MR. ARDITI: They were tried under both --

17 QUESTION: Now, are they presented and were
18 they presented as separate status claims of some kind?

19 MR. ARDITI: Yes.

20 QUESTION: So, regardless of hiring?

21 MR. ARDITI: Yes.

22 QUESTION: You still pursue those as status
23 claims?

24 MR. ARDITI: Absolutely and fringe benefit
25 claims.

1 QUESTION: On, on the labor market question.
2 Number 90 of the Supreme Court's findings,
3 concludes with the sentence, "It is not a reasonable
4 business practice to scour such sparsely populated,
5 remote regions for skilled and experienced workers."

6 Are you saying that that is clearly erroneous?

7 MR. ARDITI: Well, I would say that, but I
8 don't think I have to. I think I can also just simply
9 say that that is not a business necessity finding.

10 QUESTION: well, but you don't get to business
11 necessity until you get to the relevant market and isn't
12 this the trial court's finding of fact that bears on the
13 relevant market?

14 MR. ARDITI: No, I don't think so, Your Honor.
15 First of all, there are many of --

16 QUESTION: He did not make that finding for
17 that purpose?

18 MR. ARDITI: I am not sure what purpose he
19 made it for. I think he made it as a rebuttal to our
20 prima facie case of treatment, namely that that was a
21 non-discriminatory explanation, rather than a business
22 necessity finding.

23 QUESTION: Well, that whole finding, that
24 whole series of findings, plus this one specifically, is
25 directed at describing the general labor force, by which

1 he means the general labor market.

2 MR. ARDITI: That -- that may be. That is not
3 how I understood it. That is not how I understood the
4 reason that the employers were offering that testimony
5 at trial.

6 QUESTION: But there is ample evidence to
7 support that finding, is there not?

8 MR. ARDITI: No, there is no finding at all
9 about the skill level of people in these villages,
10 except the fact that many of them do have ample boating
11 and fishing experience.

12 Beyond that, we are not asking the employers
13 to --

14 QUESTION: Did you challenge that finding in
15 the Ninth Circuit?

16 MR. ARDITI: I am sure we did. It is not a
17 business necessity finding. It does not say --

18 QUESTION: Well, then it must be a market --
19 relevant market finding.

20 MR. ARDITI: Well, the reason that I say it is
21 not a business necessity finding is that the district
22 court never reached the issue of separate hiring
23 channels on disparate impact grounds.

24 And, as a result of that, the district --
25 district court never made findings on whether or not

1 there was a business necessity.

2 To get back to that finding -- first of
3 all, there are a number of jobs that are at issue --

4 QUESTION: well, are you now claiming that
5 this finding is clearly erroneous?

6 Are you arguing that to us?

7 MR. ARDITI: well, what I am arguing to the
8 Court is that it is not a finding that is couched in
9 business necessity.

10 QUESTION: well, I asked you if you are now
11 arguing to us that that finding is clearly erroneous?

12 That is a question that can be answered yes or
13 no.

14 MR. ARDITI: Yes. I would say that there is
15 no, no support for it.

16 QUESTION: You are arguing that to us?

17 MR. ARDITI: well, Your Honor, what I would
18 like to do is perhaps try to explain the fact that there
19 are many at-issue jobs, upper-level jobs that even the
20 district court found were unskilled, and so, we are not
21 dealing in all cases with scouring a remote area.

22 QUESTION: How many at-issue jobs are you
23 talking about?

24 MR. ARDITI: That were unskilled?

25 QUESTION: No, no, just how, how many at issue

1 Jobs -- how many non-cannery workers are there in one of
2 these canneries?

3 MR. ARDITI: I would say there are
4 approximately 30 at-issue job titles. If you would like
5 the number of individuals in those jobs, I can tell you.

6 QUESTION: Well, are there as many non-cannery
7 workers as cannery workers?

8 MR. ARDITI: No.

9 QUESTION: Maybe half or what? Vaguely, just
10 vaguely.

11 MR. ARDITI: Roughly, yes.

12 QUESTION: All right.

13 MR. ARDITI: Beyond that, we are not asking
14 that the employers be required to scour these areas.
15 They are talking to these people already about hiring
16 them for lower-paying jobs. They can easily say, this
17 is the procedure for also seeking an upper-level job.
18 There is no reason, no practical reason why they have to
19 limit the options of these individuals only to the
20 low-paying, menial jobs.

21 Finally, of course, that finding really does
22 not explain, in any way, the refusal to consider, given
23 the separate hiring channels, many of the people from
24 the lower 48, particularly the Filipino class members,
25 for upper-level jobs.

1 QUESTION: Well, I thought that the findings
2 of the district court showed that upon application at the
3 proper time, that the employer did consider and receive
4 and hire people who had been cannery workers?

5 MR. ARDITI: I don't think the district court
6 made a specific finding on considering and hiring
7 cannery workers. On making an application --

8 QUESTION: I thought its findings covered
9 that, for instance, Mr. Antonio, himself.

10 MR. ARDITI: Mr. Antonio made several
11 applications. Toward the end --

12 QUESTION: And he was hired?

13 MR. ARDITI: Only about five or six years
14 after his first application for an upper-level job. He
15 made several applications, several requests.

16 QUESTION: Well, and I thought that the
17 district court found that some of those were submitted
18 at the wrong time, or not actually submitted, or one
19 thing or another?

20 MR. ARDITI: That is right and the court of
21 appeals vacated that finding because the court of
22 appeals began with the proposition or found, from the
23 record, that the way in which whites and non-whites were
24 hired was, itself, discriminatory. And that while
25 whites were being recruited by word-of-mouth for many of

1 these upper level jobs, without necessity for an
2 application, given that, there was no need
3 or justification to require cannery workers to make
4 applications.

5 QUESTION: What business did the court of
6 appeals have making factual findings of its own, in this
7 case.

8 MR. ARDITI: I don't think that the court of
9 appeals did that.

10 QUESTION: I thought that what you referred
11 to, you said that the Court of Appeals found such and
12 such.

13 MR. ARDITI: If I did, I misspoke.

14 I think the court of appeals set aside a legal
15 error of the district court and said that its findings
16 on applications and what constituted a proper
17 application had to be reconsidered in light of its own
18 legal rulings.

19 QUESTION: But the court of appeals did not
20 make its own finding, then?

21 MR. ARDITI: No, and if I said that they did,
22 then I misspoke.

23 I would like, if I can, to try to explain the
24 mechanics, to some degree, of how the separate hiring
25 channels work.

1 Non-whites are recruited from largely
2 non-white sources, such as Alaskan native villages,
3 and through foremen of Asian descent, and at Local 37,
4 which is a union with a large Filipino membership. It
5 is undisputed that those who hire for the low-paying,
6 menial jobs, that these primarily non-white sources have
7 no authority to discuss, in any way, shape or form, the
8 possibility of employment in another upper-level job
9 with potential candidates.

10 We have talked a little bit about the fact
11 that there are Alaskan natives recruited from coastal
12 villages who, at least would appear to have significant
13 skills, for the tender and the fishing jobs, that they
14 are excluded.

15 At the same time, we have whites, often who
16 are related to people in management, who are as young as
17 14 years old, 15 years old, 16 years old and so on, who
18 are employed in the upper-level jobs, the better-paying
19 jobs.

20 Mr. Fryer discussed at length the effect of
21 Local 37 on hiring -- the effect of Local 37 on the
22 labor market and on hiring here.

23 We would ask simply that the Court read the
24 provisions of the Local 37 agreement, because the Local
25 37 agreement vests management with full authority to

1 hire.

2 There are three preferences and the preferences
3 are the only provisions in the labor contract that
4 address hiring.

5 The third preference, which is the last
6 preference, goes to those individuals who are acceptable
7 to management. The other two preferences simply
8 perpetuate the past management choices, by saying that
9 individuals who worked at the same cannery are entitled
10 to first preference on a rehired basis; individuals who
11 worked for the same company at another cannery are
12 entitled to second preference on a rehired basis.

13 QUESTION: Excuse me, Mr. Arditi?

14 MR. ARDITI: Sure.

15 QUESTION: Can I ask you about this nepotism
16 thing?

17 Do you agree that it is ultimately the
18 plaintiff's burden to show that the reason for the
19 impact is racial -- that it is because of one of the
20 forbidden discriminatory factors?

21 Even if you do it by beginning with an impact,
22 the ultimate thing that you have to persuade the finder
23 of fact of is his racial bias, in this case.

24 MR. ARDITI: We have to persuade the fact
25 finder that there is a disparate impact on the basis of

1 race, yes.

2 QUESTION: well, but the reason for
3 the disparate impact is racial bias, not that you just
4 have --

5 MR. ARDITI: The reason I am having trouble
6 with that, Your Honor, is that racial bias suggests
7 discriminatory intent. And certainly there is no
8 requirement of discriminatory intent in an impact case.

9 QUESTION: well, that is how I take the
10 language "because of such individual's race, color,
11 religion, sex, or national origin."

12 MR. ARDITI: well, the Court would have to
13 overrule a long line of very explicit holdings of this
14 Court in order to reach the result that intent is
15 required in a disparate impact violation.

16 QUESTION: well, as far as maybe burden of
17 production is concerned, but I am talking about ultimate
18 burden of proof.

19 MR. ARDITI: I would have to disagree with the
20 Court on that.

21 QUESTION: Then it is a violation of the law
22 if I run a small company and I hire my own relatives, if
23 that produces, if that produces a work force less than
24 -- that is not divided racially the way the labor market
25 is?

1 MR. ARDITI: As for the size of the business,
2 first of all, Title VII exempts very small businesses,
3 and --

4 QUESTION: But this is a big business and I
5 have a lot of relatives.

6 MR. ARDITI: Okay.

7 QUESTION: If, and I say to my supervisors,
8 look I want this to be a family kind of operation, you
9 hire your relatives, too. And it is not, you know, I
10 have no racial bias at all, I just want a family kind of
11 a place, and that would be a violation of law, then?

12 MR. ARDITI: If the practice has a disparate
13 impact and it cannot be justified by business necessity,
14 then it is a violation of the law, yes.

15 Going further to the issue of Local 37
16 involvement in the hiring process, again, I would ask
17 the Court to note the fact that the collective
18 bargaining agreement does not provide for a hiring
19 hall. This is not the situation that we often see in
20 the construction industry. It is a situation in which
21 the collective bargaining agreement reserves to
22 management full hiring discretion and authority and
23 management, even if it gets a referral, has every right
24 on earth to simply reject that referral.

25 I would like to address Mr. Fryer's comment

1 that the district court found that there was no
2 deterrence. In fact, the district court made
3 contradictory findings on that. When the district
4 court discussed individual instances of discrimination,
5 made express findings that particular individuals did
6 not seek upper-level jobs because of the segregation in
7 jobs, messing and housing.

8 Also on the question of whether there were, in
9 fact, 24 percent non-whites in the at issue jobs, I
10 don't believe that a reading of even the employer
11 statistics bears that out.

12 What the employer did was include some jobs
13 that are not at-issue, such as, laborer jobs, and I
14 would refer the Court to our Appendices A and B, in
15 which we set out both our own statistics on a
16 department-by-department basis and the employer's
17 statistics on a department-by-department basis. And
18 they show a high degree of racial segregation.

19 Because of the wide geographical area from
20 which people are hired, and because of what appears to
21 be a prevalence of favoritism, particularly in the
22 nepotism area, it is often unrealistic to expect a
23 non-white from one remote area, such as Wapata,
24 Washington, or Bristol Bay, Alaska, to make contact with
25 the tender captain, whose recommendation is the most

1 influential, or the machinist foreman, who, as a
2 practical matter, may make the hiring decisions.

3 Given the far-flung labor market area,
4 from which the employer hires, the effect of the separate
5 hiring channels is really aggravated to an extreme. By
6 the time that the cannery workers arrive at the cannery,
7 the upper-level jobs are already filled. The employer
8 articulated in its brief, and at trial, a policy of
9 discouraging transfers from the heavily non-white
10 cannery worker jobs to the upper-level jobs during the
11 season.

12 So cannery workers are locked in. And the
13 employer also, at a time when the cannery workers have
14 the easiest access to the employer -- namely while they
15 are at the cannery -- might listen to a request for a
16 better job, but will not consider that an application.

17 Seeing that I am close to the end of my time
18 here, there are a number of practices -- there are seven
19 in all -- that we challenged. They have produced a work
20 force that is racially stratified, and a work force
21 which has jobs which even the employer expressly labels
22 by race.

23 The employer, in its company records, and in
24 conversation among management officials, refer to
25 Filipino jobs, or Filipino cannery worker jobs, to the

1 native crew, to the Filipino bunkhouse, to the white
2 mess house and all of those are amply documented in the
3 record.

4 The phrase that the Court of Appeals used in
5 discussing this practice was that it was pervasive.

6 This is a case of the sort that we would have
7 expected to see more reasonably in the late '60s or the
8 early '70s, at the dawn of Title VII.

9 It is, in fact, a case that was filed in the
10 early '70s, in 1974. The record, we believe, makes a
11 very strong showing of the disparate impact of each of
12 these separate practices.

13 Despite this, the employers never really
14 offered evidence that would constitute, in any way, a
15 business necessity, although there is one finding on
16 business necessity that the district court made and that
17 the court of appeals affirmed.

18 Generally, the employer's evidence was not
19 geared toward making the type of showing that this Court
20 has recognized as justifying a disparate impact.

21 QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Arditi.

22 Mr. Fryer, you have four minutes remaining.

23 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT BY DOUGLAS M. FRYER

24 MR. FRYER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

25 To respond to Justice White's question, we

1 don't go quite as far as the government on point two,
2 Your Honor. And I think that is a somewhat extended
3 discussion and perhaps you can refer to the brief.

4 QUESTION: Do you think that the employer just
5 has the burden of production or a burden of proof?

6 MR. FRYER: You don't have to decide that in
7 this case.

8 QUESTION: I didn't ask you that.

9 MR. FRYER: All right, our position is that it
10 depends on the strengths of the plaintiff's evidence, in
11 a nutshell. And that is the standard we have been
12 applying for civil litigation for probably 200 years --
13 that you weigh the strength of the employer's
14 intermediate burden, depending upon the strength of what
15 the plaintiff has come forward with.

16 QUESTION: And anyway, you think that the
17 Court of Appeals was wrong?

18 MR. FRYER: We certainly do.

19 Well, first of all, they ignored our evidence
20 and they ignored our attacks on the Plaintiff's evidence.

21 QUESTION: But they said that you had to prove
22 what, a business necessity?

23 MR. FRYER: They said that we had to prove
24 business necessity based solely on the Plaintiff's
25 comparative statistics.

1 A couple of things I would like to run over,
2 the respondent's, Mr. Arditi, argued for his labor
3 market theory based upon the history in the industry.
4 That was specifically rejected -- rejected by the trial
5 court in findings of fact.

6 Cannery workers are never locked into any of
7 these jobs; they are free to apply at the end of the
8 season and they have seven months to do so. - And the
9 district court found that they were treated equally and
10 everyone was free to apply.

11 Contrary to Mr. Arditi's statement, the trial
12 court expressly found that he could find no deterrence
13 on this record, although some of those that testified,
14 testified that they felt they were deterred.

15 In summary, I would urge you to consider that
16 this employer, who has hired more than the available
17 percentage of minorities in the at-issue jobs, should
18 not be penalized simply because he has employed even more
19 in another job classification.

20 Further, when you get to the standard of proof
21 here, and what we must examine the employer's practices
22 by, I would urge the Court to look at the practices the
23 employer actually did use, not the practices the
24 Respondents, or the court of appeals, contend he should
25 have used. That is simply speculation.

1 Look at this employer as to how he did, in
2 fact, employ minorities in this industry.

3 Finally, on the multiple practice challenge,
4 which I really didn't address. In a nutshell, our
5 position on that is, if the employees, if the plaintiffs
6 challenge an employer's practices, under the impact
7 analysis by challenging the bottom line of the total
8 effect, of all of the employer's practices; or if they
9 challenge several practices, their burden is still to
10 prove causation.

11 It is implicit here that the plaintiffs could
12 not prove causation; that is why they have got
13 difficulty. That is why they go to the employer and
14 say, okay, Mr. Employer, you explain it. But that is
15 not how we try civil cases. The plaintiff has simply
16 got to prove his case; it is his theory, it is case.

17 Under the discovery standards, the information
18 may be possessed by the employer, but it is
19 equally available to both sides.

20 In conclusion, I would urge that this Court
21 vacate the decision of the court of appeals and remand
22 for entry of judgment in accordance with the trial
23 court's decision.

24 Thank you.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Fryer.

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The case is submitted.

(whereupon, at 2:58 o'clock p.m., the case in
the above-entitled matter was submitted.)

CERTIFICATION

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc., hereby certifies that the attached pages represents an accurate transcription of electronic sound recording of the oral argument before the Supreme Court of The United States in the Matter of:
NO. 87-1387 - WARDS COVE PACKING COMPANY, INC., ET AL., Petitioners V.

FRANK ATONIO, ET AL.

and that these attached pages constitutes the original transcript of the proceedings for the records of the court.

BY JUDY FREILICHER

(REPORTER)